Search results for 'eliminativism' (try it on Scholar)

332 found
Sort by:
  1. Gabriele Contessa (2014). One's a Crowd: Mereological Nihilism Without Ordinary‐Object Eliminativism. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):199-221.score: 24.0
    Mereological nihilism is the thesis that there are no composite objects—i.e. objects with proper material parts. One of the main advantages of mereological nihilism is that it allows its supporters to avoid a number of notorious philosophical puzzles. However, it seems to offer this advantage only at the expense of certain widespread and deeply entrenched beliefs. In particular, it is usually assumed that mereological nihilism entails eliminativism about ordinary objects—i.e. the counterintuitive thesis that there are no such things as (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Cory D. Wright (2000). Eliminativist Undercurrents in the New Wave Model of Psychoneural Reduction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 21 (4):413-436.score: 24.0
    "New wave" reductionism aims at advancing a kind of reduction that is stronger than unilateral dependency of the mental on the physical. It revolves around the idea that reduction between theoretical levels is a matter of degree, and can be laid out on a continuum between a "smooth" pole (theoretical identity) and a "bumpy" pole (extremely revisionary). It also entails that both higher and lower levels of the reductive relationship sustain some degree of explanatory autonomy. The new wave predicts that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Robert Lockie (2003). Transcendental Arguments Against Eliminativism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4):569-589.score: 24.0
    Eliminativism was targeted by transcendental arguments from the first. Three responses to these arguments have emerged from the eliminativist literature, the heart of which is that such arguments are question-begging. These responses are shown to be incompatible with the position, eliminativism, they are meant to defend. Out of these failed responses is developed a general transcendental argument against eliminativism (the "Paradox of Abandonment"). Eliminativists have anticipated this argument, but their six different attempts to counter it are shown (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Glenn Braddock (2002). Eliminativism and Indeterminate Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):37-54.score: 24.0
    One of Daniel Dennett's most sophisticated arguments for his eliminativism about phenomenological properties centers around the color phi phenomenon. He attempts to show that there is no phenomenological fact of the matter concerning the phenomenon of apparent motion because it is impossible to decide between two competing explanations. I argue that the two explanations considered by Dennett are both based on the assumption that a realist account of the phenomenon must include a neat mapping between phenomenological time and objective (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Joel Pust (1999). External Accounts of Folk Psychology, Eliminativism, and the Simulation Theory. Mind and Language 14 (1):113-130.score: 24.0
    Stich and Ravenscroft (1994) distinguish between internal and external accounts of folk psychology and argue that this distinction makes a significant difference to the debate over eliminative materialism. I argue that their views about the implications of the internal/external distinction for the debate over eliminativism are mistaken. First, I demonstrate that the first of their two external versions of folk psychology is either not a possible target of eliminativist critique, or not a target distinct from their second version of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Harold Kincaid (1990). Eliminativism and Methodological Individualism. Philosophy of Science 57 (1):141-148.score: 24.0
    Tuomela (this issue, pp. 96-103) raises several objections to the analysis and critique of methodological individualism in my (1986). In what follows I reply to those criticisms, arguing, among other things, that: (1) the alleged reductions provided by Tuomela and others fail, because they either presuppose rather than eliminate social predicates or do not avoid the problem of multiple realizations; (2) supervenience does not guarantee that the social sciences are reducible, because merely describing supervenieence bases leaves numerous questions unanswered, and (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. John M. Collins (2000). Theory of Mind, Logical Form and Eliminativism. Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):465-490.score: 24.0
    I argue for a cognitive architecture in which folk psychology is supported by an interface of a ToM module and the language faculty, the latter providing the former with interpreted LF structures which form the content representations of ToM states. I show that LF structures satisfy a range of key features asked of contents. I confront this account of ToM with eliminativism and diagnose and combat the thought that "success" and innateness are inconsistent with the falsity of folk psychology. (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Steven Horst (1995). Eliminativism and the Ambiguity of `Belief'. Synthese 104 (1):123-45.score: 24.0
    It has recently been claimed (1) that mental states such as beliefs are theoretical entities and (2) that they are therefore, in principle, subject to theoretical elimination if intentional psychology were to be supplanted by a psychology not employing mentalistic notions. Debate over these two issues is seriously hampered by the fact that the key terms 'theoretical' and 'belief' are ambiguous. This article argues that there is only one sense of 'theoretical' that is of use to the eliminativist, and in (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Andrew Melnyk (1996). Testament of a Recovering Eliminativist. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):S185-S193.score: 24.0
    If physicalism is true (e.g., if every event is a fundamental-physical event), then it looks as if there is a fundamental-physical explanation of everything. If so, then what is to become of special scientific explanations? They seem to be excluded by the fundamental-physical ones, and indeed to be excellent candidates for elimination. I argue that, if physicalism is true, there probably is a fundamental-physical explanation of everything, but that nevertheless there can perfectly well be special scientific explanations as well, notwithstanding (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Nathan Stemmer (2007). Quine's Eliminativism and the Crystal Spheres. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 38 (2):315 - 327.score: 24.0
    Quine’s eliminativist theory has largely been ignored by the philosophical community. This is highly regrettable because Quine’s theory is probably close to correct. Now, the probable correctness of Quine’s theory has an important consequence since, according to the theory, there are no mental entities (events, states, phenomena, properties, etc.) nor do such entities play any role in a scientific account of the relevant phenomena. But the hundreds or probably thousands of publications that deal with issues such as mental causation, the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. John N. Williams (2013). Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore's Paradox. Theoria 80 (4).score: 24.0
    John Turri gives an example that he thinks refutes what he takes to be “G. E. Moore's view” that omissive assertions such as “It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining” are “inherently ‘absurd'”. This is that of Ellie, an eliminativist who makes such assertions. Turri thinks that these are perfectly reasonable and not even absurd. Nor does she seem irrational if the sincerity of her assertion requires her to believe its content. A commissive counterpart of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Eric Yang (2013). Eliminativism, Interventionism and the Overdetermination Argument. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):321-340.score: 21.0
    In trying to establish the view that there are no non-living macrophysical objects, Trenton Merricks has produced an influential argument—the Overdetermination Argument—against the causal efficacy of composite objects. A serious problem for the Overdetermination Argument is the ambiguity in the notion of overdetermination that is being employed, which is due to the fact that Merricks does not provide any theory of causation to support his claims. Once we adopt a plausible theory of causation, viz. interventionism, problems with the Overdetermination will (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Elizabeth Fricker (1993). The Threat of Eliminativism. Mind and Language 8 (2):253-281.score: 21.0
  14. Lynne Rudder Baker (1993). Eliminativism and an Argument From Science. Mind and Language 8 (2):180-188.score: 21.0
  15. Natalie Stoljar (1988). Churchland's Eliminativism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (December):489-497.score: 21.0
  16. John O'Leary-Hawthorne (1994). On the Threat of Eliminativism. Philosophical Studies 74 (3):325-46.score: 21.0
  17. Emmett L. Holman (2002). Color Eliminativism and Color Experience. Pacific Philosophical Quareterly 83 (1):38-56.score: 21.0
  18. Andy Clark (1993). The Varieties of Eliminativism: Sentential, Intentional and Catastrophic. Mind and Language 8 (2):223-233.score: 21.0
  19. Victor Reppert (1991). Ramsey on Eliminativism and Self-Refutation. Inquiry 34 (4):499-508.score: 21.0
  20. Edward W. Averill (1990). Functionalism, the Absent Qualia Objection, and Eliminativism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):449-67.score: 21.0
  21. Rod Bertolet (1994). Saving Eliminativism. Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):87-100.score: 21.0
    This paper contests Lynne Rudder Baker's claim to have shown that eliminative materialism is bound to fail on purely conceptual grounds. It is argued that Baker's position depends on knowing that certain developments in science cannot occur, and that we cannot know that this is so. Consequently, the sort of argument Baker provides is question-begging. For similar reasons, the confidence that the proponents of eliminative materialism have in it is misplaced.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Andy Clark (1989). Beyond Eliminativism. Mind and Language 4 (4):251-79.score: 21.0
  23. Charles M. Hermes (2006). The Overdetermination Argument Against Eliminativism. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):113-119.score: 21.0
  24. Keith Campbell (1993). What Motivates Eliminativism? Mind and Language 8 (2):206-210.score: 21.0
  25. Barbara Hannan (1990). `Non-Scientific Realism' About Propositional Attitudes as a Response to Eliminativist Arguments. Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):21-31.score: 21.0
    Two arguments are discussed which have been advanced in support of eliminative materialism: the argument from reductionism and the argument from functionalism. It is contended that neither of these arguments is effective if "non-scientific realism" is adopted with regard to commonsense propositional attitude psychology and its embedded notions. "Non-scientific realism," the position that commonsense propositional attitude psychology is an independently legitimate descriptive/explanatory framework, neither in competition with science nor vulnerable to being shown false by science, is defended.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Berm (2006). Arguing for Eliminativism. In Brian L. Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.score: 21.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Cynthia Macdonald (1995). Connectionism and Eliminativism. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.score: 21.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Daniel Z. Korman (2009). Eliminativism and the Challenge From Folk Belief. Noûs 43 (2):242-264.score: 18.0
    Virtually everyone agrees that, even after having presented the arguments for their positions, proponents of revisionary philosophical theories are required to provide some sort of account of the conflict between their theories and what the folk believe. I examine various strategies for answering the challenge from folk belief. The examination proceeds as a case study, whose focus is eliminativism (nihilism) about ordinary material objects. I critically assess eliminativist attempts to explain folk belief by appeal to paraphrase, experience, and intuition.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Ingo Brigandt (2003). Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1305–1316.score: 18.0
    Marc Ereshefsky argues that pluralism about species suggests that the species concept is not theoretically useful. It is to be abandoned in favor of several concrete species concepts that denote real categories. While accepting species pluralism, the present paper rejects eliminativism about the species category. It is argued that the species concept is important and that it is possible to make sense of a general species concept despite the existence of different concrete species concepts.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. John Bickle (1993). Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Semantic View of Theories. Erkenntnis 39 (3):359-382.score: 18.0
    Recently some philosophers have urged that connectionist artificial intelligence is (potentially) eliminative for the propositional attitudes of folk psychology. At the same time, however, these philosophers have also insisted that since philosophy of science has failed to provide criteria distinguishing ontologically retentive from eliminative theory changes, the resulting eliminativism is not principled. Application of some resources developed within the semantic view of scientific theories, particularly recent formal work on the theory reduction relation, reveals these philosophers to be wrong in (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Jesse Prinz (2010). Can Concept Empiricism Forestall Eliminativism? Mind and Language 25 (5):612-621.score: 18.0
    In this commentary, I focus on Machery's criticism of Neo-Empiricism. I argue that Neo-Empiricism can survive Machery's critique, and I show that there is an empiricist strategy for forestalling eliminativism.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. John W. Carroll & William R. Carter (2005). An Unstable Eliminativism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):1–17.score: 18.0
    In his book Objects and Persons, Trenton Merricks has reoriented and fine-tuned an argument from the philosophy of mind to support a selective eliminativism about macroscopic objects.1 The argument turns on a rejection of systematic causal overdetermination and the conviction that microscopic things do the causal work that is attributed to a great many (though not all) macroscopic things. We will argue that Merricks’ argument fails to establish his selective eliminativism.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. John Collins (2007). Meta-Scientific Eliminativism: A Reconsideration of Chomsky's Review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):625 - 658.score: 18.0
    The paper considers our ordinary mentalistic discourse in relation to what we should expect from any genuine science of the mind. A meta-scientific eliminativism is commended and distinguished from the more familiar eliminativism of Skinner and the Churchlands. Meta-scientific eliminativism views folk psychology qua folksy as unsuited to offer insight into the structure of cognition, although it might otherwise be indispensable for our social commerce and self-understanding. This position flows from a general thesis that scientific advance is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Emmett Holman (2006). Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229--56.score: 18.0
    Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism. In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of the secondary qualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately "secondary quality eliminativism"- the view that the secondary qualities are physically uninstantiated.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Francisco Calvo Garzón (2001). Can We Turn a Blind Eye to Eliminativism? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):485 – 498.score: 18.0
    In this paper I shall reply to two arguments that Stephen Stich (1990; 1991; 1996) has recently put forward against the thesis of eliminative materialism. In a nutshell, Stich argues that (i) the thesis of eliminative materialism, according to which propositional attitudes don't exist, is neither true nor false, and that (ii) even if it were true, that would be philosophically uninteresting. To support (i) and (ii) Stich relies on two premises: (a) that the job of a theory of reference (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Hayley Clatterbuck (2013). The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: A Non-Eliminativist, Non-Platonic Account. [REVIEW] European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (3):309-329.score: 18.0
    Several major breakthroughs in the history of physics have been prompted not by new empirical data but by thought experiments. James Robert Brown and John Norton have developed accounts of how thought experiments can yield such advances. Brown argues that knowledge gained via thought experiments demands a Platonic explanation; thought experiments for Brown are a window into the Platonic realm of the laws of nature. Norton argues that thought experiments are just cleverly disguised inductive or deductive arguments, so no new (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Lucía Lewowicz (2003). Materialism, Symmetry and Eliminativism in the Latest Latour. Social Epistemology 17 (4):381 – 400.score: 18.0
    In this paper, part of the ideas developed in Lewowicz (2000) will be reconsidered in the light of Pandora's Hope (1999a) - one of the latest publications of Bruno Latour. We will ponder the significance of these ideas and some of the incidental advances or retreats of the views of this author in the last 20 years. Although we still believe that, from the ontological point of view, Latour's philosophy is materialistic - then eliminativist - and not ontological relativist (contrary (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Peter Vickers (2014). Scientific Theory Eliminativism. Erkenntnis 79 (1):111-126.score: 18.0
    The philosopher of science faces overwhelming disagreement in the literature on the definition, nature, structure, ontology, and content of scientific theories. These disagreements are at least partly responsible for disagreements in many of the debates in the discipline which put weight on the concept scientific theory. I argue that available theories of theories and conceptual analyses of theory are ineffectual options for addressing this difficulty: they do not move debates forward in a significant way. Directing my attention to debates about (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Michael J. Shaffer (2004). Probability and Tempered Modal Eliminativism. History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):305-318.score: 18.0
    In this paper the strategy for the eliminative reduction of the alethic modalities suggested by John Venn is outlined and it is shown to anticipate certain related contemporary empiricistic and nominalistic projects. Venn attempted to reduce the alethic modalities to probabilities, and thus suggested a promising solution to the nagging issue of the inclusion of modal statements in empiricistic philosophical systems. However, despite the promise that this suggestion held for laying the ‘ghost of modality’ to rest, this general approach, tempered (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. John Barry Maund (2012). Colour Relationalism and Colour Irrealism/Eliminativism/Fictionalism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):379-398.score: 18.0
    Jonathan Cohen has produced a powerful argument for Colour Relationalism: the metaphysical thesis that colours are relational properties of a certain sort—relational with respect to perceivers and circumstances. Cohen makes two important assumptions: one is that Colour Relationalism and Colour Irrealism (which include Colour Eliminativism, Fictionalism and other “error theories”) are rivals; the second is that “error theories” are theories of last resort. In this paper, I challenge both assumptions. In particular, I argue that there is good reason to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Jacoby Adeshei Carter (2014). Does “Race” Have a Future or Should the Future Have “Races”? Reconstruction or Eliminativism in a Pragmatist Philosophy of Race. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 50 (1):29-47,.score: 18.0
    In Preludes to Pragmatism: Toward A Reconstruction of Philosophy, Phillip Kitcher argues in Chapter 6, “Does ‘Race’ Have a Future” that developments in evolutionary biology may support a separation of our species into subcategories that could be regarded as races. The human species, he argues, could possibly be divided, using a similar methodology to that employed by evolutionary biologists, into relatively stable and isolated breeding populations that bear distinctive and salient clusters of significant genotypic and phenotypic traits. Hence, the eliminativist (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Andrea Scarantino (2010). Evidence of Coordination as a Cure for Concept Eliminativism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):223-224.score: 18.0
    I argue that Machery stacks the deck against hybrid theories of concepts by relying on an unduly restrictive understanding of coordination between concept parts. Once a less restrictive notion of coordination is introduced, the empirical case for hybrid theories of concepts becomes stronger, and the appeal of concept eliminativism weaker.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Nigel J. T. Thomas (1998). Imagination, Eliminativism, and the Pre-History of Consciousness. Consciousness Research Abstracts 3.score: 16.0
    Classical and medieval writers had no term for consciousness in anything like the modern sense, and their philosophy seems not to have been troubled by the mind-body problem. Contemporary eliminativists find strong support in this fact for their claim that consciousness does not exist, or, at least, is not an appropriate scientific explanandum. They typically hold that contemporary conceptions of consciousness are artefacts of Descartes' (now outmoded) views about matter and his unrealistic craving for epistemological certainty. Essentially, they say, our (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Thomas Nigel (1998). Imagination, Eliminativism, and the Pre-History of Consciousness. Consciousness Research Abstracts 3.score: 16.0
    Classical and medieval writers had no term for consciousness in anything like the modern sense, and their philosophy seems not to have been troubled by the mind-body problem. Contemporary eliminativists find strong support in this fact for their claim that consciousness does not exist, or, at least, is not an appropriate scientific explanandum. They typically hold that contemporary conceptions of consciousness are artefacts of Descartes' (now outmoded) views about matter and his unrealistic craving for epistemological certainty. Essentially, they say, our (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & J. Garon (1991). Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology. In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum. 499-533.score: 15.0
  46. Pär Sundström (2008). A Somewhat Eliminativist Proposal About Phenomenal Consciousness. In Hieke and Leitgeb (ed.), Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.score: 15.0
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Adam Pautz, Color Eliminativism.score: 15.0
    Philosophical theories of color divide over two issues. First, there is the issue of Reductionism versus Primitivism. _Reductionism_ holds that colors are identical with physical properties, dispositional properties, or other properties specifiable in non-chromatic terms.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 332