Search results for 'noncognitivism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. James Lenman (2003). Noncognitivism and Wishfulness. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (3):265-274.score: 18.0
    It has recently been argued by Cian Dorr that if noncognitivism is true, inferences to factual conclusions from premises at least one of which is moral must be condemned as irrational. For, given a noncognitivist understanding of what it is to accept such premises, such reasoning would be wishful thinking: irrationally revising our views about the world to make them cohere with our desires and feelings. This he takes to be a reductio of noncognitivism. I argue that no (...)
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  2. Daan Evers (2011). Review of Mark Schroeder - Noncognitivism in Ethics. [REVIEW] Disputatio 4 (31):295-203.score: 12.0
    Review of Mark Schroeder's book Noncognitivism in Ethics.
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  3. Theodore M. Drange, Atheism, Agnosticism, Noncognitivism (1998).score: 12.0
    Suppose you are to answer the following two questions: (1) Does the sentence "God exists" express a proposition? (2) If so, then is that proposition true or false? If you say no to the first question, then you may be classified as a noncognitivist with regard to God talk . If you say yes to it, thereby allowing that the given sentence does express a proposition, then you are a cognitivist with regard to God talk . (Let us henceforth abbreviate (...)
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  4. Mark Andrew Schroeder (2010). Noncognitivism in Ethics. Routledge.score: 12.0
    According to noncognitivists, when we say that stealing is wrong, what we are doing is more like venting our feelings about stealing or encouraging one another not to steal, than like stating facts about morality. These ideas challenge the core not only of much thinking about morality and metaethics, but also of much philosophical thought about language and meaning. -/- Noncognitivism in Ethics is an outstanding introduction to these theories, ranging from their early history through the latest contemporary developments. (...)
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  5. Christopher Macleod (2013). Was Mill a Noncognitivist? Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):206-223.score: 12.0
    In this paper, I examine the presumption that Mill endorses a form of metaethical noncognitivism. I argue that the evidence traditionally cited for this interpretation is not convincing and suggest that we should instead remain open to a cognitivist reading. I begin by laying out the “received view” of Mill on the status of practical norms, as given by Alan Ryan in the 1970s. I then argue that there is no firm textual evidence for this reading of Mill: his (...)
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  6. Nate Charlow (2014). Logic and Semantics for Imperatives. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):617-664.score: 9.0
    In this paper I will develop a view about the semantics of imperatives, which I term Modal Noncognitivism, on which imperatives might be said to have truth conditions (dispositionally, anyway), but on which it does not make sense to see them as expressing propositions (hence does not make sense to ascribe to them truth or falsity). This view stands against “Cognitivist” accounts of the semantics of imperatives, on which imperatives are claimed to express propositions, which are then enlisted in (...)
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  7. Peter Railton (1993). Noncognitivism About Rationality: Benefits, Costs, and an Alternative. Philosophical Issues 4:36-51.score: 9.0
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  8. Mark Schroeder (2010). Getting Noncognitivism Out of the Woods. [REVIEW] Analysis 70 (1):129-139.score: 9.0
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  9. Rachel Cohon (1997). Is Hume a Noncognitivist in the Motivation Argument? Philosophical Studies 85 (2-3):251-266.score: 9.0
  10. Simon Kirchin (2003). Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (3):241-264.score: 9.0
    In recent times, comments have been made and arguments advanced in support of metaethical positions based on the phenomenology of ethical experience – in other words, the feel that accompanies our ethical experiences. In this paper I cast doubt on whether ethical phenomenology supports metaethical positions to any great extent and try to tease out what is involved in giving a phenomenological argument. I consider three such positions: independent moral realism (IMR), another type of moral realism – sensibility theory – (...)
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  11. Charles Sayward (1989). Do Moral Explanations Matter? Philosophy Research Archives 14:137-142.score: 9.0
    Nicholas Sturgeon has claimed that moral explanations constitute one area of disagreement between moral realists and noncognitivists. He claims that the correctness of such explanation is consistent with moral realism but not with noncognitivism. Does this difference characterize all other anti-realist views. This paper argues that it does not. Moral relativism is a distinct anti-realist view. And the correctness of moral explanation is consistent with moral relativism.
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  12. David Enoch (2001). Noncognitivism, Normativity and Belief: A Reply to Jackson. Ratio 14 (2):185–190.score: 9.0
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  13. Robert C. Coburn (1991). A Defense of Ethical Noncognitivism. Philosophical Studies 62 (1):67 - 80.score: 9.0
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  14. David Alm (2000). Moral Conditionals, Noncognitivism, and Meaning. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):355-377.score: 9.0
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  15. Bruce N. Waller (1994). Noncognitivist Moral Realism. Philosophia 24 (1-2):57-75.score: 9.0
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  16. Patrick Loobuyck (2005). Wittgenstein and the Shift From Noncognitivism to Cognitivism in Ethics. Metaphilosophy 36 (3):381-399.score: 9.0
    Different philosophers tried ways to restore the role of reason in ethics. This shift in the philosophical climate was influenced by--or was at least in accordance with--the thought of the later Wittgenstein. In particular, this article will consider the relevance of Wittgenstein for cognitivist views, such as that of S. Toulmin, relativist like G. Harman, and British moral realists like S. Lovibond and J. McDowell. In fact, Wittgenstein is one of the founding fathers of antifoundationalism. He gives us the hopeful (...)
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  17. Mark Kalderon, Moral Pyrrhonism and Noncognitivism.score: 9.0
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  18. Ronald J. Broach (1997). A Noncognitivist Reading of Quine's Ethics. Dialectica 51 (2):119–134.score: 9.0
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  19. Daniel R. Boisvert (2013). Mark Schroeder, Noncognitivism in Ethics. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2):234-236.score: 9.0
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  20. Martin Levit (1963). Noncognitivist Ethics, Scientific Method, and Education. Studies in Philosophy and Education 2 (4):304-331.score: 9.0
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  21. R. W. Sleeper (1964). Noncognitivist Ethics May Not Be What It Seems: A Rejoinder. Studies in Philosophy and Education 3 (2):200-213.score: 9.0
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  22. Daan Evers (2011). Noncognitivism in Ethics, by Mark Schroeder. Disputatio.score: 9.0
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  23. Martin Levit (1964). Noncognitivist Ethics Revisited. Studies in Philosophy and Education 3 (3):270-277.score: 9.0
  24. Fábio P. Shecaira (2011). Hume and Noncognitivism. History of Philosophy Quarterly 28 (3):267.score: 9.0
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  25. Nicholas L. Sturgeon (2008). Hume's Metaethics: Is Hume a Moral Noncognitivist? In Elizabeth Radcliffe (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Hume. Blackwell.score: 9.0
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  26. P. T. Geach (1965). Assertion. Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.score: 6.0
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  27. P. T. Geach (1960). Ascriptivism. Philosophical Review 69 (2):221-225.score: 6.0
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  28. Matthew S. Bedke (2009). Moral Judgment Purposivism: Saving Internalism From Amoralism. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):189 - 209.score: 6.0
    Consider orthodox motivational judgment internalism: necessarily, A’s sincere moral judgment that he or she ought to φ motivates A to φ. Such principles fail because they cannot accommodate the amoralist, or one who renders moral judgments without any corresponding motivation. The orthodox alternative, externalism, posits only contingent relations between moral judgment and motivation. In response I first revive conceptual internalism by offering some modifications on the amoralist case to show that certain community-wide motivational failures are not conceptually possible. Second, I (...)
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  29. Simon Blackburn (1998/2000). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.score: 6.0
    Simon Blackburn puts forward a compelling and original philosophy of human motivation and morality. Why do we behave as we do? Can we improve? Is our ethics at war with our passions, or is it an upshot of those passions? Blackburn seeks the answers to such questions in an exploration of the nature of moral emotions and the structures of human motivation. He develops a naturalistic ethics, which integrates our understanding of ethics with the rest of our understanding of the (...)
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  30. John R. Searle (1962). Meaning and Speech Acts. Philosophical Review 71 (4):423-432.score: 6.0
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  31. Adam M. Croom (2010). Thick Concepts, Non-Cognitivism, and Wittgenstein's Rule Following Considerations. South African Journal of Philosophy 29:286-309.score: 6.0
    Non-cognitivists claim that thick concepts can be disentangled into distinct descriptive and evaluative components and that since thick concepts have descriptive shape they can be mastered independently of evaluation. In Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, John McDowell uses Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to show that such a non-cognitivist view is untenable. In this paper I do several things. I describe the non-cognitivist position in its various forms and explain its driving motivations. I then explain McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism and the Wittgensteinian considerations upon (...)
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  32. David Merli (2008). Expressivism and the Limits of Moral Disagreement. Journal of Ethics 12 (1):25 - 55.score: 6.0
    This paper argues that expressivism faces serious difficulties giving an adequate account of univocal moral disagreements. Expressivist accounts of moral discourse understand moral judgments in terms of various noncognitive mental states, and they interpret moral disagreements as clashes between competing (and incompatible) attitudes. I argue that, for various reasons, expressivists must specify just what mental states are involved in moral judgment. If they do not, we lack a way of distinguishing moral judgments from other sorts of assessment and thus for (...)
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  33. Nadeem J. Z. Hussain (2012). Nietzsche and Non-Cognitivism. In Simon Robertson & Christopher Janaway (eds.), Nietzsche, Naturalism & Normativity. Oxford University Press.score: 6.0
    Though Nietzsche traditionally often used to be interpreted as a nihilist, a range of possible metaethical interpretations, including varieties of realism, subjectivism and fictionalism, have emerged in the secondary literature. Recently the possibility that Nietzsche is a non-cognitivist has been broached. If one sees Hume as a central non-cognitivist figure, as recent non-cognitivists such as Simon Blackburn have, then the similarities between Nietzsche and Hume can make this reading seem plausible. This paper assesses the general plausibility of interpreting Nietzsche as (...)
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  34. Gideon Rosen (1998). Blackburn's Essays in Quasi-Realism. Noûs 32 (3):386-405.score: 6.0
  35. Jon Tresan (2009). Metaethical Internalism: Another Neglected Distinction. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 13 (1):51 - 72.score: 6.0
    ‘Internalism’ is used in metaethics for a cluster of claims which bear a family resemblance. They tend to link, in some distinctive way—typically modal, mereological, or causal—different parts of the normative realm, or the normative and the psychological. The thesis of this paper is that much metaethical mischief has resulted from philosophers’ neglect of the distinction between two different features of such claims. The first is the modality of the entire claim. The second is the relation between the items specified (...)
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  36. Stephen Finlay (2004). The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgement. Journal of Ethics 8 (3):205-223.score: 6.0
    Analyses of moral value judgements must meet a practicality requirement: moral speech acts characteristically express pro- or con-attitudes, indicate that speakers are motivated in certain ways, and exert influence on others' motivations. Nondescriptivists including Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard claim that no descriptivist analysis can satisfy this requirement. I argue first that while the practicality requirement is defeasible, it indeed demands a connection between value judgement and motivation that resembles a semantic or conceptual rather than merely contingent psychological link. I (...)
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  37. Kurt Baier (1962). Pains. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40 (May):1-23.score: 6.0
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  38. Robert Welsh Jordan (2001). Hartmann, Schutz, and the Hermeneutics of Action. Axiomathes 12 (3-4):327-338.score: 6.0
    Hartmann's way of conceiving what he terms "the actual ought-to-be [aktuales Seinsollen]" offers a fruitful approach to crucial issues in the phenomenology of action. The central issue to be dealt with concerns the description of the "constitution" of anticipated possibilities as projects for action. Such potentialities are termed "problematic possibilities" and are contrasted with "open possibilities" in most of the works published by Husserl as well as those published by Alfred Schutz. The description given by Alfred Schutz emphasized that the (...)
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  39. Mark Schroeder (2008). What is the Frege-Geach Problem? Philosophy Compass 3 (4):703-720.score: 3.0
    In the 1960s, Peter Geach and John Searle independently posed an important objection to the wide class of 'noncognitivist' metaethical views that had at that time been dominant and widely defended for a quarter of a century. The problems raised by that objection have come to be known in the literature as the Frege-Geach Problem, because of Geach's attribution of the objection to Frege's distinction between content and assertoric force, and the problem has since occupied a great deal of the (...)
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  40. Richard Garner (2007). Abolishing Morality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):499 - 513.score: 3.0
    Moral anti-realism comes in two forms – noncognitivism and the error theory. The noncognitivist says that when we make moral judgments we aren’t even trying to state moral facts. The error theorist says that when we make moral judgments we are making statements about what is objectively good, bad, right, or wrong but, since there are no moral facts, our moral judgments are uniformly false. This development of moral anti-realism was first seriously defended by John Mackie. In this paper (...)
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  41. David O. Brink, Handout #2: Moral Motivation and Rationalism.score: 3.0
    We have looked at worries about expressivism and other forms of noncognitivism. The externalist solution may also seem to be a solution of last resort, because it may seem to deny the platitude that moral judgments are motivationally efficacious. For this reason, we might look seriously at rationalist theories of moral motivation, because they promise to represent moral judgments as intrinsically motivational without giving up cognitivism.
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  42. Andrew Sepielli (2012). Normative Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):191-207.score: 3.0
    Normative judgments involve two gradable features. First, the judgments themselves can come in degrees; second, the strength of reasons represented in the judgments can come in degrees. Michael Smith has argued that non-cognitivism cannot accommodate both of these gradable dimensions. The degrees of a non-cognitive state can stand in for degrees of judgment, or degrees of reason strength represented in judgment, but not both. I argue that (a) there are brands of noncognitivism that can surmount Smith’s challenge, and (b) (...)
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  43. Dorit Bar-On & Matthew Chrisman (2009). Ethical Neo-Expressivism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 4. Oup Oxford. 132-65.score: 3.0
    A standard way to explain the connection between ethical claims and motivation is to say that these claims express motivational attitudes. Unless this connection is taken to be merely a matter of contingent psychological regularity, it may seem that there are only two options for understanding it. We can either treat ethical claims as expressing propositions that one cannot believe without being at least somewhat motivated (subjectivism), or we can treat ethical claims as nonpropositional and as having their semantic content (...)
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  44. Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). What Matters About Metaethics? In Peter Singer (ed.), Does Anything Really Matter? Responses to Parfit.score: 3.0
    According to Part VI of Derek Parfit’s On What Matters, some things matter.1 Indeed, there are normative truths to the effect that some things matter, and it matters that there are such truths. Moreover, according to Parfit, these normative truths are cognitive and irreducible. And in addition to mattering that there are normative truths about what matters, Parfit holds that it also matters that these truths are cognitive and irreducible. Indeed this matters so much that Parfit tells us that if (...)
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  45. Matthew Chrisman (2005). Review of Alan Gibbard's Thinking How to Live. [REVIEW] Ethics 115 (2):406-412.score: 3.0
    I imagine that people will complain that the account of normative concepts defended in Gibbard’s new book makes the metaethical waters even muddier because it blurs the line between cognitivism and noncognitivism and between realism and antirealism. However, these labels are philosophic tools, and in the wake of Gibbard’s new book, one might rightly conclude that there are new and better philosophical tools emerging on the metaethical scene. The uptake of views about practical reasoning—as exhibited by planning—into debates about (...)
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  46. Nadeem J. Z. Hussain & Nishi Shah (forthcoming). Metaethics and Its Discontents: A Case Study of Korsgaard. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Moral Constructivism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press.score: 3.0
    The maturing of metaethics has been accompanied by widespread, but relatively unarticulated, discontent that mainstream metaethics is fundamentally on the wrong track. The malcontents we have in mind do not simply champion a competitor to the likes of noncognitivism or realism; they disapprove of the supposed presuppositions of the existing debate. Their aim is not to generate a new theory within metaethics, but to go beyond metaethics and to transcend the distinctions it draws between metaethics and normative ethics and (...)
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  47. Richard Joyce (2009). Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):53 - 75.score: 3.0
    Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this paper) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (e.g., an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims and must be tested as such. This paper does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather undertakes (...)
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  48. Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1998). A Problem for Expressivism. Analysis 58 (4):239–251.score: 3.0
    Expressivists hold that ethical sentences express attitudes. We argue that it is very hard for expressivists to give an account of the relevant sense of 'express' which has some plausibility and also delivers the kind of noncognitivist account of ethical sentences they affirm. Our argument draws on Locke's point that words are voluntary signs.
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  49. Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). The Moral Truth. In Michael Glanzburg (ed.), Oxford Handbook to Truth. Oxford.score: 3.0
    Common-sense allows that talk about moral truths makes perfect sense. If you object to the United States’ Declaration of Independence’s assertion that it is a truth that ‘all men’ are ‘endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights’, you are more likely to object that these rights are not unalienable or that they are not endowed by the Creator, or even that its wording ignores the fact that women have rights too, than that this is not the sort of thing (...)
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  50. Richard Joyce, Error Theory.score: 3.0
    To hold an error theory about morality is to endorse a kind of radical moral skepticism—a skepticism analogous to atheism in the religious domain. The atheist thinks that religious utterances, such as “God loves you,” really are truth-evaluable assertions (as opposed to being veiled commands or expressions of hope, etc.), but that the world just doesn’t contain the items (e.g., God) necessary to render such assertions true. Similarly, the moral error theorist maintains that moral judgments are truth-evaluable assertions (thus contrasting (...)
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