Search results for 'fallibilism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Objectivity Fallibilism & New Cynicism (forthcoming). Susan Haack. Episteme.score: 30.0
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  2. Lisa Warenski (2009). Naturalism, Fallibilism, and the a Priori. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403 - 426.score: 24.0
    This paper argues that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism—if the a priori is understood in a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept. I argue that empirical indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a priori; however, the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted in such a way that we can be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a priori accords with the naturalist’s (...)
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  3. Dylan Dodd (2011). Against Fallibilism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):665 - 685.score: 24.0
    In this paper I argue for a doctrine I call ?infallibilism?, which I stipulate to mean that If S knows that p, then the epistemic probability of p for S is 1. Some fallibilists will claim that this doctrine should be rejected because it leads to scepticism. Though it's not obvious that infallibilism does lead to scepticism, I argue that we should be willing to accept it even if it does. Infallibilism should be preferred because it has greater explanatory power (...)
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  4. Alexander S. Harper (2010). Fallibilism, Contextualism and Second-Order Skepticism. Philosophical Investigations 33 (4):339-359.score: 24.0
    Fallibilism is ubiquitous in contemporary epistemology. I argue that a paradox about knowledge, generated by considerations of truth, shows that fallibilism can only deliver knowledge in lucky circumstances. Specifically, since it is possible that we are brains-in-vats (BIVs), it is possible that all our beliefs are wrong. Thus, the fallibilist can know neither whether or not we have much knowledge about the world nor whether or not we know any specific proposition, and so the warrant of our knowledge-claims (...)
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  5. Stephen Hetherington (2012). The Significance of Fallibilism Within Gettier's Challenge: A Case Study. Philosophia 40 (3):539-547.score: 24.0
    Taking his conceptual cue from Ernest Sosa, John Turri has offered a putative conceptual solution to the Gettier problem: Knowledge is cognitively adept belief, and no Gettiered belief is cognitively adept. At the core of such adeptness is a relation of manifestation. Yet to require that relation within knowing is to reach for what amounts to an infallibilist conception of knowledge. And this clashes with the spirit behind the fallibilism articulated by Gettier when stating his challenge. So, Turri’s form (...)
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  6. Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Concessive Knowledge Attributions and Fallibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):603-619.score: 24.0
    Lewis thought concessive knowledge attributions (e.g., ‘I know that Harry is a zebra, but it might be that he’s just a cleverly disguised mule’) caused serious trouble for fallibilists. As he saw it, CKAs are overt statements of the fallibilist view and they are contradictory. Dougherty and Rysiew have argued that CKAs are pragmatically defective rather than semantically defective. Stanley thinks that their pragmatic response to Lewis fails, but the fallibilist cause is not lost because Lewis was wrong about the (...)
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  7. Charity Anderson (2014). Fallibilism and the Flexibility of Epistemic Modals. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):597-606.score: 24.0
    It is widely acknowledged that epistemic modals admit of inter-subjective flexibility. This paper introduces intra-subjective flexibility for epistemic modals and draws on this flexibility to argue that fallibilism is consistent with the standard account of epistemic modals.
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  8. Philippe Chuard (2010). Non-Transitive Looks & Fallibilism. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):161 - 200.score: 24.0
    Fallibilists about looks deny that the relation of looking the same as is non-transitive. Regarding familiar examples of coloured patches suggesting that such a relation is non-transitive, they argue that, in fact, indiscriminable adjacent patches may well look different, despite their perceptual indiscriminability: it’s just that we cannot notice the relevant differences in the chromatic appearances of such patches. In this paper, I present an argument that fallibilism about looks requires commitment to an empirically false consequence. To succeed in (...)
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  9. Lisa Warenski (2012). Erratum To: Naturalism, Fallibilism, and the a Priori. Philosophical Studies 159 (2):321-321.score: 24.0
    Erratum to: Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori Content Type Journal Article Category Erratum Pages 1-1 DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9889-4 Authors Lisa Warenski, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  10. Michael Hannon (2014). Fallibilism and the Value of Knowledge. Synthese 191 (6):1119-1146.score: 24.0
    This paper defends the epistemological doctrine of fallibilism from recent objections. In “The Myth of Knowledge” Laurence BonJour argues that we should reject fallibilism for two main reasons: first, there is no adequate way to specify what level of justification is required for fallible knowledge; second, we cannot explain why any level of justification that is less than fully conclusive should have the significance that makes knowledge valuable. I will reply to these challenges in a way that allows (...)
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  11. Stephen Hetherington, Fallibilism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 24.0
    Fallibilism is the epistemological thesis that no belief (theory, view, thesis, and so on) can ever be rationally supported or justified in a conclusive way. Always, there remains a possible doubt as to the truth of the belief. Fallibilism applies that assessment even to science’s best-entrenched claims and to people’s best-loved commonsense views. Some epistemologists have taken fallibilism to imply skepticism, according to which none of those claims or views are ever well justified or knowledge. In fact, (...)
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  12. Stephen Hetherington (2013). Concessive Knowledge-Attributions: Fallibilism and Gradualism. Synthese 190 (14):2835-2851.score: 24.0
    Any knowledge-fallibilist needs to solve the conceptual problem posed by concessive knowledge-attributions (such as ‘I know that p, but possibly not-p’). These seem to challenge the coherence of knowledge-fallibilism. This paper defuses that challenge via a gradualist refinement of what Fantl and McGrath (2009) call weak epistemic fallibilism.
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  13. Avshalom M. Adam (2000). Farewell to Certitude: Einstein's Novelty on Induction and Deduction, Fallibilism. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 31 (1):19-37.score: 24.0
    In the late 19th century great changes in theories of light and electricity were in direct conflict with certitude, the view that scientific knowledge is infallible. What is, then, the epistemic status of scientific theory? To resolve this issue Duhem and Poincaré proposed images of fallible knowledge, Instrumentalism and Conventionalism, respectively. Only in 1919–1922, after Einstein's relativity was published, he offered arguments to support Fallibilism, the view that certainty cannot be achieved in science. Though Einstein did not consider Duhem's (...)
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  14. Ruth Weintraub (1993). Fallibilism and Rational Belief. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):251-261.score: 24.0
    Fallibilism is an attractive epistemological position, avoiding the Scylla of rationalism, and the Charybdis of scepticism. Acknowledging, on the one hand, human imperfection, yet claiming that science and rational inquiry are possible. Fallibilism is a thesis, but equally importantly – an epistemological recommendation. that we should never be absolutely sure of anything. My aim in this paper is to drive a wedge between the thesis and the recommendation. The (eminently plausible) doctrine, I shall argue, cannot be used to (...)
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  15. Catherine Legg (2005). The Meaning of Meaning-Fallibilism. Axiomathes 15 (2):293-318.score: 24.0
    Much discussion of meaning by philosophers over the last 300 years has been predicated on a Cartesian first-person authority (i.e. “infallibilism”) with respect to what one’s terms mean. However this has problems making sense of the way the meanings of scientific terms develop, an increase in scientific knowledge over and above scientists’ ability to quantify over new entities. Although a recent conspicuous embrace of rigid designation has broken up traditional meaning-infallibilism to some extent, this new dimension to the meaning of (...)
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  16. Tim Kraft (2012). Scepticism, Infallibilism, Fallibilism. Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):49-70.score: 24.0
    The relation of scepticism to infallibilism and fallibilism is a contested issue. In this paper I argue that Cartesian sceptical arguments, i.e. sceptical arguments resting on sceptical scenarios, are neither tied to infallibilism nor collapse into fallibilism. I interpret the distinction between scepticism and fallibilism as a scope distinction. According to fallibilism, each belief could be false, but according to scepticism all beliefs could be false at the same time. However, to put this distinction to work (...)
     
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  17. Boris Rähme (2007). Fallibilism, Factivity and Epistemically Truth-Guaranteeing Justification. In Nils Gilje & Harald Grimen (eds.), Discursive Modernity. Universitetsforlaget.score: 24.0
    This paper explores the question of how the epistemological thesis of fallibilism should best be formulated. Sections 1 to 3 critically discuss some influential formulations of fallibilism. In section 4 I suggest a formulation of fallibilism in terms of the unavailability of epistemically truth-guaranteeing justification. In section 5 I discuss the claim that unrestricted fallibilism engenders paradox and argue that this claim is unwarranted.
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  18. Christoph Kelp (2008). Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):221-44.score: 21.0
    This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know on the basis of merely inductive grounds. No matter how strong such theories require inductive grounds to be if a belief based on them is to qualify as knowledge, there are certain beliefs (namely, about the outcome of fair lotteries) that are based on even stronger inductive grounds, while, intuitively, they do not qualify as knowledge. This paper discusses what is often regarded as (...)
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  19. Susan Haack (1979). Fallibilism and Necessity. Synthese 41 (1):37 - 63.score: 21.0
    Part of an early version of this paper was read at the University of Warwick in October 1977, and a later version was read at the Newcastle Royal Institute of Philosophy in November 1977 and at Aberystwyth and Oxford in early 1978. Thanks are due to the many colleagues and friends who made helpful comments on early drafts; special thanks to Hugh Mellor, Rita Nolan and Paul Weiss for detailed written criticisms, and to Don Locke, for very helpful discussions.
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  20. Wesley H. Holliday (forthcoming). Fallibilism and Multiple Paths to Knowledge. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.score: 21.0
  21. Eric Thomas Weber (2008). Religion, Public Reason, and Humanism: Paul Kurtz on Fallibilism and Ethics. Contemporary Pragmatism 5 (2):131-147.score: 21.0
  22. André Leclerc (2010). Fallibilism, Demonstrative Thoughts and Russellian Propositions. Principia 5 (1-2):43-54.score: 21.0
    Russeilian or singular propositions are very useful in sernantics to specify "what has been said" by a literal and serious utterance of a sentence containing a proper name, an indexical or a dernonstrative, or for modeling demonstrative thoughts. Based on an example given by S. Guttenplan, I construct a case showing that if our only option for modeling dernonstrative thoughts is a singular proposition à la Russell, we run the risk of admitting infallible empirical (existential) beliefs. I defend the principle (...)
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  23. Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew (2009). Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):123-132.score: 18.0
    If knowing requires believing on the basis of evidence that entails what’s believed, we have hardly any knowledge at all. Hence the near-universal acceptance of fallibilism in epistemology: if it's true that "we are all fallibilists now" (Siegel 1997: 164), that's because denying that one can know on the basis of non-entailing evidence1is, it seems, not an option if we're to preserve the very strong appearance that we do know many things (Cohen 1988: 91). Hence the significance of concessive (...)
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  24. Jason Stanley (2005). Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions. Analysis 65 (286):126–131.score: 18.0
    Lewis concludes that fallibilism is uncomfortable, though preferable to scepticism. However, he believes that contextualism about knowledge allows us to ‘dodge the choice’ between fallibilism and scepticism. For the contextualist semantics for ‘know’ can explain the oddity of fallibilism, without landing us into scepticism.
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  25. Baron Reed (2002). How to Think About Fallibilism. Philosophical Studies 107 (2):143-157.score: 18.0
    Almost every contemporary theory of knowledge is a version of fallibilism, yet an adequate statement of fallibilism has not yet been provided. Standard definitions cannot account for fallibilistic knowledge of necessary truths. I consider and reject several attempts to resolve this difficulty before arguing that a belief is an instance of fallibilistic knowledge when it could have failed to be knowledge. This is a fully general account of fallibilism that applies to knowledge of necessary truths. Moreover, it (...)
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  26. Anthony Brueckner (2005). Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):384–391.score: 18.0
    Fallibilism about knowledge and justification is a widely held view in epistemology. In this paper, I will try to arrive at a proper formulation of fallibilism. Fallibilists often hold that Cartesian skepticism is a view that deserves to be taken seriously and dealt with somehow. I argue that it turns out that a canonical form of skeptical argument depends upon the denial of fallibilism. I conclude by considering a response on behalf of the skeptic.
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  27. Stephen Hetherington (2001). A Fallibilist and Wholly Internalist Solution to the Gettier Problem. Journal of Philosophical Research 26:307-324.score: 18.0
    How can a person avoid being Gettiered? This paper provides the first answer to that question that is both fallibilist and purely internalist. It is an answer that allows the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge to survive Gettier’s attack (albeit as a nonreductionist analysis of knowledge).
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  28. Adam Leite, Fallibilism.score: 18.0
    In the broadest sense of the term, fallibilism is an anti-dogmatic intellectual stance or attitude: an openness to the possibility that one has made an error and an accompanying willingness to give a fair hearing to arguments that one’s belief is incorrect (no matter what that belief happens to be about). So understood, fallibilism’s central insight is that it is possible to remain open to new evidence and arguments while also reasonably treating an issue as settled for the (...)
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  29. Ram Neta (2011). A Refutation of Cartesian Fallibilism. Noûs 45 (4):658-695.score: 18.0
    According to a doctrine that I call “Cartesianism”, knowledge – at least the sort of knowledge that inquirers possess – requires having a reason for belief that is reflectively accessible as such. I show that Cartesianism, in conjunction with some plausible and widely accepted principles, entails the negation of a popular version of Fallibilism. I then defend the resulting Cartesian Infallibilist position against popular objections. My conclusion is that if Cartesianism is true, then Descartes was right about this much: (...)
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  30. Joseph Margolis (2007). Rethinking Peirce's Fallibilism. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 43 (2):229-249.score: 18.0
    : Peirce's fallibilism is shown to be the "linchpin" of his mature philosophy. In passing, objections regarding a seemingly serious paradox, a textual discrepancy, and the plausibility of an alternative approach to Peirce are answered. Peirce's fallibilism is indeed a puzzling thesis, particularly in that it appears to violate familiar finitist, practical, "here and now" (pragmatist) constraints. But that's precisely where Peirce's ingenuity takes its most interesting form. The solution provided shows the paradox and aporias of Peirce's account (...)
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  31. Elizabeth F. Cooke (2003). Peirce, Fallibilism, and the Science of Mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica 11 (2):158-175.score: 18.0
    In this paper, it will be shown that Peirce was of two minds about whether his scientific fallibilism, the recognition of the possibility of error in our beliefs, applied to mathematics. It will be argued that Peirce can and should hold a theory of fallibilism within mathematics, and that this position is more consistent with his overall pragmatic theory of inquiry and his general commitment to the growth of knowledge. But to make the argument for fallibilism in (...)
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  32. Justin Cruickshank (2007). The Usefulness of Fallibilism in Post-Positivist Philosophy: A Popperian Critique of Critical Realism. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (3):263-288.score: 18.0
    Sayer argues that Popper defended a logicist philosophy of science. The problem with such logicism is that it creates what is termed here as a `truncated foundationalism', which restricts epistemic certainty to the logical form of scientific theories whilst having nothing to say about their substantive contents. Against this it is argued that critical realism, which Sayer advocates, produces a linguistic version of truncated foundationalism and that Popper's problem-solving philosophy, with its emphasis on developing knowledge through criticism, eschews all forms (...)
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  33. Tamba Nlandu (2011). One Play Cannot Be Known to Win or Lose a Game: A Fallibilist Account of Game. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 5 (1):21-33.score: 18.0
    This paper discusses what it means to be a good sport. It offers an account of sportsmanship rooted in the proper understanding of the limited role each participant plays during a specific sporting contest. It aims at showing that, from a fallibilist perspective, although it may perhaps be logically possible for a single play to win or lose a sporting event, it makes epistemologically no sense to single out a particular game action, moment or decision as the crucial one which (...)
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  34. Barbara Fultner (1996). The Redemption of Truth: Idealization, Acceptability and Fallibilism in Habermas' Theory of Meaning. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 4 (2):233 – 251.score: 18.0
    Abstract Jürgen Habermas has proposed a tripartite classification of analytic philosophy of language into formal semantics, intentionalistic semantics, and use?theories of meaning. Here, I focus on the relationship between formal semantics and Habermas? own account of meaning and truth. I argue against his early ?consensus theory of truth?, according to which truth is defined as idealized warranted assertibility and explained by the ?discursive redemption? of validity claims. A claim is discursively redeemed if it commands rationally motivated consensus of all discursive (...)
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  35. Baron Reed (2008). Fallibilism and the Lottery Paradox. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:217-225.score: 18.0
    Any theory of knowledge that is fallibilist—i.e., that allows for one to have knowledge that could have been false or accidentally true—faces the lottery paradox. The paradox arises from the combination of two plausible claims: first, no one can know that one’s lottery ticket will lose prior to learning that it in fact has lost, and, second, the justification one has for the belief that one’s ticket will lose is just as good as the justification one has for paradigmatic instances (...)
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  36. Peter L. Mott (1980). Haack on Fallibilism. Analysis 40 (4):177 - 183.score: 18.0
    I contend that s. Haack's proposed definition of fallibilism ("synthese" 1979) is unsatisfactory being equivalent to the assertion that we can believe anything. I say that fallibilism is best conceived as the doctrine that all our theories are (not could be) false.
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  37. James O. Bennett (1982). Peirce and the Logic of Fallibilism. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 18 (4):353 - 366.score: 18.0
    Some recent defenses of fallibilism have sought to reconcile the claim, 'i know that "p"', with the claim that one might nevertheless be in error. i argue that this cannot be done. the logic of fallibilism requires that 'i know that "p"' be replaced with 'i "believe" that i know that "p"'. in that case, one is not asserting the possession of justified true belief, but only of justified belief, which alone allows consistently for the possibility of error.
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  38. Katariina Holma (2012). Fallibilist Pluralism and Education for Shared Citizenship. Educational Theory 62 (4):397-409.score: 18.0
    Fallibilist pluralism is a moral and epistemological position that preserves both broadly conceived ethical pluralisms and the possibility of searching for a shared moral vision. In this essay Katariina Holma defends fallibilist pluralism as an important epistemological contribution to today's theories on citizenship education and analyzes the educational difficulties of adopting fallibilist pluralism as a conceptual framework in which citizens would encounter different others. Holma argues that to be successful, theories on citizenship education require—in addition to a justified philosophical foundation—a (...)
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  39. Fred Eidlin (1996). Karl Popper, 1902–1994: Radical Fallibilism, Political Theory, and Democracy. Critical Review 10 (1):135-153.score: 18.0
    Abstract Popper's philosophy of science represents a radical departure from almost all other views about knowledge. This helps account for serious misunderstandings of it among admirers no less than among adversaries. The view that knowledge has and needs no foundations is counterintuitive and apparently relativistic. But Popper's fallibilism is in fact a far cry from anti?realism. Similarly, Popper's social and political philosophy, although seemingly conservative in practice, can be quite radical in theory. And while Popper was an ardent democrat, (...)
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  40. Stewart Cohen (1988). How to Be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.score: 15.0
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  41. Christopher Hookway (2007). The Inaugural Address: Fallibilism and the Aim of Inquiry. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):1–22.score: 15.0
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  42. Elizabeth F. Cooke (2004). Fallibilism, Progress, and the Long Run in Peirce's Philosophy of Science. Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (1):155-162.score: 15.0
  43. Richard Feldman (1981). Fallibilism and Knowing That One Knows. Philosophical Review 90 (2):266-282.score: 15.0
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  44. Susan Haack (2004). Fallibilism, Objectivity, and the New Cynicism. Episteme 1 (1):35-48.score: 15.0
  45. Harald Thorsrud (2002). Cicero on His Academic Predecessors: The Fallibilism of Arcesilaus and Carneades. Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (1):1-18.score: 15.0
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  46. Jonathan Roorda (1997). Fallibilism, Ambivalence, and Belief. Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):126-155.score: 15.0
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  47. Baron Reed (2012). Fallibilism. Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.score: 15.0
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  48. John G. McEvoy (1975). A "Revolutionary" Philosophy of Science: Feyerabend and the Degeneration of Critical Rationalism Into Sceptical Fallibilism. Philosophy of Science 42 (1):49-66.score: 15.0
  49. L. S. Carrier (1993). How to Define a Nonskeptical Fallibilism. Philosophia 22 (3-4):361-372.score: 15.0
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  50. Robert Main (2011). The Frontier and Fallibilism: Toward "A More Perfect Union" of Peirce's Philosophy. The Pluralist 5 (3):89-106.score: 15.0
    Toward the close of the nineteenth century, just as American pragmatism began to approach its classic form, Frederick Jackson Turner penned what was to become the single most famous definition (of his day) of the American character. In the lead essay of his book The Frontier in American History, Turner tells us that "the frontier is the line of most rapid and effective Americanization" (56). What he means is that the idea of the frontier—not the confrontation of slavery or the (...)
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