Ours is an age of offense, a time of reactionary shock—always received, never given. Ours is an age that has forgone cultural narratives, a time of individualism—wherein personal identities trump the collective spirit. Ours is an age of failing earth, a time of ecological collapse—yet the consumption of global capitalism continues to run amok. But don't fear. You have the correct worldview, the best solutions. It’s not your fault these things are happening. It’s the president’s, the immigrant’s, and the Islamicist’s. (...) Or perhaps It’s the socialist’s, the tree hugger’s, and the baby killer’s. But it’s not your fault. Never yours. For the world exists as you see it—in an echo chamber lined with golden pixels. Do I still have your attention? Then join me. Within the covers of Narrativizing Theories, I dive into ambiguity and aesthetics to depict how clashing worldviews exist side by side yet remain mutually incompatible. I examine how cultures distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable beliefs, embodiments, and identities. And I outline an aesthetic theory of ambiguity that highlights—through the twists and turns of literature—the provisionality of knowledge and the narrativization of reality. (shrink)

This paper examines narrativism’s claim that the historical past cannot be known once and for all because it must be continuously re-described from the standpoint of the present. We argue that this claim is based on a non sequitur. We take narrativism’s claim that the past must be re-described continuously from the perspective of the present to be the result of the following train of thought: 1) “all knowledge is conceptually mediated”; 2) “the conceptual framework through which knowledge (...) of reality is mediated changes with every new generation of historians”; therefore (narrativism’s claim) “the historical past changes with every new generation of historians”. The idea of an unchanging past, for the narrativist, requires denying premise 1 (all knowledge is conceptually mediated”) and therefore rests on a problematic commitment to the chimerical notion of the past as it is in-itself, wie es eigentlich gewesen. We argue that the narrativist’s conclusion does not follow unless one adds a further premise, namely 3) “it is not possible to view reality through the categorial framework of historical agents”. If one asserts the possibility of grasping reality through the categorial framework of others, be they contemporary or past agents (as much philosophy of history written in an idealist key does), then one no longer has to accept the narrativist’s inference that since the past cannot be known in-itself or independently of conceptual mediation, then it cannot be known as it always was for the historical agents. Narrativism’s inference that the past cannot be known as it always was does not follow from premises 1 and 2 unless one smuggles in another problematic premise, premise 3. In this paper we defend the claim that the past can be known as it always was (not as it is in-itself) by invoking a different conception of the role of conceptual mediation in historical knowledge, one which assumes the possibility of viewing reality through the categorial framework of others. This notion of the role of conceptual mediation in historical knowledge is prevalent in the idealist tradition but, in the interest of brevity, we will defend this notion of mediacy by specific reference to the idealist philosophy of R.G. Collingwood. (shrink)

Using the two cases of the Icelandic Health Sector Database and Russian initiatives in biobanking, the article criticizes the view of narratives and imaginaries as a sufficient and unproblematic means of shaping public understanding of genetics and justifying population-wide projects. Narrative representations of national biobanking engage particular imaginaries that are not bound by the universal normative framework of human rights, promote affective thinking, distract the public from recognizing and discussing tangible ethical and socioeconomic issues, and harm trust in science and (...) technology. In the Icelandic case, the presentation of the project in association with national imaginaries concealed its market identity and could lead to the commodification of biodata. In the Russian case, framing in terms of "genetic sovereignty" and "civilizational code" offers pretexts for state securitization. Adherence to normative framework of human rights and public discussion of genetics in an argumentative and factual mode can counter these trends. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 11 Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen’s _Postnarrativist Philosophy of Historiography_ is a major work in the philosophy of history, one that seeks to conceive historiographies not as concerned to represent the past but rather to propose ways of regarding it. To do this requires replacing narrative as the key element in the philosophy of history with the idea that historiographies are informal arguments that propose and defend a thesis about how events or entities of the past should be viewed. (...) This re-orientation in how to view historiography makes it possible to see it as a rational enterprise in which its claims and counterclaims can be rationally assessed. The book is remarkably successful in achieving its goal, but along the way it neglects to address new questions about narrative as a form of argument, and in the end lacks full faith in its pragmatist heart by insisting that standards of rationality are universal and merely given rather than discipline—and culturally—specific, hard won achievements accomplished by historians themselves. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 11 Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen’s _Postnarrativist Philosophy of Historiography_ is a major work in the philosophy of history, one that seeks to conceive historiographies not as concerned to represent the past but rather to propose ways of regarding it. To do this requires replacing narrative as the key element in the philosophy of history with the idea that historiographies are informal arguments that propose and defend a thesis about how events or entities of the past should be viewed. (...) This re-orientation in how to view historiography makes it possible to see it as a rational enterprise in which its claims and counterclaims can be rationally assessed. The book is remarkably successful in achieving its goal, but along the way it neglects to address new questions about narrative as a form of argument, and in the end lacks full faith in its pragmatist heart by insisting that standards of rationality are universal and merely given rather than discipline—and culturally—specific, hard won achievements accomplished by historians themselves. (shrink)

Narrativism, as represented by Hayden White and Frank Ankersmit, can fruitfully be analyzed as an inversion of two brands of positivism. First, narrativist epistemology can be regarded as an inversion of empiricism. Its thesis that narratives function as metaphors which do not possess a cognitive content is built on an empiricist, "picture view" of knowledge. Moreover, all the non-cognitive aspects attributed to narrative as such are dependent on this picture theory of knowledge and a picture theory of representation. Most (...) of the epistemological characteristics that White and Ankersmit attribute to historical narratives therefore share the problems of this picture theory.The article's second thesis is that the theories of narrative explanation can also fruitfully be analyzed as inversions of positivist covering-law theory. Ankersmit's brand of narrativism is the most radical in this respect because it posits an opposition between narrative and causal modes of comprehension while simultaneously eliminating causality from narrativist historical understanding. White's brand of narrativism is more of a hybrid than is Ankersmit's as far as its theory of explanation is concerned; nevertheless, it can also be fruitfully interpreted as an inversion of covering-law theory, replacing it by an indefinite multitude of explanatory strategies.Most of the striking characteristics of both White's and Ankersmit's narrativism presuppose positivism in these two senses, especially their claim that historical narratives have a metaphorical structure and therefore no truth-value. These claims are hard to reconcile with the factual characteristics of debates by historians; this problem can be tracked down to the absence in "metaphorical" narrativism of a conceptual connection between historical narratives and historical research. (shrink)

In a successful series of papers, Schroer and Schroer presented a reductionist narrative account of personal identity. They claimed that their reductionist account had advantages over traditional narrative theories. In this paper I intend to show that they were wrong. Although it is possible to defend a reductionist narrative account, the Schroers’ theory has a problem of circularity. And solving that problem will cause their theory to have much more problems than non-reductionist narrative theories. Consequently, they should either present a (...) new and improved reductionist narrative account, or accept that non-reductionist narrative theories are better suited to account for the problem of personal identity. (shrink)

We have a strong intuition that personal identity is a determinate relationship. Parfit famously challenged this intuition. In this paper I explain how narrative identity theories can face that challenge and defend that personal identity is determinate thanks to what I call the social narrativity thesis. This move will raise some concerns regarding the also strong intuition that personal identity is what matters when we care about our future existence. I address this concern to show that narrative identity theories can (...) account for both intuitions at the same time. (shrink)

After describing the main features of the literary narrative and demonstrating its analogy with music, the author underlines the necessity not to consider a priori a musical production as a narrative. He analyses the intonation of musical contours as a form of proto-narrative which he later explains from the standpoint of Daniel Stern’s developmental psychology. It is then emphasized that music should be considered as a proto-narrative and the authors suggests a criticism of the so-called narratological musicology.

Das Bedürfnis nach Narration schuf nicht lediglich epische Gedichte und ungezählte Mythologien, sondern repräsentiert P. Ricoeur zufolge den wahren Kern der Wissensbildung über das Selbst. Der Identifikationsprozess durch das Erzählen lenkt uns nicht zum Fokus auf unsere eigene Narration. Andauernd wählen wir zunächst Erzählungen anderer Menschen aus und setzen erst hinterher mit eigener Lebensgeschichte ein. Durch den Prozess der Nachahmung, Mimesis – wie von Ricoeur angesehen – sind wir imstande, zeitgleich sowohl Ethik als auch Moral zu erlernen. Die globale Welt (...) mit ihren simplifizierten Narrationen des Marktes neigt dazu, bei der ersten und zweiten Mimesis zu verharren und ist außerstande, zur dritten überzuwechseln, wo erst die Rede von der Kreativität anfangen kann. Der Autor parallelisiert Ricoeurs philosophischen Identitätsbegriff mit Frischs literarischem Experiment im Roman Stiller. Beide sind Exempel hermeneutischer Verflechtung, die zur natürlichen Identität führt. In diesem hermeneutischen Ablauf vermögen wir, uns selbst wieder zu entdecken in einer Welt, in welcher wir unsere eigene Identität achten, indem wir ihren ideenreichen Umformungen aufgeschlossen gegenüberstehen. (shrink)

본고에서는 『춘추좌전』에 담겨있는 역사정신의 본령이나 취지가 어떻게 역사적 서사의 방식을 통해 서술되고 있는지에 대한 문제에 주목한다. 특히 以事解經의 방법은 경전을 해석하는 방식 중의 하나로서 敍事主義的맥락에서 이해된다. 『춘추좌전』은 『춘추』와 달리 敍事의 방법을 통해 義理의 목적에 도달한다. 『춘추』에서는 사건의 구체적 내용을 事例를 통해 서술하는 반면에 『춘추좌전』에서는 서사의 내용을 통해 역사의 본질적인 의도나 취지를 서술한다. 그러므로 『춘추좌전』에 서술된 서사의 내용은 대부분 특정 행위의 결과에 대한 先見之明과 관련되는 경우가 많다. 선견지명은 어떻게 예측하고 판단할 것인가 하는 문제가 반영되어 있다. 서사의 내용들은 절체절명의 天命, 가치지향적 행위, (...) 합목적적 의지 등을 특징으로 한다. 『춘추좌전』에서 특히 주목할 만한 점은 『주역』의 卦爻辭를 因果的관계가 밝혀진 역사적 사례로 보고 그 속에 반영된 예측과 판단의 결과를 역사적 사례에 적용하고 해석하는 것이다. 이는 인과적 관계가 밝혀진 역사적 사례를 활용하여 역사성의 주체적 정신을 담아내고자 하는 취지를 지닌다. 주체적 정신은 敍事의 문장과 故事의 줄거리 사이에 존재하는 내재적 관계 속에서 사실과 가치의 통합적 경계를 지향한다. 이러한 점에서 『춘추좌전』에서는 점서의 사례에 관해 서사주의의 義理的방식을 통해 역사적 사실의 진실성을 밝히고자 한 것이다. (shrink)

We find many embedded letters in ancient historiographic narratives. These letters are not simply literary ornaments, but truly historical causes of the narrated events. In other words, they contribute significantly to the course of the plot. Pioneer in Christian historiography, the author of Luke-Acts also uses embedded letters in the second part of his diptych. By reconsidering the embedded letters in the Acts of the Apostles, this paper will question their narrative functions and credibility.

In this essay we consider the moral claims of one branch of non-realist theory known as linguistic narrativism theory. By highlighting the moral implications of linguistic narrativism theory, we argue that the “moral vision” expressed by this theory can entail, at worst, undesirable moral agnosticism if not related to a transcendental and supra-personal normativity in our moral life. With its appeal to volitionism and intuitionism, the ethical sensitivity of this theory enters into difficulties brought about by several internal (...) tensions as to what morality and moral judgements involve. We contend that the proponents of linguistic narrativism theory must strongly recognize and take responsibility for the “moral vison” their theory professes, in so far as they want to think of their theory as a morally responsible one. (shrink)

In this article, I question the unspoken assumption in historical theory that there is a trade-off between language or narrative, on the one hand, and experience or presence, on the other. Both critics and proponents of historical experience seem to presuppose that this is indeed the case. I argue that this is not necessarily true, and I analyze how the opposition between language and experience in historical theory can be overcome. More specifically, I identify the necessary conditions for a philosophy (...) of language that can be the basis for this. Second, I will also suggest and present one specific instance of such a solution. I argue that the existential philosophies of language of Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas can be exactly the kind of theory we need. For Buber and Levinas, language is not a means for accessing reality, but rather a medium of encounters between human beings. I present Levinas's and Buber's arguments, discuss how their views could be applied to the writing of history, and assess what the resulting picture of the writing of history could look like. (shrink)

This paper has three aims. The first is to subject to critical analysis the intractable debate between realists and anti-realists about the status of the so-called self, a debate that traverses various academic disciplines and discursive fields. Realism about selves has fallen on hard times of late, and the second aim of this paper is to get it back on track. Traditional substantive conceptions of the self contain ontological baggage that many moderns will be loath to carry. This paper settles (...) for a more moderate aim, a “softer” kind of self-realism derived from an unlikely source—Hume—and outlines the Humean moral self and its possible advantages. The third and subsidiary aim is to challenge the view that recent “narrative” conceptions of selfhood have made the old realism versus anti-realism debate redundant. “Narrativism” about selves turns out to do little more than recycle old arguments in fancy new packages. (shrink)

Was sind die philosophischen Grundannahmen postmoderner Texte und inwieweit übernehmen sie das Denken Friedrich Nietzsches? Findet sich der postmoderne Stil umgekehrt schon bei Nietzsche selbst? Julia Maria Pollichs romanistisch ausgerichtete Studie verbindet eine originelle literaturwissenschaftliche Deutung von Nietzsches Schriften, welche dessen Übermenschen-Konzept in neuem Licht erscheinen lässt, mit dem Nachdenken über die philosophisch-poetologischen Unterschiede zwischen modernem und postmodernem Schreiben. Anhand von vier Autoren und Werken aus dem Zeitraum zwischen Fin de Siècle und dem französischen Poststrukturalismus wird so eine Brücke zwischen (...) dem bei Nietzsche - entgegen seinem vorgeblichen Atheismus und "Antichristentum" - vorhandenen Mystik-Thema und der Mystik-Thematik der Postmoderne geschlagen."-- Back cover. (shrink)

This article examines three episodes from the Life of Gregory of Agrigento, drafted in Greek in the 9th century, in which juridical material and procedure inform the hagiographical narrative, and vice versa. It argues that both spheres depend on, and contribute to, a common ‘nomos’, an idea of the righteous, lawful and cooperative coexistence of imperial and papal power in the church of Sicily. While this coexistence is anachronistic in the hagiographer’s own times, he constructs it through the narrativization of (...) law and the juridification of narrative. (shrink)

In this article, I consider some of the forms that truthfulness can take in the Christian life. Drawing on the notion of storied identity, I address the following questions. In general terms, what does it take to live truthfully with respect to some narrative? More exactly, how might that truthfulness be realized in bodily terms? And, finally, how might living truthfully with respect to a narrative contribute to the further elaboration of the narrative? I examine these questions with reference to (...) the concerns of Christian ethics in particular, by taking as my focus the kind of storied truthfulness that is embodied in the practice of neighbour love, and the question of how that truthfulness may be extended through participation in the eucharist. (shrink)

THE GREAT SPIRIT OR THE LITTLE GHOSTS? ON THE LEGITIMIZING NARRATIVES OF CAPITALISMBoltanski and Chiapello’s The New Spirit of Capitalism is a monumental work that diagnoses the nature of contemporary network capitalism and gives a compelling statement of a new ideology that sustains and legitimizes capitalism as an economic system. This paper, however, aims to raise a number of objections to Boltanski and Chiapello’s approach. It questions partly whether the ideology they identify is actually capable of legitimizing contemporary capitalism, partly (...) whether it may not be more constructive to abandon the search for one ‘spirit of capitalism’ in favor of identifying a system of different ideologies that all serve as legitimizing narratives. The paper identifies business ethics as one such ideology and argues that it actually outperforms the one identified by Boltanski and Chiapello according to the criteria defined by the authors themselves. Finally, it is argued that the different ideologies, despite their discrepancies, share one defining characteristic: They are all incapable of making a case for capitalism as an economic system that guarantees the contemporary workforce social security, and that reflects the reality of capitalist society today. (shrink)

The first scientific questionnaire to establish gender and sexual “intermediate” identities “objectively” was published in 1899 by the internationally renowned sexologist and pioneer of LGBTI emancipation, Magnus Hirschfeld (1868–1935). In this article, I show that this questionnaire changed how interactions took place between psycho-medical professionals and people who did not conform to sexual or gender norms. Rhetorically, the questionnaire created a delicate balance between self-expression and objectification of the subject. It broke down already existing semiautobiographical case histories into a list (...) of characteristics, behaviour, and inclinations; all predicated on a conventional binary view of gender. I conclude that the questionnaire paradoxically activated and reified conventionally binary-gendered phenomena precisely by offering gender nonconformist people a robust frame for (gender-fluid) self-understanding; an inheritance still haunting us today. (shrink)

The response given to C.G. Hempel’s well-known challenge by Arthur Danto in his Analytical Philosophy of History of 1965 – that deductive-nomological and narrative explanations are logically compatible yet employ incommensurable schemata – is here investigated from a historical perspective. It is shown that the developmental trajectory that emerges from an analysis of Danto’s previous writings – including not only a forgotten paper of 1958 but also his PhD dissertation of 1952 – contains distinctive step-changes with publications of 1953 and (...) 1956 still prior to that of 1958–59 which enabled his subsequent discovery of narrative sentences. It is also argued that Danto’s developmental trajectory runs contrary to that presumed by some prominent commentators. Analytical History of Philosophy was not the midpoint of his ascent from mainstream philosopher of science to high priest of postmodern aesthetics, but represents a reasoned retreat from his early historical idealism. (shrink)

This article studies the ways in which Arab intellectuals in Egypt and the Levant wrote about modern anti-Semitism during the four decades preceding the demise of the Ottoman Empire. This period is often described as the era of the Arab Nahda (revival); it refers to an era when Arab thinkers and writers showed great interest in the Arabic language, Islamic history, and Arab culture and consumed European literary and philosophical works. Arab intellectuals in this period wrote about Jewish affairs. They (...) protested the persecution of Jews in Eastern and Western Europe and compared anti-Jewish racism to an infectious disease that spread in Europe’s cities and destroyed the fabric of its democracy, especially during the Dreyfus affair. I argue that these very pro-Jewish positions were connected to several conversations about the Arab self. Since the Arabs were categorized as Semites in European racial discourses, the meanings ascribed to the term were of utmost important to them. Arab writers also connected their discussions of anti-Semitism to their broader interest in science; as anti-Semitism seemed to have reflected a remnant from the medieval past, Arab writers wondered why this phenomenon prevailed in modern and scientific Europe. As Ottoman subjects witnessing the colonization of Egypt and North Africa, Arab intellectuals underscored the fact that Europe, whose intellectuals and politicians critiqued the persecution of Christians in the Ottoman Empire and argued that their colonization brought justice to persecuted minorities, was treating its minorities in a horrific fashion. Lastly, as Arab thinkers demanded linguistic and cultural rights within the Ottoman Empire and demanded to curb the powers of autocratic rulers, they were interested in Europe’s most glaring failed emancipation. Their reflections, moreover, could help us theorize the present moment, when Jews and Muslims struggle together against purist and racist movements in the US and in Europe. (shrink)

In recent discussions of the work of new historicist critics like Stephen Greenblatt and Louis Montrose, it has often been remarked that the theory of history underlying their reading practice closely resembles that of postmodern historiographers like Hayden White and Frank Ankersmit. Taking off from one such remark, the aim of the present article is twofold. First, I intend to provide a theoretical basis from which to substantiate the idea that new historicism can indeed be taken to be the literary-critical (...) variant of what Frank Ankersmit has termed the "new historiography." In the second half of the article, this theoretical foundation will serve as the starting point of a further analysis of both the theory and practice of new historicism in terms of its distinctly postmodern historiographical project. I will argue that in order to fully characterize the new historicist reading method, we do well to distinguish between two variants of postmodern historicism: a narrativist one and a heterological one . A brief survey of the two methodological options associated with these variants is followed by an analysis of the work of the central representative of new historicism, Stephen Greenblatt. While the significant use of historical anecdotes in his work leaves unresolved the question to which of either approaches Greenblatt belongs, the distinction does serve a clear heuristic purpose. In both cases, it points to the dangerous spot where the new historicism threatens to fall prey to the evils of the traditional historicism against which it defined itself. (shrink)

Untersuchungen zur transtextuellen Poetik assyrischer herrschaftlich-narrativer Texte. By Johannes Bach. State Archives of Assyria Studies, vol. 30. Helsinki: the Neo-Assyrian Texxt Corpus Project, 2020. Pp. xvi + 481. $75 (paper). [Distributed by Penn State University Press, State Col- lege, PA].

Decoupling a modestly construed Narrative Self Shaping Hypothesis from Strong Narrativism this paper attempts to motivate devoting our intellectual energies to the former. Section one briefly introduces the notions of self-shaping and rehearses reasons for thinking that self-shaping, in a suitably tame form, is, at least to some extent, simply unavoidable for reflective beings. It is against this background that the basic commitments of a modest Narrative Self-Shaping Hypothesis are articulated. Section two identifies a foundational commitment—the central tenet—of all (...) Strong Narrativist proposals, those that posit a necessary link between narrative self-shaping and narrative self-experience. As will be shown, in the hands of Strong Narrativists the latter notion is unpacked in stronger or weaker ways by appeal to the notion of implicit Narrativizing. Section three reminds the reader of Strawson’s challenge to Strong Narrativism. It is revealed that Strawson’s objections are most effective if they target Strong Narrativism’s central tenet construed as a phenomenological revelation about what is necessary for self-experience and not merely the psychological Narrativity thesis, construed as an empirical hypothesis about typical Narrativizing proclivities. Having set the stage, section four critically examines two different strategies, pursued by Rudd and Schechtman respectively, for escaping the horns Strawson’s dilemma poses for Strong Narrativism. In the end both strategies invoke the notion of implicit Narrativizing at a crucial juncture. Section five reveals that a substantive proposal about what implicit Narrativizing might be is lacking, hence we have no reason to believe that it actually occurs. It is concluded that, as things stand, Strong Narrativism has no way of avoiding the horns of Strawson’s dilemma. Brief concluding remarks in the final section are a reminder why, despite their modesty, softer versions of the NSSH—when coupled with a developmental proposal about the narrative basis of our folk psychological competence—are non-trivial and worthy of further development and investigation. (shrink)

Films frequently employ nicknames not only for villains but also for non-criminal characters. In this paper, I present a classification of nicknames used in films, along with various examples, mostly from crime-related films. I argue that the use of nicknames in films is important not for the sake of reference, but for the sake of an additional narrative told by the nickname as a shorthand description of a character's background (cf. Tony “Two-Toes”, “Dirty” Harry, “Doc” Erwin or “Hatchet” Harry Lonsdale). (...) The first role of nicknames is their use as a case of Russell's definite descriptions, which require context to be meaningful, in this case, the film story itself. Such descriptions do not need their object to necessarily exist, but they are still meaningful. This role will be tied to the pragmatic context employed. The second role of film nicknames is to concisely present the audience with a background story, by enriching the identity of a character with additional background information, without unnecessary storytelling. Such a device is connected to the philosophical theory of narrativism, providing an additional layer of the character’s identity. (shrink)

Saul Goodman, Slipping Jimmy, Charlie Hustle, Gene Takavic, Viktor Saint Claire, and many others — all seem to be aliases of one James McGill. The characterization question, from the point of view of the metaphysics of identity, is trying to answer what determines personal identity. The notion of persistence describes necessary and sufficient conditions for a person to continue or cease to exist as a person. The practical importance of persistence includes both responsibility for a person's actions and the fact (...) that identity matters practically because of a person's selfish care about his or her own future. From a Better Call Saul perspective, we are combining metaphysical issues of identity — that pinpoint what it takes for someone to remain the same person — with the pendulum of various James McGill personae. -/- James McGill does seem to have both biological and psychological continuity while shifting from one character to another, but we will argue that psychological continuity is only relevant at the lowest level and that the narrativist account seems to better explain different Jimmy personae. Narrativism answers the persistence question by stating that we are persisting as the same person because of the stories we tell about ourselves, which influence our lives and our decisions. Identity is being constituted at a narrative level, that is — Jimmy is his (current) story, determining when he begins and ends. In this paper, by analyzing character development throughout the series, we are trying to show that James McGill may not always be equated with his aliases because of different spatial and temporal narratives, which also could open various ethical implications of responsibility for past actions. (shrink)

It has been claimed that the prototype theory of concepts supports two controversial claims in the philosophy of art: that art cannot be defined, and that the possession of a certain sort of historical narrative is a sufficient but not necessary means of determining the art status of contested works. It is argued here that two sorts of considerations undermine the thesis that prototype theory offers significant support to anti-definitionism and historical narrativism. First, there is reason to think that (...) prototype theory is as a psychological theory not the sort of view that can support philosophical theories like anti-definitionism and historical narrativism. Second, well-known objections and theoretical alternatives to prototype theory theory raise serious questions about that theory’s own credentials. (shrink)

This paper responds to Dan Hutto’s paper, ‘Narrative Self-Shaping: a Modest Proposal’. Hutto there attacks the “strong” narrativism defended in my recent book, ‘Self, Value and Narrative’ and in recent work by Marya Schechtman. I rebut Hutto’s argument that non-narrative forms of evaluative self-shaping can plausibly be conceived, and defend the notion of implicit narrative against his criticisms. I conclude by briefly indicating some difficulties that arise for the “modest” form of narrativism that Hutto defends.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the phenomenon of historical experience in Gadamer's hermeneutics and Ankersmit's philosophical-historical concept. The interest of the philosophy of history in experience was actualized against the background of exhaustion of the heuristic potential of historical narrativism and constructivism, closely related to the so-called "linguistic turn". At first glance, Gadamer and Ankersmit are representing antinomic interpretations of historical experience: as mediated by the effects of involvement in a tradition or heritage and direct, extracontextual (...) encounter with the past. However, the investigation proves that, despite the apparent antinomy of these approaches, the Gadamerian hermeneutic experience as an experience of the prevailing historical reality is not so far from the sublime historical experience of Ankersmit. And, on the contrary, the sublime historical experience, despite its claims to immediacy, turns out to be an experience of the finitude of human existence, that is, it is close to what Gadamer considered the essence of hermeneutic experience. In both cases, historical experience is considered as a condition for the possibility of understanding the past, and therefore, the question of the universal structure of such experience and understanding necessarily arises. The differences in the positions of the two authors stem from fundamentally different ontological prejudices that they share. For Gadamer, this is the reduction of history to a linguistically structured heritage, as a result of which most of the past falls out of hermeneutic experience. For Ankersmit, this is an uncritical understanding of time, as a result of which his concept of the sublime does not receive a reliable methodological foundation. Clarification of the temporality of the sublime historical, as well as rejection of the rigid connection between historical experience and language, open the prospect of removing the abstract antinomy of contextuality and immediacy of historical experience. The temporality of human existence turns out to be a universal prerequisite of historical experience, the two opposite forms of which are heredity and discontinuity. Contrary to the widespread criticism of Ankersmit's theory as far from historiographical practice, the development of the potential of the concept of sublime historical experience reveals its relevance to the dynamic and tragic modern history that Ukraine is currently experiencing. (shrink)

In the wake of the Cold War a characteristic style of genocide narratives emerged in the West. For the most part, philosophers did not pay attention to this development even though they are uniquely qualified to address arguments and conceptual issues discussed in this burgeoning genocide genre. While ostensibly a response to a specific recent article belonging to the genre, this essay offers an outline of an ethics of genocide narratives in the form of four lessons on how not to (...) write about genocide. It is argued that to the extent that works on the subject of genocide are dominated by narrativism, genocidalism, activism, or extreme pacifism, they cannot properly be classified as scholarly endeavors and must be met with resistance per the requirements of academic ethics and proper scholarly methodology. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 9, Issue 2, pp 306 - 326 In recent years David Christian and others have promoted “Big History” as an innovative approach to the study of the past. The present paper juxtaposes to Big History an old Big History, namely, the tradition of “universal history” that flourished in Europe from the mid-sixteenth century until well into the nineteenth century. The claim to universality of works in that tradition depended on the assumed truth of Christianity, a fact that (...) was fully acknowledged by the tradition’s adherents. The claim of the new Big History to universality likewise depends on prior assumptions. Simply stated, in its various manifestations the “new” Big History is rooted either in a continuing theology, or in a form of materialism that is assumed to be determinative of human history, or in a somewhat contradictory amalgam of the two. The present paper suggests that “largest-scale history” as exemplified in the old and new Big Histories is less a contribution to historical knowledge than it is a narrativization of one or another worldview. Distinguishing between largest-scale history and history that is “merely” large-scale, the paper also suggests that a better approach to meeting the desire for large scale in historical writing is through more modest endeavors, such as large-scale comparative history, network and exchange history, thematic history, and history of modernization. (shrink)

The narrativist insight -- From analytic philosophy of history to narrativism -- Three tenets of narrativist philosophy of historiography -- Representationalism and non-representationalism -- Reasoning in historiography -- Colligation -- Underdetermination and epistemic values -- From truth to warranted assertion -- The tri-partite theory of justification in historiography -- Historiography between objectivism and subjectivism -- Postnarrativist philosophy of historiography.