Search results for 'belief reports' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Emar Maier (2009). Presupposing Acquaintance: A Unified Semantics for de Dicto, de Re and de Se Belief Reports. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (5):429--474.score: 180.0
    This paper deals with the semantics of de dicto , de re and de se belief reports. First, I flesh out in some detail the established, classical theories that assume syntactic distinctions between all three types of reports. I then propose a new, unified analysis, based on two ideas discarded by the classical theory. These are: (i) modeling the de re/de dicto distinction as a difference in scope, and (ii) analyzing de se as merely a special case (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Alessandro Capone (2008). Belief Reports and Pragmatic Intrusion: The Case of Null Appositives. Journal of Pragmatics 40:2019-2040.score: 180.0
  3. Paolo Bonardi (2013). Semantic Relationism, Belief Reports and Contradiction. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):273-284.score: 180.0
    In his book Semantic Relationism, Kit Fine propounds an original and sophisticated semantic theory called ‘semantic relationism’ or ‘relational semantics’, whose peculiarity is the enrichment of Kaplan’s, Salmon’s and Soames’ Russellian semantics (more specifically, the semantic content of simple sentences and the truth-conditions of belief reports) with coordination, “the very strongest relation of synonymy or being semantically the same”. In this paper, my goal is to shed light on an undesirable result of semantic relationism: a report like “Tom (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Emar Maier (2005). De Re and de Se in Quantified Belief Reports. In Sylvia Blaho, Luis Vicente & Erik Schoorlemmer (eds.), Proceedings of Console Xiii. 211-29.score: 180.0
    Percus & Sauerland (2003) use quantified belief reports of the form 'Only Peter thinks he's...' to argue for dedicated de se LFs. The argument is targeted against any reductionist account that sees de se as merely a particular subtype of de re, viz. a de re belief about oneself from a first person perspective, requiring nothing but an account of de re attitudes. My acquaintance resolution framework is an attempt at just such a reduction and in this (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Emar Maier (2006). Belief in Context: Towards a Unified Semantics of De Re and De Se Attitude Reports. Dissertation, Radboud University Nijmegenscore: 162.0
    This thesis deals with the phenomenon of attitude reporting. More specifically, it provides a unified semantics of de re and de se belief reports. After arguing that de se belief is best thought of as a special case of de re belief, I examine whether we can extend this unification to the realm of belief reports. I show how, despite very promising first steps, previous attempts in this direction ultimately fail with respect to some (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Kent Bach (1997). Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):215-241.score: 144.0
    The traditional puzzles about belief reports puzzles rest on a certain seemingly innocuous assumption, that 'that'-clauses specify belief contents. The main theories of belief reports also rest on this "Specification Assumption", that for a belief report of the form 'A believes that p' to be true,' the proposition that p must be among the things A believes. I use Kripke's Paderewski case to call the Specification Assumption into question. Giving up that assumption offers prospects (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. David M. Braun (1998). Understanding Belief Reports. Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.score: 132.0
    In this paper, I defend a well-known theory of belief reports from an important objection. The theory is Russellianism, sometimes also called `neo-Russellianism', `Millianism', `the direct reference theory', `the "Fido"-Fido theory', or `the naive theory'. The objection concernssubstitution of co-referring names in belief sentences. Russellianism implies that any two belief sentences, that differ only in containing distinct co-referring names, express the same proposition (in any given context). Since `Hesperus' and `Phosphorus' both refer to the planet Venus, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Heimir Geirsson (1998). True Belief Reports and the Sharing of Beliefs. Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (January):331-342.score: 132.0
    In recent years Russell´s view that there are singular propositions, namely propositions that contain the individuals they are about, has gained followers. As a response to a number of puzzles about attitude ascriptions several Russellians (as I will call those who accept the view that proper names and indexicals only contribute their referents to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which they occur), including David Kaplan and Nathan Salmon, have drawn a distinction between what proposition is believed and how (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Kent Bach (2000). A Puzzle About Belief Reports. In K. Jaszczolt (ed.), The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports. Elsevier.score: 126.0
    I'd like to present a puzzle about belief reports that's been nagging at me for several years. I've subjected many friends and audiences to various abortive attempts at solving it. Now it's time to get it off my chest and let others try their hand at it.<1>.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Gerry Hough (2013). Anti-Substitution Intuitions and the Content of Belief Reports. Acta Analytica:1-13.score: 120.0
    Philosophers of language traditionally take it that anti-substitution intuitions teach us about the content of belief reports. Jennifer Saul [1997, 2002 (with David Braun), 2007] challenges this lesson. Here I offer a response to Saul’s challenge. In the first two sections of the article, I present a common sense justification for drawing conclusions about content from anti-substitution intuitions. Then, in Sect. 3, I outline Saul’s challenge—what she calls ‘the Enlightenment Problem’. Finally, in Sect. 4, I argue that Saul’s (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Giacomo Turbanti (2010). Belief Reports: Defaults, Intentions and Scorekeeping. In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophy of Language and Linguistics. Ontos Verlag. 363.score: 120.0
    Dynamic approaches to semantics like Discourse Representation Theory or Jaszczolt's Default Semantics provide more and more effective tools to represent how speakers handle meanings in linguistic practices. These deeper perspectives may give us a lever to lift some of the philosophical perplexities crowding semantics and to catch a glimpse of what hides beneath them. In this paper, I exploit these approaches with relation to the analysis of belief reports. However, it will emerge that, despite their benefits, the theories (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Stephen R. Schiffer (2006). A Problem for a Direct-Reference Theory of Belief Reports. Noûs 40 (2):361-368.score: 114.0
    (1) The propositions we believe and say are _Russellian_ _propositions_: structured propositions whose basic components are the objects and properties our thoughts and speech acts are about. (2) Many singular terms.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Joe Lau, Belief Reports and Interpreted-Logical Forms.score: 104.0
    One major obstacle in providing a compositional semantics for natural languages is that it is not clear how we should deal with propositional attitude contexts. In this paper I will discuss the Interpreted Logical Form proposal , focusing on the case of belief. This proposal has been developed in different ways by authors such as Harman (1972), Higginbotham (1986,1991), Segal (1989) and Larson and Ludlow (1993). On this approach, the that-clause of a belief report is treated as a (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. K. M. Jaszczolt (2000). Belief Reports and Pragmatic Theory: The State of the Art. In K. Jaszczolt (ed.), The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports. Elsevier. 1--12.score: 96.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Katarzyna M. Jaszczolt (2000). The Default-Based Context-Dependence of Belief Reports. In K. Jaszczolt (ed.), The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports. Elsevier. 169--185.score: 96.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Antti Kauppinen (2010). The Pragmatics of Transparent Belief Reports. Analysis 70 (3):438-446.score: 90.0
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Stephen Schiffer (1995). Descriptions, Indexicals, and Belief Reports: Some Dilemmas (but Not the Ones You Expect). Mind 104 (413):107-131.score: 90.0
  18. Philip Atkins (2013). A Pragmatic Solution to Ostertag's Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):359-365.score: 90.0
    Gary Ostertag (Philos Stud 146:249–267, 2009) has presented a new puzzle for Russellianism about belief reports. He argues that Russellians do not have the resources to solve this puzzle in terms of pragmatic phenomena. I argue to the contrary that the puzzle can be solved according to Nathan Salmon’s (Frege’s puzzle, 1986) pragmatic account of belief reports, provided that the account is properly understood. Specifically, the puzzle can be solved so long as Salmon’s guises are not (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Adam Pautz (2008). An Argument Against Fregean That-Clause Semantics. Philosophical Studies 138 (3):335 - 347.score: 90.0
    I develop a problem for the Fregean Reference Shift analysis of that-clause reference. The problem is discussed by Stephen Schiffer in his recent book The Things We Mean (2003). Either the defender of the Fregean Reference Shift analysis must count certain counterintuitive inferences as valid, or else he must reject a plausible Exportation rule. I consider several responses. I find that the best response relies on a Kaplan-inspired analysis of quantified belief reports. But I argue that this response (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. François Recanati (2000). Relational Belief Reports. Philosophical Studies 100 (3):255-272.score: 90.0
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. François Récanati & Mark Crimmins (1995). Quasi-Singular Propositions: The Semantics of Belief Reports. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69:175 - 209.score: 90.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Marga Reimer (1995). A Defense of De Re Belief Reports. Mind and Language 10 (4):446-463.score: 90.0
  23. Lenny Clapp & Robert J. Stainton (2002). `Obviously Propositions Are Nothing': Russell and the Logical Form of Belief Reports. In Georg Peter & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Logical Form and Language. Oxford University Press. 409--420.score: 90.0
  24. Tiddy Smith (2014). An Enlightenment Problem for Millianism. Philosophia 42 (1):173-179.score: 90.0
    According to a Millian theory of names, co-referring names are intersubstitutable salva veritate in all contexts, including the that-clauses of belief reports. This leads the Millian to famously argue, among other things, that if Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly then she also believes that Clark Kent can fly. Although the Millian provides an ingenious account that explains our strong anti-substitution intuitions in such cases, this paper argues that the Millian account leads to a new problem of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Nicholas Asher (1989). Belief, Acceptance and Belief Reports. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):327 - 361.score: 90.0
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Clas Weber, Semantic Values, Beliefs, and Belief Reports. GAP.7-Proceedings.score: 90.0
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Graeme Forbes (1997). Belief Reports and Speech Reports. In M. Anduschus, Albert Newen & Wolfgang Kunne (eds.), Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes. Csli Press. 313--30.score: 90.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. K. M. Jaszczolt (2007). The Syntax-Pragmatics Merger: Belief Reports in the Theory of Default Semantics. Pragmatics and Cognition 15 (1):41-64.score: 90.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Caleb Miller (1986). Proper Names and Belief Reports. Auslegung 13 (1):23-32.score: 90.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Stephen Schiffer (2006). 13.1 the Face-Value Theory of Belief Reports. In Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. 267.score: 90.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Emar Maier (2004). Acquaintance Resolution and Belief de Re. In Laura Alonso i Alemany & Paul Égré (eds.), Proceedings of the 9th Esslli Student Session.score: 84.0
    This paper proposes a way of semantically representing de re belief ascriptions that involves contextual resolution of the acquaintance relation between the attitude holder and the object about which the attitude is de re. A special case is that where the belief is about the believer herself. Here, we may discern two possibilities: the acquaintance relation is equality, in which case we end up with a de se belief, or, if the first option fails, we search the (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Laura C. Skerk (2009). A Plea for (Purely) Singular Propositions: The Cases of Belief Correction and de Re Attitude Reports. Análisis Filosófico 29 (2):167-172.score: 72.0
    In this paper I assume that it is reasonable to claim, as Michael Devitt does, that a definite description can express, in certain contexts, a genuinely referential meaning, but I discuss the requisite, also defended by Devitt, that the predicates involved in the description at stake should apply to the referred object. In so doing, I consider some cases of sentences containing definite descriptions constituted by general terms that, strictly speaking, don't apply to the intended object but are nonetheless intuitively (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Emar Maier (2005). De Se Reductionism Takes on Monsters. In Emar Maier, Corien Bary & Janneke Huitink (eds.), Proceedings of Sub9. 197-211.score: 66.0
    Chierchia (1989) and others have used the contrast between George hopes that he will win and Georges hopes to win in mistaken-self-identity scenarios, to argue for dedicated de se LFs. The argument, further strengthened by evidence of shiftable indexicals, appears applicable against any reductionist account that sees de se as merely a particular subtype of de re. My Acquaintance Resolution framework is an attempt at such a reduction, and this paper seeks to extend that theory with a logical principle of (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Mark Balaguer (2011). Is There a Fact of the Matter Between Direct Reference Theory and (Neo-)Fregeanism? Philosophical Studies 154 (1):53-78.score: 60.0
    It is argued here that there is no fact of the matter between direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism. To get a more precise idea of the central thesis of this paper, consider the following two claims: (i) While direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism can be developed in numerous ways, they can be developed in essentially parallel ways; that is, for any (plausible) way of developing direct reference theory, there is an essentially parallel way of developing neo-Fregeanism, and vice versa. And (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Steven E. Boër (2007). Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution. Springer.score: 60.0
    This book provides a formal ontology of senses and the belief-relation that grounds the distinction between de dicto, de re, and de se beliefs as well as the opacity of belief reports. According to this ontology, the relata of the belief-relation are an agent and a special sort of object-dependent sense (a "thought-content"), the latter being an "abstract" property encoding various syntactic and semantic constraints on sentences of a language of thought. One bears the belief-relation (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Ray Buchanan (2012). Is Belief a Propositional Attitude? Philosophers' Imprint 12 (1).score: 48.0
    According to proponents of the face-value account, a beliefreport of the form ‘S believes that p’ is true just in case the agentbelieves a proposition referred to by the that-clause. As againstthis familiar view, I argue that there are cases of true beliefreports of the relevant form in which there is no proposition that thethat-clause, or the speaker using the that-clause, can plausibly betaken as referring to. Moreover, I argue that given the distinctiveway in which the face-value theory of (...)-reports fails, there ispressure to give up the metaphysical thesis that belief is apropositional attitude. I conclude by suggesting that we allownon-propositional entities to be amongst the relata of thebelief-relation, and make some speculative remarks concerning whatsuch entities might be like. (shrink)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Nicholas Asher (1986). Belief in Discourse Representation Theory. Journal of Philosophical Logic 15 (2):127 - 189.score: 48.0
    I hope I have convinced the reader that DR theory offers at least some exciting potential when applied to the semantics of belief reports. It differs considerably from other approaches, and it makes intuitively acceptable predictions that other theories do not. The theory also provides a novel approach to the semantics of other propsitional attitude reports. Further, DR theory enables one to approach the topic of anaphora within belief and other propositional attitude contexts in a novel (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Joe Lau (1997). Possible Worlds Semantics for Belief Sentences. In Logica Yearbook.score: 48.0
    This paper is about possible worlds semantics for propositional attitude sentences. In particular I shall focus on belief reports in English such as "Lusina believes that tofu is nutritious." It is well-known that possible worlds semantics for such reports suffers from the so-called _problem of equivalence_ . In this paper I shall examine some attempts to deal with this problem and argue that they are unsatisfactory.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Joseph G. Moore (1999). Misdisquotation and Substitutivity: When Not to Infer Belief From Assent. Mind 108 (430):335-365.score: 48.0
    In 'A Puzzle about Belief' Saul Kripke appeals to a principle of disquotation that allows us to infer a person's beliefs from the sentences to which she assents (in certain conditions). Kripke relies on this principle in constructing some famous puzzle cases, which he uses to defend the Millian view that the sole semantic function of a proper name is to refer to its bearer. The examples are meant to undermine the anti-Millian objection, grounded in traditional Frege-cases, that truth-value (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Mitchell S. Green & Christopher R. Hitchcock (1994). Reflections on Reflection: Van Fraassen on Belief. Synthese 98 (2):297 - 324.score: 42.0
    In Belief and the Will, van Fraassen employed a diachronic Dutch Book argument to support a counterintuitive principle called Reflection. There and subsequently van Fraassen has put forth Reflection as a linchpin for his views in epistemology and the philosophy of science, and for the voluntarism (first-person reports of subjective probability are undertakings of commitments) that he espouses as an alternative to descriptivism (first-person reports of subjective probability are merely self-descriptions). Christensen and others have attacked Reflection, taking (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Friederike Moltmann, Attitude Reports, Events, and Partial Models.score: 42.0
    Clausal complements of different kinds of attitude verbs such as believe, doubt, be surprised, wonder, say, and whisper behave differently semantically in a number of respects. For example, they differ in the inference patterns they display. This paper develops a semantic account of clausal complements using partial logic which accounts for such semantic differences on the basis of a uniform meaning of clauses. It focuses on explaining the heterogeneous inference patterns associated with different kinds of attitude verbs, but it contributes (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Adrian Brasoveanu & Donka F. Farkas, Say Reports, Assertion Events and Meaning Dimensions.score: 42.0
    In this paper, we study the parameters that come into play when assessing the truth conditions of say reports and contrast them with belief attributions. We argue that these conditions are sensitive in intricate ways to the connection between the interpretation of the complement of say and the properties of the reported speech act. There are three general areas this exercise is relevant to, besides the immediate issue of understanding the meaning of say: (i) the discussion shows the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. James Beebe (2013). A Knobe Effect for Belief Ascriptions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):235-258.score: 42.0
    Knobe (Analysis 63:190-193, 2003a, Philosophical Psychology 16:309-324, 2003b, Analysis 64:181-187, 2004b) found that people are more likely to attribute intentionality to agents whose actions resulted in negative side-effects that to agents whose actions resulted in positive ones. Subsequent investigation has extended this result to a variety of other folk psychological attributions. The present article reports experimental findings that demonstrate an analogous effect for belief ascriptions. Participants were found to be more likely to ascribe belief, higher degrees of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Katarzyna Jaszczolt (1999). Discourse, Beliefs, and Intentions: Semantic Defaults and Propositional Attitude Ascription. Elsevier.score: 36.0
    This book is about beliefs, language, communication and cognition. It deals with the fundamental issue of the interpretation of the speaker's utterance expressing a belief and reporting on beliefs of other people in the form of oratio obliqua. The main aim of the book is to present a new account of the problem of interpreting utterances expressing beliefs and belief reports in terms of an approach called Default Semantics.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Peter Pagin (2010). Compositionality II: Arguments and Problems. Philosophy Compass 5 (3):265-282.score: 30.0
    This is the second part of a two-part article on compositionality, i.e. the principle that the meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meanings of its parts and the way they are put together. In the first, Pagin and Westerståhl (2010), we provide a general historical background, a formal framework, definitions, and a survey of variants of compositionality. It will be referred to as Part I. Here we discuss arguments for and against the claim that natural languages have (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Delia Graff Fara (2013). Specifying Desires. Noûs 47 (2):250-272.score: 30.0
    A report of a person's desire can be true even if its embedded clause underspecifies the content of the desire that makes the report true. It is true that Fiona wants to catch a fish even if she has no desire that is satisfied if she catches a poisoned minnow. Her desire is satisfied only if she catches an edible, meal-sized fish. The content of her desire is more specific than the propositional content of the embedded clause in our true (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. John Perry, 1 History of Situation Semantics.score: 30.0
    Situation semantics was originally conceived as an alternative to extensional model theory and possible world semantics especially suited to the analysis of various problematic constructions, including naked-infinitive perception verbs (Barwise 1981) and belief-reports (Barwise and Perry 1981a, 1981b). In its earliest forms, the central ideas were.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Gary Ostertag (2005). A Puzzle About Disbelief. Journal of Philosophy 102 (11):573-93.score: 30.0
    According to the naive theory of belief reports, our intuition that “Lois believes that Kent flies” is false results from our mistakenly identifying what this sentence implicates, which is false, with what it says, which is true. Whatever the merits of this proposal, it is here argued that the naive theory’s analysis of negative belief reports—sentences such as “Lois doesn't believe that Kent flies”—gives rise to equally problematic clashes with intuition, but that in this case no (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Gabriel Segal (1989). A Preference for Sense and Reference. Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):73-89.score: 30.0
    The topic of this paper is the semantic structure of belief reports of the form 'a believes that p'. it is argued that no existing theory of these sentences satisfactorily accounts for anaphoric relations linking expressions within the embedded complement sentence to expressions outside. a new account of belief reports is proposed which assigns to embedded expressions their normal semantic values but which also exploits frege's idea of using senses to explain the apparent failures of extensionality (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000