Search results for 'nonfactualism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  72
    Hartry Field (1998). ``Epistemological Nonfactualism and the A Prioricity of Logic". Philosophical Studies 92 (1/2):1--24.
  2.  65
    Alexis Burgess (2010). How to Reconcile Deflationism and Nonfactualism. Noûs 44 (3):433-450.
    There are three general ways to approach reconciliation: from the side of nonfactualism, from the side of deflationism, or from both sides at once. To approach reconciliation from a given side, as I will use the expression, just means to attend in the first instance to the details of that side’s position. (It will be important to keep in mind that the success of an approach from one side may ultimately require concessions from the other side.) The only attempts (...)
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  3. Seth Yalcin (2011). Nonfactualism About Epistemic Modality. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press
    When I tell you that it’s raining, I describe a way the world is—viz., rainy. I say something whose truth turns on how things are with the weather in the world. Likewise when I tell you that the weatherman thinks that it’s raining. Here the truth of what I say turns on how things are with the weatherman’s state of mind in the world. Likewise when I tell you that I think that it’s raining. Here the truth of what I (...)
     
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  4.  8
    Hartry Field (2004). Epistemological Nonfactualism and the a Prioricity of Logic. Philosophical Studies 92 (1):1-24.
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  5.  18
    Peter Railton (1992). Nonfactualism About Normative Discourse. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):961 - 968.
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  6.  28
    Michael Devitt (1996). The Metaphysics of Nonfactualism. Philosophical Perspectives 10:159 - 176.
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  7.  15
    Review author[S.]: Peter Railton (1992). Nonfactualism About Normative Discourse. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):961-968.
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  8. Simon Blackburn (1998). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
    Simon Blackburn puts forward a compelling original philosophy of human motivation and morality. Why do we behave as we do? Can we improve? Is our ethics at war with our passions, or is it an upshot of those passions? Blackburn seeks the answers to such questions in an exploration of the nature of moral emotions and the structures of human motivation. His theory is naturalistic: it integrates our understanding of ethics with the rest of our understanding of the world we (...)
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  9. P. T. Geach (1965). Assertion. Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
  10. P. T. Geach (1960). Ascriptivism. Philosophical Review 69 (2):221-225.
  11. Gideon Rosen (1998). Blackburn's Essays in Quasi-Realism. Noûs 32 (3):386-405.
  12. John R. Searle (1962). Meaning and Speech Acts. Philosophical Review 71 (4):423-432.
  13.  54
    Alejandro Pérez Carballo (2016). Structuring Logical Space. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):460-491.
    I develop a non-representationalist account of mathematical thought, on which the point of mathematical theorizing is to provide us with the conceptual capacity to structure and articulate information about the physical world in an epistemically useful way. On my view, accepting a mathematical theory is not a matter of having a belief about some subject matter; it is rather a matter of structuring logical space, in a sense to be made precise. This provides an elegant account of the cognitive utility (...)
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  14.  45
    Stephanie Beardman (2013). A Non-Factualist Defense of the Reflection Principle. Synthese 190 (15):2981-2999.
    Are there plausible synchronic constraints on how a subject thinks of herself extended over time? At first glance, Bas van Fraassen’s principle of Reflection seems to prescribe the sort of epistemic authority one’s future self should be taken by one to have over one’s current epistemic states. (The gist of this principle is that I should now believe what I’m convinced I will believe tomorrow.) There has been a general consensus that, as a principle concerning epistemic authority, Reflection does not (...)
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  15. Michael Devitt (2009). Putting Metaphysics First: Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction -- Metaphysics -- "Ostrich nominalism"' or "mirage realism"? -- Postscript to "Ostrich nominalism" or "mirage realism"? -- Aberrations of the realism debate -- Postscript to "aberrations of the realism debate" -- Underdetermination and commonsense realism -- Scientificrealism -- Postscript to "scientific realism" -- Incommensurability and the priority of metaphysics -- Postscript to "incommensurability and the priority of metaphysics" -- Global response dependency and worldmaking -- The metaphysics of nonfactualism -- The metaphysics of truth -- Moral realism : a (...)
     
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  16.  14
    P. Santorio (2016). Nonfactual Know-How and the Boundaries of Semantics. Philosophical Review 125 (1):35-82.
    Know-how and expressivism are usually regarded as disjoint topics, belonging to distant areas of philosophy. This paper argues that, despite obvious differences, the two debates have important similarities. In particular, semantic and conceptual tools developed by expressivists can be exported to the know-how debate. On the one hand, some of the expressivists' semantic resources can be used to deflect Stanley and Williamson's influential argument for factualism about know-how: the claim that knowing how to do something consists in knowing a fact. (...)
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  17.  15
    Paolo Santorio (2016). Nonfactual Know-How and the Boundaries of Semantics. Philosophical Review 125 (1):35-82.
    Know-how and expressivism are usually regarded as disjoint topics, belonging to distant areas of philosophy. This paper argues that, despite obvious differences, the two debates have important similarities. In particular, semantic and conceptual tools developed by expressivists can be exported to the know-how debate. On the one hand, some of the expressivists' semantic resources can be used to deflect Stanley and Williamson's influential argument for factualism about know-how: the claim that knowing how to do something consists in knowing a fact. (...)
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  18.  89
    Kent Bach, Statements and Beliefs Without Truth-Aptitude.
    Minimalism about truth-aptitude, if correct, would undercut expressivism about moral discourse. Indeed, it would undercut nonfactualism about any area of discourse. But it cannot be correct, for there are areas, about which people hold beliefs and make statements, to which nonfactualism uncontroversially applies. Or so I will argue. I will be thereby challenging John Divers and Alexander Miller’s [3] appeal to minimalism about truth-aptitude in defending a certain argument against expressivism about value. But I will not be defending (...)
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  19.  1
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2005). El Wittgenstein de Kripke y la analogía entre reglas y fundamentos. Dianoia 50 (55):55-94.
    I explore an argument for epistemic non-factualism, the thesis that epistemic attributions do not describe facts. The argument is analogous to but independent of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s argument for nonfactualism about rule-following. Some objections to the two arguments are considered and rejected, in particular accusations of incoherence and “reductivism”. The epistemic argument and a “skeptical solution” to it are argued to be part of Wittgenstein’s conception in On Certainty.
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  20.  44
    John Humphrey, With Factualist Friends, Kripke's Wittgenstein Needs No Enemies: On Byrne's Case for Kripke's Wittgenstein Being a Factualist About Meaning Attributions.
    _Private Language_ is that it almost universally sees KW as offering, in his sceptical solution, an account of meaning attributions (i.e., statements of the form, "X means such-and-so by 's'"; hereafter, MAs) which takes their legitimate attribution to be a function of something other than facts or truth conditions. KW is almost universally read as having rejected any account of meaning attributions which takes them to be stating facts or corresponding to facts. In a word, KW is understood as offering (...)
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  21.  34
    Patrice Philie (2005). Meaning-Scepticism and Analyticity. Dialectica 59 (3):357–365.
    In his paper "Analyticity", Boghossian defends the notion of analyticity against Quine's forceful criticism. Boghossian's main contention is that nonfactualism about analyticity of the kind advocated by Quine entails scepticism about meaning -- and this shows that Quine's argument can't be right. In other words, Boghossian presents us with a _reductio of Quine's thesis. In this paper, I present an argument to the effect that Boghossian's attempted _reductio fails. In the course of making this case, I will suggest that (...)
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  22.  15
    Lisa Warenski (2010). Naturalistic Epistemologies and A Priori Justification. In Marcin Milkowski & Konrad Kalmont-Taminski (eds.), Beyond Description: Naturalism and Normativity. College Publications
    Broadly speaking, a naturalistic approach to epistemology seeks to explain human knowledge – and justification in particular – as a phenomenon in the natural world, in keeping with the tenets of naturalism. Naturalism is typically defined, in part, by a commitment to scientific method as the only legitimate means of attaining knowledge of the natural world. Naturalism is often thought to entail empiricism by virtue of this methodological commitment. However, scientific methods themselves may incorporate a priori elements, so empiricism does (...)
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  23. Michael Devitt (2009). Putting Metaphysics First: Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press Uk.
    The metaphysical part of this book is largely concerned with realism issues. Michael Devitt starts with realism about universals, dismissing Plato's notorious 'one over many' problem. Several chapters argue for a fairly uncompromising realist view of the external physical world of commonsense and science. Both the nonfactualism of moral noncognitivism and positivistic instrumentalism, and deflationism about truth, are found to rest on an antirealism that is hard to characterize. A case is presented for moral realism. Various biological realisms are (...)
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  24. Mark Eli Kalderon (2005). Moral Fictionalism. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions - propositions that attribute moral properties to things. Noncognitivists, in contrast, maintain that the realist imagery associated with morality is a fiction, a reification of our noncognitive attitudes. The thought that there is a distinctively moral subject matter is regarded as something to be debunked by philosophical reflection on the way moral discourse mediates and makes public (...)
     
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