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Justin Klocksiem [7]Justin Allen Klocksiem [1]
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Profile: Justin Klocksiem (University of Alabama)
  1. Justin Klocksiem (2012). A Defense of the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):285 – 300.
    Although the counterfactual comparative account of harm, according to which someone is harmed when things go worse for her than they otherwise would have, is intuitively plausible, it has recently come under attack. There are five serious objections in the literature: some philosophers argue that the counterfactual account makes it hard to see how we could harm someone in the course of benefitting that person; others argue that Parfit’s non-identity problem is particularly problematic; another objection claims that the account forces (...)
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  2. Justin Klocksiem (2011). Moorean Pluralism as a Solution to the Incommensurability Problem. Philosophical Studies 153 (3):335 – 49.
    Several prominent ethical philosophers have attempted to demonstrate that there exist instances or types of value that are of crucial moral significance but which cannot legitimately be compared with one another. Bernard Williams and Michael Stocker, for example, argue that it can sometimes be rational to regret having chosen the all-things-considered better of two alternatives, and that this sense of regret entails that the goodness of the worse option is not made up for by and is therefore incommensurable with that (...)
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  3. Justin Klocksiem (2011). Perspective-Neutral Intrinsic Value. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):323-337.
    Is it possible to do a good thing, or to make the world a better place? Some argue that it is not possible, because perspective-neutral value does not exist. Some argue that ‘good’ does not play the right grammatical role; or that all good things are good ‘in a way’; or that goodness is inherently perspective-dependent. I argue that the logical and semantic properties of ‘good’ are what we should expect of an evaluative predicate; that the many ways of being (...)
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  4. Justin Klocksiem (2010). Pleasure, Desire, and Oppositeness. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Why is pain the opposite of pleasure? Several theories of pleasure and pain have substantial difficulty explaining this basic feature. Theories according to which pleasure and pain are individual sensations or features of sensations have particular difficulty, since it is difficult to understand how pairs of sensations could be opposites. Some philosophers argue that the pain is the opposite of pleasure because pain and pleasure are fundamentally a matter of desire and aversion, and desire and aversion are clear opposites. I (...)
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  5. Justin Klocksiem (2010). The Amenability of Pleasure and Pain to Aggregation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (3):293 - 303.
    According to several prominent philosophers, pleasure and pain come in measurable quantities. This thesis is controversial, however, and many philosophers have presented or felt compelled to respond to arguments for the conclusion that it is false. One important class of these arguments concerns the problem of aggregation, which says that if pleasure and pain were measurable quantities, then, by definition, it would be possible to perform various mathematical and statistical operations on numbers representing amounts of them. It is sometimes argued (...)
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  6. Justin Klocksiem (2009). In Defense of the Trichotomy Thesis. Acta Analytica 25 (3):317-327.
    According to a standard picture, for any two comparable objects and a basis for comparison, either one is greater than the other or they are equal with respect to the basis. This picture has been called the Trichotomy Thesis, and although it is intuitive and plausible, it has been called into question by such philosophers as Derek Parfit, James Griffin, Joseph Raz, and Ruth Chang. Chang’s discussion is particularly rich, for she proposes and provides a detailed account of a possible (...)
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  7. Justin Klocksiem (2008). The Problem of Interpersonal Comparisons of Pleasure and Pain. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (1):23-40.
    Several philosophers have argued that interpersonal comparisons of utility are problematic or even impossible, and that this poses a problem for the thesis that pleasure is a legitimate, measurable quantity. This, in turn, is thought to pose a problem of some kind for a variety of normative ethical and axiological theories. Perhaps it is supposed to show that utilitarianism or hedonism is false, or is supposed to show that there is no genuine hedonic calculus, or that any view that presupposes (...)
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