Naturalism is the label for the thesis that the tools we should use in answering philosophical problems are the methods and findings of the mature sciences—from physics across to biology and increasingly neuroscience. It enables us to rule out answers to philosophical questions that are incompatible with scientific findings. It enables us to rule out epistemological pluralism—that the house of knowledge has many mansions, as well as skepticism about the reach of science. It bids us doubt that (...) there are facts about reality that science cannot grasp. It gives us confidence to assert that by now in the development of science, absence of evidence is prima facie good grounds for evidence of absence: this goes for God, and a great deal else. (shrink)

This book traces the further development and emergence of American philosophy, particularly Naturalism and Pragmatism, against the backdrop of still-dominant Hegelian philosophy, during the third decade of the 20th century, through the addresses and biographies of the presidents of its oldest and largest philosophical society. Of special interest is the previously unpublished presidential address of Henry Walgrave Stewart, second president of the Pacific Division of The American Philosophical Association. The work contains the biographies, photographs, and addresses of (...) 24 past presidents, and photographs and addresses of others. No other publication has collected the presidential addresses of this, the largest society of philosophers, during its third decade of existence, and in no other publication are the biographies and photographs of all of its presidents available. While some histories of this period in 20th century American philosophy have been written, and while some collections of articles by philosophers exist which include writings of some of these individuals, none has concentrated on a representation of the leadership of. (shrink)

This chapter examines the influence of the empirical sciences (e.g., physics, biology, psychology) in contemporary analytic philosophy, with focus on philosophical theories that are guided by findings from the empirical sciences. Scientific approaches to philosophy follow a tradition of philosophical naturalism associated with Quine, which strives to ally philosophical methods and theories more closely with the empirical sciences and away from a priori theorizing and conceptual analysis.

Hilary Putnam's Philosophical Naturalism: Making Philosophy Matter for Life offers a faithful illustration of the trajectory of Putnam's thought to show how, despite the shifts in opinion on issues of central philosophical importance, his thought reveals a systematic backbone and strong continuities.

This paper examines the nature and varieties of philosophical naturalism. A central question it pursues is whether there is any unifying conception of naturalism and, if so, whether it is substantive or methodological. Another question addressed is the extent to which naturalism is motivated by or depends on empiricism. The paper explores the connection between naturalism and scientific method---often taken as central in defining it---and critically discusses naturalistic positions in metaphysics (including philosophical theology), epistemology, (...) and ethics. Given the ambitions of philosophical naturalism---which extend to construing philosophy itself as broadly empirical in the way that natural science is---and given some of the difficulties that confront naturalism, its success remains a matter of lively controversy. (shrink)

This paper examines the nature and varieties of philosophical naturalism. A central question it pursues is whether there is any unifying conception of naturalism and, if so, whether it is substantive or methodological. Another question addressed is the extent to which naturalism is motivated by or depends on empiricism. The paper explores the connection between naturalism and scientific method---often taken as central in defining it---and critically discusses naturalistic positions in metaphysics (including philosophical theology), epistemology, (...) and ethics. Given the ambitions of philosophical naturalism---which extend to construing philosophy itself as broadly empirical in the way that natural science is---and given some of the difficulties that confront naturalism, its success remains a matter of lively controversy. (shrink)

This comprehensive collection, bringing together significant essays by leading philosophers of the twentieth century, represents one prominent school of American thought philosophic naturalism. Naturalism holds that nature is objective and can be studied to gain knowledge that is not determined by methodology, perspective, belief, or theory. For the naturalist, "nature" is an all-encompassing concept; nothing is other than natural and any notion of a supernatural realm is rejected. Naturalism, however, cannot be equated with materialistic reductionism or strict (...) determinism. Certain nonmaterial aspects of human existence thoughts, feelings, meanings, values, beliefs, ideals, and free will are included within the scope of the naturalist's approach. (shrink)

One of the most pervasive and persistent questions in philosophy is the relationship between the natural sciences and traditional philosophical categories such as metaphysics, epistemology and the mind. _Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its Implications _is a unique and valuable contribution to the literature on this issue. It brings together a remarkable collection of highly regarded experts in the field along with some young theorists providing a fresh perspective. This book is noteworthy for bringing together committed philosophical (...) naturalists, thus diverging from the growing trend towards anti-naturalism. The book consists of four sections: the first deals with the metaphysical implications of naturalism, in which two contributors present radically different perspectives. The second attempts to reconcile reasons and forward-looking goals with blind Darwinian natural selection. The third tackles various problems in epistemology, ranging from meaning to natural kinds to concept learning. The final section includes three papers each addressing a specific feature of the human mind: its uniqueness, its representational capacity, and its morality. In this way the book explores the important implications of the post-Darwinian scientific world-view. (shrink)

This essay argues that philosophical naturalists who draw epistemic support from science for their worldview ought to set aside methodological naturalism in certain historical sciences. When linked to methodological naturalism, philosophical naturalism opens itself to several problems. Specifically, when joined with methodological naturalism, philosophical naturalism can 'never' be scientifically disconfirmed but will nearly 'always' be confirmed, no matter what the empirical evidence. Theistic-friendly "God hypotheses," on the other hand, can 'never' be scientifically (...) confirmed -- again, no matter what the evidence -- but are routinely said to be disconfirmed. Methodological naturalism not only leads to this self-serving dynamic, but does not appear to serve a meaningful epistemic purpose in the contest between philosophical naturalism and theism and so, for these reasons, ought to be set aside. (shrink)

Many philosophical naturalists eschew analysis in favor of discovering metaphysical truths from the a posteriori, contending that analysis does not lead to philosophical insight. A countercurrent to this approach seeks to reconcile a certain account of conceptual analysis with philosophical naturalism; prominent and influential proponents of this methodology include the late David Lewis, Frank Jackson, Michael Smith, Philip Pettit, and David Armstrong. Naturalistic analysis is a tool for locating in the scientifically given world objects and properties (...) we quantify over in everyday discourse. This collection gathers work from a range of prominent philosophers who are working within this tradition, offering important new work as well as critical evaluations of the methodology. Its centerpiece is an important posthumous paper by David Lewis, "Ramseyan Humility," published here for the first time. The contributors first address issues of philosophy of mind, semantics, and the new methodology's a priori character, then turn to matters of metaphysics, and finally consider problems regarding normativity. Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism is one of the first efforts to apply this approach to such a wide range of philosophical issues. _Contributors: _David Braddon-Mitchell, Mark Colyvan, Frank Jackson, Justine Kingsbury, Fred Kroon, David Lewis, Dustin Locke, Kelby Mason, Jonathan McKeown-Green, Peter Menzies, Robert Nola, Daniel Nolan, Philip Pettit, Huw Price, Denis Robinson, Steve Stich, Daniel Stoljar The hardcover edition does not include a dust jacket. (shrink)

In recent years naturalism has become a focal point in the discussions of many contemporary philosophers. Philosophical Naturalism in the series Midwest Studies in Philosophy offers a broad sampling of previously unpublished essays that represent the current status of discussions of naturalism.

This article addresses a complex nexus of discourse and praxis: varying Enlightenment visions of Man; emergent ideas about human differences; and encounters between European scientific voyagers and Indigenous people in New Holland (Australia) and Van Diemen's Land (Tasmania) at the start of the nineteenth century. Discursively, I trace two strands of ?anthropological? thinking. One, philosophical and economic, is epitomized in French and Scottish stadial theory. The other is naturalist and culminated in Buffon's natural history of man. Both were appropriated (...) from the late eighteenth century by a nascent science of race. With respect to praxis, I chart the reciprocal impact of metropolitan theory, antipodean experience and local agency by selective comparison of materials produced by the voyages of Matthew Flinders and Nicolas Baudin in Australian waters in 1801?1803. (shrink)

BOOK REVIEWS 3~3 reaction to them into account. The actual historical dialectic involving Moore, Mal- colm, and Wittgenstein is a good deal more complicated, and more interesting, than the story told here by Stroll. Moving on to Stroll's discussion of Wittgenstein, I should now acknowledge that, so far as I can judge, Stroll offers a largely reliable account of On Certainty. In particular, in the best chapter of the book, on "Wittgenstein's Foundationalism," he makes a convincing case for the view (...) that Wittgenstein, unlike Moore, separates propositional knowledge from the kind of "non-propositional" certainty concerning what "stands fast" for us and which is primarily evinced in our ways of acting. What is less clear to me is just what kind of response to sceptical arguments this amounts to: Stroll says that although at some points Wittgenstein is prepared to countenance, in a relativist spirit which closely adjoins scepticism, radical changes in what is thus cer- tain, by and large towards the end of On Certainty Wittgenstein advances an "absolut- ist" position which rules out such changes. But if this is so , we surely need some arguments why it has to be so. But much here depends on the broader context within which Wittgenstein's position is developed and discussed. Despite noting Wittgenstein's invocation of the conception of man as a "primitive.. (shrink)

The 21 essays collected in this volume of Midwest Studies in Philosophy question and debate the primary assumptions of science. These are its conception of an orderly universe; its ability to define; and its ability to explain. The contributors approach these topics from varying perspectives, including the historic development of our understanding of the scientific enterprise; the controversy of opposing paradigms; and the challenges raised by quantum mechanics.

If contemporary analytic philosophy can be said to have a philosophical ideology, it undoubtedly is naturalism. Naturalism is often invoked as a motivating ground for many philosophical projects, and “naturalization” programs abound everywhere, in theory of knowledge, philosophy of mind, theory of meaning, metaphysics, and ethics. But what is naturalism, and where does it come from? This paper examines the naturalism debate in midtwentieth-century America as a proximate source of contemporary naturalism. Views of (...) philosophers like Roy Wood Sellars, John Dewey, John Herman Randall, Sydney Hook, and Ernest Nagel are cited, and some of the central tenets of naturalism, such as an adherence to “scientific method” as the sole source of knowledge and the causal/ explanatory closure of the natural world, are explored. The paper ends with a brief discussion of how certain naturalistic constraints lead to some of the problems currently debated in metaethics and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Philosophical naturalism is the thesis that the entirety of the universe is composed of natural things or processes, and philosophers including Aristotle, Hume, Hegel, Nietzsche, Foucault, Mackie, and Fodor subscribe, in some sense, to it. This elusive commitment has been variously interpreted to mean that everything in the universe is physical or material, or that everything is amenable to scientific investigation, or that nothing is supernatural, or that nothing is known a priori, or that everything is natural in (...) some broader sense of that word. Thus, the thesis is sometimes metaphysical, sometimes epistemological, and sometimes methodological. Indeed, depending on its guise, philosophical naturalism has sometimes seemed a bland and uncontroversial truism, while in others it has seemed a daring, provocative, and, to some, manifestly false view. In this seminar, we will aim to come to grips with philosophical naturalism. Our first project will be to understand different kinds of naturalism, and our second will be to assess whether there is any reason to believe of any of those kinds that it is true. We will attend especially closely to historical and contemporary naturalism in ethics, epistemology, language, and mind. (shrink)

Marjorie Grene was a philosophical naturalist avant la lettre. This essay surveys some problems with contemporary (late 20th century) naturalism, argues that Grene’s criticisms of ancient epistemologies are applicable to their contemporary versions, and finds an alternative, philosophically richer, naturalism in Grene’s appropriation of J.J. Gibson’s ideas on perception and in her insistence on treating humans as no less a part of nature than plants and other animals.

David Papineau's Philosophical Naturalism offers an energetic, fast-paced trip through several familiar philosophical landscapes. He treats central issues in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mathematics. The unifying theme across this broad range is Papineau's articulation and defense of a coherent naturalistic stance.

How can we understand the world as a whole instead of separate natural and human realms? Joseph T. Rouse proposes an approach to this classic problem based on radical new conceptions of both philosophical naturalism and scientific practice.

I am honored, grateful, and of course very pleased to be the guest editor of the articles whose topic is ecstatic naturalism published here in this issue of The American Journal of Theology & Philosophy. Robert Corrington’s ecstatic naturalism has for the better part of several decades been an evolving perspective and indeed carries forward a tradition of philosophical naturalism dating back to they heyday of American naturalisms found within the mid to late twentieth century. To (...) this day Corrington’s ecstatic naturalist perspective has taken the form of ten books and over one hundred articles. (His eleventh book, Deep Pantheism: Toward a New Transcendentalism, will be published by Lexington Books in early.. (shrink)

J. Šmajs’ concept of evolutionary ontology has attracted much attention in recent years especially in Czech and Slovak academic circles, yet it remains, as some of its proponents claim, undervalued in Britain and the US. Even in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, there are, in addition to its strong supporters, several authors who almost a priori reject the concept, pointing to several questionable, contradictory or even mutually exclusive or self-refuting arguments. In this paper, mainly based on a comprehensive analysis of (...) the first part of Šmajs’ book, Evoluční ontologie kultury a problém podnikání [Evolutionary Ontology of Culture and The Issues Of Business], we attempt to demonstrate that the opponents of Šmajs’ concept are closer to the truth, since the concept, we believe, is just another variation on the extreme escalation of philosophical naturalism. (shrink)

What is a human being? The twentieth and twenty-first century tradition known as 'philosophical anthropology' has approached this question with unusual sophistication, experimentalism, and subtlety. Such innovations as Arnold Gehlen's description of humans as naturally 'deficient' beings in need of artificial institutions to survive; Max Scheler's concept of 'spirit' (Geist) as the physically and organically irreducible realm of persons and spiritual acts; and Helmuth Plessner's analysis of the way human embodiment transcends spatial locations and limitations ('ex-centric positionality') have inspired (...) generations of European intellectuals. This edited collection from an international network of scholars critically engages the philosophical anthropologies of Scheler, Plessner, Gehlen, Blumenberg, and others in unparalleled detail, showing their applicability to the themes of nature and naturalism, organic life, comparative primatology, cultural anthropology, paleoanthropology, the body, addiction, and death. The volume sets a new standard for Anglophone scholarship on this tradition and will be required reading for specialists in twentieth-century philosophy, history of the human sciences, history of the life sciences, and philosophies of human nature. (shrink)

Quine's reasons for recommending naturalist epistemology are: (1) knowledge, Mind and meaning are part of the world they have to do with, (2) since the cartesian quest for certainty and reductionism of carnap's 'aufbau' type have failed, Rational reconstruction has no more any advantage over psychology, (3) since phenomenalist validation of science is no longer our concern, It is not circular to appeal to psychology. Against this it is argued that (a) no definite methodological policy can be based on (1) (...) alone; (b) certainty and phenomenalist reduction are not the only purposes of rational reconstruction; (c) it would be circular to appeal to psychology in developing a theory of rational method of acquiring knowledge: (d) logic and psychology of science are complementary not mutually exclusive. (shrink)

Philosophers and scientists both ask questions about what the world is like. How do these fields interact with one another? How should they? Naturalism Beyond the Limits of Science investigates an approach to these questions called methodological naturalism. According to methodological naturalism, when coming up with theories about what the world is like, philosophers should, whenever possible, make use of the same methodology that is deployed by scientists. Although many contemporary philosophers have implicit commitments that lead straightforwardly (...) to methodological naturalism, few have a clear understanding of how widespread and disruptive methodological naturalism promises to be for the field. By way of a series of case studies involving laws of nature, composition, time and modality, and drawing on historical and contemporary scientific developments including the discovery of the neutrino, the introduction of dark energy, and the advent of relativity theory, this book demonstrates the ways in which scientists rely on extra-empirical reasoning and how that very same extra-empirical reasoning can yield surprising results when applied to philosophical debates. Along the way, Nina Emery's investigation illuminates the complex relationship between philosophy and the sciences, and makes the case that philosophers and scientists alike would benefit from a greater understanding of the connections between the two fields. (shrink)