Search results for ''true' contradictions' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Eric Dietrich (2008). The Bishop and Priest: Toward a Point-of-View Based Epistemology of True Contradictions. Logos Architekton 2 (2):35-58..
    True contradictions are taken increasingly seriously by philosophers and logicians. Yet, the belief that contradictions are always false remains deeply intuitive. This paper confronts this belief head-on by explaining in detail how one specific contradiction is true. The contradiction in question derives from Priest's reworking of Berkeley's argument for idealism. However, technical aspects of the explanation offered here differ considerably from Priest's derivation. The explanation uses novel formal and epistemological tools to guide the reader through a valid argument (...)
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  2.  51
    Terence Parsons (1990). True Contradictions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):335 - 353.
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  3.  26
    Jürgen Dümont & Frank Mau (1998). Are There True Contradictions? A Critical Discussion of Graham Priest's, Beyond the Limits of Thought. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 29 (2):289-299.
    The present article critically examines three aspects of Graham Priest's dialetheic analysis of very important kinds of limitations (the limit of what can be expressed, described, conceived, known, or the limit of some operation or other). First, it is shown that Priest's considerations focusing on Hegel's account of the infinite cannot be sustained, mainly because Priest seems to rely on a too restrictive notion of object. Second, we discuss Priest's treatment of the paradoxes in Cantorian set-theory. It is shown that (...)
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  4. Alan Weir (2004). There Are No True Contradictions. In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon Press
     
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  5. Yasuo Deguchi, Jay L. Garfield & Graham Priest (2013). The Contradictions Are True—And It's Not Out of This World! A Response to Takashi Yagisawa. Philosophy East and West 63 (3):370-372.
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  6.  45
    Timothy Smiley & Graham Priest (1993). Can Contradictions Be True? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 67:17 - 54.
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  7. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1989). Are All Tautologies True? Logique Et Analyse 125 (125-126):3-14.
    The paper asks: are all tautologies true in a language with truth-value gaps? It answers that they are not. No tautology is false, of course, but not all are true. It also contends that not all contradictions are false in a language with truth-value gaps, though none are true.
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  8.  19
    P. Eldridge-Smith (2011). Pinocchio Against the Dialetheists. Analysis 71 (2):306-308.
    Semantic dialetheists astutely dodge Explosion, the logical contagion of everything being true if a single contradiction is true. A dialetheia is contained in their semantics, and sustained by a paraconsistent logic. Graham Priest has shown that this is a solution to the Liar paradox. I use the Pinocchio paradox, devised by Veronique Eldridge-Smith, as a counter-example. The Pinocchio paradox turns on the truth of Pinocchio, whose nose grows if and only if what he is saying is not true, saying ‘My (...)
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  9. Lorenzo Peña (1996). Graham Priest's «Dialetheism» -- Is It Althogether True? Sorites 7:28-56.
    Graham Priest's book In Contradiction is a bold defense of the existence of true contradictions. Although Priest's case is impressive, and many of his arguments are correct, his approach is not the only one allowing for true contradictions. As against Priest's, there is at least one contradictorialist approach which establishes a link between true contradictions and degrees of truth. All in all, such an alternative is more conservative, closer to mainstream analytical philosophy. The two approaches differ as (...)
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  10.  83
    Gilbert Plumer & Kenneth Olson (2007). Reasoning From Conflicting Sources. In Hans V. Hansen, Christopher W. Tindale, J. Anthony Blair, Ralph H. Johnson & David M. Godden (eds.), Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground. Proceedings 2007 [CD-ROM]. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation 1-9.
    One might ask of two or more texts—what can be inferred from them, taken together? If the texts happen to contradict each other in some respect, then the unadorned answer of standard logic is EVERYTHING. But it seems to be a given that we often successfully reason with inconsistent information from multiple sources. The purpose of this paper is to attempt to develop an adequate approach to accounting for this given.
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  11.  23
    Manuel Bremer (2007). Believing and Asserting Contradictions. Logique Et Analyse (200):341.
    The debate around “strong” paraconsistency or dialetheism (the view that there are true contradictions) has – apart from metaphysical concerns - centred on the questions whether dialetheism itself can be definitely asserted or has a unique truth value, and what it should mean, if it is possible at all, to believe a contradiction one knows to be contradictory (i.e. an explicit contradiction). And what should it mean, if it is possible at all, to assert a sentence one knows to (...)
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  12. Mark Sainsbury (1997). Can Rational Dialetheism Be Refuted By Considerations About Negation and Denial? ProtoSociology 10.
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  13.  85
    David Ripley (2011). Contradictions at the Borders. In Rick Nouwen, Robert van Rooij, Uli Sauerland & Hans-Christian Schmitz (eds.), Vagueness in Communication. Springer 169--188.
    The purpose of this essay is to shed some light on a certain type of sentence, which I call a borderline contradiction. A borderline contradiction is a sentence of the form F a ∧ ¬F a, for some vague predicate F and some borderline case a of F , or a sentence equivalent to such a sentence. For example, if Jackie is a borderline case of ‘rich’, then ‘Jackie is rich and Jackie isn’t rich’ is a borderline contradiction. Many theories (...)
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  14. Jay Garfield & Graham Priest (2008). The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism. Philosophy East and West 58 (3):395 - 402.
    Anyone who is accustomed to the view that contradictions cannot be true, and cannot be accepted, and who reads texts in the Buddhists traditions will be struck by the fact that they frequently contain contradictions. Just consider, for example.
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  15.  74
    Alison M. Jaggar (ed.) (1994). Living with Contradictions: Controversies in Feminist Social Ethics. Westview Press.
    Some people believe that feminist ethics is little more than a series of dogmatic positions on issues such as abortion rights, pornography, and affirmative action.This caricature was never true, but Alison Jaggar’s Living with Contradictions is the first book to demonstrate just how rich and complex feminist ethics has become. Beginning with the modest assumption that feminism demands an examination of moral issues with a commitment to ending women’s subordination, this anthology shows that one can no longer divide social (...)
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  16.  6
    Bernard Curtis (1982). The True Secret of Education. Philosophy 57 (222):515 - 528.
    For extravagant young Fellows, that have Liveliness and Spirit, come sometimes to be set right, and so make Able and Great Men: but Dejected Minds , timorous and tame, and Low Spirits, are hardly ever to be raised, and very seldom attain to any thing. To avoid the Danger, that is on either hand, is the great Art; and he that has found a way, how to keep up a Child's Spirit, easy, active and free; and yet, at the same (...)
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  17.  29
    Patrick Allo (2010). A Classical Prejudice? Knowledge, Technology & Policy 23 (1-2):25-40.
    In this paper, I reassess Floridi’s solution to the Bar-Hillel–Carnap paradox (the information yield of inconsistent propositions is maximal) by questioning the orthodox view that contradictions cannot be true. The main part of the paper is devoted to showing that the veridicality thesis (semantic information has to be true) is compatible with dialetheism (there are true contradictions) and that, unless we accept the additional non-falsity thesis (information cannot be false), there is no reason to presuppose that there is (...)
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  18.  36
    M. E. Omel'ianovskii (1963). The Concept of Dialectical Contradictions in Quantum Physics. Russian Studies in Philosophy 2 (3):17-30.
    Contemporary physicists, in creating theories adequate to nature's patterns of movement and development, speak the language of dialectics whether willingly or unwillingly. Even those whose personal outlook is at variance with dialectical philosophy acknowledge this in their own way. Thus Heisenberg states that inquiry into the foundations of the quantum theory, especially as carried out by Bohr, has features reminiscent of Hegelian philosophy. And, to quote Pauli, "dialectics is that mutual game of two opponents which is typical of the Copenhagen (...)
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  19. Bruce Erlich (1986). Amphibolies: On the Critical Self-Contradictions of "Pluralism". Critical Inquiry 12 (3):521-549.
    Immanuel Kant might have stated the central and urgent problem facing contemporary literary theory as the need to seek a path between dogmatism and skepticism. We confront today a multiplicity of critical methods, each filling books and journals with no doubt convincing arguments for its correctness. If we cling to one, denying others possess truth, we are dogmatists; if, however, we grant that two or three or all are equally true, we admit that each is at the same time false (...)
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  20. Graham Priest (2006). In Contradiction. Oxford University Press Uk.
    In Contradiction advocates and defends the view that there are true contradictions, a view that flies in the face of orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The book has been at the centre of the controversies surrounding dialetheism ever since its first publication in 1987. This second edition of the book substantially expands upon the original in various ways, and also contains the author's reflections on developments over the last two decades. Further aspects of dialetheism are discussed in the (...)
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  21. Graham Priest (2006). In Contradiction. Oxford University Press Uk.
    In Contradiction advocates and defends the view that there are true contradictions, a view that flies in the face of orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The book has been at the centre of the controversies surrounding dialetheism ever since its first publication in 1987. This second edition of the book substantially expands upon the original in various ways, and also contains the author's reflections on developments over the last two decades. Further aspects of dialetheism are discussed in the (...)
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  22. Graham Priest (2000). Truth and Contradiction. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):305-319.
    I argue that there is nothing about truth as such that prevents contradictions from being true. I argue this by considering the main standard accounts of truth, and showing that they are quite compatible with the existence of true contradictions. Indeed, in many cases, they are actually friendly to the idea.
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  23.  8
    Jonas R. Becker Arenhart (2015). Liberating Paraconsistency From Contradiction. Logica Universalis 9 (4):523-544.
    In this paper we propose to take seriously the claim that at least some kinds of paraconsistent negations are subcontrariety forming operators. We shall argue that from an intuitive point of view, by considering paraconsistent negations as formalizing that particular kind of opposition, one needs not worry with issues about the meaning of true contradictions and the like, given that “true contradictions” are not involved in these paraconsistent logics. Our strategy will consist in showing that, on the one (...)
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  24.  28
    Ben Martin (2014). Dialetheism and the Impossibility of the World. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):61-75.
    This paper first offers a standard modal extension of dialetheic logics that respect the normal semantics for negation and conjunction, in an attempt to adequately model absolutism, the thesis that there are true contradictions at metaphysically possible worlds. It is shown, however, that the modal extension has unsavoury consequences for both absolutism and dialetheism. While the logic commits the absolutist to dialetheism, it commits the dialetheist to the impossibility of the actual world. A new modal logic AV is then (...)
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  25. Ira Georgia Kiourti (2010). Real Impossible Worlds : The Bounds of Possibility. Dissertation, University of St Andrews
    Lewisian Genuine Realism about possible worlds is often deemed unable to accommodate impossible worlds and reap the benefits that these bestow to rival theories. This thesis explores two alternative extensions of GR into the terrain of impossible worlds. It is divided in six chapters. Chapter I outlines Lewis’ theory, the motivations for impossible worlds, and the central problem that such worlds present for GR: How can GR even understand the notion of an impossible world, given Lewis’ reductive theoretical framework? Since (...)
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  26.  7
    Thibaut Giraud (forthcoming). On Modal Meinongianism. Synthese:1-18.
    Modal Meinongianism is a form of Meinongianism whose main supporters are Graham Priest and Francesco Berto. The main idea of modal Meinongianism is to restrict the logical deviance of Meinongian non-existent objects to impossible worlds and thus prevent it from “contaminating” the actual world: the round square is round and not round, but not in the actual world, only in an impossible world. In the actual world, supposedly, no contradiction is true. I will show that Priest’s semantics, as originally formulated (...)
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  27. Jay L. Garfield & Graham Priest (2003). Nagarjuna and the Limits of Thought. Philosophy East and West 53 (1):1-21.
    : Nagarjuna seems willing to embrace contradictions while at the same time making use of classic reductio arguments. He asserts that he rejects all philosophical views including his own-that he asserts nothing-and appears to mean it. It is argued here that he, like many philosophers in the West and, indeed, like many of his Buddhist colleagues, discovers and explores true contradictions arising at the limits of thought. For those who share a dialetheist's comfort with the possibility of true (...)
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  28. Francesco Berto (2007). Is Dialetheism an Idealism? The Russellian Fallacy and the Dialetheist's Dilemma. Dialectica 61 (2):235–263.
    In his famous work on vagueness, Russell named “fallacy of verbalism” the fallacy that consists in mistaking the properties of words for the properties of things. In this paper, I examine two (clusters of) mainstream paraconsistent logical theories – the non-adjunctive and relevant approaches –, and show that, if they are given a strongly paraconsistent or dialetheic reading, the charge of committing the Russellian Fallacy can be raised against them in a sophisticated way, by appealing to the intuitive reading of (...)
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  29.  30
    Walter Carnielli & Abilio Rodrigues, On Philosophical Motivations for Paraconsistency: An Ontology-Free Interpretation of the Logics of Formal Inconsistency.
    In this paper we present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency, a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency within the object language in such a way that consistency may be logically independent of non- contradiction. We defend the view according to which logics of formal inconsistency may be interpreted as theories of logical consequence of an epistemological character. We also argue that in order to philosophically (...)
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  30.  16
    Jeremy Barris (2014). Metaphysics, Deep Pluralism, and Paradoxes of Informal Logic. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (1):59-84.
    The paper argues that metaphysical thought, or thought in whose context our general framework of sense is under scrutiny, involves, legitimates, and requires a variety of informal analogues of the ‘true contradictions’ supported in some paraconsistent formal logics. These are what we can call informal ‘legitimate logical inadequacies’. These paradoxical logical structures also occur in deeply pluralist contexts, where more than one, conflicting general framework for sense is relevant. The paper argues further that these legitimate logical inadequacies are real (...)
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  31.  62
    Stewart Shapiro (2002). Incompleteness and Inconsistency. Mind 111 (444):817-832.
    Graham Priest's In Contradiction (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987, chapter 3) contains an argument concerning the intuitive, or ‘naïve’ notion of (arithmetic) proof, or provability. He argues that the intuitively provable arithmetic sentences constitute a recursively enumerable set, which has a Gödel sentence which is itself intuitively provable. The incompleteness theorem does not apply, since the set of provable arithmetic sentences is not consistent. The purpose of this article is to sharpen Priest's argument, avoiding reference to informal notions, consensus, or (...)
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  32.  60
    Tommaso Piazza & Francesco Piazza (2010). On Inconsistent Entities. A Reply to Colyvan. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):301 - 311.
    In a recent article M. Colyvan has argued that Quinean forms of scientific realism are faced with an unexpected upshot. Realism concerning a given class of entities, along with this route to realism, can be vindicated by running an indispensability argument to the effect that the entities postulated by our best scientific theories exist. Colyvan observes that among our best scientific theories some are inconsistent, and so concludes that, by resorting to the very same argument, we may incur a commitment (...)
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  33.  51
    Manuel Bremer (2008). Why and How to Be a Dialetheist. Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):208-227.
    In the first part the paper rehearses the main arguments why to be a dialetheist (i.e. why to assume that some contradictions are true). Dialetheism, however, has been criticised as irrational or self-refutating. Therefore the second part of the paper outlines one way to make dialetheism rational assertable. True contradictions turn out to be both believable and assertable. The argument proceeds by setting out basic principles of assertion and denial, and employing bivalent truth value operators.
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  34. Gillian Russell, Could “Knows That” Be Inconsistent?
    In his recent Philosophers’ Imprint paper “The (mostly harmless) inconsistency of knowledge attributions” [Weiner, 2009], Matt Weiner argues that the semantics of the expression “knows that”, as it is used in attributions of knowledge like “Hannah knows that the bank will be open,” are inconsistent, but that this inconsistency is “mostly harmless.” He presents his view as an alternative to the invariantist, contextualist and relativist approaches currently prevalent in the literature, (e.g. [Stanley, 2005], [DeRose, 1995], [Hawthorne, 2006], [MacFarlane, 2005]) and (...)
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  35.  33
    Wenfang Wang (2011). Against Classical Dialetheism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):492-500.
    Dialetheism is the view that there are true contradictions. Classical dialetheism holds further the view that the law of excluded middle is indeed a logical law. Most famous dialetheists, such as G. Priest and J. Beall, are classical dialetheists; they take classical dialetheism to be the only plausible solution to the semantic paradoxes. The main contention of the paper is, however, that their views should be rejected. Based on inspecting Priest’s and Beall’s dialetheist theories from a special perspective, this (...)
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  36.  13
    Constance Kassor (2013). Is Gorampa's "Freedom From Conceptual Proliferations" Dialetheist? Philosophy East and West 63 (3):399-410.
    This essay presents a critique of dialetheist readings of Madhyamaka based on the philosophy of the fifteenth-century Tibetan scholar, Gorampa Sonam Senge (Go rams pa bSod nams Seng ge) (1429-1489). In brief, dialetheism is the acceptance that in a logical system there can be at least some cases in which a statement and its negation are true; that is, it involves the acceptance of true contradictions. Jay Garfield and Graham Priest's "Nāgārjuna and the Limits of Thought" attempts to reconcile (...)
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  37.  1
    Chantal Paula Rosengurt (2014). Arte, objetos, ficción, cuerpo: Cuatro ensayos sobre estética. Tópicos 28:01-04.
    El dialeteísmo es la posición que afirma que hay contradicciones verdaderas. Este artículo versará sobre esa posición. En la primera sección, mencionaré los principales aportes que, en mi perspectiva, el dialeteísmo ha hecho a la lógica filosófica. En la segunda sección, analizaré el principal problema del dialeteísmo. En la tercera sección, mostraré que los argumentos a favor del dialeteísmo no llegan a establecer la verdad de esta posición. Finalmente, explicaré cuál es el tipo de paraconsistencia que considero adecuada y la (...)
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  38.  23
    Bradley Armour-Garb & JC Beall (2002). Further Remarks on Truth and Contradiction. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):217-225.
    We address an issue recently discussed by Graham Priest: whether the very nature of truth (understood as in correspondence theories) rules out true contradictions, and hence whether a correspondence-theoretic notion of truth rules against dialetheism. We argue that, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, objections from within the correspondence theory do not stand in the way of dialetheism. We close by highlighting, but not attempting to resolve, two further challenges for dialetheism which arise out of familiar philosophical theorizing about truth.
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  39.  2
    Lynn Sebastian Purcell (2012). Two Paths to Infinite Thought: Alain Badiou and Jacques Derrida on the Question of the Whole. Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 8 (1):151-176.
    This essay defends an idea that is no longer fashionable: that there is a whole. The motivation for a defense of this notion has nothing to do with intellectual conservatism or a penchant for Hegel. Rather, what we hope to establish is a second path into what Alain Badiou has called the ‘Cantorian Revolution’. In order to open this path we undertake a three-fold task. First, we deconstruct Badiou’s onto-logical project by isolating the suppressed significance of Ernst Zermelo. This point (...)
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  40.  2
    Helen Bohse (2006). A Paraconsistent Solution to the Problem of Moral Dilemmas. South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):77-86.
    Moral dilemmas – situations in which an agent has a moral requirement to do each of two acts but cannot do both – seem to suggest some kind of inconsistency. I argue that the inconsistency felt intuitively is actually a logical inconsistency, and then go on to show that we can neither deny the existence of moral dilemmas nor give up the deontic principles involved in the deduction of a contradiction, as both our moral judgements and the deontic principles depend (...)
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  41. Walter Carnielli & Abílio Rodrigues (2015). Towards a Philosophical Understanding of the Logics of Formal Inconsistency. Manuscrito 38 (2):155-184.
    In this paper we present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency, a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency within the object language in such a way that consistency may be logically independent of non-contradiction. We defend the view according to which logics of formal inconsistency may be interpreted as theories of logical consequence of an epistemological character. We also argue that in order to philosophically justify (...)
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  42. Greg Littman & Keith Simmons (2004). A Critique of Dialetheism. In G. Priest, J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Oxford University Press 1-226.
    This dissertation is a critical examination of dialetheism, the view that there are true contradictions. Dialetheism's proponents argue that adopting the view will allow us to solve hitherto unsolved problems, including the well-known logical paradoxes. ;Dialetheism faces three kinds of challenge. Challenges of the first kind put in doubt the intrinsic coherence of dialetheism. It can be claimed, for example, that it is incoherent for a claim to be both true and false; that claims known to be false cannot (...)
     
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  43. Hartley Slater (2002). The Fallacy in Russell's Schema. Russell 22 (2).
    An analysis of the paradoxes of self-reference, which Bertrand Russell initiated, exposes the common fallacy in them, and has consequences for some of Graham Priest's work. Notably it undermines his defence of the Domain Principle, and his consequent belief that there are true contradictions. Use of Hilbert's epsilon calculus shows, instead, that we must allow for indeterminacy of sense in connection with paradoxes of self-reference.
     
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  44. Diego Tajer (2014). Alcances y problemas del dialeteísmo. Tópicos 28:01-23.
    El dialeteísmo es la posición que afirma que hay contradicciones verdaderas. Este artículo versará sobre esa posición. En la primera sección, mencionaré los principales aportes que, en mi perspectiva, el dialeteísmo ha hecho a la lógica filosófica. En la segunda sección, analizaré el principal problema del dialeteísmo. En la tercera sección, mostraré que los argumentos a favor del dialeteísmo no llegan a establecer la verdad de esta posición. Finalmente, explicaré cuál es el tipo de paraconsistencia que considero adecuada y la (...)
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  45. Graham Priest (2006). Doubt Truth to Be a Liar. Oxford University Press.
    Dialetheism is the view that some contradictions are true. This is a view which runs against orthodoxy in logic and metaphysics since Aristotle, and has implications for many of the core notions of philosophy. Doubt Truth to Be a Liar explores these implications for truth, rationality, negation, and the nature of logic, and develops further the defense of dialetheism first mounted in Priest's In Contradiction, a second edition of which is also available.
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  46. Michael Hannon (2014). Is Knowledge True Belief Plus Adequate Information? Erkenntnis 79 (5):1069-1076.
    In When is True Belief Knowledge? (2012) Richard Foley proposes an original and strikingly simple theory of knowledge: a subject S knows some proposition p if and only if S truly believes that p and does not lack any important information. If this view is correct, Foley allegedly solves a wide variety of epistemological problems, such as the Gettier problem, the lottery paradox, the so-called ‘value problem’, and the problem of skepticism. However, a central component of his view is that (...)
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  47. Lee Walters (2015). Possible World Semantics and True‐True Counterfactuals. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1).
    The standard semantics for counterfactuals ensures that any counterfactual with a true antecedent and true consequent is itself true. There have been many recent attempts to amend the standard semantics to avoid this result. I show that these proposals invalidate a number of further principles of the standard logic of counterfactuals. The case against the automatic truth of counterfactuals with true components does not extend to these further principles, however, so it is not clear that rejecting the latter (...)
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  48. Paula Rubio‐Fernández (2015). Can We Forget What We Know in a False‐Belief Task? An Investigation of the True‐Belief Default. Cognitive Science 40 (1):n/a-n/a.
    It has been generally assumed in the Theory of Mind literature of the past 30 years that young children fail standard false-belief tasks because they attribute their own knowledge to the protagonist. Contrary to the traditional view, we have recently proposed that the children's bias is task induced. This alternative view was supported by studies showing that 3 year olds are able to pass a false-belief task that allows them to focus on the protagonist, without drawing their attention to the (...)
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  49. Finn Janning (2014). True Detective: Buddhism, Pessimism or Philosophy? Journal of Philosophy of Life 4 (4).
    The aim of this paper is to raise two questions. The first question is: How is pessimism related to Buddhism (and vice versa)? The second question is: What relation does an immanent philosophy have to pessimism and Buddhism, if any? Using True Detective, an American television crime drama, as my point of departure, first I will outline some of the likenesses between Buddhism and pessimism. At the same time, I will show how the conduct of one of the main characters (...)
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  50. Mark Jago (2013). Against Yagisawa's Modal Realism. Analysis 73 (1):10-17.
    In his book Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise (2010), Takashi Yagisawa presents and argues for a novel and imaginative version of modal realism. It differs both from Lewis’s modal realism (Lewis 1986) and from actualists’ ersatz accounts (Adams 1974; Sider 2002). In this paper, I’ll present two arguments, each of which shows that Yagisawa’s metaphysics is incoherent. The first argument shows that the combination of Yagisawa’s metaphysics with impossibilia leads to triviality: every sentence whatsoever comes (...)
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