Search results for ''true' contradictions' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Eric Dietrich (2008). The Bishop and Priest: Toward a Point-of-View Based Epistemology of True Contradictions. Logos Architekton 2 (2):35-58..score: 180.0
    True contradictions are taken increasingly seriously by philosophers and logicians. Yet, the belief that contradictions are always false remains deeply intuitive. This paper confronts this belief head-on by explaining in detail how one specific contradiction is true. The contradiction in question derives from Priest's reworking of Berkeley's argument for idealism. However, technical aspects of the explanation offered here differ considerably from Priest's derivation. The explanation uses novel formal and epistemological tools to guide the reader through a valid argument (...)
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  2. Alan Weir (2004). There Are No True Contradictions. In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon Press.score: 152.0
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  3. Terence Parsons (1990). True Contradictions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):335 - 353.score: 150.0
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  4. Jürgen Dümont & Frank Mau (1998). Are There True Contradictions? A Critical Discussion of Graham Priest's, Beyond the Limits of Thought. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 29 (2):289-299.score: 150.0
    The present article critically examines three aspects of Graham Priest's dialetheic analysis of very important kinds of limitations (the limit of what can be expressed, described, conceived, known, or the limit of some operation or other). First, it is shown that Priest's considerations focusing on Hegel's account of the infinite cannot be sustained, mainly because Priest seems to rely on a too restrictive notion of object. Second, we discuss Priest's treatment of the paradoxes in Cantorian set-theory. It is shown that (...)
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  5. Timothy Smiley & Graham Priest (1993). Can Contradictions Be True? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 67:17 - 54.score: 120.0
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  6. Yasuo Deguchi, Jay L. Garfield & Graham Priest (2013). The Contradictions Are True—And It's Not Out of This World! A Response to Takashi Yagisawa. Philosophy East and West 63 (3):370-372.score: 120.0
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  7. P. Eldridge-Smith (2011). Pinocchio Against the Dialetheists. Analysis 71 (2):306-308.score: 72.0
    Semantic dialetheists astutely dodge Explosion, the logical contagion of everything being true if a single contradiction is true. A dialetheia is contained in their semantics, and sustained by a paraconsistent logic. Graham Priest has shown that this is a solution to the Liar paradox. I use the Pinocchio paradox, devised by Veronique Eldridge-Smith, as a counter-example. The Pinocchio paradox turns on the truth of Pinocchio, whose nose grows if and only if what he is saying is not true, saying ‘My (...)
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  8. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1989). Are All Tautologies True? Logique Et Analyse 125 (125-126):3-14.score: 66.0
    The paper asks: are all tautologies true in a language with truth-value gaps? It answers that they are not. No tautology is false, of course, but not all are true. It also contends that not all contradictions are false in a language with truth-value gaps, though none are true.
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  9. Gilbert Plumer & Kenneth Olson (2007). Reasoning From Conflicting Sources. In Hans V. Hansen, Christopher W. Tindale, J. Anthony Blair, Ralph H. Johnson & David M. Godden (eds.), Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground. Proceedings 2007 [CD-ROM]. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation.score: 62.0
    One might ask of two or more texts—what can be inferred from them, taken together? If the texts happen to contradict each other in some respect, then the unadorned answer of standard logic is EVERYTHING. But it seems to be a given that we often successfully reason with inconsistent information from multiple sources. The purpose of this paper is to attempt to develop an adequate approach to accounting for this given.
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  10. Lorenzo Peña, Graham Priest's `Dialetheism' -- Is It Althogether True?score: 60.0
    Graham Priest's book In Contradiction (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) is a bold and well argued for defense of the existence of true contradictions. Priest's case for true contradictions -- or «dialetheias», as he calls them -- is by no means the only one in contemporary analytical philosophy, let alone in philosophy tout court . In some sense, other defenses of the existence of true contradictions are less philosophically «heterodox» than his is, since, unlike Priest's orientation, other approaches (...)
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  11. Manuel Bremer (2007). Believing and Asserting Contradictions. Logique Et Analyse (200):341.score: 60.0
    The debate around “strong” paraconsistency or dialetheism (the view that there are true contradictions) has – apart from metaphysical concerns - centred on the questions whether dialetheism itself can be definitely asserted or has a unique truth value, and what it should mean, if it is possible at all, to believe a contradiction one knows to be contradictory (i.e. an explicit contradiction). And what should it mean, if it is possible at all, to assert a sentence one knows to (...)
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  12. Jay Garfield & Graham Priest (2008). The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism. Philosophy East and West 58 (3):395 - 402.score: 54.0
    Anyone who is accustomed to the view that contradictions cannot be true, and cannot be accepted, and who reads texts in the Buddhists traditions will be struck by the fact that they frequently contain contradictions. Just consider, for example.
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  13. David Ripley (2011). Contradictions at the Borders. In Rick Nouwen, Robert van Rooij, Uli Sauerland & Hans-Christian Schmitz (eds.), Vagueness in Communication. Springer. 169--188.score: 54.0
    The purpose of this essay is to shed some light on a certain type of sentence, which I call a borderline contradiction. A borderline contradiction is a sentence of the form F a ∧ ¬F a, for some vague predicate F and some borderline case a of F , or a sentence equivalent to such a sentence. For example, if Jackie is a borderline case of ‘rich’, then ‘Jackie is rich and Jackie isn’t rich’ is a borderline contradiction. Many theories (...)
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  14. Alison M. Jaggar (ed.) (1994). Living with Contradictions: Controversies in Feminist Social Ethics. Westview Press.score: 54.0
    Some people believe that feminist ethics is little more than a series of dogmatic positions on issues such as abortion rights, pornography, and affirmative action.This caricature was never true, but Alison Jaggar’s Living with Contradictions is the first book to demonstrate just how rich and complex feminist ethics has become. Beginning with the modest assumption that feminism demands an examination of moral issues with a commitment to ending women’s subordination, this anthology shows that one can no longer divide social (...)
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  15. Graham Priest (2006). In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent. Oxford University Press.score: 44.0
    In Contradiction advocates and defends the view that there are true contradictions (dialetheism), a view that flies in the face of orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The book has been at the center of the controversies surrounding dialetheism ever since its first publication in 1987. This second edition of the book substantially expands upon the original in various ways, and also contains the author's reflections on developments over the last two decades. Further aspects of dialetheism are discussed in (...)
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  16. Patrick Allo (2010). A Classical Prejudice? Knowledge, Technology and Policy 23 (1-2):25-40.score: 42.0
    In this paper, I reassess Floridi’s solution to the Bar-Hillel–Carnap paradox (the information yield of inconsistent propositions is maximal) by questioning the orthodox view that contradictions cannot be true. The main part of the paper is devoted to showing that the veridicality thesis (semantic information has to be true) is compatible with dialetheism (there are true contradictions) and that, unless we accept the additional non-falsity thesis (information cannot be false), there is no reason to presuppose that there is (...)
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  17. Graham Priest (2000). Truth and Contradiction. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):305-319.score: 40.0
    I argue that there is nothing about truth as such that prevents contradictions from being true. I argue this by considering the main standard accounts of truth, and showing that they are quite compatible with the existence of true contradictions. Indeed, in many cases, they are actually friendly to the idea.
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  18. Bradley Armour-Garb & JC Beall (2002). Further Remarks on Truth and Contradiction. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):217-225.score: 40.0
    We address an issue recently discussed by Graham Priest: whether the very nature of truth (understood as in correspondence theories) rules out true contradictions, and hence whether a correspondence-theoretic notion of truth rules against dialetheism. We argue that, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, objections from within the correspondence theory do not stand in the way of dialetheism. We close by highlighting, but not attempting to resolve, two further challenges for dialetheism which arise out of familiar philosophical theorizing about truth.
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  19. D. Goldstick (1990). Could God Make a Contradiction True? Religious Studies 26 (3):377 - 387.score: 40.0
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  20. Evan Keeling (2013). Aristotle, Protagoras, and Contradiction: Metaphysics Γ 4-6. Journal of Ancient Philosophy 7 (2):75-99.score: 38.0
    In both Metaphysics Γ 4 and 5 Aristotle argues that Protagoras is committed to the view that all contradictions are true. Yet Aristotle’s arguments are not transparent, and later, in Γ 6, he provides Protagoras with a way to escape contradictions. In this paper I try to understand Aristotle’s arguments. After examining a number of possible solutions, I conclude that the best way of explaining them is to (a) recognize that Aristotle is discussing a number of Protagorean opponents, (...)
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  21. Mark Siderits (2008). Contradiction in Buddhist Argumentation. Argumentation 22 (1):125-133.score: 38.0
    Certain Buddhist texts contain statements that are prima facie contradictions. The scholarly consensus has been that such statements are meant to serve a rhetorical function that depends on the apparent contradictions being resolvable. But recently it has been claimed that such statements are meant to be taken literally: their authors assert as true statements that are of the form ‘p and not p’. This claim has ramifications for our understanding of the role played by the principle of non-contradiction (...)
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  22. Laurence Goldstein (2004). The Barber, Russell's Paradox, Catch-22, God, Contradiction and More: A Defence of a Wittgensteinian Conception of Contradiction. In Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The law of non-contradiction: new philosophical essays. Oxford University Press. 295--313.score: 36.0
    outrageous remarks about contradictions. Perhaps the most striking remark he makes is that they are not false. This claim first appears in his early notebooks (Wittgenstein 1960, p.108). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein argued that contradictions (like tautologies) are not statements (Sätze) and hence are not false (or true). This is a consequence of his theory that genuine statements are pictures.
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  23. Achille C. Varzi (2004). Conjunction and Contradiction. In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays. Clarendon Press. 93–110.score: 36.0
    There are two ways of understanding the notion of a contradiction: as a conjunction of a statement and its negation, or as a pair of statements one of which is the negation of the other. Correspondingly, there are two ways of understanding the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), i.e., the law that says that no contradictions can be true. In this paper I offer some arguments to the effect that on the first (collective) reading LNC is non-negotiable, but on the (...)
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  24. Ira Georgia Kiourti (2010). Real Impossible Worlds : The Bounds of Possibility. Dissertation, University of St Andrewsscore: 34.0
    Lewisian Genuine Realism (GR) about possible worlds is often deemed unable to accommodate impossible worlds and reap the benefits that these bestow to rival theories. This thesis explores two alternative extensions of GR into the terrain of impossible worlds. It is divided in six chapters. Chapter I outlines Lewis’ theory, the motivations for impossible worlds, and the central problem that such worlds present for GR: How can GR even understand the notion of an impossible world, given Lewis’ reductive theoretical framework? (...)
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  25. Achille C. Varzi (2014). Logic, Ontological Neutrality, and the Law of Non-Contradiction. In Elena Ficara (ed.), Contradictions. Logic, History, Actuality. De Gruyter. 53–80.score: 32.0
    Abstract. As a general theory of reasoning—and as a general theory of what holds true under every possible circumstance—logic is supposed to be ontologically neutral. It ought to have nothing to do with questions concerning what there is, or whether there is anything at all. It is for this reason that traditional Aristotelian logic, with its tacit existential presuppositions, was eventually deemed inadequate as a canon of pure logic. And it is for this reason that modern quantification theory, too, with (...)
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  26. Francesco Berto (2007). Is Dialetheism an Idealism? The Russellian Fallacy and the Dialetheist's Dilemma. Dialectica 61 (2):235–263.score: 30.0
    In his famous work on vagueness, Russell named “fallacy of verbalism” the fallacy that consists in mistaking the properties of words for the properties of things. In this paper, I examine two (clusters of) mainstream paraconsistent logical theories – the non-adjunctive and relevant approaches –, and show that, if they are given a strongly paraconsistent or dialetheic reading, the charge of committing the Russellian Fallacy can be raised against them in a sophisticated way, by appealing to the intuitive reading of (...)
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  27. Jay L. Garfield & Graham Priest (2003). Nagarjuna and the Limits of Thought. Philosophy East and West 53 (1):1-21.score: 30.0
    : Nagarjuna seems willing to embrace contradictions while at the same time making use of classic reductio arguments. He asserts that he rejects all philosophical views including his own-that he asserts nothing-and appears to mean it. It is argued here that he, like many philosophers in the West and, indeed, like many of his Buddhist colleagues, discovers and explores true contradictions arising at the limits of thought. For those who share a dialetheist's comfort with the possibility of true (...)
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  28. Stewart Shapiro (2002). Incompleteness and Inconsistency. Mind 111 (444):817-832.score: 30.0
    Graham Priest's In Contradiction (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987, chapter 3) contains an argument concerning the intuitive, or ‘naïve’ notion of (arithmetic) proof, or provability. He argues that the intuitively provable arithmetic sentences constitute a recursively enumerable set, which has a Gödel sentence which is itself intuitively provable. The incompleteness theorem does not apply, since the set of provable arithmetic sentences is not consistent. The purpose of this article is to sharpen Priest's argument, avoiding reference to informal notions, consensus, or (...)
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  29. Manuel Bremer (2008). Why and How to Be a Dialetheist. Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):208-227.score: 30.0
    In the first part the paper rehearses the main arguments why to be a dialetheist (i.e. why to assume that some contradictions are true). Dialetheism, however, has been criticised as irrational or self-refutating. Therefore the second part of the paper outlines one way to make dialetheism rational assertable. True contradictions turn out to be both believable and assertable. The argument proceeds by setting out basic principles of assertion and denial, and employing bivalent truth value operators.
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  30. Tommaso Piazza & Francesco Piazza (2010). On Inconsistent Entities. A Reply to Colyvan. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):301 - 311.score: 30.0
    In a recent article M. Colyvan has argued that Quinean forms of scientific realism are faced with an unexpected upshot. Realism concerning a given class of entities, along with this route to realism, can be vindicated by running an indispensability argument to the effect that the entities postulated by our best scientific theories exist. Colyvan observes that among our best scientific theories some are inconsistent, and so concludes that, by resorting to the very same argument, we may incur a commitment (...)
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  31. Gillian Russell, Could “Knows That” Be Inconsistent?score: 30.0
    In his recent Philosophers’ Imprint paper “The (mostly harmless) inconsistency of knowledge attributions” [Weiner, 2009], Matt Weiner argues that the semantics of the expression “knows that”, as it is used in attributions of knowledge like “Hannah knows that the bank will be open,” are inconsistent, but that this inconsistency is “mostly harmless.” He presents his view as an alternative to the invariantist, contextualist and relativist approaches currently prevalent in the literature, (e.g. [Stanley, 2005], [DeRose, 1995], [Hawthorne, 2006], [MacFarlane, 2005]) and (...)
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  32. Wenfang Wang (2011). Against Classical Dialetheism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):492-500.score: 30.0
    Dialetheism is the view that there are true contradictions. Classical dialetheism holds further the view that the law of excluded middle is indeed a logical law. Most famous dialetheists, such as G. Priest and J. Beall, are classical dialetheists; they take classical dialetheism to be the only plausible solution to the semantic paradoxes. The main contention of the paper is, however, that their views should be rejected. Based on inspecting Priest’s and Beall’s dialetheist theories from a special perspective, this (...)
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  33. Ben Martin (forthcoming). Dialetheism and the Impossibility of the World. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.score: 30.0
    This paper first offers a standard modal extension of dialetheic logics that respect the normal semantics for negation and conjunction, in an attempt to adequately model absolutism, the thesis that there are true contradictions at metaphysically possible worlds. It is shown, however, that the modal extension has unsavoury consequences for both absolutism and dialetheism. While the logic commits the absolutist to dialetheism, it commits the dialetheist to the impossibility of the actual world. A new modal logic AV is then (...)
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  34. Walter Carnielli & Abilio Rodrigues, On Philosophical Motivations for Paraconsistency: An Ontology-Free Interpretation of the Logics of Formal Inconsistency.score: 30.0
    In this paper we present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency, a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency within the object language in such a way that consistency may be logically independent of non- contradiction. We defend the view according to which logics of formal inconsistency may be interpreted as theories of logical consequence of an epistemological character. We also argue that in order to philosophically (...)
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  35. Jeremy Barris (forthcoming). Metaphysics, Deep Pluralism, and Paradoxes of Informal Logic. International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-26.score: 30.0
    The paper argues that metaphysical thought, or thought in whose context our general framework of sense is under scrutiny, involves, legitimates, and requires a variety of informal analogues of the ‘true contradictions’ supported in some paraconsistent formal logics. These are what we can call informal ‘legitimate logical inadequacies’. These paradoxical logical structures also occur in deeply pluralist contexts, where more than one, conflicting general framework for sense is relevant. The paper argues further that these legitimate logical inadequacies are real (...)
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  36. Constance Kassor (2013). Is Gorampa's "Freedom From Conceptual Proliferations" Dialetheist? Philosophy East and West 63 (3):399-410.score: 30.0
    This essay presents a critique of dialetheist readings of Madhyamaka based on the philosophy of the fifteenth-century Tibetan scholar, Gorampa Sonam Senge (Go rams pa bSod nams Seng ge) (1429-1489). In brief, dialetheism is the acceptance that in a logical system there can be at least some cases in which a statement and its negation are true; that is, it involves the acceptance of true contradictions. Jay Garfield and Graham Priest's "Nāgārjuna and the Limits of Thought" attempts to reconcile (...)
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  37. Helen Bohse (2006). A Paraconsistent Solution to the Problem of Moral Dilemmas. South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):77-86.score: 30.0
    Moral dilemmas – situations in which an agent has a moral requirement to do each of two acts but cannot do both – seem to suggest some kind of inconsistency. I argue that the inconsistency felt intuitively is actually a logical inconsistency, and then go on to show that we can neither deny the existence of moral dilemmas nor give up the deontic principles involved in the deduction of a contradiction, as both our moral judgements and the deontic principles depend (...)
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  38. Francesco Berto (2008). Adynaton and Material Exclusion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):165 – 190.score: 28.0
    Philosophical dialetheism, whose main exponent is Graham Priest, claims that some contradictions hold, are true, and it is rational to accept and assert them. Such a position is naturally portrayed as a challenge to the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC). But all the classic formulations of the LNC are, in a sense, not questioned by a typical dialetheist, since she is (cheerfully) required to accept them by her own theory. The goal of this paper is to develop a formulation of (...)
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  39. Graham Priest (2006). Doubt Truth to Be a Liar. Oxford University Press.score: 28.0
    Dialetheism is the view that some contradictions are true. This is a view which runs against orthodoxy in logic and metaphysics since Aristotle, and has implications for many of the core notions of philosophy. Doubt Truth to Be a Liar explores these implications for truth, rationality, negation, and the nature of logic, and develops further the defense of dialetheism first mounted in Priest's In Contradiction, a second edition of which is also available.
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  40. Uli Sauerland, Vagueness in Language: The Case Against Fuzzy Logic Revisited.score: 28.0
    Kamp and Fine presented an influential argument against the use of fuzzy logic for linguistic semantics in 1975. However, the argument assumes that contradictions of the form "A and not A" have semantic value zero. The argument has been recently criticized because sentences of this form are actually not perceived as contradictory by naive speakers. I present new experimental evidence arguing that fuzzy logic still isn't useful for linguistic semantics even if we take such naive speaker judgements at face (...)
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  41. Mark Jago (2013). Against Yagisawa's Modal Realism. Analysis 73 (1):10-17.score: 24.0
    In his book Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise (2010), Takashi Yagisawa presents and argues for a novel and imaginative version of modal realism. It differs both from Lewis’s modal realism (Lewis 1986) and from actualists’ ersatz accounts (Adams 1974; Sider 2002). In this paper, I’ll present two arguments, each of which shows that Yagisawa’s metaphysics is incoherent. The first argument shows that the combination of Yagisawa’s metaphysics with impossibilia leads to triviality: every sentence whatsoever comes out true. This is (...)
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  42. Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.) (2013). Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications. Springer.score: 24.0
    A logic is called 'paraconsistent' if it rejects the rule called 'ex contradictione quodlibet', according to which any conclusion follows from inconsistent premises. While logicians have proposed many technically developed paraconsistent logical systems and contemporary philosophers like Graham Priest have advanced the view that some contradictions can be true, and advocated a paraconsistent logic to deal with them, until recent times these systems have been little understood by philosophers. This book presents a comprehensive overview on paraconsistent logical systems to (...)
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  43. Reed Winegar (2011). Good Sense, Art, and Morality in Hume's ''Of the Standard of Taste''. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 9 (1):17-35.score: 24.0
    In his essay ‘‘Of the Standard of Taste,’’ Hume argues that artworks with morally flawed outlooks (including Homer's poems) are, to some extent, aesthetically flawed. While Hume's remarks regarding the relationship between art and morality have influenced contemporary aestheticians, Hume's own position has struck many people as incoherent. For Hume appears to entangle himself in two separate contradictions. First, Hume seems to claim both that true judges should not enter into vicious sentiments and that true judges should adopt the (...)
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  44. Hans Sluga (2007). Truth and the Imperfection of Language. Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):1-26.score: 24.0
    Frege subscribed neither to a correspondence theory of truth nor, as is now frequently argued, to a simple redundancy theory of truth. He did not believe, in other words, that the word "true" can be dropped from the language without loss. He argues, instead, that in a perfect language we would not require the term "true" but that we are far from possessing such a language. A perfect language would be one that is fully adequate in the sense that it (...)
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  45. Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2006). Dialetheism, Semantic Pathology, and the Open Pair. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):395 – 416.score: 24.0
    Over the past 25 years, Graham Priest has ably presented and defended dialetheism, the view that certain sentences are properly characterized as true with true negations. Our goal here is neither to quibble with the tenability of true, assertable contradictions nor, really, with the arguments for dialetheism. Rather, we wish to address the dialetheist's treatment of cases of semantic pathology and to pose a worry for dialetheism that has not been adequately considered. The problem that we present seems to (...)
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  46. Arvid Båve (2012). On Using Inconsistent Expressions. Erkenntnis 77 (1):133-148.score: 24.0
    The paper discusses the Inconsistency Theory of Truth (IT), the view that “true” is inconsistent in the sense that its meaning-constitutive principles include all instances of the truth-schema (T). It argues that (IT) entails that anyone using “true” in its ordinary sense is committed to all the (T)-instances and that any theory in which “true” is used in that sense entails the (T)-instances (which, given classical logic, entail contradictions). More specifically, I argue that theorists are committed to the meaning-constitutive (...)
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  47. B. Armour-Garb & Jc Beall (2003). Minimalism and the Dialetheic Challenge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):383 – 401.score: 24.0
    Minimalists, following Horwich, claim that all that can be said about truth is comprised by all and only the nonparadoxical instances of (E) p is true iff p. It is, accordingly, standard in the literature on truth and paradox to ask how the minimalist will restrict (E) so as to rule out paradox-inducing sentences (alternatively: propositions). In this paper, we consider a prior question: On what grounds does the minimalist restrict (E) so as to rule out paradox-inducing sentences and, thereby, (...)
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  48. Graham Harman (2012). Object-Oriented France: The Philosophy of Tristan Garcia. Continent 2 (1):6-21.score: 24.0
    continent. 2.1 (2012): 6–21. The French philosopher and novelist Tristan Garcia was born in Toulouse in 1981. This makes him rather young to have written such an imaginative work of systematic philosophy as Forme et objet , 1 the latest entry in the MétaphysiqueS series at Presses universitaires de France. But this reference to Garcia’s youthfulness is not a form of condescension: by publishing a complete system of philosophy in the grand style, he has already done what none of us (...)
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  49. Graham Priest (1982). To Be and Not to Be: Dialectical Tense Logic. Studia Logica 41 (2-3):249 - 268.score: 24.0
    The paper concerns time, change and contradiction, and is in three parts. The first is an analysis of the problem of the instant of change. It is argued that some changes are such that at the instant of change the system is in both the prior and the posterior state. In particular there are some changes from p being true to p being true where a contradiction is realized. The second part of the paper specifies a formal logic which accommodates (...)
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  50. Greg Littmann (2012). Dialetheism and the Graphic Liar. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):15-27.score: 24.0
    A Liar sentence is a sentence that, paradoxically, we cannot evaluate for truth in accordance with classical logic and semantics without arriving at a contradiction. For example, consider L If we assume that L is true, then given that what L says is ‘L is false,’ it follows that L is false. On the other hand, if we assume that L is false, then given that what L says is ‘L is false,’ it follows that L is true. Thus, L (...)
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