Search results for 'zombie twins' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Eric Dietrich & Julietta Rose (2009). The Paradox of Consciousness and the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate. Logos Architekton 3 (1):7-37.score: 90.0
    Beginning with the paradoxes of zombie twins, we present an argument that dualism is both true and false. We show that avoiding this contradiction is impossible. Our diagnosis is that consciousness itself engenders this contradiction by producing contradictory points of view. This result has a large effect on the realism/anti-realism debate, namely, it suggests that this debate is intractable, and furthermore, it explains why this debate is intractable. We close with some comments on what our results mean for (...)
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  2. Rebecca Roman Hanrahan (2009). Consciousness and Modal Empiricism. Philosophia 37 (2):281-306.score: 34.0
    David Chalmers supports his contention that there is a possible world populated by our zombie twins by arguing for the assumption that conceivability entails possibility. But, I argue, the modal epistemology he sets forth, ‘modal rationalism,’ ignores the problem of incompleteness and relies on an idealized notion of conceivability. As a consequence, this epistemology can’t justify our quotidian judgments of possibility, let alone those judgments that concern the mind/body connection. Working from the analogy that the imagination is to (...)
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  3. Almost Indiscernible Twins & He Baber (1992). Harold Brown. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2).score: 30.0
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  4. Josh Weisberg (2011). The Zombie's Cogito: Meditations on Type-Q Materialism. Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):585 - 605.score: 24.0
    Most materialist responses to the zombie argument against materialism take either a ?type-A? or ?type-B? approach: they either deny the conceivability of zombies or accept their conceivability while denying their possibility. However, a ?type-Q? materialist approach, inspired by Quinean suspicions about a priority and modal entailment, rejects the sharp line between empirical and conceptual truths needed for the traditional responses. In this paper, I develop a type-Q response to the zombie argument, one stressing the theory-laden nature of our (...)
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  5. Amir Horowitz (2009). Turning the Zombie on its Head. Synthese 170 (1):191 - 210.score: 18.0
    This paper suggests a critique of the zombie argument that bypasses the need to decide on the truth of its main premises, and specifically, avoids the need to enter the battlefield of whether conceivability entails metaphysical possibility. It is argued that if we accept, as the zombie argument’s supporters would urge us, the assumption that an ideal reasoner can conceive of a complete physical description of the world without conceiving of qualia, the general principle that conceivability entails metaphysical (...)
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  6. Robert Kirk (1999). The Inaugural Address: Why There Couldn't Be Zombies. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):1–16.score: 18.0
    Philosophical zombies are exactly as physicalists suppose we are, right down to the tiniest details, but they have no conscious experiences. (It is presupposed that all explicable physical events are explicable physically.) Are such things even logically possible? My aim is to contribute to showing not only that the answer is 'No', but why. (I concede that systems superficially like human beings might exist and lack consciousness.) My strategy has two prongs: a fairly brisk argument which demolishes the zombie (...)
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  7. Cord Friebe (2012). Twins' Paradox and Closed Timelike Curves: The Role of Proper Time and the Presentist View on Spacetime. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 43 (2):313-326.score: 18.0
    Relativity allegedly contradicts presentism, the dynamic view of time and reality, according to which temporal passage is conceived of as an existentially distinguished ‘moving’ now. Against this common belief, the paper motivates a presentist interpretation of spacetime: It is argued that the fundamental concept of time—proper time—cannot be characterized by the earlier-later relation, i.e., not in the B-theoretical sense. Only the presentist can provide a temporal understanding of the twins’ paradox and of universes with closed timelike curves.
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  8. Iii Jazmin Camchong, Kelvin O. Lim, Scott R. Sponheim, Angus W. Macdonald (2009). Frontal White Matter Integrity as an Endophenotype for Schizophrenia: Diffusion Tensor Imaging in Monozygotic Twins and Patients' Nonpsychotic Relatives. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 3.score: 18.0
    Diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) provides anatomical connectivity information by examining the directional organization of white matter microstructure. Anatomical connectivity and its abnormalities may be heritable traits associated with schizophrenia. To further examine this hypothesis, two studies were conducted to compare anatomical connectivity between (a) monozygotic (MZ) twin pairs and random pairings among twins and (b) first-degree relatives of schizophrenia patients and a healthy control group. Analyses focused on frontal regions of the brain following previous findings of anatomical connectivity abnormalities (...)
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  9. Selmer Bringsjord (1999). The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):41-69.score: 15.0
  10. Raphaël Millière (forthcoming). Is God a Zombie? Divine Consciousness and Omnipresence. International Journal of Philosophy and Theology:1-17.score: 15.0
    While nobody will ever know what it may be like to be God, there is a more basic question one may try to answer: does God have phenomenal consciousness, does He have experiences within a conscious point of view (POV)? Drawing on recent debates within philosophy of mind, I argue that He doesn’t: if God exists, ‘He’ is not phenomenally conscious, at least in the sense that there is no ‘divine subjectivity’. The article aims at displaying an incompatibility between God’s (...)
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  11. Jaron Lanier (1995). You Can't Argue with a Zombie. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):333-345.score: 15.0
  12. W. A. Hunt & F. M. Clarke (1937). The Startle Pattern in Children and Identical Twins. Journal of Experimental Psychology 21 (3):359.score: 15.0
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  13. E. T. Raney (1938). Reversed Lateral Dominance in Identical Twins. Journal of Experimental Psychology 23 (3):304.score: 15.0
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  14. Robert Stalnaker (2002). What is It Like to Be a Zombie? In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. 385--400.score: 15.0
     
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  15. R. C. W. Ettinger (2004). To Be or Not to Be: The Zombie in the Computer. In Nick Bostrom, R.C.W. Ettinger & Charles Tandy (eds.), Death and Anti-Death, Volume 2: Two Hundred Years After Kant, Fifty Years After Turing. Palo Alto: Ria University Press.score: 15.0
     
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  16. Daniel J. Hill (2005). The Morality of the Separation of the Conjoined Attard Twins of Manchester. Health Care Analysis 13 (3):163-176.score: 15.0
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  17. E. T. Raney (1939). Brain Potentials and Lateral Dominance in Identical Twins. Journal of Experimental Psychology 24 (1):21.score: 15.0
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  18. Wayne Wu (2013). The Case for Zombie Agency. Mind 122 (485):217-230.score: 14.0
    In response to Mole 2009, I present an argument for zombie action. The crucial question is not whether but rather to what extent we are zombie agents. I argue that current evidence supports only minimal zombie agency.
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  19. Daniel C. Dennett (1995). The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):322-26.score: 12.0
    Knock-down refutations are rare in philosophy, and unambiguous self-refutations are even rarer, for obvious reasons, but sometimes we get lucky. Sometimes philosophers clutch an insupportable hypothesis to their bosoms and run headlong over the cliff edge. Then, like cartoon characters, they hang there in mid-air, until they notice what they have done and gravity takes over. Just such a boon is the philosophers' concept of a zombie, a strangely attractive notion that sums up, in one leaden lump, almost everything (...)
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  20. Owen J. Flanagan & Thomas W. Polger (1995). Zombies and the Function of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):313-21.score: 12.0
    Todd Moody’s Zombie Earth thought experiment is an attempt to show that ‘conscious inessentialism’ is false or in need of qualification. We defend conscious inessentialism against his criticisms, and argue that zombie thought experiments highlight the need to explain why consciousness evolved and what function(s) it serves. This is the hardest problem in consciousness studies.
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  21. Robert Kirk (ed.) (2006/2007). Zombies and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.score: 12.0
    Zombies and minimal physicalism -- The case for zombies -- Zapping the zombie idea -- What has to be done -- Deciders -- Decision, control, and integration -- De-sophisticating the framework -- Direct activity -- Gap? What gap? -- Survival of the fittest.
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  22. Daniel Stoljar (2001). The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical. Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):393-413.score: 12.0
    The conceivability argument (CA) against physicalism1 starts from the prem- ises that: (1) It is conceivable that I have a zombie-twin, i.e., that there is someone who is physically identical to me and yet who lacks phenomenal con- sciousness; and (2) If it is conceivable that I have a zombie-twin, then it is possible that I have a zombie-twin. These premises entail that physicalism is false, for physicalism is the claim—or can be assumed for our purposes to (...)
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  23. Keith Frankish (2007). The Anti-Zombie Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):650–666.score: 12.0
    In recent years the 'zombie argument' has come to occupy a central role in the case against physicalist views of consciousness, in large part because of the powerful advocacy it has received from David Chalmers.1 In this paper I seek to neutralize it by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism, an argument turning on the conceivability of what I shall call anti-zombies. I shall argue that the result is a stand-off, and that the zombie (...)
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  24. Mike Kearns, Could Daniel Dennett Be a Zombie?score: 12.0
  25. Susanna Siegel, The Dog and the Zombie.score: 12.0
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  26. Michael P. Lynch (2006). Zombies and the Case of the Phenomenal Pickpocket. Synthese 149 (1):37-58.score: 12.0
    A prevailing view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that zombies are logically possible. I argue, via a thought experiment, that if this prevailing view is correct, then I could be transformed into a zombie. If I could be transformed into a zombie, then surprisingly, I am not certain that I am conscious. Regrettably, this is not just an idiosyncratic fact about my psychology; I think you are in the same position. This means that we must revise or (...)
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  27. Andy Clark (2007). What Reaching Teaches: Consciousness, Control, and the Inner Zombie. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):563 - 594.score: 12.0
    What is the role of conscious visual experience in the control and guidance of human behaviour? According to some recent treatments, the role is surprisingly indirect. Conscious visual experience, on these accounts, serves the formation of plans and the selection of action types and targets, while the control of 'online' visually guided action proceeds via a quasi-independent non-conscious route. In response to such claims, critics such as (Wallhagen [2007], pp. 539-61) have suggested that the notions of control and guidance invoked (...)
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  28. W. R. Webster (2006). Human Zombies Are Metaphysically Impossible. Synthese 151 (2):297-310.score: 12.0
    Chalmers (The Conscious Mind, Oxford Unversity Press, Oxford 1996) has argued for a form of property dualism on the basis of the concept of a zombie (which is physically identical to normals), and the concept of the inverted spectrum. He asserts that these concepts show that the facts about consciousness, such as experience or qualia, are really further facts about our world, over and above the physical facts. He claims that they are the hard part of the mind-body issue. (...)
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  29. John McCarthy (1995). Todd Moody's Zombies. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):345-347.score: 12.0
    From the AI point of view, consciousness must be regarded as a collection of interacting processes rather than the unitary object of much philosophical speculation. We ask what kinds of propositions and other entities need to be designed for consciousness to be useful to an animal or a machine. We thereby assert that human consciousness is useful to human functioning and not just and epiphenomenon. Zombies in the sense of Todd Moody's article are merely the victims of Moody's prejudices. To (...)
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  30. Storrs McCall & E. J. Lowe (2003). D/4D Equivalence, the Twins Paradox and Absolute Time. Analysis 63 (278):114-123.score: 12.0
    The thesis of 3D/4D equivalence states that every three-dimensional description of the world is translatable without remainder into a four-dimensional description, and vice versa. In representing an object in 3D or in 4D terms we are giving alternative descriptions of one and the same thing, and debates over whether the ontology of the physical world is "really" 3D or 4D are pointless. The twins paradox is shown to rest, in relativistic 4D geometry, on a reversed law of triangle inequality. (...)
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  31. Y. Michael Barilan (2003). One or Two: An Examination of the Recent Case of the Conjoined Twins From Malta. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 28 (1):27 – 44.score: 12.0
    The article questions the assumption that conjoined twins are necessarily two people or persons by employing arguments based on different points of view: non-personal vitalism, the person as a sentient being, the person as an agent, the person as a locus of narrative and valuation, and the person as an embodied mind. Analogies employed from the cases of amputation, multiple personality disorder, abortion, split-brain patients and cloning. The article further questions the assumption that a conjoined twin's natural interest and (...)
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  32. M. Cathleen Kaveny (2002). Conjoined Twins and Catholic Moral Analysis: Extraordinary Means and Casuistical Consistency. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12 (2):115-140.score: 12.0
    : This article draws upon the Roman Catholic distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" means of medical treatment to analyze the case of "Jodie" and "Mary," the Maltese conjoined twins whose surgical separation was ordered by the English courts over the objection of their Roman Catholic parents and Cormac Murphy-O'Connor, the Roman Catholic Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. It attempts to shed light on the use of that distinction by surrogate decision makers with respect to incompetent patients. In addition, it critically (...)
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  33. Uri Ben-Ya'acov (1995). Statistical Mechanics Analysis of the “Twins Paradox”. Foundations of Physics 25 (12):1733-1740.score: 12.0
    The aging of the two brothers in the “twins paradox” is analyzed through the space-time evolution of the densities that correspond to their internal complex structure. Taking into account their relative motion, it is shown that the traveling brother evolves over a shorter interval of time than his twin, which makes him younger than his brother.
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  34. David Wenkel (2006). Separation of Conjoined Twins and the Principle of Double Effect. Christian Bioethics 12 (3):291-300.score: 12.0
    This article examines the relationship between the principle of double effect and justification for separation surgeries for conjoined twins. First, the principle of double effect is examined in light of its historical context. It is argued that it can only operate under an absolutist view of good and evil that is compatible with the Bible. Given this foundation for application, scenarios for separating conjoined twins are considered against the criteria for the principle of double effect. It is concluded (...)
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  35. Rose Koch (2006). Conjoined Twins and the Biological Account of Personal Identity. The Monist 89 (3):351-370.score: 12.0
    During the first 16 days after fertilization, the developing embryo has the capacity to separate into two genetically identical embryos, or monozygotic twins (triplets, etc.). Because of this capacity, philosophers typically argue that the pre-16 day embryo is not a human being. On a Biological Account of Personal Identity (BAPI), which considers us human beings as essentially organisms, the development of the embryo into an organism at 16 (or 21) days marks our origins. The development of an embryo into (...)
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  36. Jeremiah Dyke & & Walter E. Block, 38. “Explorations in Property Rights: Conjoined Twins”.score: 12.0
    We attempt to shed light on property rights by examining the case of conjoined twins. We do so since their situation is perhaps among the most challenging of all cases of separating “mine” from “thine.”.
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  37. Lloyd Humberstone (2006). Identical Twins, Deduction Theorems, and Pattern Functions: Exploring the Implicative BCsK Fragment of S. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (5):435 - 487.score: 12.0
    We recapitulate (Section 1) some basic details of the system of implicative BCSK logic, which has two primitive binary implicational connectives, and which can be viewed as a certain fragment of the modal logic S5. From this modal perspective we review (Section 2) some results according to which the pure sublogic in either of these connectives (i.e., each considered without the other) is an exact replica of the material implication fragment of classical propositional logic. In Sections 3 and 5 we (...)
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  38. Lloyd Humberstone (2007). Identical Twins, Deduction Theorems, and Pattern Functions: Exploring the Implicative BCsK Fragment of S. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (5):435 - 487.score: 12.0
    We recapitulate (Section 1) some basic details of the system of implicative BCSK logic, which has two primitive binary implicational connectives, and which can be viewed as a certain fragment of the modal logic S5. From this modal perspective we review (Section 2) some results according to which the pure sublogic in either of these connectives (i.e., each considered without the other) is an exact replica of the material implication fragment of classical propositional logic. In Sections 3 and 5 we (...)
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  39. Raamy Majeed (forthcoming). From Zombie Art to Dead Art. Think.score: 12.0
    Zombie art, or salvage art, are artworks that are damaged beyond repair, deemed ‘no-longer-art’ by insurance companies, and removed from the market and stored at claims inventories due to their purported loss of value. This paper aims to make sense of the notion of zombie art. It then aims to determine whether artefacts that fall under this concept retain any aesthetic value, and whether they can genuinely cease being artworks, i.e. be dead art.
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  40. Heather Brook (2013). Zombie Law: Conjugality, Annulment, and the (Married) Living Dead. [REVIEW] Feminist Legal Studies 22 (1):1-18.score: 12.0
    This article deploys and extends Ulrich Beck’s critique of ‘zombie categories’ (Beck in J Consum Cult 1 (2):261–277, 2001) to consider how conjugal relationships are brought into being before the law. The argument presented here is that sexual performatives relating to marriage—and especially, in this instance, consummation—continue to produce a kind of social-legal magic, even as the social flesh of their enactment is rotting. Rules concerning annulment relating to wedding ceremonies, consent, disclosure, and consummation demonstrate that certain frameworks of (...)
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  41. Shaka McGlotten & Lisa Jean Moore (2013). The Geriatric Clinic: Dry and Limp: Aging Queers, Zombies, and Sexual Reanimation. [REVIEW] Journal of Medical Humanities 34 (2):261-268.score: 12.0
    This essay looks to the omission of aging queer bodies from new medical technologies of sex. We extend the Foucauldian space of the clinic to the mediascape, a space not only of representations but where the imagination is conditioned and different worlds dreamed into being. We specifically examine the relationship between aging queers and the marketing of technologies of sexual function. We highlight the ways queers are excluded from the spaces of the clinic, specifically the heternormative sexual scripts that organize (...)
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  42. Dean Zimmerman (forthcoming). Dispatches From the Zombie Wars. The Times Literary Supplement (April 28).score: 11.0
    Review of Daniel Dennett's *Sweet Dreams* and Gregg Rosenberg's *A Place for Consciousness*.
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  43. Eric Marcus (2004). Why Zombies Are Inconceivable. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):477-90.score: 10.0
    I argue that zombies are inconceivable. More precisely, I argue that the conceivability-intuition that is used to demonstrate their possibility has been misconstrued. Thought experiments alleged to feature zombies founder on the fact that, on the one hand, they _must_ involve first-person imagining, and yet, on the other hand, _cannot_. Philosophers who take themselves to have imagined zombies have unwittingly conflated imagining a creature who lacks consciousness with imagining a creature without also imagining the consciousness it may or may not (...)
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  44. Nigel J. T. Thomas (1998). Zombie Killer. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.score: 10.0
    Philosopher's zombies are hypothetical beings behaviorally, functionally, and perhaps even physically indistinguishable from normal humans, but who lack our consciousness. Many people seem to be convinced that such zombies are a real conceptual possibility, and that this bare possibility entails that understanding human consciousness must remain forever beyond the reach of science. However, the conceptual entailments of zombiehood have not been sufficiently examined. This brief article shows that any way of understanding the behavior of zombies that does in fact support (...)
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  45. Jan Sleutels (2006). Greek Zombies. Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):177-197.score: 10.0
    This paper explores the possibility that the human mind underwent substantial changes in recent history. Assuming that consciousness is a substantial trait of the mind, the paper focuses on the suggestion made by Julian Jaynes that the Mycenean Greeks had a "bicameral" mind instead of a conscious one. The suggestion is commonly dismissed as patently absurd, for instance by critics such as Ned Block. A closer examination of the intuitions involved, considered from different theoretical angles (social constructivism, idealism, eliminativism, realism), (...)
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  46. Paul G. Skokowski (2002). I, Zombie. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):1-9.score: 10.0
    Certain recent philosophical theories offer the prospect that zombies are possible. These theories argue that experiential contents, or qualia, are nonphysical properties. The arguments are based on the conceivability of alternate worlds in which physical laws and properties remain the same, but in which qualia either differ or are absent altogether. This article maintains that qualia are, on the contrary, physical properties in the world. It is shown how, under the burden of the a posteriori identification of qualia with physical (...)
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  47. Wyona Freysteinson (2009). The Twins: A Case Study in Ethical Deliberation. Nursing Ethics 16 (1):127-130.score: 10.0
    A case study of an ethical dilemma concerning twin nine-year-old sisters in a persistent vegetative state is presented. This is illustrated by the use of a systematic ethical framework to examine the case and the resolution, which was ultimately obtained with nurse—parent interrelations, using the human becoming nursing theory.
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  48. István Aranyosi (2005). Chalmers' Zombie Argument. In Type-a Dualism: A Novel Theory of the Mental-Physical Nexus. Dissertation, Central European University.score: 9.0
  49. David J. Chalmers (2004). Imagination, Indexicality, and Intensions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):182-90.score: 9.0
    John Perry's book Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness is a lucid and engaging defense of a physicalist view of consciousness against various anti-physicalist arguments. In what follows, I will address Perry's responses to the three main anti-physicalist arguments he discusses: the zombie argument (focusing on imagination), the knowledge argument (focusing on indexicals), and the modal argument (focusing on intensions).
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  50. Todd C. Moody (1994). Conversations with Zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):196-200.score: 9.0
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