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Profile: Angeles Eraña (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico)
  1. Ángeles Eraña (2012). Cuestiones de Teoría del Conocimiento. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 27 (1):120-122.
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  2. Angeles Eraña (2012). Dual Process Theories Versus Massive Modularity Hypotheses. Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):855-872.
    Two prevailing accounts of the structure of the mind have been provided, respectively, by the Dual System Theory and by the Massive Modularity Hypothesis. It has been claimed, however, that they cannot both be true at the same time, i.e., that they are incompatible and, thus, that one of them must be abandoned. I will offer some arguments to challenge this claim. I will show that a plausible understanding of each theory makes it possible for them both to be true (...)
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  3. Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia, Ángeles Eraña & Robert Stainton (2010). The Contribution of Domain Specificity in the Highly Modular Mind. Minds and Machines 20 (1):19-27.
    Is there a notion of domain specificity which affords genuine insight in the context of the highly modular mind, i.e. a mind which has not only input modules, but also central ‘conceptual’ modules? Our answer to this question is no. The main argument is simple enough: we lay out some constraints that a theoretically useful notion of domain specificity, in the context of the highly modular mind, would need to meet. We then survey a host of accounts of what domain (...)
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  4. Axel Barceló Aspeitia, Ángeles Eraña & Robert Stainton (2010). The Contribution of Domain Specificity in the Highly Modular Mind. Minds and Machines 20 (1):19-27.
    Is there a notion of domain specificity which affords genuine insight in the context of the highly modular mind, i.e. a mind which has not only input modules, but also central ‘conceptual’ modules? Our answer to this question is no. The main argument is simple enough: we lay out some constraints that a theoretically useful notion of domain specificity, in the context of the highly modular mind, would need to meet. We then survey a host of accounts of what domain (...)
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  5. Angeles Erana (2009). Animal and Reflexive Knowledge. Levels or Types of Knowledge. Teorema 28 (1):100-111.
     
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  6. Ángeles Eraña (2009). El Conocimiento Animal y El Conocimiento Reflexivo.¿ Niveles o Tipos de Conocimiento? Teorema 28 (1):00-00.
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  7. Ángeles Eraña (2007). Sobre la Viabilidad de Una Epistemología Empírica y Normativa. Signos Filosóficos 60 (17):101-137.
    The three main concerns of epistemology throughout the XXth Century were the following: (1) provide a definition of knowledge; (2) provide plausible answers to the skeptical challenge and; (3) study our belief-forming processes in order to deter- mine which of them are leading towards the acquisit..
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  8. Angeles Eraña (2006). Las "teorías intuitivas" ¿Son módulos? Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica 44 (111):85-99.
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  9. Angeles Eraña (2002). Creencia, Racionalidad y Agencia Cognoscitiva. Theoria 17 (1):137-159.
    A prevailing assumption in contemporary epistemology is that there exists a conceptual connection between the notions of belief and rationality. In this paper I examine a weak notion of rationality, according to which it is not necessary to assume the existence of a uniquc set of norms of rationality in order to be able to assign beliefi to a subject. From this point of view, belief attribution only requires that we understand a subject's utterances and, to do this, we only (...)
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  10. Angeles Eraña (1999). Un acercamiento naturalista a la noción de diversidad cognoscitiva. Analogía Filosófica: Revista de Filosofía, Investigación y Difusión 13 (2):141-154.
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