Search results for 'nonconceptual content' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jeff Speaks (2005). Is There a Problem About Nonconceptual Content? Philosophical Review 114 (3):359-98.score: 240.0
    In the past twenty years, issues about the relationship between perception and thought have largely been framed in terms of the question of whether the contents of perception are nonconceptual. I argue that this debate has rested on an ambiguity in `nonconceptual content' and some false presuppositions about what is required for concept possession. Once these are cleared away, I argue that none of the arguments which have been advanced about nonconceptual content do much to (...)
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  2. Walter Hopp (2010). How to Think About Nonconceptual Content. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 10 (1):1-24.score: 240.0
    This paper provides a general account of what nonconceptual content is, and some considerations in favor of its existence. After distinguishing between the contents and objects of mental states, as well as the properties of being conceptual and being conceptualized, I argue that what is phenomenologically distinctive about conceptual content is that it is not determined by, and does not determine, the intuitive character of an experience. That is, for virtually any experience E with intuitive character I, (...)
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  3. Kristina Musholt (2013). Self-Consciousness and Nonconceptual Content. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):649-672.score: 240.0
    Self-consciousness can be defined as the ability to think 'I'-thoughts. Recently, it has been suggested that self-consciousness in this sense can (and should) be accounted for in terms of nonconceptual forms of self-representation. Here, I will argue that while theories of nonconceptual self-consciousness do provide us with important insights regarding the essential genetic and epistemic features of self-conscious thought, they can only deliver part of the full story that is required to understand the phenomenon of self-consciousness. I will (...)
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  4. Daniel D. Hutto (1998). Nonconceptual Content and Objectivity. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy (6).score: 240.0
    In recent times the question of whether or not there is such a thing as nonconceptual content has been the object of much serious attention. For analytical philosophers, the locus classicus of the view that there is such a phenomena is to be found in Evans remarks about perceptual experience in Varieties of Reference. John McDowell has taken issue with Evans over his claim that "conceptual capacities are first brought into operation only when one makes a judgement of (...)
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  5. Richard Heck (2000). Nonconceptual Content and the "Space of Reasons&Quot;. Philosophical Review 109 (4):483-523.score: 210.0
    In Mind and World, John McDowell argues against the view that perceptual representation is non-conceptual. The central worry is that this view cannot offer any reasonable account of how perception bears rationally upon belief. I argue that this worry, though sensible, can be met, if we are clear that perceptual representation is, though non-conceptual, still in some sense 'assertoric': Perception, like belief, represents things as being thus and so.
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  6. Terry Dartnall (2007). Internalism, Active Externalism, and Nonconceptual Content: The Ins and Outs of Cognition. Cognitive Science 31 (2):257-283.score: 210.0
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  7. Christopher Peacocke (2001). Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):609-615.score: 192.0
    This note aims to clarify which arguments do, and which arguments do not, tell against Conceptualism, the thesis that the representational content of experience is exclusively conceptual. Contrary to Sean Kelly’s position, conceptualism has no difficulty accommodating the phenomena of color constancy and of situation-dependence. Acknowledgment of nonconceptual content is also consistent with holding that experiences have nonrepresentational subjective features. The crucial arguments against conceptualism stem from animal perception, and from a distinction, elaborated in the final section (...)
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  8. Robert Stalnaker (2003). What Might Nonconceptual Content Be? In York H. Gunther (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press. 339-352.score: 192.0
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  9. Alex Byrne (2003). Consciousness and Nonconceptual Content. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 113 (3):261-274.score: 192.0
    Consciousness, Color, and Content is a significant contribution to our understanding of consciousness, among other things. I have learned a lot from it, as well as Tye’s other writings. What’s more, I actually agree with much of it – fortunately for this symposium, not all of it. The book continues the defense of the “PANIC” theory of phenomenal consciousness that Tye began in Ten Problems of Consciousness (1995). A fair chunk of it, though, is largely independent of this theory: (...)
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  10. York H. Gunther (ed.) (2003). Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press.score: 192.0
  11. Adrian Cussins (2003). Content, Conceptual Content, and Nonconceptual Content. In York H. Gunther (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press. 133–163.score: 192.0
     
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  12. Adina L. Roskies (2008). A New Argument for Nonconceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):633–659.score: 180.0
    This paper provides a novel argument against conceptualism, the claim that the content of human experience, including perceptual experience, is entirely conceptual. Conceptualism entails that the content of experience is limited by the concepts that we possess and deploy. I present an argument to show that such a view is exceedingly costly—if the nature of our experience is entirely conceptual, then we cannot account for concept learning: all perceptual concepts must be innate. The version of nativism that results (...)
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  13. José Luis Bermúdez (1999). Cognitive Impenetrability, Phenomenology, and Nonconceptual Content. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):367-368.score: 180.0
    This commentary discusses Pylyshyn's model of perceptual processing in the light of the philosophical distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual content of perception. Pylyshyn's processing distinction maps onto an important distinction in the phenomenology of visual perception.
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  14. Ronald L. Chrisley (1994). Taking Embodiment Seriously: Nonconceptual Content and Robotics. In Kenneth M. Ford, C. Glymour & Patrick Hayes (eds.), Android Epistemology. MIT Press.score: 180.0
    The development and deployment of the notion of pre-objective or nonconceptual content for the purposes of intentional explanation of requires assistance from a practical and theoretical understanding of computational/robotic systems acting in real-time and real-space. In particular, the usual "that"-clause specification of content will not work for non-conceptual contents; some other means of specification is required, means that make use of the fact that contents are aspects of embodied and embedded systems. That is, the specification of non-conceptual (...)
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  15. Ingar Brinck (1999). Nonconceptual Content and the Distinction Between Implicit and Explicit Knowledge. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):760-761.score: 180.0
    The notion of nonconceptual content in Dienes & Perner's theory is examined. A subject may be in a state with nonconceptual content without having the concepts that would be used to describe the state. Nonconceptual content does not seem to be a clear-cut case of either implicit or explicit knowledge. It underlies a kind of practical knowledge, which is not reducible to procedural knowledge, but is accessible to the subject and under voluntary control.
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  16. Athanasios Raftopoulos (2008). Ambiguous Figures and Nonconceptual Content. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:179-187.score: 180.0
    Macpherson (2006) argues that the square/regular diamond figure threatens representationalism, which holds that the phenomenal character of experience is either identical, or supervenes on, the nonconceptual content of experience (NCC). Her argument is that representationalism is committed to the thesis that differences in the phenomenal experience of ambiguous figures, the gestalt switch, should be explained by differences in the NCC of perception of these figures. However, with respect to the square/regular diamond figure such differences in NCC do not (...)
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  17. Michael Tye (2005). On the Nonconceptual Content of Experience. Schriftenreihe-Wittgenstein Gesellschaft.score: 180.0
    I suppose that substantive philosophical theses are much like second marriages. The philo- sophical thesis I wish to discuss in this paper is the thesis that experiences have nonconceptual content. I shall not attempt to argue that _all_ experiences have nonconceptual content nor that the only contents experiences have are nonconceptual. Instead, I want to ? esh out the thesis of nonconceptual content for experience in more detail than has been offered hithertofore and (...)
     
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  18. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2013). The Cognitive Impenetrability of the Content of Early Vision is a Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Purely Nonconceptual Content. Philosophical Psychology (5):1-20.score: 180.0
    I elaborate on Pylyshyn's definition of the cognitive impenetrability (CI) of early vision, and draw on the role of concepts in perceptual processing, which links the problem of the CI or cognitive penetrability (CP) of early vision with the problem of the nonconceptual content (NCC) of perception. I explain, first, the sense in which the content of early vision is CI and I argue that if some content is CI, it is conceptually encapsulated, that is, it (...)
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  19. André Abath & João Queiroz (2005). Nonconceptual Content, Fineness of Grain and Recognitional Capacities. Abstracta 1 (2):193-206.score: 180.0
    One of the current debates in philosophy of mind is whether the content of perceptual experiences is conceptual or nonconceptual. The proponents of nonconceptual content, or nonconceptualists, typically support their position by appealing to the so-called Fineness of Grain Argument, which, in rough terms, has as its conclusion that we do not possess concepts for everything we perceive. In his Mind and World, John McDowell tried to give a response to the argument, and show that we (...)
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  20. Tim Crane (1992). The Nonconceptual Content of Experience. In , The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.score: 170.0
    Some have claimed that people with very different beliefs literally see the world differently. Thus Thomas Kuhn: ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual—conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1970, p. ll3). This view — call it ‘Perceptual Relativism’ — entails that a scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it while the second won’t. The (...)
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  21. Uriah Kriegel (2004). Perceptual Experience, Conscious Content, and Nonconceptual Content. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-14.score: 168.0
    One of the promising approaches to the problem of perceptual consciousness has been the representational theory, or representationalism. The idea is to reduce the phenomenal character of conscious perceptual experiences to the representational content of those experiences. Most representationalists appeal specifically to non-conceptual content in reducing phenomenal character to representational content. In this paper, I discuss a series of issues involved in this representationalist appeal to non-conceptual content. The overall argument is the following. On the face (...)
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  22. José Luis Bermúdez (2007). What is at Stake in the Debate on Nonconceptual Content? Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):55–72.score: 162.0
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  23. Christopher Peacocke (2001). Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content? Journal of Philosophy 98 (5):239-264.score: 162.0
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  24. Jose Luis Bermudez (1995). Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States. Mind and Language 10 (4):333-69.score: 162.0
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  25. Robert Hanna (2005). Kant and Nonconceptual Content. European Journal of Philosophy 13 (2):247-290.score: 162.0
  26. Christopher Peacocke (1994). Nonconceptual Content: Kinds, Rationales, and Relations. Mind and Language 4 (4):419-29.score: 162.0
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  27. Sonia Sedivy (1996). Must Conceptually Informed Perceptual Experience Involve Nonconceptual Content? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):413-31.score: 162.0
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  28. Mario Gómez-Torrente (1998). Report of an Unsuccessful Search for Nonconceptual Content. Philosophical Issues 9:369-379.score: 162.0
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  29. Michael Tye (2006). Nonconceptual Content, Richness, and Fineness of Grain. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. 504–30.score: 162.0
     
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  30. Jose Luis Bermudez & Fiona Macpherson (1998). Nonconceptual Content and the Nature of Perceptual Experience. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6.score: 156.0
    [1] Recent philosophy of mind and epistemology has seen an important and influential trend towards accounting for at least some features of experiences in content-involving terms. It is a contested point whether ascribing content to experiences can account for all the intrinsic properties of experiences, but on many theories of experiences there are close links between the ascription of content and the ways in which experiences are ascribed and typed. The issues here have both epistemological and psychological (...)
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  31. María del Rosario Hernández Borges & Tamara Ojeda Arceo (2008). Emotion, self-deception and conceptual/nonconceptual content. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:223-231.score: 156.0
    First the rationalist tradition and then the cognitive revolution put limits on the philosophy and social sciences with regard to the analysis of emotion, of irrationality in mental events and actions, to the reduction of our representations to conceptual elements, and so on. This fact caused an increasing interest in these topics. In this paper, we intend to claim the significant relations among these three issues: emotion, selfdeception and non-conceptual content, with two aims: i) to analyse the relation between (...)
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  32. Alva Noe, Perception, Action, and Nonconceptual Content.score: 150.0
    profile deforms as we move about it. As perceivers we are masters of the patterns of sensorimotor contingency that shape our perceptual interaction with the world. We expect changes in such things as apparent size, shape and color to occur as we actively explore the environment. In encountering perspective-dependent changes of this sort, we learn how things are quite apart form our particular perspective. Our possession of these skills is constitutive of our ability to see (and generally to perceive). This (...)
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  33. Christopher Peacocke (1998). Nonconceptual Content Defended. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):381-388.score: 150.0
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  34. Andy Clark, Connectionism, Nonconceptual Content, and Representational Redescription.score: 150.0
  35. Adrian Cussins (1993). Nonconceptual Content and the Elimination of Misonceived Composites. Mind and Language 8 (2):234-52.score: 150.0
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  36. Josefa Toribio (2007). Nonconceptual Content. Philosophy Compass 2 (3):445–460.score: 150.0
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  37. Robert Stalnaker (1998). What Might Nonconceptual Content Be? Philosophical Issues 9:339-352.score: 150.0
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  38. Michael Luntley (2003). Nonconceptual Content and the Sound of Music. Mind and Language 18 (4):402-426.score: 150.0
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  39. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2010). Can Nonconceptual Content Be Stored in Visual Memory? Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):639-668.score: 150.0
  40. Dietmar H. Heidemann (2011). Introduction: Kant and Nonconceptual Content – Preliminary Remarks. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):319 - 322.score: 150.0
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 19, Issue 3, Page 319-322, July 2011.
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  41. José Luis Bermúdez (1995). Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States. Mind and Language 10 (4):333-369.score: 150.0
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  42. T. Crane, Nonconceptual Content.score: 150.0
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  43. Richard G. Heck Jr (2000). Nonconceptual Content and the "Space of Reasons". Philosophical Review 109 (4):483 - 523.score: 150.0
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  44. Monima Chadha (2009). An Independent, Empirical Route to Nonconceptual Content. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):439-448.score: 150.0
  45. Christopher Peacocke (1998). Review: Nonconceptual Content Defended. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):381 - 388.score: 150.0
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  46. Alex Byrne (2003). Review: Consciousness and Nonconceptual Content. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 113 (3):261 - 274.score: 150.0
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  47. R. Meeks (2006). Why Nonconceptual Content Cannot Be Immune to Error Through Misidentification. European Review of Philosophy 6:81-100.score: 150.0
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