Search results for 'hume s principle' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Sean Walsh (2012). Comparing Peano Arithmetic, Basic Law V, and Hume's Principle. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (11):1679-1709.score: 720.0
    This paper presents new constructions of models of Hume's Principle and Basic Law V with restricted amounts of comprehension. The techniques used in these constructions are drawn from hyperarithmetic theory and the model theory of fields, and formalizing these techniques within various subsystems of second-order Peano arithmetic allows one to put upper and lower bounds on the interpretability strength of these theories and hence to compare these theories to the canonical subsystems of second-order arithmetic. The main results of (...)
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  2. Crispin Wright (2001). Is Hume's Principle Analytic? In Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (eds.), The Reason's Proper Study. Oxford University Press. 307-333.score: 549.0
    This paper is a reply to George Boolos's three papers (Boolos (1987a, 1987b, 1990a)) concerned with the status of Hume's Principle. Five independent worries of Boolos concerning the status of Hume's Principle as an analytic truth are identified and discussed. Firstly, the ontogical concern about the commitments of Hume's Principle. Secondly, whether Hume's Principle is in fact consistent and whether the commitment to the universal number by adopting Hume's Principle might (...)
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  3. Andrew Boucher, Who Needs (to Assume) Hume's Principle? July 2006.score: 540.0
    In the Foundations of Arithmetic, Frege famously developed a theory which today goes by the name of logicism - that it is possible to prove the truths of arithmetic using only logical principles and definitions. Logicism fell out of favor for various reasons, most spectacular of which was that the system, which Frege thought would definitively prove his thesis, turned out to be inconsistent. In the early 1980s a movement called neo-logicism was begun by Crispin Wright. Neo-logicism holds that Frege (...)
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  4. Andrew Boucher, Who Needs (to Assume) Hume's Principle?score: 540.0
    Neo-logicism uses definitions and Hume's Principle to derive arithmetic in second-order logic. This paper investigates how much arithmetic can be derived using definitions alone, without any additional principle such as Hume's.
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  5. Matthias Schirn (2006). Hume's Principle and Axiom V Reconsidered: Critical Reflections on Frege and His Interpreters. Synthese 148 (1):171 - 227.score: 540.0
    In this paper, I shall discuss several topics related to Frege’s paradigms of second-order abstraction principles and his logicism. The discussion includes a critical examination of some controversial views put forward mainly by Robin Jeshion, Tyler Burge, Crispin Wright, Richard Heck and John MacFarlane. In the introductory section, I try to shed light on the connection between logical abstraction and logical objects. The second section contains a critical appraisal of Frege’s notion of evidence and its interpretation by Jeshion, the introduction (...)
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  6. Richard G. Heck Jr (1997). Finitude and Hume's Principle. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (6):589 - 617.score: 540.0
    The paper formulates and proves a strengthening of 'Frege's Theorem', which states that axioms for second-order arithmetic are derivable in second-order logic from Hume's Principle, which itself says that the number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs just in case the Fs and Gs are equinumerous. The improvement consists in restricting this claim to finite concepts, so that nothing is claimed about the circumstances under which infinite concepts have the same number. 'Finite Hume's (...)
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  7. João Paulo Monteiro (2010). Hume's Principle. Principia 3 (2):165-186.score: 540.0
    Hume's project aimed at the discovery of the principles of human nature, and among these the most important in most respects is not association of ideas, but the one he calls "custom or habil." But what is the real nature of Hume's principle? It would be philosophically naïve to decide that Hume's concept of habit simply reproduces the dominant conception. In the latter the main element is time, and the possibility of habit depending only on repetition (...)
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  8. John Beaudoin (1999). On Some Criticisms of Hume's Principle of Proportioning Cause to Effect. Philo 2 (2):26-40.score: 537.0
    That no qualities ought to be ascribed to a cause beyond what are requisite for bringing about its effect(s) is a methodological principle Hume employs to evacuate arguments from design of much theological significance. In this article I defend Hume’s use of the principle against several objections brought against it by Richard Swinburne.
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  9. Daniel Steel & S. Kedzie Hall (2011). What If the Principle of Induction Is Normative? Formal Learning Theory and Hume's Problem. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):171-185.score: 531.0
    This article argues that a successful answer to Hume's problem of induction can be developed from a sub-genre of philosophy of science known as formal learning theory. One of the central concepts of formal learning theory is logical reliability: roughly, a method is logically reliable when it is assured of eventually settling on the truth for every sequence of data that is possible given what we know. I show that the principle of induction (PI) is necessary and sufficient (...)
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  10. Daniel Steel, What If the Principle of Induction is Normative? Means-Ends Epistemology and Hume's Problem.score: 522.0
    I develop a critique of Hume’s infamous problem of induction based upon the idea that the principle of induction (PI) is a normative rather than descriptive claim. I argue that Hume’s problem is a false dilemma, since the PI might be neither a “relation of ideas” nor a “matter of fact” but rather what I call a contingent normative statement. In this case, the PI could be justified by a means-ends argument in which the link between means (...)
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  11. David Hume (1777/2004). An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Prometheus Books.score: 500.0
    Shortly before his death, David Hume declared his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) to be the best of his many writings. In this highly influential work, Hume sets out his theory of justice and benevolence and the other virtues, and argues that morality is founded on the natural feelings or sentiments of humankind. The text printed in this edition is the Clarendon critical edition of Hume's works. This volume also includes detailed explanatory notes on the (...)
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  12. Angela Coventry & Tom Seppalainen (2012). Hume’s Empiricist Inner Epistemology: A Reassessment of The Copy Principle. In Alan Bailey & Dan O'Brien (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Hume. Continuum. 38--56.score: 486.0
    Vivacity, the “liveliness” of perceptions, is central to Hume’s epistemology. Hume equated belief with vivid ideas. Vivacity is a conscious quality so believable ideas are felt to be lively. Hume’s empiricism revolves around a phenomenological, inner epistemology. Through copying, Hume bases vivacity in impressions. Sensory vivacity also concerns liveliness or patterns of change. Through learnt skillful use, it tracks change specific to intentional sense-perceptual experience, Hume’s “coherent and constant” complex impressions. Copying, in turn, communicates the (...)
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  13. Richard Heck (1997). Finitude and Hume's Principle. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (6):589-617.score: 468.0
    The paper formulates and proves a strengthening of Freges Theorem, which states that axioms for second-order arithmetic are derivable in second-order logic from Humes Principle, which itself says that the number of Fs is the same as the number ofGs just in case the Fs and Gs are equinumerous. The improvement consists in restricting this claim to finite concepts, so that nothing is claimed about the circumstances under which infinite concepts have the same number. Finite Humes Principle also (...)
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  14. Albert Visser (2011). Hume's Principle, Beginnings. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (1):114-129.score: 459.0
    In this note we derive Robinsons Principle in the context of very weak theories of classes and relations.
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  15. Ian Rumfitt (2001). Hume's Principle and the Number of All Objects. Noûs 35 (4):515–541.score: 450.0
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  16. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (forthcoming). Hume's Principle and Entitlement: On the Epistemology of the Neo-Fregean Programme. In Philip Ebert & Marcus Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism. Oxford University Press.score: 450.0
  17. Luca Incurvati (2007). On Some Consequences of the Definitional Unprovability of Hume's Principle. In Pierre Joray (ed.), Contemporary Perspectives on Logicism and the Foundations of Mathematics. CDRS.score: 450.0
  18. Matthias Schirn (1995). Axiom V and Hume¿ s Principle in Frege¿ s Foundational Project. Dialogos 30 (66):7-20.score: 450.0
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  19. Crispin Wright (1998). On the Harmless Impredicativity of N=('Hume's Principle'). In Matthias Schirn (ed.), The Philosophy of Mathematics Today. Clarendon Press. 339--68.score: 450.0
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  20. Karánn Durland (1996). Hume's First Principle, His Missing Shade, and His Distinctions of Reason. Hume Studies 22 (1):105-121.score: 444.0
  21. José Oscar de Almeida Marques (2012). The Relation Between the General Maxim of Causality and the Principle of Uniformity in Hume's Theory of Knowledge. Manuscrito 35 (1):85-98.score: 435.0
  22. Michael Haynes (1988). Hume’s Tu Quoque: Newtonianism and the Rationality of the Causal Principle. Man and Nature 7:131-139.score: 435.0
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  23. Henry E. Allison (2003). Reflective Judgment and the Application of Logic to Nature: Kant's Deduction of the Principle of Purposiveness as an Answer to Hume. In Hans-Johann Glock (ed.), Strawson and Kant. Oxford University Press.score: 405.0
  24. G. Douglas (1990). Long's Paper,"'Utility'and the'Utility Principle': Hume, Smith, Bentham, Mill,". Utilitas 2 (1).score: 405.0
     
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  25. Charles Pigden (2010). Comments on 'Hume's Master Argument'. In , Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave Macmillan. 128-142.score: 390.0
    This is a commentary on Adrian Heathcote’s interesting paper ‘Hume’s Master Argument’. Heathcote contends that No-Ought-From-Is is primarily a logical thesis, a ban on Is/Ought inferences which Hume derives from the logic of Ockham. NOFI is thus a variation on what Heathcote calls ‘Hume’s Master Argument’, which he also deploys to prove that conclusions about the future (and therefore a-temporal generalizations) cannot be derived by reason from premises about the past, and that conclusions about external objects or (...)
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  26. Jessica M. Wilson (2014). Hume's Dictum and the Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence. In Alastair Wilson (ed.), Chance and Temporal Asymmetry. Oxford University Press. 258-279.score: 381.0
    Why believe Hume's Dictum, according to which there are, roughly speaking, no necessary connections between wholly distinct entities? Schaffer ('Quiddistic Knowledge', 2009) suggests that HD, at least as applied to causal or nomological connections, is motivated as required by the best account of (the truth) of counterfactuals---namely, a similarity-based possible worlds account, where the operative notion of similarity requires 'miracles'---more specifically, worlds where entities of the same type that actually exist enter into different laws. The main cited motivations for (...)
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  27. Jessica M. Wilson (forthcoming). Hume's Dictum and Metaphysical Modality: Lewis's Combinatorialism. In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to David Lewis. Blackwell.score: 381.0
    Many contemporary philosophers accept Hume's Dictum (HD), according to which there are no metaphysically necessary connections between distinct, intrinsically typed entities. Tacit in Lewis's work is a potential motivation for HD, according to which one should accept HD as presupposed by the best account of the range of metaphysical possibilities---namely, a combinatorial account, applied to spatiotemporal fundamentalia. Here I elucidate and assess this Ludovician motivation for HD. After refining HD and surveying its key, recurrent role in Lewis’s work, I (...)
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  28. Charles Pigden (2010). Snare's Puzzle/Hume's Purpose: Non-Cognitivism and What Hume Was Really Up to with No-Ought-From-Is. In Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 324.0
    Frank Snare had a puzzle. Noncognitivism implies No-Ought-From-Is but No- Ought-From-Is does not imply non-cognitivism. How then can we derive non-cognitivism from No-Ought-From-Is? Via an abductive argument. If we combine non-cognitivism with the conservativeness of logic (the idea that in a valid argument the conclusion is contained in the premises), this implies No-Ought-From-Is. Hence if No-Ought-From-Is is true, we can arrive at non-cognitivism via an inference to the best explanation. With prescriptivism we can make this argument more precise. I develop (...)
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  29. Don Garrett (2007). The First Motive to Justice: Hume's Circle Argument Squared. Hume Studies 33 (2):257-288.score: 324.0
    Hume argues that respect for property (“justice”) is a convention-dependent (“artificial”) virtue. He does so by appeal to a principle, derived from his virtue-based approach to ethics, which requires that, for any kind of virtuous action, there be a “first virtuous motive” that is other than a sense of moral duty. It has been objected, however, that in the case of justice (and also in a parallel argument concerning promise-keeping) Hume (i) does not, (ii) should not, and (...)
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  30. Louis E. Loeb (2006). Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume's Argument About Induction. Synthese 152 (3):321 - 338.score: 315.0
    Since the mid-1970s, scholars have recognized that the skeptical interpretation of Hume’s central argument about induction is problematic. The science of human nature presupposes that inductive inference is justified and there are endorsements of induction throughout Treatise Book I. The recent suggestion that I.iii.6 is confined to the psychology of inductive inference cannot account for the epistemic flavor of its claims that neither a genuine demonstration nor a non-question-begging inductive argument can establish the uniformity principle. For Hume, (...)
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  31. Cameron Buckner (2013). Morgan's Canon, Meet Hume's Dictum: Avoiding Anthropofabulation in Cross-Species Comparisons. Biology and Philosophy 28 (5):853-871.score: 315.0
    How should we determine the distribution of psychological traits—such as Theory of Mind, episodic memory, and metacognition—throughout the Animal kingdom? Researchers have long worried about the distorting effects of anthropomorphic bias on this comparative project. A purported corrective against this bias was offered as a cornerstone of comparative psychology by C. Lloyd Morgan in his famous “Canon”. Also dangerous, however, is a distinct bias that loads the deck against animal mentality: our tendency to tie the competence criteria for cognitive capacities (...)
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  32. Paul O'Mahoney (2013). Hume's Correlationism: On Meillassoux, Necessity and Belief. Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 21 (1):132-160.score: 315.0
    The article argues that Meillassoux's 'After Finitude' underestimates the nature and profundity of Hume's sceptical challenge; it neglects the fact that Hume's scepticism concerns final causes (and agrees fundamentally with Bacon and Descartes in this respect), and that in Hume even the operations of reason do not furnish entirely a priori knowledge. We contend that Hume himself institutes a form of correlationism (which in part showed Kant the way to counter the sceptical challenge via transcendental idealism), (...)
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  33. Jani Hakkarainen (2011). Hume's Argument for the Ontological Independence of Simple Properties. Metaphysica 12 (2):197-212.score: 315.0
    In this paper, I will reconstruct Hume's argument for the ontological (in the sense of rigid existential) independence of simple properties in A Treatise of Human Nature , Book 1 (1739). According to my reconstruction, the main premises of the argument are the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property, Hume's Separability Principle and his Conceivability Principle. In my view, Hume grounds the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property in his (...)
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  34. Matthias Schirn (2014). Frege's Logicism and the Neo-Fregean Project. Axiomathes 24 (2):207-243.score: 315.0
    Neo-logicism is, not least in the light of Frege’s logicist programme, an important topic in the current philosophy of mathematics. In this essay, I critically discuss a number of issues that I consider to be relevant for both Frege’s logicism and neo-logicism. I begin with a brief introduction into Wright’s neo-Fregean project and mention the main objections that he faces. In Sect. 2, I discuss the Julius Caesar problem and its possible Fregean and neo-Fregean solution. In Sect. 3, I raise (...)
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  35. Angela Coventry (2010). Hume's System of Space and Time. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 13.score: 315.0
    David Hume’s views on topics such as causation, free will, personal identity, scepticism and morals are without doubt all significant contributions to philosophy. However, his account of the origin and nature of our ideas of space and time has never been influential (Rosenberg 1993, 82). In fact, the account of space and time is generally thought to be the least satisfactory part of his empiricist system of philosophy (Kemp Smith, 1941: 287, Noxon 1973, 115 and Flew 1986, 38). The (...)
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  36. Ingvar Johansson (2012). Hume's Ontology. Metaphysica 13 (1):87-105.score: 315.0
    The paper claims that Hume’s philosophy contains an ontology, i.e. an abstract exhaustive classification of what there is. It is argued that Hume believes in the existence of a mind-independent world, and that he has a classification of mind-related entities that contains four top genera: perception, faculty, principle and relation. His ontology is meant to be in conformity with his philosophy of language and epistemology, and vice versa. Therefore, crucial to Hume’s ontology of mind-independent entities is (...)
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  37. Robert May (2005). Frege's Other Program. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 46 (1):1-17.score: 315.0
    Frege’s logicist program requires that arithmetic be reduced to logic. Such a program has recently been revamped by the “neologicist” approach of Hale & Wright. Less attention has been given to Frege’s extensionalist program, according to which arithmetic is to be reconstructed in terms of a theory of extensions of concepts. This paper deals just with such a theory. We present a system of second-order logic augmented with a predicate representing the fact that an object x is the extension of (...)
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  38. Adam Christian Scarfe (2012). Kant and Hegel's Responses to Hume's Skepticism Concerning Causality: An Evolutionary Epistemological Perspective. Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 8 (1):227-288.score: 309.0
    According to Hume, determinations of necessary causal connection are without empirical warrant, but, as he maintains, the concept of causality qua necessary connection is indispensable to human beings, having survival value for them, a claim which points to the biological significance of this concept. In contrast to Hume, Kant argues that the causal principle qua necessary connection belongs to the a priori conceptual framework by which rational beings constitute their experience and render the world intelligible. In “Kant’s (...)
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  39. David Landy (2006). Hume's Impression/Idea Distinction. Hume Studies 32 (1):119-139.score: 306.0
    Understanding the distinction between impressions and ideas that Hume draws in the opening paragraphs of his A Treatise on Human Nature is essential for understanding much of Hume’s philosophy. This, however, is a task that has been the cause of a good deal of controversy in the literature on Hume. I here argue that the significant philosophical and exegetical issues previous treatments of this distinction (such as the force and vivacity reading and the external-world reading) encounter are (...)
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  40. Henry E. Allison (2005). Hume's Philosophical Insouciance. Hume Studies 31 (2):317-346.score: 306.0
    This paper argues that Hume’s central concern in T 1.4.7 is to find a way to rely upon his cognitive faculties in spite of what he has learned about them in the preceding sections of part 4. The trouble is that having identified the understanding with “the general and more establish’d properties of the imagination” (T 1.4.7.6; SBN 267), Hume finds that these properties cannot function apart from other “seemingly trivial” ones, which calls into question the trustworthiness of (...)
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  41. Henry E. Allison (2005). Hume's Philosophical Insouciance: A Reading of Treatise 1.4. 7. Hume Studies 31 (2):317-346.score: 306.0
    This paper argues that Hume’s central concern in T 1.4.7 is to find a way to rely upon his cognitive faculties in spite of what he has learned about them in the preceding sections of part 4. The trouble is that having identified the understanding with "the general and more establish'd properties of the imagination" (T 1.4.7.6; SBN 267), Hume finds that these properties cannot function apart from other "seemingly trivial" ones, which calls into question the trustworthiness of (...)
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  42. Roy T. Cook (2009). Hume's Big Brother: Counting Concepts and the Bad Company Objection. Synthese 170 (3):349 - 369.score: 300.0
    A number of formal constraints on acceptable abstraction principles have been proposed, including conservativeness and irenicity. Hume’s Principle, of course, satisfies these constraints. Here, variants of Hume’s Principle that allow us to count concepts instead of objects are examined. It is argued that, prima facie, these principles ought to be no more problematic than HP itself. But, as is shown here, these principles only enjoy the formal properties that have been suggested as indicative of acceptability if (...)
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  43. Laurence B. McCullough (1999). Hume's Influence on John Gregory and the History of Medical Ethics. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 24 (4):376 – 395.score: 300.0
    The concept of medicine as a profession in the English-language literature of medical ethics is of recent vintage, invented by the Scottish physician and medical ethicist, John Gregory (1724-1773). Gregory wrote the first secular, philosophical, clinical, and feminine medical ethics and bioethics in the English language and did so on the basis of Hume's principle of sympathy. This paper provides a brief account of Gregory's invention and the role that Humean sympathy plays in that invention, with reference to (...)
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  44. William H. Williams (1992). Is Hume's Shade of Blue a Red Herring? Synthese 92 (1):83 - 99.score: 297.0
    The existence of an idea of a missing shade of blue contradicts Hume's first principle that simple ideas all derive from corresponding simple impressions. Hume dismisses the exception to his principle as unimportant. Why does he do so? His later account of distinctions of reason suggests a systematic way of dealing with simple ideas not derived from simple impressions. Why does he not return to the problem of the missing shade, having offered that account? Several suggestions (...)
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  45. Rico Vitz (2004). Sympathy and Benevolence in Hume's Moral Psychology. Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (3):261-275.score: 297.0
    In this paper, I argue that Hume’s account of sympathy is substantially unchanged from the Treatise to the second Enquiry. I show that Hume uses the term ‘sympathy’ to refer to three different mental phenomena (a psychological mechanism or principle, a sentiment, and a conversion process) and that he consistently refers to sympathy as a cause of benevolent motivation. I attempt to resolve an apparent difficulty regarding sympathy and humanity by explaining how each is an ‘original (...)’ in Hume’s sense. I conclude by suggesting how my interpretation might make a contemporary evaluation of Hume’s account of benevolent motivation possible. (shrink)
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  46. Albert Casullo (1979). Reid and Mill on Hume's Maxim of Conceivability. Analysis 39 (4):212--219.score: 297.0
    Hume's maxim consists of two principles which are logically independent of each other: (1) whatever is conceivable is possible; and (2) whatever is inconceivable is impossible. Thomas Reid offered several arguments against the former principle, while John Stuart mill argued against the latter. The primary concern of this paper is to examine whether Reid and mill were successful in calling Hume's maxim into question.
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  47. Alan Hájek (1995). In Defense of Hume's Balancing of Probabilities in the Miracles Argument. Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (1):111-118.score: 297.0
    I vindicate Hume’s argument against belief in miracle reports against a prevalent objection. Hume has us balance the probability of a miracle’s occurrence against the probability of its being falsely attested to, and argues that the latter must inevitably be the greater; thus, reason requires us to reject any miracle report. The "flaw" in this reasoning, according to Butler and many others, is that it proves too much--it counsels us to never believe historians, newspaper reports of lottery results, (...)
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  48. Michael Levine (1997). Bayesian Analyses of Hume's Argument Concerning Miracles. Philosophy and Theology 10 (1):101-106.score: 297.0
    Bayesian analyses are prominent among recent and allegedly novel interpretations of Hume’s argument against the justified belief in miracles. However, since there is no consensus on just what Hume’s argument is any Bayesian analysis will beg crucial issues of interpretation. Apart from independent philosophical arguments—arguments that would undermine the relevance of a Bayesian analysis to the question of the credibility of reports of the miraculous—no such analysis can, in principle, prove that no testimony can (or cannot) establish (...)
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  49. Daniel Breazeale (1975). Hume's Impasse. Journal of the History of Philosophy 13 (3):311-333.score: 297.0
    THE QUESTION TO BE CONSIDERED is the relation of Hume's celebrated scepticism to his own constructive philosophical projects and analyses. Since Thomas Reid there have been those who detect an unresolved tension between, on the one hand, Hume's Enlightenment devotion to science with its attendent opposition to dogmatism and superstition and, on the other, his explicitly sceptical manner and principles. Some (e.g., Green and Kolakowski) find this tension unresolvable in principle and utterly subversive of Hume's positive (...)
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  50. Aaron Wolf (forthcoming). Giving Up Hume's Guillotine. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.score: 297.0
    The appealing principle that you can't get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, sometimes called Hume's Guillotine , faces a well-known challenge: it must give a clear account of the distinction between normative and descriptive sentences while dodging counter-examples. I argue in this paper that recent efforts to answer this challenge fail because the distinction between normative and descriptive sentences cannot be described well enough to be of any help. As a result, no version of the principle is (...)
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