Search results for 'noncognitivism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  48
    James Lenman (2003). Noncognitivism and Wishfulness. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (3):265-274.
    It has recently been argued by Cian Dorr that if noncognitivism is true, inferences to factual conclusions from premises at least one of which is moral must be condemned as irrational. For, given a noncognitivist understanding of what it is to accept such premises, such reasoning would be wishful thinking: irrationally revising our views about the world to make them cohere with our desires and feelings. This he takes to be a reductio of noncognitivism. I argue that no (...)
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  2. Theodore M. Drange, Atheism, Agnosticism, Noncognitivism (1998).
    This online essay puts forth and defends precise definitions of the terms "atheism," "agnosticism." and "[theological] noncognitivism.".
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  3.  21
    Patrick Loobuyck (2005). Wittgenstein and the Shift From Noncognitivism to Cognitivism in Ethics. Metaphilosophy 36 (3):381-399.
    Different philosophers tried ways to restore the role of reason in ethics. This shift in the philosophical climate was influenced by--or was at least in accordance with--the thought of the later Wittgenstein. In particular, this article will consider the relevance of Wittgenstein for cognitivist views, such as that of S. Toulmin, relativist like G. Harman, and British moral realists like S. Lovibond and J. McDowell. In fact, Wittgenstein is one of the founding fathers of antifoundationalism. He gives us the hopeful (...)
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  4.  92
    Mark Andrew Schroeder (2010). Noncognitivism in Ethics. Routledge.
    According to noncognitivists, when we say that stealing is wrong, what we are doing is more like venting our feelings about stealing or encouraging one another not to steal, than like stating facts about morality. These ideas challenge the core not only of much thinking about morality and metaethics, but also of much philosophical thought about language and meaning. -/- Noncognitivism in Ethics is an outstanding introduction to these theories, ranging from their early history through the latest contemporary developments. (...)
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  5. Daan Evers (2011). Review of Mark Schroeder - Noncognitivism in Ethics. [REVIEW] Disputatio 4 (31):295-203.
    Review of Mark Schroeder's book Noncognitivism in Ethics.
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  6. Ronald J. Broach (1997). A Noncognitivist Reading of Quine's Ethics. Dialectica 51 (2):119–134.
    Until recently it has been tacitly assumed that Quine is a cognitivist about ethical sentences, that ethical sentences have cognitive meaning. I argue that for broad systematic reasons Quine must be read as a noncognitivist concerning ethical sentences. Because Quine himself has written as if he were a cognitivist, he has a number of claims about ethics which turn out to conflict with the noncognitivist reading of his position, and I make explicit the conflicts engendered by three particular claims. I (...)
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  7. Michael Steven Green (1990). Elements of Noncognitivism in Nietzsche's Metaethics and Epistemology. Dissertation, Yale University
    The dissertation is an account of Nietzsche's denial of cognitive objectivity, that is, his denial that there can be such a thing as a true judgment. I claim that plausible arguments for denying cognitive objectivity can be found in Nietzsche, but only after some strong analogies between this denial and traditional arguments against evaluative objectivity are made apparent. Judgments of value are not considered objective because they are motivational, that is, because making an evaluative judgment is necessarily connected with having (...)
     
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  8. Mark Schroeder (2010). Noncognitivism in Ethics. Routledge.
    According to noncognitivists, when we say that stealing is wrong, what we are doing is more like venting our feelings about stealing or encouraging one another not to steal, than like stating facts about morality. These ideas challenge the core not only of much thinking about morality and metaethics, but also of much philosophical thought about language and meaning. _Noncognitivism in Ethics_ is an outstanding introduction to these theories, ranging from their early history through the latest contemporary developments. Beginning with (...)
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  9.  40
    David Alm (2000). Moral Conditionals, Noncognitivism, and Meaning. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):355-377.
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  10.  62
    Rachel Cohon (1997). Is Hume a Noncognitivist in the Motivation Argument? Philosophical Studies 85 (2-3):251-266.
  11.  55
    Peter Railton (1993). Noncognitivism About Rationality: Benefits, Costs, and an Alternative. Philosophical Issues 4:36-51.
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  12.  73
    Mark Schroeder (2010). Getting Noncognitivism Out of the Woods. [REVIEW] Analysis 70 (1):129-139.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  13.  47
    David Enoch (2001). Noncognitivism, Normativity and Belief: A Reply to Jackson. Ratio 14 (2):185–190.
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  14. Fábio P. Shecaira (2011). Hume and Noncognitivism. History of Philosophy Quarterly 28 (3):267.
  15.  39
    Robert C. Coburn (1991). A Defense of Ethical Noncognitivism. Philosophical Studies 62 (1):67 - 80.
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  16.  8
    Daan Evers (2011). Noncognitivism in Ethics, by Mark Schroeder. Disputatio.
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  17.  9
    Daniel R. Boisvert (2013). Mark Schroeder, Noncognitivism in Ethics. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2):234-236.
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  18.  23
    Bruce N. Waller (1994). Noncognitivist Moral Realism. Philosophia 24 (1-2):57-75.
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  19. Mark Kalderon, Moral Pyrrhonism and Noncognitivism.
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  20.  1
    Martin Levit (1963). Noncognitivist Ethics, Scientific Method, and Education. Studies in Philosophy and Education 2 (4):304-331.
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  21.  1
    Martin Levit (1964). Noncognitivist Ethics Revisited. Studies in Philosophy and Education 3 (3):270-277.
  22.  1
    R. W. Sleeper (1964). Noncognitivist Ethics May Not Be What It Seems: A Rejoinder. Studies in Philosophy and Education 3 (2):200-213.
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  23. Thomas Mcclintock (1978). Noncognitivism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 59 (3):273.
     
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  24. Nicholas L. Sturgeon (2008). Hume's Metaethics: Is Hume a Moral Noncognitivist? In Elizabeth Radcliffe (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Hume. Blackwell
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  25. Nate Charlow (2014). Logic and Semantics for Imperatives. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):617-664.
    In this paper I will develop a view about the semantics of imperatives, which I term Modal Noncognitivism, on which imperatives might be said to have truth conditions (dispositionally, anyway), but on which it does not make sense to see them as expressing propositions (hence does not make sense to ascribe to them truth or falsity). This view stands against “Cognitivist” accounts of the semantics of imperatives, on which imperatives are claimed to express propositions, which are then enlisted in (...)
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  26.  44
    Simon Kirchin (2003). Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (3):241-264.
    In recent times, comments have been made and arguments advanced in support of metaethical positions based on the phenomenology of ethical experience – in other words, the feel that accompanies our ethical experiences. In this paper I cast doubt on whether ethical phenomenology supports metaethical positions to any great extent and try to tease out what is involved in giving a phenomenological argument. I consider three such positions: independent moral realism (IMR), another type of moral realism – sensibility theory – (...)
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  27.  51
    Charles Sayward (1989). Do Moral Explanations Matter? Philosophy Research Archives 14:137-142.
    Nicholas Sturgeon has claimed that moral explanations constitute one area of disagreement between moral realists and noncognitivists. He claims that the correctness of such explanation is consistent with moral realism but not with noncognitivism. Does this difference characterize all other anti-realist views. This paper argues that it does not. Moral relativism is a distinct anti-realist view. And the correctness of moral explanation is consistent with moral relativism.
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  28. Simon Blackburn (1998). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
    Simon Blackburn puts forward a compelling original philosophy of human motivation and morality. Why do we behave as we do? Can we improve? Is our ethics at war with our passions, or is it an upshot of those passions? Blackburn seeks the answers to such questions in an exploration of the nature of moral emotions and the structures of human motivation. His theory is naturalistic: it integrates our understanding of ethics with the rest of our understanding of the world we (...)
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  29. P. T. Geach (1965). Assertion. Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
  30. Stephen Finlay (2004). The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgement. Journal of Ethics 8 (3):205-223.
    Analyses of moral value judgements must meet a practicality requirement: moral speech acts characteristically express pro- or con-attitudes, indicate that speakers are motivated in certain ways, and exert influence on others' motivations. Nondescriptivists including Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard claim that no descriptivist analysis can satisfy this requirement. I argue first that while the practicality requirement is defeasible, it indeed demands a connection between value judgement and motivation that resembles a semantic or conceptual rather than merely contingent psychological link. I (...)
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  31. P. T. Geach (1960). Ascriptivism. Philosophical Review 69 (2):221-225.
  32. Nadeem J. Z. Hussain (2012). Nietzsche and Non-Cognitivism. In Simon Robertson & Christopher Janaway (eds.), Nietzsche, Naturalism & Normativity. Oxford University Press
    Though Nietzsche traditionally often used to be interpreted as a nihilist, a range of possible metaethical interpretations, including varieties of realism, subjectivism and fictionalism, have emerged in the secondary literature. Recently the possibility that Nietzsche is a non-cognitivist has been broached. If one sees Hume as a central non-cognitivist figure, as recent non-cognitivists such as Simon Blackburn have, then the similarities between Nietzsche and Hume can make this reading seem plausible. This paper assesses the general plausibility of interpreting Nietzsche as (...)
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  33. Matthew S. Bedke (2009). Moral Judgment Purposivism: Saving Internalism From Amoralism. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):189 - 209.
    Consider orthodox motivational judgment internalism: necessarily, A’s sincere moral judgment that he or she ought to φ motivates A to φ. Such principles fail because they cannot accommodate the amoralist, or one who renders moral judgments without any corresponding motivation. The orthodox alternative, externalism, posits only contingent relations between moral judgment and motivation. In response I first revive conceptual internalism by offering some modifications on the amoralist case to show that certain community-wide motivational failures are not conceptually possible. Second, I (...)
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  34. David Merli (2008). Expressivism and the Limits of Moral Disagreement. Journal of Ethics 12 (1):25 - 55.
    This paper argues that expressivism faces serious difficulties giving an adequate account of univocal moral disagreements. Expressivist accounts of moral discourse understand moral judgments in terms of various noncognitive mental states, and they interpret moral disagreements as clashes between competing (and incompatible) attitudes. I argue that, for various reasons, expressivists must specify just what mental states are involved in moral judgment. If they do not, we lack a way of distinguishing moral judgments from other sorts of assessment and thus for (...)
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  35.  34
    Andrew Alwood (2016). Should Expressivism Be a Theory at the Level of Metasemantics? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):13-22.
    Michael Ridge argues that metaethical expressivism can avoid its most worrisome problems by going ‘Ecumenical’. Ridge emphasizes that he aims to develop expressivism at the level of metasemantics rather than at the level of semantics. This is supposed to allow him to avoid a mentalist semantics of attitudes and instead offer an orthodox, truth-conditional or propositional semantics. However, I argue that Ridge's theory remains committed to mentalist semantics, and that his move to go metasemantic doesn't bring any clear advantages to (...)
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  36.  68
    Jon Tresan (2009). Metaethical Internalism: Another Neglected Distinction. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 13 (1):51 - 72.
    ‘Internalism’ is used in metaethics for a cluster of claims which bear a family resemblance. They tend to link, in some distinctive way—typically modal, mereological, or causal—different parts of the normative realm, or the normative and the psychological. The thesis of this paper is that much metaethical mischief has resulted from philosophers’ neglect of the distinction between two different features of such claims. The first is the modality of the entire claim. The second is the relation between the items specified (...)
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  37. Gideon Rosen (1998). Blackburn's Essays in Quasi-Realism. Noûs 32 (3):386-405.
  38. John R. Searle (1962). Meaning and Speech Acts. Philosophical Review 71 (4):423-432.
  39. Adam M. Croom (2010). Thick Concepts, Non-Cognitivism, and Wittgenstein's Rule Following Considerations. South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):286-309.
    Non-cognitivists claim that thick concepts can be disentangled into distinct descriptive and evaluative components and that since thick concepts have descriptive shape they can be mastered independently of evaluation. In Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, John McDowell uses Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to show that such a non-cognitivist view is untenable. In this paper I do several things. I describe the non-cognitivist position in its various forms and explain its driving motivations. I then explain McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism and the Wittgensteinian considerations upon (...)
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  40.  11
    Andrew Fisher & Simon Kirchin (eds.) (2006). Arguing About Metaethics. Routledge.
    _Arguing about Metaethics_ collects together some of the most exciting contemporary work in metaethics in one handy volume. In it, many of the most influential philosophers in the field discuss key questions in metaethics: Do moral properties exist? If they do, how do they fit into the world as science conceives it? If they don’t exist, then how should we understand moral thought and language? What is the relation between moral judgement and motivation? As well as these questions, this volume (...)
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  41.  44
    Theodore M. Drange (2005). Is “God Exists” Cognitive? Philo 8 (2):137-150.
    The title question is approached by distinguishing two senses of “God” and two senses of “cognitive” (or “cognitively meaningful”), producing four separate questions. Each is given an affirmative or negative answer, which is defended against possible objections. At the end, the debate between atheism and theological non-cognitivism is addressed, with the atheist side argued to have the preferable outlook.
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  42.  49
    Robert Welsh Jordan (2001). Hartmann, Schutz, and the Hermeneutics of Action. Axiomathes 12 (3-4):327-338.
    Hartmann's way of conceiving what he terms "the actual ought-to-be [aktuales Seinsollen]" offers a fruitful approach to crucial issues in the phenomenology of action. The central issue to be dealt with concerns the description of the "constitution" of anticipated possibilities as projects for action. Such potentialities are termed "problematic possibilities" and are contrasted with "open possibilities" in most of the works published by Husserl as well as those published by Alfred Schutz. The description given by Alfred Schutz emphasized that the (...)
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  43.  11
    Edmund Wall (2015). Natural Morality, Descriptivism, and Non-Cognitivism. Philosophia 43 (1):233-248.
    I attempt to identify a problem running through the foundation of R. M. Hare’s ethical prescriptivism and the more recent sentimentalism/ethical expressivism of Simon Blackburn. The non-cognitivism to which Hare and Blackburn’s approaches are committed renders them unable to establish stable contents for basic moral principles and, thus, incapable of conducting a logical analysis of moral terms or statements. I argue that objective-descriptive- natural ethical theories are in a much better position to provide a satisfying account of the logical analysis (...)
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  44.  46
    Kurt Baier (1962). Pains. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40 (May):1-23.
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  45.  26
    Andrew Fisher (2007). Moral Fictionalism – Mark Eli Kalderon. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):145–148.
    A review of Mark Kalderon's book 'Moral Fictionalism'.
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  46.  63
    Mark Andrew Schroeder (2008). Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism. Oxford University Press.
    Expressivism - the sophisticated contemporary incarnation of the noncognitivist research program of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare - is no longer the province of metaethicists alone. Its comprehensive view about the nature of both normative language and normative thought has also recently been applied to many topics elsewhere in philosophy - including logic, probability, mental and linguistic content, knowledge, epistemic modals, belief, the a priori, and even quantifiers. Yet the semantic commitments of expressivism are still poorly understood and have not been (...)
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  47.  14
    Mark Schroeder (2008). Being For. Oxford University Press.
    Expressivism - the sophisticated contemporary incarnation of the noncognitivist research program of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare - is no longer the province of metaethicists alone. Its comprehensive view about the nature of both normative language and normative thought has also recently been applied to many topics elsewhere in philosophy - including logic, probability, mental and linguistic content, knowledge, epistemic modals, belief, the a priori, and even quantifiers. [...] Expressivism, the book argues, is coherent and interesting, but false.
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  48. Menachem Fisch (2004). Through Thick and Thin. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):1-24.
    Some relativists deny that moral discourse is factual. According to them, our ethical commitments are to be explained by appealing to noncognitive mental states like desires, rather than to beliefs in some independent moral facts. Indeed, the package antirealism (there are no moral properties) & noncognitivism (the source of moral commitments is noncognitive) seems to be implicit in Lewis’s and Harman’s relativism. But to many philosophers this package seems to be unattractive. Our task in this paper is to construe (...)
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  49. David Bain (2012). What Makes Pains Unpleasant? Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
    The unpleasantness of pain motivates action. Hence many philosophers have doubted that it can be accounted for purely in terms of pain’s possession of indicative representational content. Instead, they have explained it in terms of subjects’ inclinations to stop their pains, or in terms of pain’s imperative content. I claim that such “noncognitivist” accounts fail to accommodate unpleasant pain’s reason-giving force. What is needed, I argue, is a view on which pains are unpleasant, motivate, and provide reasons in virtue of (...)
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  50. Mark Schroeder (2008). What is the Frege-Geach Problem? Philosophy Compass 3 (4):703-720.
    In the 1960s, Peter Geach and John Searle independently posed an important objection to the wide class of 'noncognitivist' metaethical views that had at that time been dominant and widely defended for a quarter of a century. The problems raised by that objection have come to be known in the literature as the Frege-Geach Problem, because of Geach's attribution of the objection to Frege's distinction between content and assertoric force, and the problem has since occupied a great deal of the (...)
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