In Willing, Wanting, Waiting, Richard Holton lays out a detailed account of resolutions, arguing that they enable agents to resist temptation. Holton claims that temptation often leads to inappropriate shifts in judgment, and that resolutions are a special kind of first- and second-order intention pair that blocks such judgment shift. In this paper, I elaborate upon an intuitive but underdeveloped objection to Holton’s view – namely, that his view does not enable agents to successfully block the transmission of temptation in (...) the way that he claims, because the second-order intention is as equally susceptible to temptation as the first-order intention alone would be. I appeal to independently compelling principles – principles that Holton should accept, because they help fill an important explanatory gap in his account – to demonstrate why this objection succeeds. This argument both shows us where Holton’s view goes wrong and points us to the kind of solu-tion we need. In conclusion, I sketch an alternative account of resolutions as a first-order intention paired with a second-order desire. I argue that my account is not susceptible to the same objection because a temptation that cannot be blocked by an intention can be blocked by a desire. (shrink)

Abstract: “Resolute readings” initially started life as a radical new approach to Wittgenstein's early philosophy, but are now starting to take root as a way of interpreting the later writings as well—a trend exemplified by Stephen Mulhall's Wittgenstein's Private Language (2007) as well as by Phil Hutchinson's “What's the Point of Elucidation?” (2007) and Rom Harré's “Grammatical Therapy and the Third Wittgenstein” (2008). The present article shows that there are neither good philosophical nor compelling exegetical grounds for accepting a resolute (...) reading of the later Wittgenstein's work. It is possible to make sense of Wittgenstein's philosophical method without either ascribing to him an incoherent conception of “substantial nonsense” or espousing the resolute readers' preferred option of nonsense austerity. If the interpretation here is correct, it allows us to recognize Wittgenstein's radical break with the philosophical tradition without having to characterize his achievements in purely therapeutic fashion. (shrink)

I motivate and characterize an intensional semantics for ‘ought’ on which it does not behave as a universal quantifier over possibilities. My motivational argument centers on taking at face value some standard challenges to the quantificational semantics, especially to the idea that ‘ought’-sentences satisfy the principle of Inheritance. I argue that standard pragmatic approaches to these puzzles are either not sufficiently detailed or unconvincing.

Discussion of temptation has figured prominently in recent debates concerning instrumental rationality. In light of some particularly interesting cases in which giving in to temptation involves acting in accordance with one’s current evaluative rankings, two lines of thought have been developed: one appeals to the possibility of deviating from a well-grounded resolution, and the other appeals to the possibility of being insufficiently responsive to the prospect of future regret. But the current appeals to resolutions and regret and some of (...) the verdicts provided face some serious challenges. Building on recent work concerning instrumental rationality, and delving into some important complications concerning human psychology, I revisit the relevant cases of temptation and analyze them in a way that puts resolutions, rational failure, and regret in their proper places. In the process, I highlight and explain the significance of the neglected fact that resolutions can introduce effective anchor points, which can serve agents faced with temptation well, even if the resolutions are abandoned. (shrink)

‘Conciliationism’ is the view that disagreement with qualified disputants gives us a powerful reason for doubting our disputed views, a reason that will often be sufficient to defeat what would otherwise be strong evidential justification for our position. Conciliationism is disputed by many qualified philosophers, a fact that has led many to conclude that conciliationism is self-defeating. After examining one prominent response to this challenge and finding it wanting, I develop a fresh approach to the problem. I identify two levels (...) at which one may show epistemic deference—the level of one's credences and the level of one's reasoning—and show that in disagreements over conciliationism, deference at one level results in non-deference at the other. A commitment to epistemic deference therefore does not provide a rational reason to reduce confidence when conciliationism itself is disputed. After presenting the case for ‘resolute conciliationism’, I address two objections. (shrink)

A pool resolution proof is a dag-like resolution proof which admits a depth-first traversal tree in which no variable is used as a resolution variable twice on any branch. The problem of determining whether a given dag-like resolution proof is a valid pool resolution proof is shown to be NP-complete.

The foundational hypothesis to this study is that congregations which have a healthy perception and a greater understanding of conflict will develop more effective responses to conflict that will translate into more effective conflict resolution and reconciliation. The process and sustainability of the development of a missional church, the context of the study, is pregnant with potential conflict. Untamed conflict has the propensity to retard, jeopardise or even destroy the development of a missional church. When conflict arises, it must (...) be understood and dealt with theologically. The inherent problem is that conflict appears to be neither understood nor appreciated sociologically and theologically. This knowledge and praxis vacuum has the potential for conflict to translate into inappropriate or ineffective responses that do not always make for effective resolution and reconciliation. The research focuses mainly on an empirical study based on the four practical theological questions of Osmer (2008). Participants for this study were randomly selected from specific sectors of Methodist congregations in the wider Pretoria area. The research explores congregants’ perceptions, understanding and views of conflict; their responses to conflict; and some felt and observed outcomes of conflict. The presupposition is that the development of the local missional church would be more effective and efficient when the management and process of conflict resolution and reconciliation are well led and well managed. This study confirmed that conflict, despite its normalcy and necessity, carries a negative undertone and is mostly avoided in congregations. This is compounded by the evidence that there is little, if any, theological or scriptural understanding of conflict. There is also no indication that churches intentionally and purposefully educate their members to appreciate and understand conflict. In so doing, churches are harming their innate calling as the glory and manifestation of God’s divine grace through faith communities for the transformation of all peoples. Yet, the church understands the dangers of unhealthy conflict, and on occasion even expects conflict to arise, although deeming it inappropriate. Practical theological discernment is sought as to why this may be so and remedial action is proposed to address the problem of conflict within congregations. (shrink)

A spectator of the passing philosophical scene, recently encountering the current controversy about “resolute readings” of the Tractatus, might be forgiven for finding it difficult to figure out what the debate is supposed to be about and who exactly is on which side and why. This chapter demonstrates, through a reconstruction of some relevant features of “the” debate, that at one point there are in fact several orthogonal debates taking place, confusedly cast as contributions to a single debate. It indicates (...) some of the respects in which the term “resolute reading” has come to acquire different meanings, and sometimes even a different logic. The chapter traces the shifts in the meaning of the term “resolute reading” and the related family of cognate and contrastive expressions. Cora Diamond and James Conant are often presented as the main proponents of a “resolute reading” of the Tractatus. (shrink)

Why should we typically act in accordance with our resolutions when faced with the temptation to do otherwise? A much-maligned view suggests that we should do so because resolutions themselves provide us with reasons for action. We defend a version of this view, on which resolutions provide second-order reasons. This account avoids the objections typically taken to be fatal for the view that resolutions are reasons, including the prominent bootstrapping objections.

The use of super‐resolution imaging techniques in cell biology has yielded a wealth of information regarding cellular elements and processes that were invisible to conventional imaging. Focusing on images obtained by stimulated emission depletion (STED) microscopy, we discuss how the new high‐resolution data influence the ways in which we use and interpret images in cell biology. Super‐resolution images have lent support to some of our current hypotheses. But, more significantly, they have revealed unexpectedly complex processes that cannot (...) be accounted for by the simpler models based on diffraction‐limited imaging. The super‐resolution imaging data challenge cell biologists to change their theoretical framework, by including, for instance, interpretations that describe multiple functions, functional errors or lack of function for cellular elements. In this context, we argue that descriptive research using super‐resolution microscopy is now as necessary as hypothesis‐driven research. (shrink)

In the 1920s, Paul Hertz (1881-1940) developed certain calculi based on structural rules only and established normal form results for proofs. It is shown that he anticipated important techniques and results of general proof theory as well as of resolution theory, if the latter is regarded as a part of structural proof theory. Furthermore, it is shown that Gentzen, in his first paper of 1933, which heavily draws on Hertz, proves a normal form result which corresponds to the completeness (...) of prepositional SLD-resolution in logic programming. (shrink)

Bertrand's random-chord paradox purports to illustrate the inconsistency of the principle of indifference when applied to problems in which the number of possible cases is infinite. This paper shows that Bertrand's original problem is vaguely posed, but demonstrates that clearly stated variations lead to different, but theoretically and empirically self-consistent solutions. The resolution of the paradox lies in appreciating how different geometric entities, represented by uniformly distributed random variables, give rise to respectively different nonuniform distributions of random chords, and (...) hence to different probabilities. The principle of indifference appears consistently applicable to infinite sets provided that problems can be formulated unambiguously. (shrink)

This paper presents a formulation and completeness proof of the resolution-type calculi for the first order fragment of Girard's linear logic by a general method which provides the general scheme of transforming a cutfree Gentzen-type system into a resolution type system, preserving the structure of derivations. This is a direct extension of the method introduced by Maslov for classical predicate logic. Ideas of the author and Zamov are used to avoid skolomization. Completeness of strategies is first established for (...) the Gentzen-type system, and then transferred to resolution. The propositional resolution system was implemented by T. Tammet. (shrink)

I was invited by CARE International of Kenya to do some research on conceptions of conflict and its resolution among refugees in Kenya. Findings would help the refugees themselves in furthering their peace education project. I interviewed sixteen people, with aid of translators, on interpersonal to international issues of conflict resolution. The final report was submitted to CARE International of Kenya and representatives of U.N.H.C.R. in August of 2001. This article reflects on some of the highlights from the (...) interviews. Refugees can be wise, keen thinkers, who have observed firsthand some of the globe’s most pressing problems, and can learn from reflecting on their own experience. I share their insights on topics of interpersonal conflict, refugee camp conflict, national and international conflict. (shrink)

It is well known that when resolution occurs in the stichic iambics and trochaics of tragedy word-end is not found between the two shorts so produced: w or, more accurately, that the first short of resolution must not be the last syllable of a polysyllabic word. Moreover, the syllables in resolution most often form part of the same word as the following short or anceps, e.g.: Ion 1143.

Solutions to Russell’s paradox of propositions and to Kaplan’s paradox are proposed based on an extension of von Neumann’s method of avoiding paradox. It is shown that Russell’s ‘anti-Cantorian’ mappings can be preserved using this method, but Kaplan’s mapping cannot. In addition, several versions of the Epimenides paradox are discussed in light of von Neumann’s method.

Resolution is an effective deduction procedure for classical logic. There is no similar "resolution" system for non-classical logics (though there are various automated deduction systems). The paper presents resolution systems for intuistionistic predicate logic as well as for modal and temporal logics within the framework of labelled deductive systems. Whereas in classical predicate logic resolution is applied to literals, in our system resolution is applied to L(abelled) R(epresentation) S(tructures). Proofs are discovered by a refutation procedure (...) defined on LRSs, that imposes a hierarchy on clause sets of such structures together with an inheritance discipline. This is a form of Theory Resolution. For intuitionistic logic these structures are called I(ntuitionistic) R(epresentation) S(tructures). Their hierarchical structure allows the restriction of unification of individual variables and/or constants without using Skolem functions. This structures must therefore be preserved when we consider other (non-modal) logics. Variations between different logics are captured by fine tuning of the inheritance properties of the hierarchy. For modal and temporal logics IRS's are extended to structures that represent worlds and/or times. This enables us to consider all kinds of combined logics. (shrink)

The logical calculus for SAT are not valid for MaxSAT and MinSAT because they preserve satisfiability but not the number of unsatisfied clauses. To overcome this drawback, a MaxSAT resolution rule preserving the number of unsatisfied clauses was defined in the literature. This rule is complete for MaxSAT when it is applied following a certain strategy. In this paper we first prove that the MaxSAT resolution rule also provides a complete calculus for MinSAT if it is applied following (...) the strategy proposed here. We then describe an exact variable elimination algorithm for MinSAT based on that rule. Finally, we show how the results for Boolean MinSAT can be extended to solve the MinSAT problem of the multiple-valued clausal forms known as signed conjunctive normal form formulas. (shrink)

The question of Theodicy demands a reasonable justification of the nature, structures and goals of evil and suffering in the world. The paper attempts to explain the reasons for its presence in our lives and seeks to unveil its principles. If God is all knowing, almighty and also merciful, we must face the problem of the presence of evil and suffering in this world. The main goal of the paper is to show the way the New Testament deals with this (...) question, and further to show to what extent it has influenced the life of Christians from the point of view of teleology. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that a corollary of resolute readings of Wittgenstein’s conception of nonsense cannot be sustained. First, I describe the corollary. Next, I point out the relevance to it of Wittgenstein’s discussion of family resemblance concepts. Then, I survey some typical uses of nonsense to see what they bring to an ordinary language treatment of the word “nonsense” and its relatives. I will subsequently consider the objection, on behalf of a resolute reading, that “nonsense” (...) is a term of philosophical criticism. Finally, I conclude that resolute readings have not sufficiently accounted for how nonsense behaves in our language; they have failed to heed Wittgenstein’s warning: “don’t think, but look!”. (shrink)

The uniqueness of Psychiatry as a medical speciality lies in the fact that aside from tackling what it considers as illnesses, it has perchance to comment on and tackle many issues of social relevance as well. Whether this is advisable or not is another matter; but such a process is inevitable due to the inherent nature of the branch and the problems it deals with. Moreover this is at the root of the polarization of psychiatry into opposing psychosocial and biological (...) schools. This gets reflected in their visualization of scope, in definitions and in methodology as well. Whilst healthy criticism of one against the other school is necessary, there should be caution against hasty application of one's frame of reference to an approach that does not intend to follow, or conform to, one's methodology. This should be done within the referential framework of the school critically evaluated, with due consideration for its methods and concepts. Similarly, as at present, there is no evidence to prove one or the other of these approaches as better, aside from personal choice. We can say so even if there is a strong paradigm shift towards the biological at present. A renaissance of scientific psychoanalysis coupled with a perceptive neurobiology which can translate those insights into testable hypotheses holds the greatest promise for psychiatry in the future. This suggests the need for unification of diverse appearing approaches to get a more comprehensive and enlightened worldview. It requires a highly integrative capacity. Just as a physicist thinks simultaneously in terms of particles and waves, a psychiatrist must think of motives, emotions and desires in the same breath as neurobiology, genetics and psychopharmacology. However, the integration must be attempted without destroying the internal cohesiveness of the individual schools. This will give a fair chance for polarization in which a single proper approach in psychiatry could emerge, which may be a conglomerate of diverse appearing approaches of today, or one which supersedes the rest. A synthesis of cognitive psychology and neuroscience offers the greatest promise at present. (shrink)

Down syndrome (DS), the most common genetic cause of intellectual disability, results from the partial or complete triplication of chromosome 21. Individuals with DS are impaired at using a high-resolution, allocentric spatial representation to learn and remember discrete locations in a controlled environment. Here, we assessed the capacity of individuals with DS to perform low-resolution spatial learning, depending on two competing memory systems: (1) the place learning system, which depends on the hippocampus and creates flexible relational representations of (...) the environment; and (2) the response learning system, which depends on the striatum and creates fixed stimulus-response representations of behavioral actions. Individuals with DS exhibited a preservation of the low-resolution spatial learning capacities subserved by these two systems. In place learning, although the average performance of individuals with DS was lower than that of typically-developing (TD) mental age-matched children and TD young adults, the number of individuals with DS performing above chance level did not differ from TD children. In response learning, the average performance of individuals with DS was lower than that of TD adults, but it did not differ from that of TD children. Moreover, the number of individuals with DS performing above chance level did not differ from TD adults, and was higher than that of TD children. In sum, whereas low-resolution place learning appears relatively preserved in individuals with DS, response learning appears facilitated. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the neural pathways supporting low-resolution place learning and response learning are relatively preserved in DS. (shrink)

Traditionally, weakness of will has been identified with an agent acting contrary to her better judgment, or akrasia. Recent empirical findings, however, have led many to conclude that the folk concept of WOW is not amenable to necessary and sufficient conditions. To this end, it has been argued that WOW attributions point to a cluster concept :341–360, 2012), a disjunctive account of WOW as either judgment or resolution violation :391–404, 2010), and a two-tiered account including both failures to adhere (...) to commitments as well as failures to commit :3935–3954, 2014). Contrary to these views, I argue that there is indeed an underlying unifying feature of the folk concept of WOW. In particular, I argue that WOW is a matter of violating one’s salient reasons for action. I develop and defend this account in three stages. First, I introduce the theory philosophically, by critiquing the traditional view, i.e. judgment violation, as well as its initial competitor, Holton’s :241–262, 1999; Willing, wanting, waiting, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) view of resolution violation. I then turn to the empirical case for Salient Reasons Violation, arguing that the view best fits the data concerning folk attributions of WOW. Importantly, I argue that folk attributions unsurprisingly include violations of reasons that the attributor finds salient, even when the agent in the case may not. Finally, I turn to an explanatory account of Salient Reasons Violation, which moves beyond establishing the contours of our concept, by providing an explanation as to why the concept functions as it does. (shrink)

Given the endowment effect, the role of attention in decision-making, and the framing effect, most behavioral economists agree that it would be a mistake to accept the satisfaction of revealed preferences as the normative criterion of choice. Some have suggested that what makes agents better off is not the satisfaction of revealed preferences, but ‘true’ preferences, which may not always be observed through choice. While such preferences may appear to be an improvement over revealed preferences, some philosophers of economics have (...) argued that they face insurmountable epistemological, normative, and methodological challenges. This article introduces a new kind of true preference – values-based preferences – that blunts these challenges. Agents express values-based preferences when they choose in a manner that is compatible with a consumption plan grounded in a value commitment that is normative, affective, and stable for the agent who has one. Agents who choose according to their plans are resolute choosers. My claim is that while values-based preferences do not apply to every choice situation, this kind of preference provides a rigorous way for thinking about classic choice situations that have long interested behavioral economists and philosophers of economics, such as ‘Joe-in-the-cafeteria.’. (shrink)

Coreference resolution is the task of finding all expressions that refer to the same entity in a text. It is one of the higher level NLP (Natural Language Processing) tasks. It allows, for example, to extract more information about medical products from larger texts. A product such as ‘ambidextrous gloves’ may appear in a text in many different forms. For example, they could be referred to by the pronoun ‘they’, such as in this sentence. The algorithm presented in this (...) paper finds pronouns and for each of them (except the pleonastic ‘it’) it creates a coreference candidate with entities that appeared earlier in the same sentence or in the previous sentence. Each candidate (pair of mentions) is described by 48 binary features which represent their grammatical and location properties. In the training set, each pair is marked as a coreference or not, based on which a decision tree classifier is trained. A classifier with a high precision of 0.94 and a decent recall of 0.61 were obtained on the training set, still with a good precision out of a sample of 0.64. (shrink)

We develop and study the complexity of propositional proof systems of varying strength extending resolution by allowing it to operate with disjunctions of linear equations instead of clauses. We demonstrate polynomial-size refutations for hard tautologies like the pigeonhole principle, Tseitin graph tautologies and the clique-coloring tautologies in these proof systems. Using interpolation we establish an exponential-size lower bound on refutations in a certain, considerably strong, fragment of resolution over linear equations, as well as a general polynomial upper bound (...) on interpolants in this fragment.We then apply these results to extend and improve previous results on multilinear proofs , as studied in [Ran Raz, Iddo Tzameret, The strength of multilinear proofs. Comput. Complexity ]. Specifically, we show the following:• Proofs operating with depth-3 multilinear formulas polynomially simulate a certain, considerably strong, fragment of resolution over linear equations.• Proofs operating with depth-3 multilinear formulas admit polynomial-size refutations of the pigeonhole principle and Tseitin graph tautologies. The former improve over a previous result that established small multilinear proofs only for the functional pigeonhole principle. The latter are different from previous proofs, and apply to multilinear proofs of Tseitin mod p graph tautologies over any field of characteristic 0. We conclude by connecting resolution over linear equations with extensions of the cutting planes proof system. (shrink)

The method of approximate reasoning using a fuzzy logic introduced by Baldwin (1978 a,b,c), is used to model human reasoning in the resolution of two well known paradoxes. It is shown how classical propositional logic fails to resolve the paradoxes, how multiple valued logic partially succeeds and that a satisfactory resolution is obtained with fuzzy logic. The problem of precise representation of vague concepts is considered in the light of the results obtained.

This paper sketches an approach to pronoun reference resolution in context based on a dynamic incremental semantics for NL in polymorphic type theory. Our set-up provides full incrementality of processing, and can handle salience and pronoun resolution in context. An implementation of the system in Haskell, in ‘literate programming’ style, exists. The full literate source code can be found at http://www.cwi.nl/ jve/papers/02/rric.

In order to investigate whether addressees can make immediate use of speaker‐based constraints during reference resolution, participant addressees' eye movements were monitored as they helped a confederate cook follow a recipe. Objects were located in the helper's area, which the cook could not reach, and the cook's area, which both could reach. Critical referring expressions matched one object (helper's area) or two objects (helper's and cook's areas), and were produced when the cook's hands were empty or full, which defined (...) the cook's reaching ability constraints. Helper's first and total fixations showed that they restricted their domain of interpretation to their own objects when the cook's hands were empty, and widened it to include the cook's objects only when the cook's hands were full. These results demonstrate that addressees can quickly take into account task‐relevant constraints to restrict their referential domain to referents that are plausible given the speaker's goals and constraints. (shrink)

A central concept for information retrieval is that of similarity. Although an information retrieval system is expected to return a set of documents most relevant to the query word(s), it is often described as returning a set of documents most similar to the query. The authors argue that in order to reason with similarity we need to model the concept of discriminating power. They offer a simple topological notion called resolution space that provides a rich mathematical framework for reasoning (...) with limited discriminating power, avoiding the vagueness paradox. (shrink)

Robert Fogelin has argued that in deep disagreements, resolution cannot be achieved by rational argumentation. In response, Richard Feldman has claimed that deep disagreements can be resolved in a similar way to more everyday disagreements. I argue that Feldman’s claim is based on a relatively superficial notion of “resolution” of a disagreement whereas the notion at stake in Fogelin’s argument is more substantive. Furthermore, I argue that Feldman’s reply is based on a particular reading of Fogelin’s argument. There (...) is an alternative reading, which takes the central concern to be the role of common ground in argumentation. Engaging with this version of Fogelin’s argument is also a worthwhile endeavour. (shrink)

Sheehan and coworkers have claimed [D. P. Sheehan et al., Found. Phys. 30, 1227 ; 32, 441 ; D. P. Sheehan, in Quantum Limits to the Second Law, AIP Conference Proceedings 643, p. 391] that a dilute gas trapped between an external shell and a gravitator can support a steady state in which energy flux by particles in one direction is balanced by energy flux by radiation in the opposite direction, and in which work can be extracted from an isothermal (...) heat reservoir, thereby violating the second law of thermodynamics. In this paper, we identify a fundamental error in their simulation and analysis of their model system that vitiates their conclusions. We analyze a simpler, exactly soluble, three-dimensional model of a very dilute gas in a gravitational field between two thermal reservoirs, and show that their conclusions are not supported for the simple model. We show that their method of simulation, when applied to either the simple model or their more complex model under simpler conditions where the answers are known, leads to unphysical results. We also show that, when appropriate sampling is done, their model gives results in accord with the second law and detailed balance. (shrink)

Rarely do ethics consults focus on genuine moral puzzlement in which people collectively wonder what is the right thing to do. Far more often, consults are about conflict. Each side knows quite well what is “right.” The problem is that the other side is too blind or stubborn to recognize it. And so the ethics consultant is called, perhaps in the hope that s/he will throw the weight of ethics toward one side and end the controversy so everyone can get (...) on with other business. Perhaps the greater problem in these scenarios is that even if one side “wins” by gaining the power to dictate what happens next, the toxicity permeating the relationships often markedly worsens and other conflicts erupt, major and minor. (shrink)

Folk psychology holds that resolving to do something is effective in resisting temptation. What is a resolution? Resolutions are often understood as two-tier intentions or an intention-desire pair. However, both accounts of resolution are subject to a problem. Why should we expect the second-order aspect of resolutions to resist temptation? Even if we posit that we have additional or independent reasons for the second-order intention or desire, these reasons will be insufficient in the face of temptation, because temptation (...) makes one’s reasons for acting on tempting desires very salient. From the first-person perspective there is no neutral deliberative space from which to take stock of reasons when being tempted. I conclude that rationally resisting temptation instead requires forestalling temptation through the practical virtue of resolve. Resolve understood as a virtue involves dispositions to deliberate and desire in accordance with one’s resolutions. (shrink)

More than ever do people seem entrenched in their intellectual positions despite a dearth of concerted and honest reflection upon them. This obstinacy presents a moral and rhetorical challenge—attempting persuasion through naked rational argumentation alone will prove fruitless. But we should not discount the role of the intellect in the fixation of even the least-reflectively formed beliefs. From the perspective of cognition, this fixation is proximately the result of interpretation. In the language of Thomism, this interpretive adherence to falsity consists (...) in a perverse process of discursive reasoning. To exposit the constitution of adherence to false interpretation, here we will draw on the traditions of Thomism, phenomenology, and semiotics. With the insights of these traditions, we will proceed: first, examining the process of interpretation itself; second, considering two different modes of interpretation; and third, situating interpretation in the context of the twofold movement of resolution. Through analyzing interpretation and resolution, we will demonstrate that obstinate intellectual insistence consists in two intellectual errors: adoption of the vague as sufficient for understanding; and reflexive confusions. In both cases, the error persists through the failure to pursue the twofold movement of resolution. (shrink)

Introduction -- Conceptual analysis of resolution -- Ontology development method -- Resolution of single observations -- Resolution of observation collections -- Ontology design patterns for resolution -- Ontology of resolution -- implementation stage -- Conclusion.

It is widely thought that, in §201 of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein reveals himself to oppose a definite view or theory of rule-following. I argue that, due to the self-undermining character of that section, no such interpretation should be accepted. Then I sketch a reading of Wittgenstein’s method that accounts for the paradoxical nature of §201, and I show how this methodology is realized in his remarks on following a rule.

The paper presents a new argument for epistemic permissivism. The version of permissivism that we defend is a moderate version that applies only to explicit doxastic attitudes. Drawing on Yalcin’s framework for modeling such attitudes, we argue that two fully rational subjects who share all their evidence, prior beliefs, and epistemic standards may still differ in the explicit doxastic attitudes that they adopt. This can happen because two such subjects may be sensitive to different questions. Thus, differing intellectual interests can (...) yield failures of uniqueness. This is not a merely pragmatic phenomenon. (shrink)