Search results for 'explanatory power' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Petri Ylikoski & Jaakko Kuorikoski (2010). Dissecting Explanatory Power. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):201–219.
    Comparisons of rival explanations or theories often involve vague appeals to explanatory power. In this paper, we dissect this metaphor by distinguishing between different dimensions of the goodness of an explanation: non-sensitivity, cognitive salience, precision, factual accuracy and degree of integration. These dimensions are partially independent and often come into conflict. Our main contribution is to go beyond simple stipulation or description by explicating why these factors are taken to be explanatory virtues. We accomplish this by using (...)
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  2.  18
    Peter Brössel (2015). On the Role of Explanatory and Systematic Power in Scientific Reasoning. Synthese 192 (12):3877-3913.
    The paper investigates measures of explanatory power and how to define the inference schema “Inference to the Best Explanation”. It argues that these measures can also be used to quantify the systematic power of a hypothesis and the inference schema “Inference to the Best Systematization” is defined. It demonstrates that systematic power is a fruitful criterion for theory choice and IBS is truth-conducive. It also shows that even radical Bayesians must admit that systemic power is (...)
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  3. Aidan Lyon & Mark Colyvan (2008). The Explanatory Power of Phase Spaces. Philosophia Mathematica 16 (2):227-243.
    David Malament argued that Hartry Field's nominalisation program is unlikely to be able to deal with non-space-time theories such as phase-space theories. We give a specific example of such a phase-space theory and argue that this presentation of the theory delivers explanations that are not available in the classical presentation of the theory. This suggests that even if phase-space theories can be nominalised, the resulting theory will not have the explanatory power of the original. Phase-space theories thus raise (...)
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  4.  91
    Jonah N. Schupbach & Jan Sprenger (2011). The Logic of Explanatory Power. Philosophy of Science 78 (1):105-127.
    This article introduces and defends a probabilistic measure of the explanatory power that a particular explanans has over its explanandum. To this end, we propose several intuitive, formal conditions of adequacy for an account of explanatory power. Then, we show that these conditions are uniquely satisfied by one particular probabilistic function. We proceed to strengthen the case for this measure of explanatory power by proving several theorems, all of which show that this measure neatly (...)
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  5.  4
    Lara Huber & Lara Kutschenko (2009). Medicine in a Neurocentric World: About the Explanatory Power of Neuroscientific Models in Medical Research and Practice. [REVIEW] Medicine Studies 1 (4):307-313.
    Medicine in a Neurocentric World: About the Explanatory Power of Neuroscientific Models in Medical Research and Practice Content Type Journal Article Category Editorial Notes Pages 307-313 DOI 10.1007/s12376-009-0036-2 Authors Lara Huber, University Medical Center of the Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz Institute for History, Philosophy and Ethics of Medicine Am Pulverturm 13 55131 Mainz Germany Lara K. Kutschenko, University Medical Center of the Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz Institute for History, Philosophy and Ethics of Medicine Am Pulverturm 13 55131 Mainz (...)
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  6.  50
    Jonah N. Schupbach (2011). Comparing Probabilistic Measures of Explanatory Power. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):813-829.
    Recently, in attempting to account for explanatory reasoning in probabilistic terms, Bayesians have proposed several measures of the degree to which a hypothesis explains a given set of facts. These candidate measures of "explanatory power" are shown to have interesting normative interpretations and consequences. What has not yet been investigated, however, is whether any of these measures are also descriptive of people’s actual explanatory judgments. Here, I present my own experimental work investigating this question. I argue (...)
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  7.  91
    Alan Baker (2003). Quantitative Parsimony and Explanatory Power. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):245-259.
    The desire to minimize the number of individual new entities postulated is often referred to as quantitative parsimony. Its influence on the default hypotheses formulated by scientists seems undeniable. I argue that there is a wide class of cases for which the preference for quantitatively parsimonious hypotheses is demonstrably rational. The justification, in a nutshell, is that such hypotheses have greater explanatory power than less parsimonious alternatives. My analysis is restricted to a class of cases I shall refer (...)
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  8. Jiri Benovsky (2013). Primitiveness, Metaontology, and Explanatory Power. Dialogue 52 (2):341-358.
    Metaphysical theories heavily rely on the use of primitives to which they typically appeal. I will start by examining and evaluating some traditional well-known theories and I will discuss the role of primitives in metaphysical theories in general. I will then turn to a discussion of claims of between theories that, I think, depend on equivalences of primitives, and I will explore the nature of primitives. I will then claim that almost all explanatory power of metaphysical theories comes (...)
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  9. Jonah N. Schupbach (2011). Studies in the Logic of Explanatory Power. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Human reasoning often involves explanation. In everyday affairs, people reason to hypotheses based on the explanatory power these hypotheses afford; I might, for example, surmise that my toddler has been playing in my office because I judge that this hypothesis delivers a good explanation of the disarranged state of the books on my shelves. But such explanatory reasoning also has relevance far beyond the commonplace. Indeed, explanatory reasoning plays an important role in such varied fields as (...)
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  10.  34
    D. Tulodziecki (2011). A Case Study in Explanatory Power: John Snow's Conclusions About the Pathology and Transmission of Cholera. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 42 (3):306-316.
    In the mid-1800s, there was much debate about the origin or 'exciting cause' of cholera. Despite much confusion surrounding the disease, the so-called miasma theory emerged as the prevalent account about cholera's cause. Going against this mainstream view, the British physician John Snow inferred several things about cholera's origin and pathology that no one else inferred. Without observing the vibrio cholerae, however,-data unavailable to Snow and his colleagues-, there was no way of settling the question of what exactly was causing (...)
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  11.  9
    M. P. Cohen (forthcoming). On Three Measures of Explanatory Power with Axiomatic Representations. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv017.
    Jonah N. Schupbach and Jan Sprenger and Vincenzo Crupi and Katya Tentori have recently proposed measures of explanatory power and have shown that they are characterized by certain arguably desirable conditions or axioms. I further examine the properties of these two measures, and a third measure considered by I. J. Good and Timothy McGrew . This third measure also has an axiomatic representation. I consider a simple coin-tossing example in which only the Crupi–Tentori measure does not perform well. (...)
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  12.  16
    Raoul Gervais (2015). Mechanistic and Non-Mechanistic Varieties of Dynamical Models in Cognitive Science: Explanatory Power, Understanding, and the ‘Mere Description’ Worry. Synthese 192 (1):43-66.
    In the literature on dynamical models in cognitive science, two issues have recently caused controversy. First, what is the relation between dynamical and mechanistic models? I will argue that dynamical models can be upgraded to be mechanistic as well, and that there are mechanistic and non-mechanistic dynamical models. Second, there is the issue of explanatory power. Since it is uncontested the mechanistic models can explain, I will focus on the non-mechanistic variety of dynamical models. It is often claimed (...)
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  13.  13
    William L. Vanderburgh (2014). Quantitative Parsimony, Explanatory Power and Dark Matter. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (2):317-327.
    Baker argues that quantitative parsimony—the principle that hypotheses requiring fewer entities are to be preferred over their empirically equivalent rivals—is a rational methodological criterion because it maximizes explanatory power. Baker lends plausibility to his account by confronting it with the example of postulating of the neutrino in order to resolve a discrepancy in Beta decay experiments. Baker’s account is initially attractive, but I argue that its details are problematic and that it yields undesirable consequences when applied to the (...)
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  14.  7
    Michael P. Cohen (2015). On Schupbach and Sprenger’s Measures of Explanatory Power. Philosophy of Science 82 (1):97-109.
    Jonah N. Schupbach and Jan Sprenger have proposed conditions of adequacy for measures of explanatory power. They derive and defend a measure of explanatory power satisfying their conditions of adequacy. This article furthers the development of their measure. The requirement that the measure be multidimensional analytic is avoided. Several proofs are simplified, and gaps in proofs are filled.
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  15.  20
    F. J. Beckwith (2004). The Explanatory Power of the Substance View of Persons. Christian Bioethics 10 (1):33-54.
    The purpose of this essay is to offer support for the substance view of persons, the philosophical anthropology defended by Patrick Lee in his essay. In order to accomplish this the author (1) presents a brief definition of the substance view; (2) argues that the substance view has more explanatory power in accounting for why we believe that human persons are intrinsically valuable even when they are not functioning as such (e.g., when one is temporarily comatose), why human (...)
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  16.  10
    Joseph F. Hanna (1978). On Transmitted Information as a Measure of Explanatory Power. Philosophy of Science 45 (4):531-562.
    This paper contrasts two information-theoretic approaches to statistical explanation: namely, (1) an analysis, which originated in my earlier research on problems of testing stochastic models of learning, based on an entropy-like measure of expected transmitted-information (and here referred to as the Expected-Information Model), and (2) the analysis, which was proposed by James Greeno (and which is closely related to Wesley Salmon's Statistical Relevance Model), based on the information-transmitted-by-a-system. The substantial differences between these analyses can be traced to the following basic (...)
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  17.  6
    Douglas Hanes & Gin McCollum (2003). Dimensionality and Explanatory Power of Reading Models. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):486-487.
    The authors' review of alternative models for reading is of great value in identifying issues and progress in the field. More emphasis should be given to distinguishing between models that offer an explanation for behavior and those that merely simulate experimental data. An analysis of a model's discrete structure can allow for comparisons of models based upon their inherent dimensionality and explanatory power.
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  18.  5
    Prasad Tadepalli (2003). Cognitive Architectures Have Limited Explanatory Power. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (5):622-623.
    Cognitive architectures, like programming languages, make commitments only at the implementation level and have limited explanatory power. Their universality implies that it is hard, if not impossible, to justify them in detail from finite quantities of data. It is more fruitful to focus on particular tasks such as language understanding and propose testable theories at the computational and algorithmic levels.
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  19.  32
    Dominic Alford-Duguid & Michael Arsenault (forthcoming). On the Explanatory Power of Hallucination. Synthese:1-21.
    Pautz has argued that the most prominent naive realist account of hallucination—negative epistemic disjunctivism—cannot explain how hallucinations enable us to form beliefs about perceptually presented properties. He takes this as grounds to reject both negative epistemic disjunctivism and naive realism. Our aims are two: First, to show that this objection is dialectically ineffective against naive realism, and second, to draw morals from the failure of this objection for the dispute over the nature of perceptual experience at large.
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  20.  31
    Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori (2012). A Second Look at the Logic of Explanatory Power (with Two Novel Representation Theorems). Philosophy of Science 79 (3):365-385.
  21.  10
    Nathalie Bulle (2009). Under What Conditions Can Formal Models of Social Action Claim Explanatory Power? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (1):47-64.
    This paper's purpose is to set forth the conditions of explanation in the domain of formal modelling of social action. Explanation is defined as an adequate account of the underlying factors bringing about a phenomenon. The modelling of a social phenomenon can claim explanatory value in this sense if the following two conditions are fulfilled. (1) The generative mechanisms involved translate the effects of real factors abstracted from their phenomenal context, not those of purely ideal ones. (2) The (...) hypotheses, which account for the effects of explanatory factors, and the purely descriptive hypotheses, which introduce conceptual simplifications and summarise complex secondary mechanisms, are relatively independent from each other with regard to the phenomenon represented. This condition subjects the model to testing by alternatives through the development of purely descriptive hypotheses in the sense of explanatory or analytical realism. (shrink)
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  22.  10
    Tor Egil Førland (2008). 3. Mentality as a Social Emergent: Can the Zeitgeist Have Explanatory Power? History and Theory 47 (1):44–56.
    This paper probes the explanatory value of mentality as a social emergent in general and of the Zeitgeist in particular. Durkheim’s contention that social facts have emergent properties is open to the charge that it implies logically inconsistent “downward causation.” On the basis of an analogy with the brain–mind dilemma and mental emergentism, the first part of the essay discusses and dismisses the notion of social emergent properties that cannot be reduced to the properties of their component parts—individuals—and their (...)
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  23. T. Sedova (2000). Towards the Explanatory Power of the Interpretativism in Social Sciences. Filozofia 55 (6):443-459.
    The paper draws on Sperber's thesis, according to which the social and historical sciences are a free alliance of various research programs with various objectives. One of the most expanded of these programs is interpretativism. Although the author acknowledges various interpretative approaches , she focuses solely on the contextual interpretation. She defines it in the light of the difference between the thick and thin descriptions , analyzes the conditions and the chracteristics of the interpretation . The attention is paid also (...)
     
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  24. Bill Wringe (2014). Collective Obligations: Their Existence, Their Explanatory Power, and Their Supervenience on the Obligations of Individuals. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4).
    In this paper I discuss a number of different relationships between two kinds of (moral) obligation: those which have individuals as their subject, and those which have groups of individuals as their subject. I use the name collective obligations to refer to obligations of the second sort. I argue that there are collective obligations, in this sense; that such obligations can give rise to and explain obligations which fall on individuals; that because of these facts collective obligations are not simply (...)
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  25. Larry Laudan (1997). How About Bust? Factoring Explanatory Power Back Into Theory Evaluation. Philosophy of Science 64 (2):306-316.
  26.  12
    Samuli Pöyhönen (2014). Explanatory Power of Extended Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):735-759.
  27. David Sobel (2010). The Limits of the Explanatory Power of Developmentalism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (4):517-527.
    Richard Kraut's neo-Aristotelian account of well-being, Developmentalism, aspires to explain not only which things are good for us but why those things are good for us. The key move in attempting to make good on this second aspiration involves his claim that our ordinary intuitions about what is good for a person can be successfully explained and systematized by the idea that what benefi ts a living thing develops properly that living thing's potentialities, capacities, and faculties. I argue that Kraut's (...)
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  28.  49
    Brian Skyrms (2002). Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information. Philosophy of Science 69 (3):407-428.
    Pre‐play signals that cost nothing are sometimes thought to be of no significance in interactions which are not games of pure common interest. We investigate the effect of pre‐play signals in an evolutionary setting for Assurance, or Stag Hunt, games and for a Bargaining game. The evolutionary game with signals is found to have dramatically different dynamics from the same game without signals. Signals change stability properties of equilibria in the base game, create new polymorphic equilibria, and change the basins (...)
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  29.  9
    Markus Eronen & Raphael van Riel (2015). Understanding Through Modeling: The Explanatory Power of Inadequate Representation. Synthese 192 (12):3777-3780.
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  30. Alexander Rueger & W. David Sharp (1996). Simple Theories of a Messy World: Truth and Explanatory Power in Nonlinear Dynamics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):93-112.
    Philosophers like Duhem and Cartwright have argued that there is a tension between laws' abilities to explain and to represent. Abstract laws exemplify the first quality, phenomenological laws the second. This view has both metaphysical and methodological aspects: the world is too complex to be represented by simple theories; supplementing simple theories to make them represent reality blocks their confirmation. We argue that both aspects are incompatible with recent developments in nonlinear dynamics. Confirmation procedures and modelling strategies in nonlinear dynamics (...)
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  31.  90
    Horacio Arló-Costa & Jeffrey Helzner (2010). Ambiguity Aversion: The Explanatory Power of Indeterminate Probabilities. Synthese 172 (1):37 - 55.
    Daniel Ellsberg presented in Ellsberg (The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75:643–669, 1961) various examples questioning the thesis that decision making under uncertainty can be reduced to decision making under risk. These examples constitute one of the main challenges to the received view on the foundations of decision theory offered by Leonard Savage in Savage (1972). Craig Fox and Amos Tversky have, nevertheless, offered an indirect defense of Savage. They provided in Fox and Tversky (1995) an explanation of Ellsberg’s two-color problem (...)
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  32.  22
    Erik Weber & Jeroen Van Bouwel (2007). Assessing the Explanatory Power of Causal Explanations. In Johannes Persson & Petri Ylikoski (eds.), Rethinking Explanation. Springer
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  33.  15
    Jeffrey Helzner & Horacio Arlo-Costa, On the Explanatory Power of Indeterminate Probabilities.
    Building on work that we reported at ISIPTA 2005 we revisit claims made by Fox and Tversky concerning their "comparative ignorance" hypothesis for decision making under uncertainty.
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  34.  12
    Richard Boyd (1991). Observations, Explanatory Power, and Simplicity: Toward a Non-Humean Account. In Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper & J. D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science. MIT Press 349--377.
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  35.  37
    Marc Lange (1992). Armstrong and Dretske on the Explanatory Power of Regularities. Analysis 52 (3):154 - 159.
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  36.  50
    Garrett Pendergraft (2010). The Explanatory Power of Local Miracle Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 156 (2):249-266.
    Local miracle compatibilists claim that we are sometimes able to do otherwise than we actually do, even if causal determinism obtains. When we can do otherwise, it will often be true that if we were to do otherwise, then an actual law of nature would not have been a law of nature. Nevertheless, it is a compatibilist principle that we cannot do anything that would be or cause an event that violates the laws of nature. Carl Ginet challenges this nomological (...)
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  37.  9
    Lee McIntyre (1995). Explanatory Power, Individualism and Neoclassical Economics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):179-181.
  38.  54
    Jonathan Ellis (2006). Color, Error, and Explanatory Power. Dialectica 60 (2):171-179.
    At least since Democritus, philosophers have been fond of the idea that material objects do not “really” have color. One such view is the error theory, according to which our ordinary judgments ascribing colors to objects are all erroneous, false; no object has any color at all. The error theorist proposes that everything that is so, including the fact that material objects appear to us to have color, can be explained without ever attributing color to objects—by appealing merely to, e.g., (...)
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  39.  40
    Kelly James Clark (1989). The Explanatory Power of Theism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 25 (3):129 - 146.
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  40.  24
    Anatol Rapoport (1972). Explanatory Power and Explanatory Appeal of Theories. Synthese 24 (3-4):321 - 342.
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  41.  8
    Vincenzo Crupi (1996). An Argument for Not Equating Confirmation and Explanatory Power. Philosophy of Science 63:21-6.
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  42. H. Cruse (2001). The Explanatory Power and Limits of Simulation Models in the Neurosciences. In Peter K. Machamer, Peter McLaughlin & Rick Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press 138--154.
  43.  8
    Lee McIntyre (1996). Explanatory Power, Individualism and Neoclassical Economics: Comments on Kincaid. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (S1):179-181.
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  44.  2
    Bartłomiej Skowron (2015). The Explanatory Power of Topology in the Philosophy of God. In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), God, Truth, and Other Enigmas. De Gruyter 241-254.
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  45.  16
    Jane Singleton (1974). The Explanatory Power of Chomsky's Transformational Generative Grammar. Mind 83 (331):429-431.
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  46.  10
    Harold Kincaid (1996). Can Neoclassical Economics Be Defended on Grounds of Explanatory Power? Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (S1):155-177.
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  47.  8
    James A. Montmarquet (1982). On the Explanatory Power of Some Metaethical Views. Journal of Value Inquiry 16 (4):249-257.
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  48.  5
    Richard C. Jeffrey (1970). Remarks on Explanatory Power. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1970:40 - 46.
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  49.  4
    Robert A. Hinde (2001). Emotion: The Relation Between Breadth of Definition and Explanatory Power. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):37-38.
    Attempts to integrate diverse phenomena in terms of common processes are much needed in psychology, but definitional precision is a necessary preliminary to explanation. It is also preferable to use caution in juxtaposing concepts from different realms of discourse.
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  50. Baker Alan (2003). Quantitative Parsimony and Explanatory Power. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2).
     
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