Abstract: A person who remembers having done something has a belief that she did it from having done it. To have a belief that one did something from having done it is to believe that one did the action on the (causal) basis of having done it, where this belief (in order for one to have it) need not be (causally) based even in part on any contributor to the belief other than doing the action. The notion of a contributor (...) to a belief (as opposed to a mere facilitating cause of the belief) is explicated through a series of examples. The account of having a belief that one did something from having done it is then deployed in criticising Ginet's account of ‘memory connection’, in assessing Martin and Deutscher's causal theory of remembering, in indicating how diachronic justification functions in a nontraditional theory of memory, and in setting forth one type of psychological connectedness which, according to advocates of a psychological continuity theory of personal identity, may be employed (noncircularly) in formulating the theory, and which, according to opponents of the theory, provides a target for criticising the theory. (shrink)
In a paper ?The intentionality of memory,? Jordi Fernández (2006) proposes a way of distinguishing between episodic and semantic memory. I identify three difficulties with his proposal and provide a way of drawing the distinction that avoids these shortcomings.
The paper presents considerations that weigh against one or another version of the psychological continuity theory of personal identity over time. Such Locke-like theories frequently go wrong, it is argued, in not formulating precisely how the psychological states of an individual person are related diachronically, in failing to capture a truly appropriate causal connection between later and earlier psychological states, and in claiming support from particular cases. In addition, the paper offers examples and other considerations that support an alternative, biological (...) continuity theory according to which you and I are each identical with a human organism. (shrink)
This article reports research in three Nottingham schools, concerned with (1) 'The school as fertile ground: how the ethos of a school enables everyone in it to benefit from the presence of artists in class'; (2) 'Children on the edge: how the arts reach those children who otherwise exclude themselves from class activities, for any reason' and (3) 'Children's voices and choices: how even very young children can learn to express their wishes, and then have them realised through arts projects'. (...) The research methodology was rooted in two modes of inquiry, philosophical investigation and action research. The article draws on this research to argue that arts-based work in school has helped disadvantaged and/or disaffected children to engage in activities (both arts-based and others), and to be able to lay the groundwork for exercising voice and agency as they did so. If social justice is to flourish there is a need for particular kinds of public spaces and a need to create conditions such that children can learn to participate in those spaces, whether or not they are comfortable with the usual settings for 'rational argument' or 'deliberative democracy'. It is suggested that arts-based education, in some forms, is one good way of creating these conditions. (shrink)
K. Lehrer and J. Richard’s analysis of remembering that p is shown to be deficient, particularly because it fails to treat factual memory as an epistemic concept. Adding a requirement concerning the subject’s past justification accommodates instances of factual memory without factual knowledge, helps explain the role of justification in remembering that p, and strengthens the analysis against certain counterexamples. The paper includes an assessment of A. Cusmariu;s definition of impure memory.
A theory of occurrent factual memory is sketched out. The theory represents an alterative to the traditional theory in John L. Pollock’s Knowledge and Justification, in that it analyzes occurrently remembering that p without employing the notion of ostensible recollection that p. The latter notion, it is argued, can be understood in terms of occurrently believing (or being inclined to believe) that p. In defending his theory against nontraditional alternatives, Pollock employs arguments that conflict with his own principle of implicit (...) reasons. That principle, it is shown, sanctions cross-temporal justification of the sort presupposed by the alternative nontraditional theory. [CORRIGENDUM: Line 6 at the top of page 137 should read: memory, then if S occurrently remembers that p at t, then S, at t, has a justified (occurrent) belief that p such that (a) this belief that p constitutes, at t, S’s In lines 7–9 at the top of page 140, the sentence beginning with “For” and ending with “way” should be deleted, and in line 11 “fact” should be “face”.] . (shrink)
Harry g frankfurt gave what has been taken to be a counter-Example to the principle that, "a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise." I argue that in his case the agent cannot be morally responsible for what he did, Because it was not within his power not to be compelled to do it. So frankfurt's case is not a counter-Example to this principle.
The definition of memory knowledge that p put forward in this paper is nontraditional in that the justification for the belief that p which constitutes that knowledge is not located in any memory-impression or other present state of the subject. Rather it is the subject's actual past justification for p, or a proper part thereof, that justifies this present belief that p. It is argued (1) that the notion under definition is that of knowing straight from memory, (2) that an (...) adequate definition here must take into account a difference, as to conflicting evidence one does not possess, between evidence one has forgotten and evidence one has never had, (3) that compared to Ginet's traditional definition (1975), the definition has several advantages, and (4) that the definition handles at least one type of situation where there can be memory knowledge that p without previous knowledge that p. (shrink)
This paper examines a leading traditional account of memory knowledge. (A “traditional” account of memory knowledge locates whatever positive justification there may be for the belief which constitutes that knowledge in a present memory-impression.) The paper (1) presents a pair of cases designed to show that Carl Ginet’s four-part defeasibility-type definition of memory knowledge that p is either too weak or too strong, and (2) suggests how these cases could be handled by one sort of non-traditional account.
Summary One aim of this paper is to provide an assessment of the recent attempts to interpret the development of Galileo's theory of motion in the late Paduan period 1604?1610. In addition to this a new interpretation of this process of development is advanced. This interpretation is the first that proves able to provide a full account of all the features on folio 152r of volume 72 of the Galilean manuscripts which has been claimed to be of crucial significance. The (...) major feature of the interpretation is that it is the first to account for the relationship between Galileo's theoretical and experimental work in the period 1604?1610. (shrink)
One difference between traditional and contemporary nontraditional theories of memory is that the former would affirm, whereas the latter would deny, that a person can be correctly described as having remembered that p solely in virtue of having knowledge the certainty of which is grounded upon the person’s present remembering. I argue that there cannot be such a case, and that what may appear to be such a case—as presented in Don Locke’s book Memory—can be explicated by a contemporary nontraditional (...) theorist without making any concessions to the traditional theorist. (shrink)
For cases in which to remember that p is to have (strict) nonbasic, unmixed memory knowledge that p; in which there is at most one prior time, t, from which one remembers; in which one knew at t that p; and in which there can arise a sensible question whether one remembers that p from t — a person, B, remembers that p from t if and only if: (1) There is a set of grounds a subset of which consists (...) of (i) only those grounds B has at both t and the present for B to be sure that p, and (ii) enough such grounds to make it reasonable at both t and the present for B to be sure that p (I call any such subset a set of “adequate original grounds dating from t”), and (2) there is no time prior to t such that B has a set of adequate original grounds dating from that time. The way in which the crucial terms in this explication are being used is explained. And the explication is defended by showing how it can deal with cases that are counterexamples to explications recently offered by Malcolm and by Munsat. (shrink)
Against Russell’s skeptical conjecture, that the world and its entire population came into existence five minutes ago, it is argued that any one of the following is logically incompatible with the conjunction of the other two: ostensible memories of certain events, records of such events, and the non-occurrence of these same events. This conclusion is reached through a critical examination of (1) the arguments advanced by Norman Malcolm in trying to show that Russell’s “hypothesis” does not express a logical possibility, (...) and (2) the counterarguments by which James W. Cornman tries to show that it does. (shrink)