Search results for 'THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Thought Experiments (1992). Thought Experiments and the Epistemology of Laws. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22:15-4.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Yiftach J. H. Fehige & Harald Wiltsche (2012). The Body, Thought Experiments, and Phenomenology. In Thought Experiments in Philosophy, Science, and the Arts.
    An explorative contribution to the ongoing discussion of thought experiments. While endorsing the majority view that skepticism about thought experiments is not well justified, in what follows we attempt to show that there is a kind of “bodiliness” missing from current accounts of thought experiments. That is, we suggest a phenomenological addition to the literature. First, we contextualize our claim that the importance of the body in thought experiments has been widely underestimated. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. John Zeimbekis (2011). Thought Experiments and Mental Simulations. In Katerina Ierodiakonou & Sophie Roux (eds.), Thought Experiments in Methodological and Historical Contexts. Brill
    Thought experiments have a mysterious way of informing us about the world, apparently without examining it, yet with a great degree of certainty. It is tempting to try to explain this capacity by making use of the idea that in thought experiments, the mind somehow simulates the processes about which it reaches conclusions. Here, I test this idea. I argue that when they predict the outcomes of hypothetical physical situations, thought experiments cannot simulate physical (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Roy A. Sorensen (1992). Thought Experiments. Oxford University Press.
    Sorensen presents a general theory of thought experiments: what they are, how they work, what are their virtues and vices. On Sorensen's view, philosophy differs from science in degree, but not in kind. For this reason, he claims, it is possible to understand philosophical thought experiments by concentrating on their resemblance to scientific relatives. Lessons learned about scientific experimentation carry over to thought experiment, and vice versa. Sorensen also assesses the hazards and pseudo-hazards of (...) experiments. Although he grants that there are interesting ways in which the method leads us astray, he attacks most scepticism about thought experiments as arbitrary. They should be used, he says, as they generally are used--as part of a diversified portfolio of techniques. All of these devices are individually susceptible to abuse, fallacy, and error. Collectively, however, they provide a network of cross-checks that make for impressive reliability. (shrink)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   46 citations  
  5. Edouard Machery (2011). Thought Experiments and Philosophical Knowledge. Metaphilosophy 42 (3):191-214.
    : While thought experiments play an important role in contemporary analytic philosophy, much remains unclear about thought experiments. In particular, it is still unclear whether the judgments elicited by thought experiments can provide evidence for the premises of philosophical arguments. This article argues that, if an influential and promising view about the nature of the judgments elicited by thought experiments is correct, then many thought experiments in philosophy fail to provide (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  6. Simon Beck (2014). Transplant Thought-Experiments: Two Costly Mistakes in Discounting Them. South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):189-199.
    ‘Transplant’ thought-experiments, in which the cerebrum is moved from one body to another, have featured in a number of recent discussions in the personal identity literature. Once taken as offering confirmation of some form of psychological continuity theory of identity, arguments from Marya Schechtman and Kathleen Wilkes have contended that this is not the case. Any such apparent support is due to a lack of detail in their description or a reliance on predictions that we are in no (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  7. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Sara Praëm (2015). Philosophical Thought Experiments as Heuristics for Theory Discovery. Synthese 192 (9):2827-2842.
    The growing literature on philosophical thought experiments has so far focused almost exclusively on the role of thought experiments in confirming or refuting philosophical hypotheses or theories. In this paper we draw attention to an additional and largely ignored role that thought experiments frequently play in our philosophical practice: some thought experiments do not merely serve as means for testing various philosophical hypotheses or theories, but also serve as facilitators for conceiving and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson (2003). When Are Thought Experiments Poor Ones? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 34 (2):305-322.
    A characteristic of contemporary analytic philosophy is its ample use of thought experiments. We formulate two features that can lead one to suspect that a given thought experiment is a poor one. Although these features are especially in evidence within the philosophy of mind, they can, surprisingly enough, also be discerned in some celebrated scientific thought experiments. Yet in the latter case the consequences appear to be less disastrous. We conclude that the use of (...) experiments is more successful in science than in philosophy. (shrink)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  9. Jeremy Pierce (2013). Glasgow's Race Antirealism: Experimental Philosophy and Thought Experiments. Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (2):146-168.
    Joshua Glasgow argues against the existence of races. His experimental philosophy asks subjects questions involving racial categorization to discover the ordinary concept of race at work in their judgments. The results show conflicting information about the concept of race, and Glasgow concludes that the ordinary concept of race is inconsistent. I conclude, rather, that Glasgow’s results fit perfectly fine with a social-kind view of races as real social entities. He also presents thought experiments to show that social-kind views (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  25
    Simon Beck (2016). Technological Fictions and Personal Identity: On Ricoeur, Schechtman and Analytic Thought Experiments. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 47 (2):117-132.
    Paul Ricoeur and Marya Schechtman express grave doubts about the acceptability and informativeness of the thought-experiments employed by analytic philosophers (notably Derek Parfit) in the debate about personal identity, and for what appear to be related reasons. I consider their reasoning and argue that their reasons fail to justify their doubts. I go on to argue that, from this discussion of possible problems concerning select thought-experiments, something positive can be learned about personal identity.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  47
    Kristian Camilleri (2014). Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Thought Experiments in Science. Synthese 191 (8):1697-1716.
    This paper presents a critical analysis of Tamar Szabó Gendler’s view of thought experiments, with the aim of developing further a constructivist epistemology of thought experiments in science. While the execution of a thought experiment cannot be reduced to standard forms of inductive and deductive inference, in the process of working though a thought experiment, a logical argument does emerge and take shape. Taking Gendler’s work as a point of departure, I argue that performing (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  12. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2014). Intuitions in Science: Thought Experiments as Argument Pumps. In Anthony R. Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press 119-134.
    In this piece, I advocate and motivate a new understanding of thought experiments, which avoids problems with the rival accounts of Brown and Norton.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13.  12
    Michael T. Stuart (2016). Taming Theory with Thought Experiments: Understanding and Scientific Progress. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 58:24-33.
    I claim that one way thought experiments contribute to scientific progress is by increasing scientific understanding. Understanding does not have a currently accepted characterization in the philosophical literature, but I argue that we already have ways to test for it. For instance, current pedagogical practice often requires that students demonstrate being in either or both of the following two states: 1) Having grasped the meaning of some relevant theory, concept, law or model, 2) Being able to apply that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Simon Beck (2009). Martha Nussbaum and the Foundations of Ethics: Identity, Morality and Thought-Experiments. South African Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):261-270.
    Martha Nussbaum has argued in support of the view (supposedly that of Aristotle) that we can, through thought-experiments involving personal identity, find an objective foundation for moral thought without having to appeal to any authority independent of morality. I compare the thought-experiment from Plato’s Philebus that she presents as an example to other thought-experiments involving identity in the literature and argue that this reveals a tension between the sources of authority which Nussbaum invokes for (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  6
    Michael T. Stuart (2016). Norton and the Logic of Thought Experiments. Axiomathes 26 (4):451-466.
    John D. Norton defends an empiricist epistemology of thought experiments, the central thesis of which is that thought experiments are nothing more than arguments. Philosophers have attempted to provide counterexamples to this claim, but they haven’t convinced Norton. I will point out a more fundamental reason for reformulation that criticizes Norton’s claim that a thought experiment is a good one when its underlying logical form possesses certain desirable properties. I argue that by Norton’s empiricist standards, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  36
    Yiftach Fehige (2013). The Relativized a Priori and the Laboratory of the Mind: Towards a Neo-Kantian Account of Thought Experiments in Science. Epistemologia 36 (1):55-73.
    Building on a previously published contextualization of Marco Buzzoni’s Neo- Kantian account of scientific thought-experiments, this paper examines the explanatory power of this account. It is argued that Buzzoni’s account suffers from a number of shortcomings. Einstein’s clock-in-the-box thought experiment facilitates the demonstration of these deficits. In the light of both the identified inadequacies of Buzzoni’s account and the long-standing history of Kantian approaches to thought experiments, this paper finally sketches an alternative Neo-Kantian account. This (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  17.  11
    David Egan (2016). Literature and Thought Experiments. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 74 (2):139-150.
    Like works of literature, thought experiments present fictional narratives that prompt reflection in their readers. Because of these and other similarities, a number of philosophers have argued for a strong analogy between works of literary fiction and thought experiments, some going so far as to say that works of literary fiction are a species of thought experiment. These arguments are often used in defending a cognitivist position with regard to literature: thought experiments produce (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Michael J. Shaffer (forthcoming). “Filling In”, Thought Experiments and Intuitions. Episteme.
    Recently Timothy Williamson (2007) has argued that characterizations of the standard (i.e. intuition-based) philosophical practice of philosophical analysis are misguided because of the erroneous manner in which this practice has been understood. In doing so he implies that experimental critiques of the reliability of intuition are based on this misunderstanding of philosophical methodology and so have little or no bearing on actual philosophical practice or results. His main point is that the orthodox understanding of philosophical methodology is incorrect in that (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  44
    Letitia Meynell (2014). Imagination and Insight: A New Acount of the Content of Thought Experiments. Synthese 191 (17):4149-4168.
    This paper motivates, explains, and defends a new account of the content of thought experiments. I begin by briefly surveying and critiquing three influential accounts of thought experiments: James Robert Brown’s Platonist account, John Norton’s deflationist account that treats them as picturesque arguments, and a cluster of views that I group together as mental model accounts. I use this analysis to motivate a set of six desiderata for a new approach. I propose that we treat (...) experiments primarily as aesthetic objects, specifically fictions, and then use this analysis to characterize their content and ultimately assess their epistemic success. Taking my starting point from Kendall Walton’s account of representation (Mimesis as make-believe, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990), I argue that the best way to understand the content of thought experiments is to treat them as props for imagining fictional worlds. Ultimately, I maintain that, in terms of their form and content, thought experiments share more with literary fictions and pictorial representations than with either argumentation or observations of the Platonic realm. Moreover, while they inspire imaginings, thought experiments themselves are not mental kinds. My approach redirects attention towards what fixes the content of any given thought experiment and scrutinizes the assumptions, cognitive capacities and conventions that generate them. This view helps to explain what seems plausible about Brown’s, Norton’s, and the mental modelers’ views. (shrink)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  50
    Aspasia S. Moue, Kyriakos A. Masavetas & Haido Karayianni (2006). Tracing the Development of Thought Experiments in the Philosophy of Natural Sciences. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (1):61 - 75.
    An overview is provided of how the concept of the thought experiment has developed and changed for the natural sciences in the course of the 20th century. First, we discuss the existing definitions of the term 'thought experiment' and the origin of the thought experimentation method, identifying it in Greek Presocratics epoch. Second, only in the end of the 19th century showed up the first systematic enquiry on thought experiments by Ernst Mach's work. After the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  21.  67
    Marcus Schulzke (2014). Simulating Philosophy: Interpreting Video Games as Executable Thought Experiments. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Technology 27 (2):251-265.
    This essay proposes an alternative way of studying video games: as thought experiments akin to the narrative thought experiments that are frequently used in philosophy. This perspective incorporates insights from the narratological and ludological perspectives in game studies and highlights the philosophical significance of games. Video game thought experiments are similar to narrative thought experiments in many respects and can perform the same functions. They also have distinctive advantages over narrative thought (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. James Maffie (1997). “Just-so” Stories About “Inner Cognitive Africa”: Some Doubts About Sorensen's Evolutionary Epistemology of Thought Experiments. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 12 (2):207-224.
    Roy Sorensen advances an evolutionary explanation of our capacity for thought experiments which doubles as a naturalized epistemological justification. I argue Sorensens explanation fails to satisfy key elements of environmental-selectionist explanations and so fails to carry epistemic force. I then argue that even if Sorensen succeeds in showing the adaptive utility of our capacity, he still fails to establish its reliability and hence epistemic utility. I conclude Sorensens account comes to little more than a just-so story.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23. David Atkinson (2003). When Are Thought Experiments Poor Ones? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 34 (2):305 - 322.
    A characteristic of contemporary analytic philosophy is its ample use of thought experiments. We formulate two features that can lead one to suspect that a given thought experiment is a poor one. Although these features are especially in evidence within the philosophy of mind, they can, surprisingly enough, also be discerned in some celebrated scientific thought experiments. Yet in the latter case the consequences appear to be less disastrous. We conclude that the use of (...) experiments is more successful in science than in philosophy. (shrink)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  54
    Hayley Clatterbuck (2013). The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: A Non-Eliminativist, Non-Platonic Account. [REVIEW] European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (3):309-329.
    Several major breakthroughs in the history of physics have been prompted not by new empirical data but by thought experiments. James Robert Brown and John Norton have developed accounts of how thought experiments can yield such advances. Brown argues that knowledge gained via thought experiments demands a Platonic explanation; thought experiments for Brown are a window into the Platonic realm of the laws of nature. Norton argues that thought experiments are (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  79
    Rafal Urbaniak (2012). “Platonic” Thought Experiments: How on Earth? Synthese 187 (2):731-752.
    Brown (The laboratory of the mind. Thought experiments in the natural science, 1991a , 1991b ; Contemporary debates in philosophy of science, 2004 ; Thought experiments, 2008 ) argues that thought experiments (TE) in science cannot be arguments and cannot even be represented by arguments. He rest his case on examples of TEs which proceed through a contradiction to reach a positive resolution (Brown calls such TEs “platonic”). This, supposedly, makes it impossible to represent (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  49
    Margaret Schabas (2008). Hume's Monetary Thought Experiments. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):161-169.
    Contemporary economists deem virtually every piece of reasoning and argumentation in economics a model, forgetting that there may well be other conceptual tools at hand. This article demonstrates that David Hume used thought experiments to make some remarkable breakthroughs in monetary economics, and that this resolves a longstanding debate about an apparent inconsistency in Hume, between the neutrality and non-neutrality of money. In the actual world, money is never neutral for Hume; only in thought experiments does (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27. Yiftach J. H. Fehige (2011). Gedankenexperimente in der Offenbarungstheologie? Eine Erste Annäherung/ Thought Experiments in Revealed Theology? A First Approach. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 59 (1):209-229.
    Thought experiments play an important cognitive role in many fields of inquiry, especially in physics and philosophy. Do they also matter in revealed theology? In addressing this question, I will argue first why it is important to do so, then elaborate on the characteristic features of such thought experiments in revealed theology, and finally discuss two instances of thought experimenting in Augustine.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  33
    Yiftach J. H. Fehige (2012). 'Experiments of Pure Reason': Kantianism and Thought Experiments in Science. Epistemologia 35 (1):141-160.
    Marco Buzzoni has presented a Kantian account of thought experiments in science as a serious rival to the current empiricist and Platonic accounts. This paper takes the first steps of a comprehensive assessment of this account in order to further the more general discussion of the feasibility of a Kantian theory of scientific thought experiments. Such a discussion is overdue. To this effect the broader question is addressed as to what motivates a Kantian approach. Buzzoni's account (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  50
    Robert Klee (2008). Physical Scale Effects and Philosophical Thought Experiments. Metaphilosophy 39 (1):89–104.
    The scales across which physical properties exist are vast and subtle in their effects on particular systems placed locally on such scales. For example, human experiential access is restricted only to partial segments of the mass density, size, and temperature scales of the universe. I argue that philosophers must learn to appreciate better the effects of physical scales. Specifically, thought experiments in philosophy should be more sensitive to physical scale effects, because the conclusion of a thought experiment (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  23
    Martin Cohen (2005). Wittgenstein's Beetle and Other Classic Thought Experiments. Blackwell Pub..
    A is for Alice and astronomers arguing about acceleration -- B is for Bernard's body-exchange machine -- C is for the Catholic cannibal -- D is for Maxwell's demon -- E is for evolution (and an embarrassing problem with it) -- F is for the forms lost forever to the prisoners of the cave -- G is for Galileo's gravitational balls -- H is for Hume's shades -- I is for the identity of indiscernibles -- J is for Henri Poincaré (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  27
    Katerina Ierodiakonou & Sophie Roux (eds.) (2011). Thought Experiments in Methodological and Historical Contexts. Brill.
    Thought experiments being central to contemporary philosophy and science, the following questions were asked in recent literature. What is their definition? Are they heuristic devices, arguments, paradoxes? Are they comparable to real experiments? Do intuition and conceivability intervene? Equally imaginative thought experiments are found in ancient, medieval, and Renaissance texts. Paying attention to prime historical examples of thought experiments, we show that historical perspectives help answer these general questions.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  67
    James Robert Brown (1991). The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the Natural Sciences. Routledge.
    The book concludes with chapters on the nature of Einstein's work and on the interpretation of quantum mechanics which stand as a test of the author's central ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   37 citations  
  33. Kirk Ludwig (2007). The Epistemology of Thought Experiments : First Person Versus Third Person Approaches. In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Blackwell Pub. Inc. 128-159.
    There has been a movement recently to bring to bear on the conduct of philosophical thought experiments 1 the empirical techniques of the social sciences, that is, to treat their conduct as in the nature of an anthropological investigation into the application conditions of the concepts of a group of subjects. This is to take a third person, in contrast to the traditional first person, approach to conceptual analysis. This has taken the form of conducting surveys about scenarios (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   77 citations  
  34.  44
    Nenad Miscevic (2013). A Hierarchy of Armchairs: Gerald Gaus on Political Thought Experiments. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (1):52-63.
    The paper places the work of G. Gaus into the tradition of political thought experimenting. In particular, his strategy of modeling moral decision by the heuristic device of idealized Members of the Public is presented as an iterated thought experiment, which stands in marked contrast with more traditional devices like the veil of ignorance. The consequences are drawn, and issues of utopianism and realism briefly discussed.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Thomas Grundmann & Joachim Horvath (2014). Erratum To: Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant Realizations. Philosophical Studies 170 (3):535-536.
    Erratum to: Philos Stud DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0226-3Dear Reader, due to production systems the following changes could not be made to this article:In the paragraph immediately preceding the case description (ford-iii), the sentenceHere we explicitly state that Smith’s inference is based only on his belief that Jones owns a Ford, and that this logical inference provides Smith’s only justification for believing that someone in his office owns a Ford (to make things fully precise, we also add a time index).should be replaced withHere (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36.  25
    Thomas Grundmann & Joachim Horvath (2014). Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant Realizations. Philosophical Studies 170 (3):525-533.
    Descriptions of Gettier cases can be interpreted in ways that are incompatible with the standard judgment that they are cases of justified true belief without knowledge. Timothy Williamson claims that this problem cannot be avoided by adding further stipulations to the case descriptions. To the contrary, we argue that there is a fairly simple way to amend the Ford case, a standard description of a Gettier case, in such a manner that all deviant interpretations are ruled out. This removes one (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37.  19
    Roger N. Shepard (2008). The Step to Rationality: The Efficacy of Thought Experiments in Science, Ethics, and Free Will. Cognitive Science 32 (1):3-35.
  38.  33
    James Robert Brown & Michael T. Stuart (2013). Katerina Ierodiakonou and Sophie Roux, Eds.Thought Experiments in Methodological and Historical Contexts. Leiden: Brill, 2011. Pp. Vii+233. €99.00. [REVIEW] Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 3 (1):154-157.
  39.  80
    Adrian Walsh (2011). A Moderate Defence of the Use of Thought Experiments in Applied Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):467-481.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  26
    Ian Winchester (1990). Thought Experiments and Conceptual Revision. Studies in Philosophy and Education 10 (1):73-80.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  9
    Sophie Roux (2011). Introduction : The Emergence of the Notion of Thought Experiments. In Katerina Ierodiakonou & Sophie Roux (eds.), Thought Experiments in Methodological and Historical Contexts. Brill
    Roux begins by exploring the texts in which the origins of the scientific notion of thought experiments are usually said to be found. Her general claim is simple: the emergence of the notion of thought experiments relies on a succession of misunderstandings and omissions. She then examines, in a more systematic perspective, the three characteristics of the broad category of thought experiments nowadays in circulation: thought experiments are counterfactual, they involve a concrete (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Michael T. Stuart, James Robert Brown & Yiftach Fehige (eds.) (2017). The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. Routledge.
  43.  87
    Soren Haggqvist (1998). Thought Experiments in Philosophy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1).
    Philosophy and science employ abstract hypothetical scenarios- thought experiments - to illustrate, defend, and dispute theoretical claims. Since thought experiments furnish no new empirical observations, the method prompts two epistemological questions: whether anything may be learnt from the merely hypothetical, and, if so, how. Various sceptical arguments against the use of thought experiments in philosophy are discussed and criticized. The thesis that thought experiments in science provide a priori knowledge through non-sensory grasping (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  44. Elke Brendel (2004). Intuition Pumps and the Proper Use of Thought Experiments. Dialectica 58 (1):89–108.
    I begin with an explication of "thought experiment". I then clarify the role that intuitions play in thought experiments by addressing two important issues: (1) the informativeness of thought experiments and (2) the legitimacy of the method of thought experiments in philosophy and the natural sciences. I defend a naturalistic account of intuitions that provides a plausible explanation of the informativeness of thought experiments, which, in turn, allows thought experiments (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  45.  65
    Marco Buzzoni (2015). Causality, Teleology, and Thought Experiments in Biology. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (2):279-299.
    Thought experiments de facto play many different roles in biology: economical, ethical, technical and so forth. This paper, however, is interested in whether there are any distinctive features of biological TEs as such. The question may be settled in the affirmative because TEs in biology have a function that is intimately connected with the epistemological and methodological status of biology. Peculiar to TEs in biology is the fact that the reflexive, typically human concept of finality may be profitably (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  28
    Marek Picha (2014). Apriorism, Psychologism, and Conceptualism About Thought Experiments. Dokos 2014 (1):27-47.
    Epistemological optimists about thought experiments hold that imagination could be under certain conditions source of epistemic justification. Their claim is usually based on one of three dominant conceptions about epistemic value of thought experiments. Apriorism states that imagination may serve as unique a priori source of new synthetic knowledge about the actual world. I argue against this view and show that apriorism is either too weak, or too strong or too vague. Psychologism is viable, yet not (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. David J. Cole (1984). Thought and Thought Experiments. Philosophical Studies 45 (May):431-44.
    Thought experiments have been used by philosophers for centuries, especially in the study of personal identity where they appear to have been used extensively and indiscriminately. Despite their prevalence, the use of thought experiments in this area of philosophy has been criticized in recent times. Bernard Williams criticizes the conclusions that are drawn from some experiments, and retells one of these experiments from a different perspective, a retelling which leads to a seemingly opposing result. (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  48. Tamara Horowitz & Gerald J. Massey (eds.) (1991). Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Despite their centrality and importance to both science and philosophy, relatively little has been written about thought experiments. This volume brings together a series of extremely interesting studies of the history, mechanics, and applications of this important intellectual resource. A distinguished list of philosophers and scientists consider the role of thought experiments in their various disciplines, and argue that an examination of thought experimentation goes to the heart of both science and philosophy.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  49. Simon Beck (2006). These Bizarre Fictions: Thought-Experiments, Our Psychology and Our Selves. Philosophical Papers 35 (1):29-54.
    Philosophers have traditionally used thought-experiments in their endeavours to find a satisfactory account of the self and personal identity. Yet there are considerations from empirical psychology as well as related ones from philosophy itself that appear to completely undermine the method of thought-experiment. This paper focuses on both sets of considerations and attempts a defence of the method.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  50. Stephen R. Coleman (2000). Thought Experiments and Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies 98 (1):51-66.
    Thought experiments are profitably compared to compasses. A compass is a simple but useful device for determining direction. Nevertheless, it systematically errs in the presence of magnets ...it becomes unreliable near the North Pole, in mine shafts, when vibrated, in the presence of metal ...experts will wish to use the compass as one element in a wider portfolio of navigational techniques. Analogously, thought experiments are simple but useful devices for determining the status of propositions. Sadly, they (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000