Search results for 'Kyburg Jr' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  15
    Henry E. Kyburg (ed.) (1984). Theory and Measurement. Cambridge University Press.
    Measurement is fundamental to all the sciences, the behavioural and social as well as the physical and in the latter its results provide our paradigms of 'objective fact'. But the basis and justification of measurement is not well understood and is often simply taken for granted. Henry Kyburg Jr proposes here an original, carefully worked out theory of the foundations of measurement, to show how quantities can be defined, why certain mathematical structures are appropriate to them and what meaning (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   31 citations  
  2.  12
    Fahiem Bacchus, Henry E. Kyburg Jr & Mariam Thalos (1990). Against Conditionalization. Synthese 85 (3):475 - 506.
  3.  9
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (2001). Probability as a Guide in Life. The Monist 84 (2):135 - 152.
    Bishop Butler, [Butler, 1736], said that probability was the very guide of life. But what interpretations of probability can serve this function? It isn't hard to see that empirical (frequency) views won't do, and many recent writers—for example John Earman, who has said that Bayesianism is "the only game in town"—have been persuaded by various dutch book arguments that only subjective probability will perform the function required. We will defend the thesis that probability construed in this way offers very little (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  16
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1958). The Justification of Deduction. Review of Metaphysics 12 (1):19 - 25.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  4
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1987). The Hobgoblin. The Monist 70 (2):141 - 151.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  14
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1992). Getting Fancy with Probability. Synthese 90 (2):189 - 203.
    There are a number of reasons for being interested in uncertainty, and there are also a number of uncertainty formalisms. These formalisms are not unrelated. It is argued that they can all be reflected as special cases of the approach of taking probabilities to be determined by sets of probability functions defined on an algebra of statements. Thus, interval probabilities should be construed as maximum and minimum probabilities within a set of distributions, Glenn Shafer's belief functions should be construed as (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  6
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1970). On a Certain Form of Philosophical Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (3):229 - 237.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  7
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1968). Bets and Beliefs. American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1):54 - 63.
  9.  6
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1965). Salmon's Paper. Philosophy of Science 32 (2):147 - 151.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  7
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (2002). Don't Take Unnecessary Chances! Synthese 132 (1/2):9 - 26.
    The dominant argument for the introduction of propensities or chances as an interpretation of probability depends on the difficulty of accounting for single case probabilities. We argue that in almost all cases, the "single case" application of probability can be accounted for otherwise. "Propensities" are needed only in theoretical contexts, and even there applications of probability need only depend on propensities indirectly.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  6
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1964). Recent Work in Inductive Logic. American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (4):249 - 287.
  12.  6
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1965). Comments on Salmon's "Inductive Evidence". American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (4):274 - 276.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  1
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1977). Decisions, Conclusions, and Utilities. Synthese 36 (1):87 - 96.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  1
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1979). Direct Measurement. American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):259 - 272.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  1
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1977). Reply to Professor Freudenthal. Synthese 36 (4):493 - 498.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  4
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1971). Epistemological Probability. Synthese 23 (2/3):309 - 326.
  17.  2
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1981). Leeds' Infernal Machine. Philosophy of Science 48 (1):92 - 94.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  1
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1976). Chance. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (3):355 - 393.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. William Harper & Gregory Wheeler (2007). Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. College Publications.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  20.  23
    W. Balzer & C. M. Dawe (1986). KYBURG Jr, H. E. [1984]: Theory and Measurement. Cambridge University Press. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (4):506-510.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  7
    Wesley C. Salmon (1967). Book Review:Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 34 (3):283-.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  6
    Stephen Spielman (1986). Book Review:Epistemology and Inference Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 53 (1):149-.
  23.  3
    Susan Haack (2007). Thanks, but No Thanks : Response to Henry Kyburg, Jr. In Cornelis De Waal (ed.), Susan Haack: A Lady of Distinctions: The Philosopher Responds to Critics. Prometheus Books
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  2
    Alex C. Michalos (1969). Book Review:Philosophy of Science A: Formal Approach Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 36 (3):326-.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Michael Martin (1972). Henry E. Kyburg, Jr., "Probability and Inductive Logic". [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 2 (4):380.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Charles A. Baylis (1960). Kyburg Henry E. Jr., The Justification of Deduction. The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 12 No. 1 , Pp. 19–25. Journal of Symbolic Logic 25 (4):339-340.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Robert L. Causey (1972). Kyburg Henry E. Jr., A Modest Proposal Concerning Simplicity. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 70 , Pp. 390–395. Journal of Symbolic Logic 37 (1):177.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Ian Hacking (1974). Swain Marshall. Editor's Introduction. Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief, Edited by Swain Marshall, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland, and Humanities Press, New York, 1970, Pp. 1–5.Schick Frederic. Three Logics of Belief. Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief, Edited by Swain Marshall, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland, and Humanities Press, New York, 1970, Pp. 6–26.Swain Marshall. The Consistency of Rational Belief. Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief, Edited by Swain Marshall, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland, and Humanities Press, New York, 1970, Pp. 27–54.Kyburg Henry E. Jr., Conjunctivitis. Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief, Edited by Swain Marshall, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland, and Humanities Press, New York, 1970, Pp. 55–82.Harman Gilbert H.. Induction. A Discussion of the Relevance of the Theory of Knowledge to the Theory of Induction . Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief, Edited. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 39 (1):166-168.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Peter Krauss (1970). Kyburg Henry E. Jr., Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, Conn., 1961, X + 350 Pp. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):127-128.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Peter Krauss (1970). Kyburg Henry E. Jr., Probability and Randomness. Theoria , Vol. 29 , Pp. 27–55. Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):129.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Peter Krauss (1970). Kyburg Henry E. Jr., Demonstrative Induction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 21 No. 1 , Pp. 80–92. Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):129.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. D. H. Mellor (1984). KYBURG, HENRY E., Jr: "Epistemology and Inference". [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35:175.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. David Miller (1969). Kyburg Henry E. Jr., Philosophy of Science: A Formal Approach. The Macmillan Company, New York, and Collier-Macmillan Limited, London, 1968, Xii + 332 Pp. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 34 (4):643-644.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Patrick Suppes (1988). Kyburg Henry E. Jr. Theory and Measurement. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Etc. 1984, Viii + 273 Pp. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (3):989.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  29
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1983). The Reference Class. Philosophy of Science 50 (3):374-397.
    The system presented by the author in The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference (Kyburg 1974) suffered from certain technical difficulties, and from a major practical difficulty; it was hard to be sure, in discussing examples and applications, when you had got hold of the right reference class. The present paper, concerned mainly with the characterization of randomness, resolves the technical difficulties and provides a well structured framework for the choice of a reference class. The definition of randomness that leads (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  36. Kyburg Jr (2009). Theory and Measurement. Cambridge University Press.
    Measurement is fundamental to all the sciences, the behavioural and social as well as the physical and in the latter its results provide our paradigms of 'objective fact'. But the basis and justification of measurement is not well understood and is often simply taken for granted. Henry Kyburg Jr proposes here an original, carefully worked out theory of the foundations of measurement, to show how quantities can be defined, why certain mathematical structures are appropriate to them and what meaning (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  83
    Gregory Wheeler (2007). A Review of the Lottery Paradox. [REVIEW] In William Harper & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr.
    Henry Kyburg’s lottery paradox (1961, p. 197) arises from considering a fair 1000 ticket lottery that has exactly one winning ticket. If this much is known about the execution of the lottery it is therefore rational to accept that one ticket will win. Suppose that an event is very likely if the probability of its occurring is greater than 0.99. On these grounds it is presumed rational to accept the proposition that ticket 1 of the lottery will not win. (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  38.  17
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1961). A Modest Proposal Concerning Simplicity. Philosophical Review 70 (3):390-395.
    Kyburg proposes the following test for the simplicity of a theory: the complexity of a theory is measured by the number of quantifiers that occur in the set of statements comprising the theory. (staff).
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39. E. Henry Jr (forthcoming). Kyburg.'The Rule of Adjunction and Reasonable Inference,'. Journal of Philosophy.
  40. Kyburg Jr (1983). Epistemology and Inference. Univ of Minnesota Press.
    _Epistemology and Inference _ was first published in 1983. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. Henry Kyburg has developed an original and important perspective on probabilistic and statistical inference. Unlike much contemporary writing by philosophers on these topics, Kyburg's work is informed by issues that have arisen in statistical theory and practice as well as issues familiar to professional philosophers. (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  29
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1961). Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Wesleyan University Press.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   138 citations  
  42.  27
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (2010). Subjective Probability : Criticisms, Reflections and Problems. [REVIEW] In Antony Eagle (ed.), Journal of Philosophical Logic. Routledge 157 - 180.
  43. Antony Eagle (2005). Randomness Is Unpredictability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):749-790.
    The concept of randomness has been unjustly neglected in recent philosophical literature, and when philosophers have thought about it, they have usually acquiesced in views about the concept that are fundamentally flawed. After indicating the ways in which these accounts are flawed, I propose that randomness is to be understood as a special case of the epistemic concept of the unpredictability of a process. This proposal arguably captures the intuitive desiderata for the concept of randomness; at least it should suggest (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  44. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1981). Leeds' Infernal Machine. Philosophy of Science 48 (1):92-94.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Alan Hájek (2003). Conditional Probability Is the Very Guide of Life. In Kyburg Jr, E. Henry & Mariam Thalos (eds.), Probability is the Very Guide of Life: The Philosophical Uses of Chance. Open Court 183--203.
    in Probability is the Very Guide of Life: The Philosophical Uses of Chance, eds. Henry Kyburg, Jr. and Mariam Thalos, Open Court. Abridged version in Proceedings of the International Society for Bayesian Analysis 2002.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  46. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1970). ``Conjunctivitis&Quot. In Marshall Swain (ed.), Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief. Dordrecht: D. Reidel 55-82.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   36 citations  
  47.  37
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1997). The Rule of Adjunction and Reasonable Inference. Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):109-125.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  48.  26
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1977). Randomness and the Right Reference Class. Journal of Philosophy 74 (9):501-521.
  49. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1980). Conditionalization. Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):98-114.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  50.  41
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1997). Quantities, Magnitudes, and Numbers. Philosophy of Science 64 (3):377-410.
    Quantities are naturally viewed as functions, whose arguments may be construed as situations, events, objects, etc. We explore the question of the range of these functions: should it be construed as the real numbers (or some subset thereof)? This is Carnap's view. It has attractive features, specifically, what Carnap views as ontological economy. Or should the range of a quantity be a set of magnitudes? This may have been Helmholtz's view, and it, too, has attractive features. It reveals the close (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000