Search results for 'Haecceities' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  10
    Gary Rosenkrantz (1979). Haecceities and Perceptual Identification. Grazer Philosophische Studien 9:107-119.
    Russell maintained that a person can have knowledge about a particular only if he is acquainted with some particular. In a similar vein, Chisholm has argued that a person cannot identify a particular unless he identifies some particular per se. According to Chisholm, a person identifies a particular per se just in casehe has knowledge of its haecceity or individml essence. Chisholni urges us to accept the following controversial claim concerning haecceities: none of us has knowledge of the haecceity (...)
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  2. Paul Teller (1998). Quantum Mechanics and Haecceities. In Elena Castellani (ed.), Interpreting Bodies. Princeton University Press 114--141.
  3.  58
    Richard Brian Davis (2002). Haecceities, Individuation and the Trinity: A Reply to Keith Yandell. Religious Studies 38 (2):201-213.
    In this paper I reply to Keith Yandell's recent charge that Anselmian theists cannot also be Trinitarians. Yandell's case turns on the contention that it is impossible to individuate Trinitarian members, if they exist necessarily. Since the ranks of Anselmian Trinitarians includes the likes of Alvin Plantinga, Robert Adams, and Thomas Flint, Yandell's claim is of considerable interest and import. I argue, by contrast, that Anselmians can appeal to what Plantinga calls an essence or haecceity – a property essentially unique (...)
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  4. Richard Brian Davis (2002). Haecceities, Individuation and the Trinity: A Reply to Keith Yandell. Religious Studies 38 (2).
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  5. Chad Carmichael (2016). Deep Platonism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):307-328.
    According to the traditional bundle theory, particulars are bundles of compresent universals. I think we should reject the bundle theory for a variety of reasons. But I will argue for the thesis at the core of the bundle theory: that all the facts about particulars are grounded in facts about universals. I begin by showing how to meet the main objection to this thesis (which is also the main objection to the bundle theory): that it is inconsistent with the possibility (...)
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  6. Robert Merrihew Adams (1979). Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity. Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):5-26.
  7. David Lewis (1983). Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation. Philosophical Review 92 (1):3-32.
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  8.  96
    Sam Cowling (2015). Non-Qualitative Properties. Erkenntnis 80 (2):275-301.
    The distinction between qualitative properties like mass and shape and non-qualitative properties like being Napoleon and being next to Obama is important, but remains largely unexamined. After discussing its theoretical significance and cataloguing various kinds of non-qualitative properties, I survey several views about the nature of this distinction and argue that all proposed reductive analyses of this distinction are unsatisfactory. I then defend primitivism, according to which the distinction resists reductive analysis.
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  9.  78
    Catherine Legg (2008). Catnesses. In Stephen D. Hales (ed.), What Philosophy Can Tell you About your Cat. Carus
    An introduction to cat metaphysics..........
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  10. John O'Leary-Hawthorne (1995). The Bundle Theory of Substance and the Identity of Indiscernibles. Analysis 55 (3):191 - 196.
    The strongest version of the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles states that of necessity, there are no distinct things with all their universals in common (where such putative haecceities as being Aristotle do not count as universals: I use 'universal' rather than 'property' here and in what follows for the simple reason that 'universal' is the term of art that most safely excludes haecceities from its instances). It is commonly supposed that Max Black's famous paper 'The identity (...)
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  11. Uri Nodelman & Edward N. Zalta (2014). Foundations for Mathematical Structuralism. Mind 123 (489):39-78.
    We investigate the form of mathematical structuralism that acknowledges the existence of structures and their distinctive structural elements. This form of structuralism has been subject to criticisms recently, and our view is that the problems raised are resolved by proper, mathematics-free theoretical foundations. Starting with an axiomatic theory of abstract objects, we identify a mathematical structure as an abstract object encoding the truths of a mathematical theory. From such foundations, we derive consequences that address the main questions and issues that (...)
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  12. Christopher Menzel (1990). Actualism, Ontological Commitment, and Possible World Semantics. Synthese 85 (3):355 - 389.
    Actualism is the doctrine that the only things there are, that have being in any sense, are the things that actually exist. In particular, actualism eschews possibilism, the doctrine that there are merely possible objects. It is widely held that one cannot both be an actualist and at the same time take possible world semantics seriously — that is, take it as the basis for a genuine theory of truth for modal languages, or look to it for insight into the (...)
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  13.  42
    Giuliano Torrengo (2013). The Grounding Problem and Presentist Explanations. Synthese 190 (12):2047-2063.
    Opponents of presentism have often argued that the presentist has difficulty in accounting for what makes true past-tensed propositions true in a way that is compatible with her metaphysical view of time and reality. The problem is quite general and concerns not only strong truth-maker principles, but also the requirement that truth be grounded in reality. In order to meet the challenge, presentists have proposed many peculiar present aspects of the world as grounds for truths concerning the past, such as (...)
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  14. Torrengo Giuliano (forthcoming). The Grounding Problem and Presentist Explanations. Synthese.
    Opponents of presentism have often argued that the presentist has difficulty in accounting for what makes true past-tensed propositions true in a way that is compatible with her metaphysical view of time and reality. The problem is quite general and concerns not only strong truth-maker principles, but also the requirement that truth be grounded in reality. In order to meet the challenge, presentists have proposed many peculiar present aspects of the world as grounds for truths concerning the past, such as (...)
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  15.  37
    Franklin Mason (2006). What is Presentism? Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):107-128.
    Presentism has received much scrutiny of late, yet little has been said of its definition. Many assume that it means simply that all that exists, exists at present. However, this definition will not do. It is defective in a multiplicity of ways. I consider and reject each of a number of intuitive ways in which to amend it. Each carries us a bit closer to our goal, but not until the end do we reach a definition that is wholly satisfactory. (...)
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  16.  20
    Gregg A. Ten Elshof (2000). A Defense of Moderate Haecceitism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 60:55-74.
    The identity of indiscernibles is false. Robert Adams and others have argued that if the identity of indiscernibles is false, then primitive thisness must be admitted as a fundamental feature of the world (i.e. haecceitism is true). Moreover, it has been suggested that if haecceitism is true, then essentialism is false - that accounting for individuation by means of haecceities precludes a thing's having essential qualitative properties. I will argue that this suggestion is misguided. In so doing, I will (...)
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  17.  74
    Mark Moyer, Defending Coincidence: An Explanation of a Sort.
    Can different material objects have the same parts at all times at which they exist? This paper defends the possibility of such coincidence against the main argument to the contrary, the ‘Indiscernibility Argument’. According to this argument, the modal supervenes on the nonmodal, since, after all, the non-modal is what grounds the modal; hence, it would be utterly mysterious if two objects sharing all parts had different essential properties. The weakness of the argument becomes apparent once we understand how the (...)
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  18.  24
    Gary Rosenkrantz (1985). On Objects Totally Out Of This World. Grazer Philosophische Studien 25:197-208.
    The view that a possible world is an existing abstract object implies that all nonexistent possible individuals have a principle of individuation in terms of existing objects, properties, and relations. However, some individuals of this kind are totally out of this world both in the subjective sense that nobody in this world can pick them out, and in the ontological sense that they would neither be created by assembling or arranging existing bits of matter nor otherwise be generated by existing (...)
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  19. Mark Johnston (1984). Particulars and Persistence. Dissertation, Princeton University
    The thesis is concerned with the outline of an ontology which admits only particulars and with the persistence of particulars through time. In Chapter 1 it is argued that a neglected class of particulars--the cases--have to be employed in order to solve the problem of universals, i.e., to give a satisfactory account of properties and kinds. In Chapter 2, two ways in which particulars could persist though time are distinguished. Difficulties are raised for the view that everything perdures through time, (...)
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  20.  3
    Franklin Mason (2006). What is Presentism? Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):107-128.
    Presentism has received much scrutiny of late, yet little has been said of its definition. Many assume that it means simply that all that exists, exists at present. However, this definition will not do. It is defective in a multiplicity of ways. I consider and reject each of a number of intuitive ways in which to amend it. Each carries us a bit closer to our goal, but not until the end do we reach a definition that is wholly satisfactory. (...)
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