Search results for 'anti-luminosity' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Murali Ramachandran, Anti-Luminosity.
    Timothy Williamson (2000) reckons that hardly any mental state is luminous, i.e. is such that if one were in it, then one would invariably be in a position to know that one was. This paper examines an argument he presents against the luminosity of feeling cold, which he claims generalizes to other phenomenal states, such as e.g. being in pain. As we shall see, the argument fails. However, our deliberations do yield two anti-luminosity results: a simple refutation of the (...)
     
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  2. Murali Ramachandran (2009). Anti-Luminosity: Four Unsuccessful Strategies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):659-673.
    In KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS Timothy Williamson argues against the luminosity of phenomenal states in general by way of arguing against the luminosity of feeling cold, that is, against the view that if one feels cold, one is at least in a position to know that one does. In this paper I consider four strategies that emerge from his discussion, and argue that none succeeds.
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  3. Anthony Brueckner & M. Oreste Fiocco (2002). Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):285–293.
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  4.  60
    Thomas A. Blackson (2007). On Williamson's Argument for (Ii) in His Anti-Luminosity Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):397-405.
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  5.  82
    Wai-hung Wong (2008). What Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument Really Is. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):536-543.
    Abstract: Williamson argues that when one feels cold, one may not be in a position to know that one feels cold. He thinks this argument can be generalized to show that no mental states are such that when we are in them we are in a position to know that we are in them. I argue that his argument is a sorites argument in disguise because it relies on the implicit premise that warming up is gradual. Williamson claims that his (...)
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  6.  21
    Brueckner Anthony (2002). Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument. Philosophical Studies 110 (3).
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  7. Carmelo di Primo, Gaston H. U. I. Bon Hoa, Pierre Douzou & Stephen Sligar (forthcoming). What Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument Really Is. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
     
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  8. Kelly Becker (2009). Margins for Error and Sensitivity: What Nozick Might Have Said. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 24 (1):17-31.
    Timothy Williamson has provided damaging counterexamples to Robert Nozick’s sensitivity principle. The examples are based on Williamson’s anti-luminosity arguments, and they show how knowledge requires a margin for error that appears to be incompatible with sensitivity. I explain how Nozick can rescue sensitivity from Williamson’s counterexamples by appeal to a specific conception of the methods by which an agent forms a belief. I also defend the proposed conception of methods against Williamson’s criticisms.
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  9. Julien Dutant & Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Just Do It? When to Do What You Judge You Ought to Do. Synthese:1-18.
    While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role (...)
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  10.  80
    Elia Zardini (2013). Luminosity and Determinacy. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):765-786.
    The paper discusses some ways in which the phenomenon of borderline cases may be thought to bear on the traditional philosophical idea that certain domains of facts are fully open to our view. The discussion focusses on a very influential argument (due to Tim Williamson) to the effect that, roughly, no such domains of luminous facts exist. Many commentators have felt that the vagueness unavoidably inherent in the description of the facts that are best candidates for being luminous plays an (...)
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  11. Nicholas Silins (2012). Judgment as a Guide to Belief. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press
  12. Selim Berker (2008). Luminosity Regained. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (2):1-22.
    The linchpin of Williamson (2000)'s radically externalist epistemological program is an argument for the claim that no non-trivial condition is luminous—that no non-trivial condition is such that whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know that it obtains. I argue that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument succeeds only if one assumes that, even in the limit of ideal reflection, the obtaining of the condition in question and one's beliefs about that condition can be radically disjoint from one another. However, (...)
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  13.  66
    Ralph Wedgwood (2014). Rationality as a Virtue. Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):319-338.
    A concept that can be expressed by the term ‘rationality’ plays a central role in both epistemology and ethics -- and especially in formal epistemology and decision theory. It is argued here that when the term is used in this way, the concept of “rationality” is the concept of a kind of virtue, with all the central features that are ascribed to the virtues by Plato and Aristotle, among others. Interpreting rationality as a kind of virtue helps to solve several (...)
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  14.  44
    Elia Zardini (2012). Luminosity and Vagueness. Dialectica 66 (3):375-410.
    The paper discusses some ways in which vagueness and its phenomena may be thought to impose certain limits on our knowledge and, more specifically, may be thought to bear on the traditional philosophical idea that certain domains of facts are luminous, i.e., roughly, fully open to our view. The discussion focuses on a very influential argument to the effect that almost no such interesting domains exist. Many commentators have felt that the vagueness unavoidably inherent in the description of the facts (...)
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  15.  76
    Christoph Jäger (2009). Affective Ignorance. Erkenntnis 71 (1):123 - 139.
    According to one of the most influential views in the philosophy of self-knowledge each person enjoys some special cognitive access to his or her own current mental states and episodes. This view faces two fundamental tasks. First, it must elucidate the general conceptual structure of apparent asymmetries between beliefs about one’s own mind and beliefs about other minds. Second, it must demarcate the mental territory for which first-person-special-access claims can plausibly be maintained. Traditional candidates include sensations, experiences (of various kinds), (...)
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  16.  61
    Julien Dutant (2007). Inexact Knowledge, Margin for Error and Positive Introspection. Proceedings of Tark XI.
    Williamson (2000a) has argued that posi- tive introspection is incompatible with in- exact knowledge. His argument relies on a margin-for-error requirement for inexact knowledge based on a intuitive safety prin- ciple for knowledge, but leads to the counter- intuitive conclusion that no possible creature could have both inexact knowledge and posi- tive introspection. Following Halpern (2004) I put forward an alternative margin-for-error requirement that preserves the safety require- ment while blocking Williamson’s argument. I argue that the infallibilist conception of knowledge (...)
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  17.  83
    Earl Conee (2005). The Comforts of Home. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):444–451.
    The paper argues against Timothy Williamson's anti-luminosity argument. It also offers an argument against luminosity from the possibility of defeat of introspective justification.
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  18.  93
    Duncan Pritchard (2010). The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. Oxford University Press.
    The value problem -- Unpacking the value problem -- The swamping problem -- fundamental and non-fundamental epistemic goods -- The relevance of epistemic value monism -- Responding to the swamping problem I : the practical response -- Responding to the swamping problem II : the monistic response -- Responding to the swamping problem III : the pluralist response -- Robust virtue epistemology -- Knowledge and achievement -- Interlude : is robust virtue epistemology a reductive theory of knowledge? -- Achievement without (...)
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  19.  93
    Amia Srinivasan (2015). Are We Luminous? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):294-319.
    Since its appearance over a decade ago, Timothy Williamson's anti-luminosity argument has come under sustained attack. Defenders of the luminous overwhelmingly object to the argument's use of a certain margin-for-error premise. Williamson himself claims that the premise follows easily from a safety condition on knowledge together with his description of the thought experiment. But luminists argue that this is not so: the margin-for-error premise either requires an implausible interpretation of the safety requirement on knowledge, or it requires other equally (...)
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  20.  75
    Kevin Meeker & Ted Poston (2010). Skeptics Without Borders. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (3):223.
    Timothy Williamson’s anti luminosity argument has received considerable attention. Escaping unnoticed, though, is a strikingly similar argument from David Hume. This paper highlights some of the arresting parallels between Williamson’s reasoning and Hume’s that will allow us to appreciate more deeply the plausibility of Williamson’s reasoning and to understand how, following Hume, we can extend this reasoning to undermine the “luminosity” of simple necessary truths. More broadly the parallels help us to identify a common skeptical predicament underlying both arguments, which (...)
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  21. Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.) (2015). Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    Written by an international team of leading scholars, this collection of thirteen new essays explores the implications of semantic externalism for self-knowledge and skepticism, bringing recent developments in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, and epistemology to bear on the issue. Structured in three parts, the collection looks at self-knowledge, content transparency, and then meta-semantics and the nature of mental content. The chapters examine a wide range of topics in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, (...)
     
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  22.  62
    J. Adam Carter & Bolesław Czarnecki (forthcoming). (Anti)-Anti-Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti-intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge-how to φ. John Bengson & Marc Moffett (2009; 2011a; 2011b) and Carlotta Pavese (2015a; 2015b) have embraced precisely this strategy (...)
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  23. K. Brad Wray (2013). Success and Truth in the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate. Synthese 190 (9):1719-1729.
    I aim to clarify the relationship between the success of a theory and the truth of that theory. This has been a central issue in the debates between realists and anti-realists. Realists assume that success is a reliable indicator of truth, but the details about the respects in which success is a reliable indicator or test of truth have been largely left to our intuitions. Lewis (Synthese 129:371–380, 2001) provides a clear proposal of how success and truth might be connected, (...)
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  24.  14
    Harjit Bhogal (forthcoming). Minimal Anti-Humeanism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    There is a tension in our theorizing about laws of nature: our practice of using and reasoning with laws of nature suggests that laws are universal generalizations, but if laws are universal generalizations then we face the problem of explanatory circularity. In this paper I elucidate this tension and show how it motivates a view of laws that I call Minimal Anti-Humeanism. This view says that the laws are the universal generalizations that are not grounded in their instances. I argue (...)
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  25. Jeffrey Roland & Jon Cogburn (2011). Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths. Philosophia 39 (3):547-561.
    That believing truly as a matter of luck does not generally constitute knowing has become epistemic commonplace. Accounts of knowledge incorporating this anti-luck idea frequently rely on one or another of a safety or sensitivity condition. Sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge have a well-known problem with necessary truths, to wit, that any believed necessary truth trivially counts as knowledge on such accounts. In this paper, we argue that safety-based accounts similarly trivialize knowledge of necessary truths and that two ways of responding (...)
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  26.  30
    Ole Thomassen Hjortland (forthcoming). Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic. Philosophical Studies:1-28.
    Logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn’t a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position is most famously defended by Quine, but has more recent advocates in Maddy, Priest, Russell, and Williamson. Although these authors agree on many methodological issues about logic, (...)
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  27. Yitzhak Y. Melamed (2010). Spinoza's Anti-Humanism. In Smith Justin & Fraenkel Carlos (eds.), The Rationalists. Springer/Synthese
    A common perception of Spinoza casts him as one of the precursors, perhaps even founders, of modern humanism and Enlightenment thought. Given that in the twentieth century, humanism was commonly associated with the ideology of secularism and the politics of liberal democracies, and that Spinoza has been taken as voicing a “message of secularity” and as having provided “the psychology and ethics of a democratic soul” and “the decisive impulse to… modern republicanism which takes it bearings by the dignity of (...)
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  28.  31
    Duncan Pritchard (forthcoming). Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Defeat. Synthese:1-13.
    This paper explores how a certain theory of knowledge—known as anti-luck virtue epistemology—can account for, and in the process shed light on, the notion of an epistemic defeater. To this end, an overview of the motivations for anti-luck virtue epistemology is offered, along with a taxonomy of different kinds of epistemic defeater. It is then shown how anti-luck virtue epistemology can explain: why certain kinds of putative epistemic defeater are not bona fide; how certain kinds of epistemic defeater are genuine (...)
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  29.  83
    Stephen Biggs & Jessica M. Wilson (forthcoming). Carnap, the Necessary a Priori, and Metaphysical Anti-Realism. In Stephen Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.), Ontology after Carnap.
    (August 2015 final pre-publication version!) In Meaning and Necessity (1947/1950), Carnap advances an intensional semantic framework on which modal claims are true in virtue of semantical rules alone, and so are a priori. In 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' (1950), Carnap advances an epistemic-ontological framework on which metaphysical claims are either trivial or meaningless, since lacking any means of substantive confirmation. Carnap carried out these projects two decades before Kripke influentially argued, in Naming and Necessity (1972/1980), that some modal claims are (...)
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  30. Pierre Steiner (2014). Enacting Anti-Representationalism. The Scope and the Limits of Enactive Critiques of Representationalism. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):43-86.
    I propose a systematic survey of the various attitudes proponents of enaction (or enactivism) entertained or are entertaining towards representationalism and towards the use of the concept “mental representation” in cognitive science. For the sake of clarity, a set of distinctions between different varieties of representationalism and anti-representationalism are presented. I also recapitulate and discuss some anti-representationalist trends and strategies one can find the enactive literature, before focusing on some possible limitations of eliminativist versions of enactive anti-representationalism. These limitations are (...)
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  31. Feng Ye (2010). What Anti-Realism in Philosophy of Mathematics Must Offer. Synthese 175 (1):13 - 31.
    This article attempts to motivate a new approach to anti-realism (or nominalism) in the philosophy of mathematics. I will explore the strongest challenges to anti-realism, based on sympathetic interpretations of our intuitions that appear to support realism. I will argue that the current anti-realistic philosophies have not yet met these challenges, and that is why they cannot convince realists. Then, I will introduce a research project for a new, truly naturalistic, and completely scientific approach to philosophy of mathematics. It belongs (...)
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  32. Eric Dietrich & Julietta Rose (2009). The Paradox of Consciousness and the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate. Logos Architekton 3 (1):7-37.
    Beginning with the paradoxes of zombie twins, we present an argument that dualism is both true and false. We show that avoiding this contradiction is impossible. Our diagnosis is that consciousness itself engenders this contradiction by producing contradictory points of view. This result has a large effect on the realism/anti-realism debate, namely, it suggests that this debate is intractable, and furthermore, it explains why this debate is intractable. We close with some comments on what our results mean for metaphysics and (...)
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  33.  57
    Rafik Z. Elias (2009). The Impact of Anti-Intellectualism Attitudes and Academic Self-Efficacy on Business Students' Perceptions of Cheating. Journal of Business Ethics 86 (2):199 - 209.
    College cheating represents a major ethical problem facing students and educators, especially in colleges of business. The current study surveys 666 business students in three universities to examine potential determinants of cheating perceptions. Anti-intellectualism refers to a student’s negative view of the value and importance of intellectual pursuits and critical thinking. Academic self-efficacy refers to a student’s belief in one’s ability to accomplish an academic task. As hypothesized, students high in anti-intellectualism attitudes and those with low academic self-efficacy were least (...)
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  34.  23
    Duško Prelević (2015). Zombies Slap Back: Why the Anti-Zombie Parody Does Not Work. Disputatio 7 (40):25–43.
    In his ‘anti-zombie argument’, Keith Frankish turns the tables on ‘zombists’, forcing them to find an independent argument against the conceivability of anti-zombies. I argue that zombists can shoulder the burden, for there is an important asymmetry between the conceivability of zombies and the conceivability of anti-zombies, which is reflected in the embedding of a totality-clause under the conceivability operator. This makes the anti-zombie argument susceptible to what I call the ‘Modified Incompleteness’, according to which we cannot conceive of scenarios. (...)
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  35.  19
    Otávio Bueno (2016). An Anti-Realist Account of the Application of Mathematics. Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2591-2604.
    Mathematical concepts play at least three roles in the application of mathematics: an inferential role, a representational role, and an expressive role. In this paper, I argue that, despite what has often been alleged, platonists do not fully accommodate these features of the application of mathematics. At best, platonism provides partial ways of handling the issues. I then sketch an alternative, anti-realist account of the application of mathematics, and argue that this account manages to accommodate these features of the application (...)
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  36.  11
    Diana Stuart & Michelle R. Worosz (2012). Risk, Anti-Reflexivity, and Ethical Neutralization in Industrial Food Processing. Agriculture and Human Values 29 (3):287-301.
    While innovations have fostered the mass production of food at low costs, there are externalities or side effects associated with high-volume food processing. We focus on foodborne illness linked to two commodities: ground beef and bagged salad greens. In our analysis, we draw from the concepts of risk, reflexive modernization, and techniques of ethical neutralization. For each commodity, we find that systems organized for industrial goals overlook how production models foster cross-contamination and widespread outbreaks. Responses to outbreaks tend to rely (...)
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  37. Jack Reynolds (2013). Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics: Complementary Anti-Theoretical Methodological and Ethical Trajectories? In K. Hermberg P. Gyllenhammer (ed.), Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics. Continuum
    In this paper, I argue that the negative injunctions against certain ways of conceiving of the ethico-political that we can draw explicitly from the methodological strictures of phenomenology are also consistent with some of the core more positive dimensions of contemporary virtue ethics (especially at the more anti-theoretical end of the virtue ethical spectrum), and that central aspects of virtue ethics are consistent with most of the explicit reflections on ethical matters proffered by canonical phenomenologists.
     
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  38.  42
    Christopher Bobier (2014). Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and Divine Revelation. Philosophia 42 (2):309-320.
    Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (ALVE) states that for S to have knowledge, S must have a virtuously formed safe true belief. S’s belief that p is safe if, in most near-by possible worlds where S’s belief is formed in the same manner as in the actual world, S’s belief is true. S’s safe belief that p is virtuously formed if S’s safe belief is formed using reliable and well-integrated cognitive processes and it is to S’s credit that she formed the belief. (...)
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  39.  50
    Lawrence Lengbeyer (2004). Rhetoric and Anti-Semitism. Academic Questions 17 (2):22-32.
    Given that charges of anti-Semitism, racism, and the like continue to be potent weapons of moral and intellectual critique in our culture, it is important that we work toward a clear understanding about just what sorts of conduct and circumstances constitute these moral offenses. In particular, can criticism of a state (such as Israel), or other social or political institution or organization (such as the NAACP), ever amount to anti-Semitism, racism, or other bigotry against the people represented by or associated (...)
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  40.  56
    M. Rathjen (2001). Kripke-Platek Set Theory and the Anti-Foundation Axiom. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 47 (4):435-440.
    The paper investigates the strength of the Anti-Foundation Axiom, AFA, on the basis of Kripke-Platek set theory without Foundation. It is shown that the addition of AFA considerably increases the proof theoretic strength.
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  41. Endre Begby (2011). Concepts and Abilities in Anti-Individualism. Journal of Philosophy 108 (10):555-575.
  42.  49
    Stephen M. Campbell & Sven Nyholm (2015). Anti-Meaning and Why It Matters. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4): 694-711.
    It is widely recognized that lives and activities can be meaningful or meaningless, but few have appreciated that they can also be anti-meaningful. Anti-meaning is the polar opposite of meaning. Our purpose in this essay is to examine the nature and importance of this new and unfamiliar topic. In the first part, we sketch four theories of anti-meaning that correspond to leading theories of meaning. In the second part, we argue that anti-meaning has significance not only for our attempts to (...)
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  43. Kenneth R. Westphal (2007). Consciousness and its Transcendental Conditions: Kant’s Anti-Cartesian Revolt. In Lähteenmäki & Remes Heinämaa (ed.), Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy. Springer
    Kant was the first great anti-Cartesian in epistemology and philosophy of mind. He criticised five central tenets of Cartesianism and developed sophisticated alternatives to them. His transcendental analysis of the necessary a priori conditions for the very possibility of self-conscious human experience invokes externalism about justification and proves externalism about mental content. Semantic concern with the unity of the proposition—required for propositionally structured awareness and self-awareness—is central to Kant’s account of the unity of any cognitive judgment. The perceptual ‘binding problem’ (...)
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  44.  3
    Rodrigo Borges (2016). Bad Luck for the Anti‐Luck Epistemologist. Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (4):463-479.
    Anti-luck epistemologists tell us that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck and that epistemic luck is just a special case of luck in general. Much work has been done on the intricacies of the first claim. In this paper, I scrutinize the second claim. I argue that it does not survive scrutiny. I then offer an analysis of luck that explains the relevant data and avoids the problems from which the current views of luck suffer. However, this analysis of luck (...)
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  45. Imogen Dickie (2010). Negation, Anti-Realism, and the Denial Defence. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):161 - 185.
    Here is one argument against realism. (1) Realists are committed to the classical rules for negation. But (2) legitimate rules of inference must conserve evidence. And (3) the classical rules for negation do not conserve evidence. So (4) realism is wrong. Most realists reject 2. But it has recently been argued that if we allow denied sentences as premisses and conclusions in inferences we will be able to reject 3. And this new argument against 3 generates a new response to (...)
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  46.  62
    Heinrich Wansing (2012). A Non-Inferentialist, Anti-Realistic Conception of Logical Truth and Falsity. Topoi 31 (1):93-100.
    Anti-realistic conceptions of truth and falsity are usually epistemic or inferentialist. Truth is regarded as knowability, or provability, or warranted assertability, and the falsity of a statement or formula is identified with the truth of its negation. In this paper, a non-inferentialist but nevertheless anti-realistic conception of logical truth and falsity is developed. According to this conception, a formula (or a declarative sentence) A is logically true if and only if no matter what is told about what is told about (...)
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  47.  19
    Mark Schweda & Georg Marckmann (2013). How Do We Want to Grow Old? Anti‐Ageing‐Medicine and the Scope of Public Healthcare in Liberal Democracies. Bioethics 27 (7):357-364.
    Healthcare counts as a morally relevant good whose distribution should neither be left to the free market nor be simply imposed by governmental decisions without further justification. This problem is particularly prevalent in the current boom of anti-ageing medicine. While the public demand for medical interventions which promise a longer, healthier and more active and attractive life has been increasing, public healthcare systems usually do not cover these products and services, thus leaving their allocation to the mechanisms of supply and (...)
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  48.  22
    Thomas Porter (2011). Colburn on Anti-Perfectionism and Autonomy. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    I argue against the strategy recently proposed by Ben Colburn for reconciling two apparently conflicting theses, the “Autonomy Claim” and “Anti-Perfectionism.” The strategy turns on demonstrating that the conception of Anti-Perfectionism that captures the intuitions of most anti-perfectionists is not opposed to state promotion of what Colburn calls “second-order values,” and that autonomy is just such a value. I object that Anti-Perfectionism should be understood as opposed to some second-order values, and that autonomy is just such a value.
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  49.  96
    Jesse M. Mulder (2012). What Generates the Realism/Anti-Realism Dichotomy? Philosophica 84 (1):53-84.
    The most basic divide amongst analytic metaphysicians separates realists from anti-realists. By examining certain characteristic and problematic features of these two families of views, we uncover their underlying metametaphysicalorientations, which turn out to coincide. This shared philosophical picture that underlies both the realist and the anti-realist project we call the Modern Picture. It rests on a crucial distinction between reality as it is for us and reality as it is in itself. It is argued that this distinction indeed generates the (...)
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  50.  81
    Jan Willem Wieland (2010). Anti-Positionalism's Regress. Axiomathes 20 (4):479-493.
    This paper is about the Problem of Order, which is basically the problem how to account for both the distinctness of facts like a’s preceding b and b’s preceding a, and the identity of facts like a’s preceding b and b’s succeeding a. It has been shown that the Standard View fails to account for the second part and is therefore to be replaced. One of the contenders is Anti-Positionalism. As has recently been pointed out, however, Anti-Positionalism falls prey to (...)
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