Search results for 'Moore's Paradox' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Clayton Littlejohn (2010). Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.score: 720.0
    We shall evaluate two strategies for motivating the view that knowledge is the norm of belief. The first draws on observations concerning belief's aim and the parallels between belief and assertion. The second appeals to observations concerning Moore's Paradox. Neither of these strategies gives us good reason to accept the knowledge account. The considerations offered in support of this account motivate only the weaker account on which truth is the fundamental norm of belief.
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  2. Timothy Chan (2010). Moore's Paradox is Not Just Another Pragmatic Paradox. Synthese 173 (3):211 - 229.score: 720.0
    One version of Moore’s Paradox is the challenge to account for the absurdity of beliefs purportedly expressed by someone who asserts sentences of the form ‘p & I do not believe that p’ (‘Moorean sentences’). The absurdity of these beliefs is philosophically puzzling, given that Moorean sentences (i) are contingent and often true; and (ii) express contents that are unproblematic when presented in the third-person. In this paper I critically examine the most popular proposed solution to these two puzzles, (...)
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  3. Jack Woods (2014). Expressivism and Moore's Paradox. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (5):1-12.score: 720.0
    Expressivists explain the expression relation which obtains between sincere moral assertion and the conative or affective attitude thereby expressed by appeal to the relation which obtains between sincere assertion and belief. In fact, they often explicitly take the relation between moral assertion and their favored conative or affective attitude to be exactly the same as the relation between assertion and the belief thereby expressed. If this is correct, then we can use the identity of the expression relation in the two (...)
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  4. Timothy Chan (2008). Belief, Assertion and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):395 - 414.score: 720.0
    In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually contradictory claims about Moore’s Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief (ATB), the functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion (BAA), the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean (...)
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  5. Michael Cholbi (2009). Moore's Paradox and Moral Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):495-510.score: 720.0
    Assertions of statements such as ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe it’ are standard examples of what is known as Moore’s paradox. Here I consider moral equivalents of such statements, statements wherein individuals affirm moral judgments while also expressing motivational indifference to those judgments (such as ‘hurting animals for fun is wrong, but I don’t care’). I argue for four main conclusions concerning such statements: 1. Such statements are genuinely paradoxical, even if not contradictory. 2. This paradoxicality can be (...)
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  6. John N. Williams (2014). Moore's Paradox in Belief and Desire. Acta Analytica 29 (1):1-23.score: 720.0
    Is there a Moore’s paradox in desire? I give a normative explanation of the epistemic irrationality, and hence absurdity, of Moorean belief that builds on Green and Williams’ normative account of absurdity. This explains why Moorean beliefs are normally irrational and thus absurd, while some Moorean beliefs are absurd without being irrational. Then I defend constructing a Moorean desire as the syntactic counterpart of a Moorean belief and distinguish it from a ‘Frankfurt’ conjunction of desires. Next I discuss putative (...)
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  7. John N. Williams (2013). Moore's Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.score: 720.0
    Moore’s paradox is the fact that assertions or beliefs such asBangkok is the capital of Thailand but I do not believe that Bangkok is the capital of Thailand or Bangkok is the capital of Thailand but I believe that Bangkok is not the capital of Thailandare ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. The current orthodoxy is that an explanation of the absurdity should first start with belief, on the assumption that once the absurdity in belief has been explained then this will (...)
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  8. John N. Williams (2013). The Completeness of the Pragmatic Solution to Moore's Paradox in Belief: A Reply to Chan. Synthese 190 (12):2457-2476.score: 720.0
    Moore’s paradox in belief is the fact that beliefs of the form ‘ p and I do not believe that p ’ are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. Writers on the paradox have nearly all taken the absurdity to be a form of irrationality. These include those who give what Timothy Chan calls the ‘pragmatic solution’ to the paradox. This solution turns on the fact that having the Moorean belief falsifies its content. Chan, who also takes the absurdity (...)
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  9. John N. Williams (2013). Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore's Paradox. Theoria 80 (3).score: 720.0
    John Turri gives an example that he thinks refutes what he takes to be “G. E. Moore's view” that omissive assertions such as “It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining” are “inherently ‘absurd'”. This is that of Ellie, an eliminativist who makes such assertions. Turri thinks that these are perfectly reasonable and not even absurd. Nor does she seem irrational if the sincerity of her assertion requires her to believe its content. A commissive counterpart (...)
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  10. Hamid Vahid (2008). Radical Interpretation and Moore's Paradox. Theoria 74 (2):146-163.score: 717.0
    Abstract: Moore's sentences of the form "P & ∼I believe that P" and "P & I believe that ∼P" are thought to be paradoxical because they cannot be properly asserted despite being possibly true. Solutions to the paradox usually explain the oddity of such sentences in terms of phenomena as diverse as the pragmatics of speech acts, nature of belief or justification. In this paper I shall argue that despite their seemingly different approaches to the problem, there is (...)
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  11. William S. Larkin (1999). Shoemaker on Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 96 (3):239-52.score: 711.0
    Shoemaker argues that a satisfactory resolution of Moore's paradox requires a _self-intimation thesis that posits a "constitutive relation between belief and believing that one believes." He claims that such a thesis is needed to explain the crucial fact that the assent conditions for '_P' entail those for '_I believe that P'. This paper argues for an alternative resolution of Moore's paradox that provides for an adequate explanation of the crucial fact without relying on the kind of (...)
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  12. Uriah Kriegel (2004). Moore's Paradox and the Structure of Conscious Belief. Erkenntnis 61 (1):99-121.score: 702.0
    Propositions such as <It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining> are paradoxical, in that even though they can be true, they cannot be truly asserted or believed. This is Moore’s paradox. Sydney Shoemaker has recently ar- gued that the paradox arises from a constitutive relation that holds between first- and second-order beliefs. This paper explores this approach to the paradox. Although Shoemaker’s own account of the paradox is rejected, a different account (...)
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  13. Declan Smithies (2012). Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.score: 630.0
    This paper argues that justification is accessible in the sense that one has justification to believe a proposition if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition. I argue that the accessibility of justification is required for explaining what is wrong with believing Moorean conjunctions of the form, ‘p and I do not have justification to believe that p.’.
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  14. Rogers Albritton (1995). Comments on Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):229-239.score: 612.0
  15. Amy Kind (2003). Shoemaker, Self-Blindness and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):39-48.score: 612.0
    I show how the 'innersense' (quasiperceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential 'argument from selfblindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be selfblind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker's discussion conflates introspective awareness and selfknowledge, he cannot establish (...)
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  16. Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (2011). Moore's Paradox, Truth and Accuracy. Acta Analytica 26 (3):243-255.score: 567.0
    G. E. Moore famously observed that to assert ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I do not believe that I did’ would be ‘absurd’. Moore calls it a ‘paradox’ that this absurdity persists despite the fact that what I say about myself might be true. Krista Lawlor and John Perry have proposed an explanation of the absurdity that confines itself to semantic notions while eschewing pragmatic ones. We argue that this explanation faces four objections. We give a (...)
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  17. John N. Williams (2006). Moore's Paradox and Conscious Belief. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414.score: 558.0
    For Moore, it is a paradox that although I would be absurd in asserting that (it is raining but I don.
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  18. Anthony S. Gillies (2001). A New Solution to Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 105 (3):237-250.score: 549.0
    Moore's paradox pits our intuitions about semantic oddnessagainst the concept of truth-functional consistency. Most solutions tothe problem proceed by explaining away our intuitions. But``consistency'' is a theory-laden concept, having different contours indifferent semantic theories. Truth-functional consistency is appropriateonly if the semantic theory we are using identifies meaning withtruth-conditions. I argue that such a framework is not appropriate whenit comes to analzying epistemic modality. I show that a theory whichaccounts for a wide variety of semantic data about epistemic modals(Update (...)
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  19. Lennart Åqvist (1964). A Solution to Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 15 (1-2):1 - 5.score: 540.0
    Moore's paradox pits our intuitions about semantic oddness against the concept of truth-functional consistency. Most solutions to the problem proceed by explaining away our intuitions. But "consistency" is a theory-laden concept, having different contours in different semantic theories. Truth-functional consistency is appropriate only if the semantic theory we are using identifies meaning with truth-conditions. I argue that such a framework is not appropriate when it comes to analyzing epistemic modality. I show that a theory which accounts for a (...)
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  20. Jordi Fernández (2005). Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556.score: 540.0
    I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore’s paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief. Then, I argue that (...)
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  21. Claudio de Almeida (2001). What Moore's Paradox is About. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33-58.score: 540.0
    On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore’s paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-paradoxical proposition is one for (...)
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  22. Severin Schroeder (2006). Moore's Paradox and First-Person Authority. Grazer Philosophische Studien 71 (1):161-174.score: 540.0
    This paper explores Wittgenstein's attempts to explain the peculiarities of the first-person use of 'believe' that manifest themselves in Moore's paradox, discussed in Philosophical Investigations, Part II, section x. An utterance of the form 'p and I do not believe that p' is a kind of contradiction, for the second conjunct is not, as it might appear, just a description of my mental state, but an expression of my belief that not-p, contradicting the preceding expression of my belief (...)
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  23. C. Mason Myers (1971). Moore's Paradox of Analysis. Metaphilosophy 2 (4):295–308.score: 540.0
    The nature of conceptual analysis is elucidated by a proposed solution to moore's paradox of analysis. Occurrent, Dispositional, And property concepts are distinguished, And the notion of epistemic gain is introduced and explained. It is shown that although a correct analysis equates property concepts this is done with epistemic gain. It is argued that in a correct analysis there must be no identity between analysans and analysandum in respect to occurrent concepts. The relevance of thought experiments to conceptual (...)
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  24. Peter Pagin (2008). Informativeness and Moore's Paradox. Analysis 68 (1):46 - 57.score: 540.0
    The first case is usually referred to as omissive and the second as commissive. What is traditionally perceived as paradoxical is that although such statements may well be true, asserting them is clearly absurd. An account of Moore’s Paradox is an explanation of the absurdity. In the last twenty years, there has also been a focus on the incoherence of judging or believing such propositions.
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  25. Byeong D. Lee (2001). Moore's Paradox and Self-Ascribed Belief. Erkenntnis 55 (3):359-370.score: 540.0
    Moore's paradox arises from the logicaloddity of sentences of the form`P and I do not believe that P'or `P and I believe that not-P'. Thiskind of sentence is logically peculiarbecause it is absurd to assert it, although it isnot a logical contradiction. In this paperI offer a new proposal. I argue that Moore's paradox arises because there is a defaultprocedure for evaluating a self-ascribed belief sentence and one is presumptivelyjustified in believing that one believes a sentence (...)
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  26. John N. Williams (2010). Moore's Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief and Conscious Belief. Theoria 76 (3):221-248.score: 540.0
    In this journal, Hamid Vahid argues against three families of explanation of Moore-paradoxicality. The first is the Wittgensteinian approach; I assert that p just in case I assert that I believe that p. So making a Moore-paradoxical assertion involves contradictory assertions. The second is the epistemic approach, one committed to: if I am justified in believing that p then I am justified in believing that I believe that p. So it is impossible to have a justified omissive Moore-paradoxical belief. The (...)
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  27. Claudio Almeida (2001). What Moore's Paradox Is About. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33 - 58.score: 540.0
    On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore's paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-paradoxical proposition is one (...)
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  28. David Rosenthal (2002). Moore's Paradox and Crimmins's Case. Analysis 62 (274):167-171.score: 540.0
    Moore’s paradox occurs with sentences, such as (1) It’s raining and I don’t think it’s raining. which are self-defeating in a way that prevents one from making an asser- tion with them.1 But Mark Crimmins has given us a case of a sentence that is syntactically just like (1) but is nonetheless assertible. Suppose I know somebody, and know or have excellent reason to believe that I know that very person under some other guise. I do not know what (...)
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  29. Eugene Chislenko (2014). Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2).score: 540.0
    G.E. Moore noticed the oddity of statements like: “It's raining, but I don't believe it.” This oddity is often seen as analogous to the oddity of believing akratically, or believing what one believes one should not believe, and has been appealed to in denying the possibility of akratic belief. I describe a Belief Akratic's Paradox, analogous to Moore's paradox and centered on sentences such as: “I believe it's raining, but I shouldn't believe it.” I then defend the (...)
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  30. John N. Williams (2007). Moore's Paradox, Evans's Principle, and Iterated Beliefs. In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.score: 540.0
  31. Robert Hambourger (1984). Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Justification. Philosophy Research Archives 10:1-12.score: 540.0
    The author discusses solutions to Moore’s Paradox by Moore and Wittgenstein and then offers one of his own: ‘I believe that P’ and ‘not-P’ can both be true but nonetheless are not epistemically compatible; that is, it is logically impossible simultaneously to have sufficient evidence to justify assertions of each. The author then argues that similar transgressions are committed by other “paradoxical” utterances whose paradoxicality cannot be explained by the Moore or Wittgenstein solutions and also that this provides a (...)
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  32. Jonathan E. Adler & Bradley Armour-Garb (2007). Moore's Paradox and the Transparency of Belief. In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.score: 540.0
     
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  33. Jay David Atlas (2007). What Reflexive Pronouns Tell Us About Belief : A New Moore's Paradox de Se, Rationality, and Privileged Access. In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.score: 540.0
  34. Cristina Borgoni (2008). Interpretando la Paradoja de Moore (Interpreting Moore's Paradox). Theoria 23 (2):145-161.score: 540.0
    RESUMEN: Este trabajo ofrece una lectura de la Paradoja de Moore que pone énfasis en su relevancia para nuestra comprensión de la racionalidad y de la interpretación lingüística. Mantiene que las oraciones que dan origen a la paradoja no necesitan entenderse en términos de ausencia de una contradicción, sino más bien en términos de ausencia de racionalidad, entendida esta como un término más amplio que el de coherencia y consistencia lógica. Se defenderá tal posición por medio de tres tesis, dos (...)
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  35. André Gallois (2007). Consciousness, Reasons, and Moore's Paradox. In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.score: 540.0
     
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  36. John N. Williams (2004). Moore's Paradoxes, Evans's Principle and Self-Knowledge. Analysis 64 (284):348-353.score: 528.0
    I supply an argument for Evans's principle that whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I believe that p. I show how this principle helps explain how I come to know my own beliefs in a way that normally makes me the best authority on them. Then I show how the principle helps to solve Moore's paradoxes.
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  37. Annalisa Coliva (2008). The Paradox of Moore's Proof of an External World. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):234–243.score: 522.0
    Moore's proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. I argue that neither Wright's nor Pryor's readings of the proof can explain this paradox. Rather, one must take the proof as responding to a sceptical challenge to our right to claim to have warrant for our ordinary empirical beliefs, either for any particular empirical belief we might have, (...)
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  38. Sydney Shoemaker (1995). Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):211-28.score: 522.0
  39. Annalisa Coliva, The Paradox of Moore's Proof Of.score: 522.0
    Moore’s proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. I argue that neither Wright’s nor Pryor’s readings of the proof can explain this paradox. Rather, one must take the proof as responding to a sceptical challenge to our right to claim to have warrant for our ordinary empirical beliefs, either for any particular empirical belief we might have, or (...)
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  40. Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.) (2007). Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.score: 495.0
    G. E. Moore observed that to assert, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' would be 'absurd'. Over half a century later, such sayings continue to perplex philosophers. In the definitive treatment of the famous paradox, Green and Williams explain its history and relevance and present new essays by leading thinkers in the area.
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  41. Krista Lawlor & John Perry (2008). Moore's Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):421 – 427.score: 486.0
    G. E. Moore famously noted that saying 'I went to the movies, but I don't believe it' is absurd, while saying 'I went to the movies, but he doesn't believe it' is not in the least absurd. The problem is to explain this fact without supposing that the semantic contribution of 'believes' changes across first-person and third-person uses, and without making the absurdity out to be merely pragmatic. We offer a new solution to the paradox. Our solution is that (...)
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  42. David M. Rosenthal (1995). Self-Knowledge and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):195 - 209.score: 486.0
    As G. E. Moore famously observed, sentences such as 'It's raining but I don't think it is', though they aren't contradictory, cannot be used to make coherent assertions.' The trouble with such sentences is not a matter of their truth conditions; such sentences can readily be true. Indeed, it happens often enough with each of us that we think, for example, that it isn't raining even though it is. This shows that such sentences are not literally contradictory. But even though (...)
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  43. Bas C. Van Fraassen (2011). Thomason's Paradox for Belief, and Two Consequence Relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1):15-32.score: 480.0
    Thomason (1979/2010)’s argument against competence psychologism in semantics envisages a representation of a subject’s competence as follows: he understands his own language in the sense that he can identify the semantic content of each of its sentences, which requires that the relation between expression and content be recursive. Then if the scientist constructs a theory that is meant to represent the body of the subject’s beliefs, construed as assent to the content of the pertinent sentences, and that theory satisfies certain (...)
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  44. Bernard W. Kobes (1995). Telic Higher-Order Thoughts and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Perspectives 9:291-312.score: 468.0
  45. John N. Williams, Moore's Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief and Conscious Belieftheo_1073 221..248.score: 468.0
    In this journal, Hamid Vahid argues against three families of explanation of Mooreparadoxicality. The first is the Wittgensteinian approach; I assert that p just in case I assert that I believe that p. So making a Moore-paradoxical assertion involves contradictory assertions. The second is the epistemic approach, one committed to: if I am justified in believing that p then I am justified in believing that I believe that p. So it is impossible to have a justified omissive Mooreparadoxical belief. The (...)
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  46. Zoltán Gendler Szabó (2001). Fictionalism and Moore's Paradox. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):293-307.score: 459.0
    A fictionalist attitude towards an area of discourse encourages us to assent to certain sentences of that discourse without believing that they are true. Prima facie, this amounts to a suggestion that we should also assent to sentences of the form 'S but I don't believe that S'. Traditional versions of fictionalism have an answer to this challenge, but I argue that the answer is unavailable for a currently popular type of fictionalism. This is bad news for fictionalism in general (...)
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  47. John Williams & Mitchell S. Green, Introduction to Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality and the First Person.score: 459.0
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  48. Michael Huemer (2007). Moore's Paradox and the Norm of Belief. In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Clarendon Press.score: 459.0
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  49. Roy Sorensen (2007). Can the Dead Speak? Moore's Paradox and Postmortem Messages. In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Clarendon Press.score: 459.0
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  50. Anthony Brueckner (2009). More on Justification and Moore's Paradox. Analysis 69 (3):497-499.score: 450.0
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