Search results for 'INDUCTION' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  5
    Christopher Byrne (2014). The Object of Aristotelian Induction: Formal Cause or Composite Individual? In Louis F. Groarke & Paolo C. Biondi (eds.), Shifting the Paradigm: Alternative Perspectives on Induction. De Gruyter 251-268.
    According to a long interpretative tradition, Aristotle holds that the formal cause is the ultimate object of induction when investigating perceptible substances. For, the job of induction is to find the essential nature common to a set of individuals, and that nature is captured solely by their shared formal cause. Against this view, I argue that Aristotle understands perceptible individuals as irreducibly composite objects whose nature is constituted by both their formal and their material cause. As a result, (...)
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  2. John H. Holland (1986). Induction Processes of Inference, Learning, and Discovery. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
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  3. Colin Howson (2000). Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief. Oxford University Press.
    In the mid-eighteenth century David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth of the predicting theory. But physical theory routinely predicts the values of observable magnitudes within very small ranges of error. The chance of this sort of predictive success without a true theory suggests that Hume's argument is flawed. However, Colin Howson argues that there is no flaw and examines the implications of this disturbing conclusion; he also offers a solution to one of the central (...)
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  4. Moti Mizrahi (2013). The Pessimistic Induction: A Bad Argument Gone Too Far. Synthese 190 (15):3209-3226.
    In this paper, I consider the pessimistic induction construed as a deductive argument (specifically, reductio ad absurdum) and as an inductive argument (specifically, inductive generalization). I argue that both formulations of the pessimistic induction are fallacious. I also consider another possible interpretation of the pessimistic induction, namely, as pointing to counterexamples to the scientific realist’s thesis that success is a reliable mark of (approximate) truth. I argue that this interpretation of the pessimistic induction fails, too. If (...)
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  5. Ruth Weintraub (2013). Induction and Inference to the Best Explanation. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):203-216.
    In this paper I adduce a new argument in support of the claim that IBE is an autonomous form of inference, based on a familiar, yet surprisingly, under-discussed, problem for Hume’s theory of induction. I then use some insights thereby gleaned to argue for the claim that induction is really IBE, and draw some normative conclusions.
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  6.  41
    Marc Gasser-Wingate (2016). Aristotle on Induction and First Principles. Philosophers' Imprint 16 (4).
    Aristotle's cognitive ideal is a form of understanding that requires a sophisticated grasp of scientific first principles. At the end of the Analytics, Aristotle tells us that we learn these principles by induction. But on the whole, commentators have found this an implausible claim: induction seems far too basic a process to yield the sort of knowledge Aristotle's account requires. In this paper I argue that this criticism is misguided. I defend a broader reading of Aristotelian induction, (...)
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  7. Seungbae Park (2011). A Confutation of the Pessimistic Induction. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):75-84.
    The pessimistic induction holds that successful past scientific theories are completely false, so successful current ones are completely false too. I object that past science did not perform as poorly as the pessimistic induction depicts. A close study of the history of science entitles us to construct an optimistic induction that would neutralize the pessimistic induction. Also, even if past theories were completely false, it does not even inductively follow that the current theories will also turn (...)
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  8. Nicholas Maxwell (1993). Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein Versus Van Fraassen Part One: How to Solve the Problem of Induction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):61-79.
    In this three-part paper, my concern is to expound and defend a conception of science, close to Einstein's, which I call aim-oriented empiricism. I argue that aim-oriented empiricsim has the following virtues. (i) It solve the problem of induction; (ii) it provides decisive reasons for rejecting van Fraassen's brilliantly defended but intuitively implausible constructive empiricism; (iii) it solves the problem of verisimilitude, the problem of explicating what it can mean to speak of scientific progress given that science advances from (...)
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  9.  88
    Alexandru Baltag, Sonja Smets & Jonathan Alexander Zvesper (2009). Keep 'Hoping' for Rationality: A Solution to the Backward Induction Paradox. Synthese 169 (2):301 - 333.
    We formalise a notion of dynamic rationality in terms of a logic of conditional beliefs on (doxastic) plausibility models. Similarly to other epistemic statements (e.g. negations of Moore sentences and of Muddy Children announcements), dynamic rationality changes its meaning after every act of learning, and it may become true after players learn it is false. Applying this to extensive games, we “simulate” the play of a game as a succession of dynamic updates of the original plausibility model: the epistemic situation (...)
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  10. Brendan Shea (2010). Three Ways of Getting It Wrong: Induction in Wonderland. In Richard Brian Davis (ed.), Alice in Wonderland and Philosophy: Curiouser and Curiouser. Wiley Blackwell 93-107.
    Alice encounters at least three distinct problems in her struggles to understand and navigate Wonderland. The first arises when she attempts to predict what will happen in Wonderland based on what she has experienced outside of Wonderland. In many cases, this proves difficult -- she fails to predict that babies might turn into pigs, that a grin could survive without a cat or that playing cards could hold criminal trials. Alice's second problem involves her efforts to figure out the basic (...)
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  11. Benjamin Smart (2013). Is the Humean Defeated by Induction? Philosophical Studies 162 (2):319-332.
    Many necessitarians about cause and law (Armstrong 1983; Mumford 2004; Bird 2007) have argued that Humeans are unable to justify their inductive inferences, as Humean laws are nothing but the sum of their instances. In this paper I argue against these necessitarian claims. I show that Armstrong is committed to the explanatory value of Humean laws (in the form of universally quantified statements), and that contra Armstrong, brute regularities often do have genuine explanatory value. I finish with a Humean attempt (...)
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  12.  56
    John Foster (2004). The Divine Lawmaker: Lectures on Induction, Laws of Nature, and the Existence of God. Oxford University Press.
    John Foster presents a clear and powerful discussion of a range of topics relating to our understanding of the universe: induction, laws of nature, and the existence of God. He begins by developing a solution to the problem of induction - a solution whose key idea is that the regularities in the workings of nature that have held in our experience hitherto are to be explained by appeal to the controlling influence of laws, as forms of natural necessity. (...)
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  13. John D. Norton (2013). A Material Dissolution of the Problem of Induction. Synthese 191 (4):1-20.
    In a formal theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by universal schemas. In a material theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by facts. With this change in the conception of the nature of induction, I argue that the celebrated “problem of induction” can no longer be set up and is thereby dissolved. Attempts to recreate the problem in the material theory of induction fail. They require relations of inductive support to conform to an (...)
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  14. Robert Kowalenko (2012). Reply to Israel on the New Riddle of Induction. Philosophia 40 (3):549-552.
    Israel 2004 claims that numerous philosophers have misinterpreted Goodman’s original ‘New Riddle of Induction’, and weakened it in the process, because they do not define ‘grue’ as referring to past observations. Both claims are false: Goodman clearly took the riddle to concern the maximally general problem of “projecting” any type of characteristic from a given realm of objects into another, and since this problem subsumes Israel’s, Goodman formulated a stronger philosophical challenge than the latter surmises.
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  15.  87
    Seungbae Park (2014). A Pessimistic Induction Against Scientific Antirealism. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 21 (1):3-21.
    There are nine antirealist explanations of the success of science in the literature. I raise difficulties against all of them except the latest one, and then construct a pessimistic induction that the latest one will turn out to be problematic because its eight forerunners turned out to be problematic. This pessimistic induction is on a par with the traditional pessimistic induction that successful present scientific theories will be revealed to be false because successful past scientific theories were (...)
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  16.  14
    Wolfgang Pietsch (2014). The Structure of Causal Evidence Based on Eliminative Induction. Topoi 33 (2):421-435.
    It is argued that in deterministic contexts evidence for causal relations states whether a boundary condition makes a difference or not to a phenomenon. In order to substantiate the analysis, I show that this difference/indifference making is the basic type of evidence required for eliminative induction in the tradition of Francis Bacon and John Stuart Mill. To this purpose, an account of eliminative induction is proposed with two distinguishing features: it includes a method to establish the causal irrelevance (...)
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  17.  36
    M. J. Hill, J. B. Paris & G. M. Wilmers (2002). Some Observations on Induction in Predicate Probabilistic Reasoning. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):43-75.
    We consider the desirability, or otherwise, of various forms of induction in the light of certain principles and inductive methods within predicate uncertain reasoning. Our general conclusion is that there remain conflicts within the area whose resolution will require a deeper understanding of the fundamental relationship between individuals and properties.
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  18. Louis E. Loeb (2006). Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume's Argument About Induction. Synthese 152 (3):321 - 338.
    Since the mid-1970s, scholars have recognized that the skeptical interpretation of Hume’s central argument about induction is problematic. The science of human nature presupposes that inductive inference is justified and there are endorsements of induction throughout Treatise Book I. The recent suggestion that I.iii.6 is confined to the psychology of inductive inference cannot account for the epistemic flavor of its claims that neither a genuine demonstration nor a non-question-begging inductive argument can establish the uniformity principle. For Hume, that (...)
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  19.  27
    Kevin R. Busch (2015). Reason, Induction, and the Humean Objection to Kant. Kant Yearbook 7 (1):23-45.
    While Kant does not address the problem of induction often attributed to Hume, he does, by way of a transcendental deduction of an a priori principle of reflecting empirical judgment, address a distinct problem Hume raises indirectly. This problem is that induction cannot be justified so long as it presupposes some empirical concept applying to or some empirical principle true of more than one object in nature, a presupposition neither determined by nor founded on reason. I draw on (...)
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  20.  16
    Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo (2015). Induction, Reliability and Predicates of Type Grue. Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (1):33-47.
    Collin Howson (2000) challenges van Cleve’s reliabilist defense of induction (1984) based on an adaptation of Goodman Paradox (or new riddle of induction). I will try to show that Howson’s argument does not succeed once it is self-defeating. Nevertheless, I point out another way which Howson could have employed the new riddle to undermine the reliabilist defense.
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  21. F. Thomas Burke (2002). Qualities, Universals, Kinds, and the New Riddle of Induction. In F. Thomas Burke, D. Micah Hester & Robert B. Talisse (eds.), Dewey's Logical Theory: New Studies and Interpretations. Vanderbilt University Press
    The limited aim here is to explain what John Dewey might say about the formulation of the grue example. Nelson Goodman’s problem of distinguishing good and bad inductive inferences is an important one, but the grue example misconstrues this complex problem for certain technical reasons, due to ambiguities that contemporary logical theory has not yet come to terms with. Goodman’s problem is a problem for the theory of induction and thus for logical theory in general. Behind the whole discussion (...)
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  22.  22
    Thomas L. Griffiths, David M. Sobel, Joshua B. Tenenbaum & Alison Gopnik (2011). Bayes and Blickets: Effects of Knowledge on Causal Induction in Children and Adults. Cognitive Science 35 (8):1407-1455.
    People are adept at inferring novel causal relations, even from only a few observations. Prior knowledge about the probability of encountering causal relations of various types and the nature of the mechanisms relating causes and effects plays a crucial role in these inferences. We test a formal account of how this knowledge can be used and acquired, based on analyzing causal induction as Bayesian inference. Five studies explored the predictions of this account with adults and 4-year-olds, using tasks in (...)
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  23. Ruth Weintraub (1995). What Was Hume's Contribution to the Problem of Induction? Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):460-470.
    There are very few philosophical issues which are so intimately associated with one single philosopher as is the problem of induction with Hume. This paper argues against this received opinion. It shows that Hume was neither the first to think induction problematic, nor the originator of the argument he adduced in support of the (sceptical) position. It then explains his (more modest) contribution. Its primary concern, however, is not historical. By considering Hume’s contribution to the problem of (...), it is argued, we can come to a better understanding of this recalcitrant problem. (shrink)
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  24. Nicholas Maxwell (2005). A Mug's Game? Solving the Problem of Induction with Metaphysical Presuppositions. In John Earman & John Norton (eds.), PhilSci Archive.
    A Mug's Game? Solving the Problem of Induction with Metaphysical Presuppositions Nicholas Maxwell Emeritus Reader in Philosophy of Science at University College London Email: nicholas.maxwell@ucl.ac.uk Website: www.ucl.ac.uk/from-knowledge-to-wisdom . Abstract This paper argues that a view of science, expounded and defended elsewhere, solves the problem of induction. The view holds that we need to see science as accepting a hierarchy of metaphysical theses concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, these theses asserting less and less as we go (...)
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  25.  89
    Xinli Wang (2001). Hume Is Not A Skeptic About Induction. Dialogos 36 (78):41-54.
    On the basis of the distinction between logical and factual probability, epistemic justification is distinguished from logical justification of induction. It is argued that, contrary to the accepted interpretation of Hume, Hume believes that inductive inferences are epistemically legitimate and justifiable. Hence the beliefs arrived at via (correct) inductive inferences are rational beliefs. According to this interpretation, Hume is not a radical skeptic about induction.
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  26.  46
    Hsueh Qu (2014). Hume's Positive Argument on Induction. Noûs 48 (4):595-625.
    Discussion on whether Hume's treatment of induction is descriptive or normative has usually centred on Hume's negative argument, somewhat neglecting the positive argument. In this paper, I will buck this trend, focusing on the positive argument. First, I argue that Hume's positive and negative arguments should be read as addressing the same issues . I then argue that Hume's positive argument in the Enquiry is normative in nature; drawing on his discussion of scepticism in Section 12 of the Enquiry, (...)
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  27.  7
    Eduardo Castro (2016). Is the Humean Defeated by Induction? A Reply to Smart. Philosophia 44 (2):435-446.
    This paper is a reply to Benjamin Smart’s : 319–332, 2013) recent objections to David Armstrong’s solution to the problem of induction : 503–511, 1991). To solve the problem of induction, Armstrong contends that laws of nature are the best explanation of our observed regularities, where laws of nature are dyadic relations of necessitation holding between first-order universals. Smart raises three objections against Armstrong’s pattern of inference. First, regularities can explain our observed regularities; that is, universally quantified conditionals (...)
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  28.  17
    Richard Dawid (2015). Turning Norton’s Dome Against Material Induction. Foundations of Physics 45 (9):1101-1109.
    John Norton has proposed a position of “material induction” that denies the existence of a universal inductive inference schema behind scientific reasoning. In this vein, Norton has recently presented a “dome scenario” based on Newtonian physics that, in his understanding, is at variance with Bayesianism. The present note points out that a closer analysis of the dome scenario reveals incompatibilities with material inductivism itself.
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  29.  80
    D. C. Stove (1986). The Rationality of Induction. Oxford University Press.
    Writing on the justification of certain inductive inferences, the author proposes that sometimes induction is justified and that arguments to prove otherwise are not cogent. In the first part he examines the problem of justifying induction, looks at some attempts to prove that it is justified, and responds to criticisms of these proofs. In the second part he deals with such topics as formal logic, deductive logic, the theory of logical probability, and probability and truth.
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  30.  23
    Alexander Paseau (2011). Proving Induction. Australasian Journal of Logic 9:1-17.
    The hard problem of induction is to argue without begging the question that inductive inference, applied properly in the proper circumstances, is conducive to truth. A recent theorem seems to show that the hard problem has a deductive solution. The theorem, provable in zfc, states that a predictive function M exists with the following property: whatever world we live in, M correctly predicts the world’s present state given its previous states at all times apart from a well-ordered subset. On (...)
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  31.  19
    Gal Yehezkel (2016). The New Riddle of Induction and the New Riddle of Deduction. Acta Analytica 31 (1):31-41.
    Many believe that Goodman’s new riddle of induction proves the impossibility of a purely syntactical theory of confirmation. After discussing and rejecting Jackson’s solution to Goodman’s paradox, I formulate the “new riddle of deduction,” in analogy to the new riddle of induction. Since it is generally agreed that deductive validity can be defined syntactically, the new riddle of induction equally does not show that inductive validity cannot be defined syntactically. I further rely on the analogy between (...) and deduction in order to explain why some predicates, such as “grue,” are unprojectible. (shrink)
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  32. Jared Bates (2005). The Old Problem of Induction and the New Reflective Equilibrium. Dialectica 59 (3):347–356.
    In 1955, Goodman set out to 'dissolve' the problem of induction, that is, to argue that the old problem of induction is a mere pseudoproblem not worthy of serious philosophical attention. I will argue that, under naturalistic views of the reflective equilibrium method, it cannot provide a basis for a dissolution of the problem of induction. This is because naturalized reflective equilibrium is -- in a way to be explained -- itself an inductive method, and thus renders (...)
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  33. Greg Bamford (1989). Watkins and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction. Analysis 49 (4):203 - 205..
    Watkins proposes a neo-Popperian solution to the pragmatic problem of induction. He asserts that evidence can be used non-Inductively to prefer the principle that corroboration is more successful over all human history than that, Say, Counter-Corroboration is more successful either over this same period or in the future. Watkins's argument for rejecting the first counter-Corroborationist alternative is beside the point, However, As whatever is the best strategy over all human history is irrelevant to the pragmatic problem of induction (...)
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  34.  43
    Alan Padgett (2010). Overcoming the Problem of Induction: Science and Religion as Ways of Knowing. In Science and Religion in Dialogue. Wiley-Blackwell 862--883.
    This chapter contains sections titled: * The Problem of Induction * Reid’s Common-Sense Realism * Tradition and Reason in the Principles of Informal Inference * Back to the Rationality of Religion * Notes * Bibliography.
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  35.  81
    John D. Norton (2011). History of Science and the Material Theory of Induction: Einstein's Quanta, Mercury's Perihelion. [REVIEW] European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):3-27.
    The use of the material theory of induction to vindicate a scientist's claims of evidential warrant is illustrated with the cases of Einstein's thermodynamic argument for light quanta of 1905 and his recovery of the anomalous motion of Mercury from general relativity in 1915. In a survey of other accounts of inductive inference applied to these examples, I show that, if it is to succeed, each account must presume the same material facts as the material theory and, in addition, (...)
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  36.  93
    Howard Sankey (1997). Induction and Natural Kinds. Principia 1 (2):239-254.
    The paper sketches an ontological solution to an epistemological problem in the philosophy of science. Taking the work of Hilary Kornblith and Brian Ellis as a point of departure, it presents a realist solution to the Humean problem of induction, which is based on a scientific essentialist interpretation of the principle of the uniformity of nature. More specifically, it is argued that use of inductive inference in science is rationally justified because of the existence of real, natural kinds of (...)
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  37.  21
    Cassiano Terra Rodrigues (2011). The Method of Scientific Discovery in Peirce's Philosophy: Deduction, Induction, and Abduction. [REVIEW] Logica Universalis 5 (1):127-164.
    In this paper we will show Peirce’s distinction between deduction, induction and abduction. The aim of the paper is to show how Peirce changed his views on the subject, from an understanding of deduction, induction and hypotheses as types of reasoning to understanding them as stages of inquiry very tightly connected. In order to get a better understanding of Peirce’s originality on this, we show Peirce’s distinctions between qualitative and quantitative induction and between theorematical and corollarial deduction, (...)
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  38. Chris Tucker (2009). Evidential Support, Reliability, and Hume's Problem of Induction. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):503-519.
    Necessity holds that, if a proposition A supports another B, then it must support B. John Greco contends that one can resolve Hume's Problem of Induction only if she rejects Necessity in favor of reliabilism. If Greco's contention is correct, we would have good reason to reject Necessity and endorse reliabilism about inferential justification. Unfortunately, Greco's contention is mistaken. I argue that there is a plausible reply to Hume's Problem that both endorses Necessity and is at least as good (...)
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  39.  76
    Daniel Steel (2009). Testability and Ockham's Razor: How Formal and Statistical Learning Theory Converge in the New Riddle of Induction. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):471 - 489.
    Nelson Goodman’s new riddle of induction forcefully illustrates a challenge that must be confronted by any adequate theory of inductive inference: provide some basis for choosing among alternative hypotheses that fit past data but make divergent predictions. One response to this challenge is to distinguish among alternatives by means of some epistemically significant characteristic beyond fit with the data. Statistical learning theory takes this approach by showing how a concept similar to Popper’s notion of degrees of testability is linked (...)
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  40.  20
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (1998). Grappling With the Centipede: Defence of Backward Induction for BI-Terminating Games. Economics and Philosophy 14 (1):95.
    According to a standard objection to the use of backward induction in extensive-form games with perfect information, backward induction can only work if the players are confident that each player is resiliently rational - disposed to act rationally at each possible node that the game can reach, even at the nodes that will certainly never be reached in actual play - and also confident that these beliefs in the players’ future resilient rationality are robust, i.e. that they would (...)
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  41.  21
    G. Aldo Antonelli (2012). A Note on Induction, Abstraction, and Dedekind-Finiteness. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 53 (2):187-192.
    The purpose of this note is to present a simplification of the system of arithmetical axioms given in previous work; specifically, it is shown how the induction principle can in fact be obtained from the remaining axioms, without the need of explicit postulation. The argument might be of more general interest, beyond the specifics of the proposed axiomatization, as it highlights the interaction of the notion of Dedekind-finiteness and the induction principle.
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  42.  99
    Bruno G. Bara & Monica Bucciarelli (2000). Deduction and Induction: Reasoning Through Mental Models. [REVIEW] Mind and Society 1 (1):95-107.
    In this paper we deal with two types of reasoning: induction, and deduction First, we present a unified computational model of deductive reasoning through models, where deduction occurs in five phases: Construction, Integration, Conclusion, Falsification, and Response. Second, we make an attempt, to analyze induction through the same phases. Our aim is an explorative evaluation of the mental processes possibly shared by deductive and inductive reasoning.
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  43. Theodore W. Budlong (1975). Analogy, Induction and Other Minds. Analysis 35 (January):111-112.
    Alvin plantinga and michael slote, Following ayer, Have attempted to formulate the argument from analogy for the existence of other minds as an enumerative induction. Their way of avoiding the 'generalizing from a single case' objection is shown to be fallacious.
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  44.  78
    Conor Mayo-Wilson (2011). The Problem of Piecemeal Induction. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):864-874.
    It is common to assume that the problem of induction arises only because of small sample sizes or unreliable data. In this paper, I argue that the piecemeal collection of data can also lead to underdetermination of theories by evidence, even if arbitrarily large amounts of completely reliable experimental and observational data are collected. Specifically, I focus on the construction of causal theories from the results of many studies (perhaps hundreds), including randomized controlled trials and observational studies, where the (...)
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  45.  31
    Greg Frost-Arnold (2011). From the Pessimistic Induction to Semantic Antirealism. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1131-1142.
    The Pessimistic Induction (PI) states: most past scientific theories were radically mistaken; therefore, current theories are probably similarly mistaken. But mistaken in what way? On the usual understanding, such past theories are false. However, on widely held views about reference and presupposition, many theoretical claims of previous scientific theories are neither true nor false. And if substantial portions of past theories are truth-valueless, then the PI leads to semantic antirealism. But most current philosophers of science reject semantic antirealism. So (...)
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  46.  8
    Ralf Mayrhofer & Michael R. Waldmann (2015). Sufficiency and Necessity Assumptions in Causal Structure Induction. Cognitive Science 40 (4).
    Research on human causal induction has shown that people have general prior assumptions about causal strength and about how causes interact with the background. We propose that these prior assumptions about the parameters of causal systems do not only manifest themselves in estimations of causal strength or the selection of causes but also when deciding between alternative causal structures. In three experiments, we requested subjects to choose which of two observable variables was the cause and which the effect. We (...)
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  47.  53
    K. Brad Wray (2013). The Pessimistic Induction and the Exponential Growth of Science Reassessed. Synthese 190 (18):4321-4330.
    My aim is to evaluate a new realist strategy for addressing the pessimistic induction, Ludwig Fahrbach’s (Synthese 180:139–155, 2011) appeal to the exponential growth of science. Fahrbach aims to show that, given the exponential growth of science, the history of science supports realism. I argue that Fahrbach is mistaken. I aim to show that earlier generations of scientists could construct a similar argument, but one that aims to show that the theories that they accepted are likely true. The problem (...)
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  48.  89
    John Broome & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1999). Backwards Induction in the Centipede Game. Analysis 59 (264):237–242.
    The standard backward-induction reasoning in a game like the centipede assumes that the players maintain a common belief in rationality throughout the game. But that is a dubious assumption. Suppose the first player X didn't terminate the game in the first round; what would the second player Y think then? Since the backwards-induction argument says X should terminate the game, and it is supposed to be a sound argument, Y might be entitled to doubt X's rationality. Alternatively, Y (...)
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  49.  64
    Miguel Hoeltje, Benjamin Schnieder & Alex Steinberg (2013). Explanation by Induction? Synthese 190 (3):509-524.
    Philosophers of mathematics commonly distinguish between explanatory and non-explanatory proofs. An important subclass of mathematical proofs are proofs by induction. Are they explanatory? This paper addresses the question, based on general principles about explanation. First, a recent argument for a negative answer is discussed and rebutted. Second, a case is made for a qualified positive take on the issue.
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    Cheryl A. Logan (2007). Overheated Rats, Race, and the Double Gland: Paul Kammerer, Endocrinology and the Problem of Somatic Induction. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Biology 40 (4):683 - 725.
    In 1920, Eugen Steinach and Paul Kammerer reported experiments showing that exposure to high temperatures altered the structure of the gonad and produced hyper-sexuality in "heat rats," presumably as a result of the increased production of sex hormones. Using Steinach's evidence that the gonad is a double gland with distinct sexual and generative functions, they used their findings to explain "racial" differences in the sexuality of indigenous tropical peoples and Europeans. The authors also reported that heat induced anatomical changes in (...)
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