Search results for '*Cognition' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Shannon Spaulding (forthcoming). Embodied Cognition and Theory of Mind. In Lawrence Shapiro (ed.), Handbook of Embodied Cognition. Routledge.score: 14.0
    According to embodied cognition, the philosophical and empirical literature on theory of mind is misguided. Embodied cognition rejects the idea that social cognition requires theory of mind. It regards the intramural debate between the Theory Theory and the Simulation Theory as irrelevant, and it dismisses the empirical studies on theory of mind as ill conceived and misleading. Embodied cognition provides a novel deflationary account of social cognition that does not depend on theory of mind. In this chapter, l describe embodied (...)
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  2. Bertram F. Malle (2005). Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Human Social Cognition. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. 225-255.score: 14.0
    The human ability to represent, conceptualize, and reason about mind and behavior is one of the greatest achievements of human evolution and is made possible by a “folk theory of mind” — a sophisticated conceptual framework that relates different mental states to each other and connects them to behavior. This chapter examines the nature and elements of this framework and its central functions for social cognition. As a conceptual framework, the folk theory of mind operates prior to any particular conscious (...)
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  3. Stevan Harnad & Itiel Dror (2006). Distributed Cognition: Cognizing, Autonomy and the Turing Test. Pragmatics and Cognition 14 (2):14.score: 14.0
    Some of the papers in this special issue distribute cognition between what is going on inside individual cognizers' heads and their outside worlds; others distribute cognition among different individual cognizers. Turing's criterion for cognition was individual, autonomous input/output capacity. It is not clear that distributed cognition could pass the Turing Test.
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  4. David Kirsh (2005). Metacognition, Distributed Cognition and Visual Design. In Peter Gardenfors, Petter Johansson & N. J. Mahwah (eds.), Cognition, education, and communication technology. Erlbaum Associates. 147--180.score: 14.0
    Metacognition is associated with planning, monitoring, evaluating and repairing performance Designers of elearning systems can improve the quality of their environments by explicitly structuring the visual and interactive display of learning contexts to facilitate metacognition. Typically page layout, navigational appearance, visual and interactivity design are not viewed as major factors in metacognition. This is because metacognition tends to be interpreted as a process in the head, rather than an interactive one. It is argued here, that cognition and metacognition are part (...)
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  5. Georg Theiner (2014). Varieties of Group Cognition. In Lawrence Shapiro (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition. Routledge. 347-357.score: 14.0
    Benjamin Franklin famously wrote that “the good [that] men do separately is small compared with what they may do collectively” (Isaacson 2004). The ability to join with others in groups to accomplish goals collectively that would hopelessly overwhelm the time, energy, and resources of individuals is indeed one of the greatest assets of our species. In the history of humankind, groups have been among the greatest workers, builders, producers, protectors, entertainers, explorers, discoverers, planners, problem-solvers, and decision-makers. During the late 19th (...)
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  6. Lawrence Lengbeyer (2007). Situated Cognition: The Perspect Model. In David Spurrett, Don Ross, Harold Kincaid & Lynn Stephens (eds.), Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context. MIT Press. 227.score: 14.0
    The standard philosophical and folk-psychological accounts of cognition and action credit us with too much spontaneity in our activities and projects. We are taken to be fundamentally active rather than reactive, to project our needs and aims and deploy our full supporting arsenal of cognitive instruments upon an essentially passive environment. The corrected point of view presented here balances this image of active agency with an appreciation of how we are also continually responding to the world, that is, to the (...)
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  7. Shannon Spaulding (2013). Mirror Neurons and Social Cognition. Mind and Language 28 (2):233-257.score: 12.0
    Mirror neurons are widely regarded as an important key to social cognition. Despite such wide agreement, there is very little consensus on how or why they are important. The goal of this paper is to clearly explicate the exact role mirror neurons play in social cognition. I aim to answer two questions about the relationship between mirroring and social cognition: What kind of social understanding is involved with mirroring? How is mirroring related to that understanding? I argue that philosophical and (...)
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  8. Fred Adams (2010). Embodied Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):619-628.score: 12.0
    Embodied cognition is sweeping the planet. On a non-embodied approach, the sensory system informs the cognitive system and the motor system does the cognitive system’s bidding. There are causal relations between the systems but the sensory and motor systems are not constitutive of cognition. For embodied views, the relation to the sensori-motor system to cognition is constitutive, not just causal. This paper examines some recent empirical evidence used to support the view that cognition is embodied and raises questions about some (...)
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  9. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2013). Superdupersizing the Mind: Extended Cognition and the Persistence of Cognitive Bloat. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):791-806.score: 12.0
    Extended Cognition (EC) hypothesizes that there are parts of the world outside the head serving as cognitive vehicles. One criticism of this controversial view is the problem of “cognitive bloat” which says that EC is too permissive and fails to provide an adequate necessary criterion for cognition. It cannot, for instance, distinguish genuine cognitive vehicles from mere supports (e.g. the Yellow Pages). In response, Andy Clark and Mark Rowlands have independently suggested that genuine cognitive vehicles are distinguished from supports in (...)
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  10. John Sutton, Celia B. Harris, Paul G. Keil & Amanda J. Barnier (2010). The Psychology of Memory, Extended Cognition, and Socially Distributed Remembering. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):521-560.score: 12.0
    This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but complementary properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the nature of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive complementarity argument, (...)
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  11. Shannon Spaulding (2012). Overextended Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):469 - 490.score: 12.0
    Extended cognition is the view that some cognitive processes extend beyond the brain. One prominent strategy of arguing against extended cognition is to offer necessary conditions on cognition and argue that the proposed extended processes fail to satisfy these conditions. I argue that this strategy is misguided and fails to refute extended cognition. I suggest a better way to evaluate the case for extended cognition that should be acceptable to all parties, captures the intuitiveness of previous objections, and avoids the (...)
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  12. Erik Rietveld (2008). Situated Normativity: The Normative Aspect of Embodied Cognition in Unreflective Action. Mind 117 (468):973-1001.score: 12.0
    In everyday life we often act adequately, yet without deliberation. For instance, we immediately obtain and maintain an appropriate distance from others in an elevator. The notion of normativity implied here is a very basic one, namely distinguishing adequate from inadequate, correct from incorrect, or better from worse in the context of a particular situation. In the first part of this paper I investigate such ‘situated normativity’ by focusing on unreflective expert action. More particularly, I use Wittgenstein’s examples of craftsmen (...)
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  13. Shannon Spaulding (2010). Embodied Cognition and Mindreading. Mind and Language 25 (1):119-140.score: 12.0
    Recently, philosophers and psychologists defending the embodied cognition research program have offered arguments against mindreading as a general model of our social understanding. The embodied cognition arguments are of two kinds: those that challenge the developmental picture of mindreading and those that challenge the alleged ubiquity of mindreading. Together, these two kinds of arguments, if successful, would present a serious challenge to the standard account of human social understanding. In this paper, I examine the strongest of these embodied cognition arguments (...)
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  14. Dave Ward & Mog Stapleton (2012). Es Are Good. Cognition as Enacted, Embodied, Embedded, Affective and Extended. In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness.score: 12.0
    We present a specific elaboration and partial defense of the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended. According to the view we will defend, the enactivist claim that perception and cognition essentially depend upon the cognizer’s interactions with their environment is fundamental. If a particular instance of this kind of dependence obtains, we will argue, then it follows that cognition is essentially embodied and embedded, that the underpinnings of cognition are inextricable from those of affect, that (...)
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  15. Shannon Spaulding (2011). Embodied Social Cognition. Philosophical Topics 39 (1):141-162.score: 12.0
    In this paper I evaluate embodied social cognition, embodied cognition’s account of how we understand others. I identify and evaluate three claims that motivate embodied social cognition. These claims are not specific to social cognition; they are general hypotheses about cognition. As such, they may be used in more general arguments for embodied cognition. I argue that we have good reasons to reject these claims. Thus, the case for embodied social cognition fails. Moreover, to the extent that general arguments for (...)
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  16. John Sutton (2006). Introduction: Memory, Embodied Cognition, and the Extended Mind. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):281-289.score: 12.0
    I introduce the seven papers in this special issue, by Andy Clark, Je´roˆme Dokic, Richard Menary, Jenann Ismael, Sue Campbell, Doris McIlwain, and Mark Rowlands. This paper explains the motivation for an alliance between the sciences of memory and the extended mind hypothesis. It examines in turn the role of worldly, social, and internalized forms of scaffolding to memory and cognition, and also highlights themes relating to affect, agency, and individual differences.
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  17. William J. Rapaport (2012). Semiotic Systems, Computers, and the Mind: How Cognition Could Be Computing. International Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems 2 (1):32-71.score: 12.0
    In this reply to James H. Fetzer’s “Minds and Machines: Limits to Simulations of Thought and Action”, I argue that computationalism should not be the view that (human) cognition is computation, but that it should be the view that cognition (simpliciter) is computable. It follows that computationalism can be true even if (human) cognition is not the result of computations in the brain. I also argue that, if semiotic systems are systems that interpret signs, then both humans and computers are (...)
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  18. Leon De Bruin & Sanneke De Haan (2012). Enactivism and Social Cognition: In Search for the Whole Story. Journal of Cognitive Semiotics (1):225-250.score: 12.0
    Although the enactive approach has been very successful in explaining many basic social interactions in terms of embodied practices, there is still much work to be done when it comes to higher forms of social cognition. In this article, we discuss and evaluate two recent proposals by Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Hutto that try to bridge this ‘cognitive gap’ by appealing to the notion of narrative practice. Although we are enthusiastic about these proposals, we argue that (i) it is difficult (...)
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  19. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2008). The Bounds of Cognition. Blackwell Pub..score: 12.0
    An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...)
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  20. Cory D. Wright (2008). Embodied Cognition: Grounded Until Further Notice? British Journal of Psychology 99:157-164.score: 12.0
    Embodied Cognition is the kind of view that is all trees, no forest. Mounting experimental evidence gives it momentum in fleshing out the theoretical problems inherent in Cognitivists’ separation of mind and body. But the more its proponents compile such evidence, the more the fundamental concepts of Embodied Cognition remain in the dark. This conundrum is nicely exemplified by Pecher and Zwaan’s (2005) book, Grounding Cognition, which is a programmatic attempt to rally together an array of empirical results and linguistic (...)
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  21. K. Ramakrishna Rao (2005). Perception, Cognition, and Consciousness in Classical Hindu Psychology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (3):3-30.score: 12.0
    Perception is sensory awareness. Cognition is reflective awareness. Consciousness is awareness-as-such. In Indian psychology, as represented by Samkhya-Yoga and Advaita Vedanta systems, consciousness and mind are fundamentally different. Reality is the composite of being (sat), knowing (cit) and feeling (ananda). Consciousness is the knowledge side of the universe. It is the ground condition of all awareness. Consciousness is not a part or aspect of the mind. Mind is physical and consciousness is not. Consciousness does not interact with the mind, the (...)
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  22. Wayne Wu (2014). Being in the Workspace, From a Neural Point of View: Comments on Peter Carruthers, 'On Central Cognition'. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):163-174.score: 12.0
    In his rich and provocative paper, Peter Carruthers announces two related theses: (a) a positive thesis that “central cognition is sensory based, depending on the activation and deployment of sensory images of various sorts” (Carruthers 2013) and (b) a negative thesis that the “central mind does not contain any workspace within which goals, decisions, intentions, or non-sensory judgments can be active” (Carruthers 2013). These are striking claims suggesting that a natural view about cognition, namely that explicit theoretical reasoning involves direct (...)
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  23. William D. Casebeer & Patricia S. Churchland (2003). The Neural Mechanisms of Moral Cognition: A Multiple-Aspect Approach to Moral Judgment and Decision-Making. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):169-194.score: 12.0
    We critically review themushrooming literature addressing the neuralmechanisms of moral cognition (NMMC), reachingthe following broad conclusions: (1) researchmainly focuses on three inter-relatedcategories: the moral emotions, moral socialcognition, and abstract moral reasoning. (2)Research varies in terms of whether it deploysecologically valid or experimentallysimplified conceptions of moral cognition. Themore ecologically valid the experimentalregime, the broader the brain areas involved.(3) Much of the research depends on simplifyingassumptions about the domain of moral reasoningthat are motivated by the need to makeexperimental progress. This is a (...)
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  24. Guy Dove (2011). On the Need for Embodied and Dis-Embodied Cognition. Frontiers in Psychology 1 (242):1-13.score: 12.0
    This essay proposes and defends a pluralistic theory of conceptual embodiment. Our concepts are represented in at least two ways: (i) through sensorimotor simulations of our interactions with objects and events and (ii) through sensorimotor simulations of natural language processing. Linguistic representations are “dis-embodied” in the sense that they are dynamic and multimodal but, in contrast to other forms of embodied cognition, do not inherit semantic content from this embodiment. The capacity to store information in the associations and inferential relationships (...)
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  25. Wayne Christensen & John Sutton (2012). Reflections on Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning Toward an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Cognition. In Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. Psychology Press. 327-347.score: 12.0
    B eginning with the problem of integrating diverse disciplinary perspectives on moral cognition, we argue that the various disciplines have an interest in developing a common conceptual framework for moral cognition research. We discuss issues arising in the other chapters in this volume that might serve as focal points for future investigation and as the basis for the eventual development of such a framework. These include the role of theory in binding together diverse phenomena and the role of philosophy in (...)
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  26. Lawrence A. Shapiro (2010). Embodied Cognition. Routledge.score: 12.0
    Introduction: toward an understanding of embodied cognition -- Standard cognitive science -- Challenging standard cognitive science -- Conceptions of embodiment -- Embodied cognition: the conceptualization hypothesis -- Embodied cognition: the replacement hypothesis -- Embodied cognition: the constitution hypothesis -- Concluding thoughts.
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  27. Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.) (2005). Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.score: 12.0
    This volume provides an up to date and comprehensive overview of the philosophy and neuroscience movement, which applies the methods of neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and uses philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience. At the heart of the movement is the conviction that basic questions about human cognition, many of which have been studied for millennia, can be answered only by a philosophically sophisticated grasp of neuroscience's insights into the processing of information by the human brain. Essays in (...)
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  28. Duncan Pritchard (2010). Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis. Synthese 175 (1):133 - 151.score: 12.0
    This paper explores the ramifications of the extended cognition thesis in the philosophy of mind for contemporary epistemology. In particular, it argues that all theories of knowledge need to accommodate the ability intuition that knowledge involves cognitive ability, but that once this requirement is understood correctly there is no reason why one could not have a conception of cognitive ability that was consistent with the extended cognition thesis. There is thus, surprisingly, a straightforward way of developing our current thinking about (...)
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  29. Richard Menary (2006). Attacking the Bounds of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):329-344.score: 12.0
    Recently internalists have mounted a counter-attack on the attempt to redefine the bounds of cognition. The counter-attack is aimed at a radical project which I call "cognitive integration," which is the view that internal and external vehicles and processes are integrated into a whole. Cognitive integration can be defended against the internalist counter arguments of Adams and Aizawa (A&A) and Rupert. The disagreement between internalists and integrationists is whether the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes a cognitive process. Integrationists think that (...)
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  30. Jason L. Megill (2003). What Role Do the Emotions Play in Cognition? Towards a New Alternative to Cognitive Theories of Emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):81-100.score: 12.0
    This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness ? as generally formulated ? are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in (...)
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  31. Michael A. Trestman (2013). The Cambrian Explosion and the Origins of Embodied Cognition. Biological Theory 8 (1):80-92.score: 12.0
    Around 540 million years ago there was a sudden, dramatic adaptive radiation known as the Cambrian Explosion. This event marked the origin of almost all of the phyla (major lineages characterized by fundamental body plans) of animals that would ever live on earth, as well the appearance of many notable features such as rigid skeletons and other hard parts, complex jointed appendages, eyes, and brains. This radical evolutionary event has been a major puzzle for evolutionary biologists since Darwin, and while (...)
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  32. Leslie Marsh & Christian Onof (2008). Stigmergic Epistemology, Stigmergic Cognition. Cognitive Systems Research 9 (1-2).score: 12.0
    To know is to cognize, to cognize is to be a culturally bounded, rationality-bounded and environmentally located agent. Knowledge and cognition are thus dual aspects of human sociality. If social epistemology has the formation, acquisition, mediation, transmission and dissemination of knowledge in complex communities of knowers as its subject matter, then its third party character is essentially stigmergic. In its most generic formulation, stigmergy is the phenomenon of indirect communication mediated by modifications of the environment. Extending this notion one might (...)
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  33. Sergeiy Sandler (2011). Reenactment: An Embodied Cognition Approach to Meaning and Linguistic Content. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):583-598.score: 12.0
    A central finding in experimental research identified with Embodied Cognition (EC) is that understanding actions involves their embodied simulation, i.e. executing some processes involved in performing these actions. Extending these findings, I argue that reenactment – the overt embodied simulation of actions and practices, including especially communicative actions and practices, within utterances – makes it possible to forge an integrated EC-based account of linguistic meaning. In particular, I argue: (a) that remote entities can be referred to by reenacting actions performed (...)
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  34. J. Adam Carter (2013). Extended Cognition and Epistemic Luck. Synthese 190 (18):4201-4214.score: 12.0
    When extended cognition is extended into mainstream epistemology, an awkward tension arises when considering cases of environmental epistemic luck. Surprisingly, it is not at all clear how the mainstream verdict that agents lack knowledge in cases of environmental luck can be reconciled with principles central to extended cognition.
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  35. David Michael Kaplan (2012). How to Demarcate the Boundaries of Cognition. Biology and Philosophy 27 (4):545-570.score: 12.0
    Advocates of extended cognition argue that the boundaries of cognition span brain, body, and environment. Critics maintain that cognitive processes are confined to a boundary centered on the individual. All participants to this debate require a criterion for distinguishing what is internal to cognition from what is external. Yet none of the available proposals are completely successful. I offer a new account, the mutual manipulability account, according to which cognitive boundaries are determined by relationships of mutual manipulability between the properties (...)
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  36. Joshua Shepherd (2012). Action, Mindreading and Embodied Social Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):507-518.score: 12.0
    One of the central insights of the embodied cognition (EC) movement is that cognition is closely tied to action. In this paper, I formulate an EC-inspired hypothesis concerning social cognition. In this domain, most think that our capacity to understand and interact with one another is best explained by appeal to some form of mindreading. I argue that prominent accounts of mindreading likely contain a significant lacuna. Evidence indicates that what I call an agent’s actional processes and states—her goals, needs, (...)
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  37. Lawrence W. Barsalou (2010). Grounded Cognition: Past, Present, and Future. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):716-724.score: 12.0
    Thirty years ago, grounded cognition had roots in philosophy, perception, cognitive linguistics, psycholinguistics, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuropsychology. During the next 20 years, grounded cognition continued developing in these areas, and it also took new forms in robotics, cognitive ecology, cognitive neuroscience, and developmental psychology. In the past 10 years, research on grounded cognition has grown rapidly, especially in cognitive neuroscience, social neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology, and developmental psychology. Currently, grounded cognition appears to be achieving increased acceptance throughout cognitive (...)
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  38. Mason Cash (2010). Extended Cognition, Personal Responsibility, and Relational Autonomy. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):645-671.score: 12.0
    The Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC)—that many cognitive processes are carried out by a hybrid coalition of neural, bodily and environmental factors—entails that the intentional states that are reasons for action might best be ascribed to wider entities of which individual persons are only parts. I look at different kinds of extended cognition and agency, exploring their consequences for concerns about the moral agency and personal responsibility of such extended entities. Can extended entities be moral agents and bear responsibility for (...)
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  39. Fred A. Keijzer (2005). Theoretical Behaviorism Meets Embodied Cognition: Two Theoretical Analyses of Behavior. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):123-143.score: 12.0
    This paper aims to do three things: First, to provide a review of John Staddon's book Adaptive dynamics: The theoretical analysis of behavior. Second, to compare Staddon's behaviorist view with current ideas on embodied cognition. Third, to use this comparison to explicate some outlines for a theoretical analysis of behavior that could be useful as a behavioral foundation for cognitive phenomena. Staddon earlier defended a theoretical behaviorism, which allows internal states in its models but keeps these to a minimum while (...)
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  40. Michael Thau (2002). Consciousness and Cognition. Oxford University Press.score: 12.0
    This book maintains that our conception of consciousness and cognition begins with and depends upon a few fundamental errors. Thau elucidates these errors by discussing three important philosophical puzzles - Spectrum Inversion, Frege's Puzzle, and Black-and-White Mary - each of which concerns some aspect of either consciousness or cognition. He argues that it has gone unnoticed that each of these puzzles presents the very same problem and, in bringing this commonality to light, the errors in our natural conception of consciousness (...)
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  41. Krishna Del Toso (2011). Is Cognition an Attribute of the Self or It Rather Belongs to the Body? Some Dialectical Considerations on Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s Position Against Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):48-56.score: 12.0
    In this article an attempt is made to detect what could have been the dialectical reasons that impelled the Cārvāka thinker Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa to revise and reformulate the classical materialistic concept of cognition. If indeed according to ancient Cārvākas, cognition is an attribute entirely dependent on the physical body, for Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa cognition is an independent principle that, of course, needs the presence of a human body for manifesting itself. Therefore, he seems to describe cognition according to a double ontology: it is (...)
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  42. David Kirsh (2006). Distributed Cognition: A Methodological Note. Pragmatics and Cognition 14 (2):249-262.score: 12.0
  43. Timothy Williamson (2006). Can Cognition Be Factorized Into Internal and External Components? In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.score: 12.0
    0. Platitudinously, cognitive science is the science of cognition. Cognition is usually defined as something like the process of acquiring, retaining and applying knowledge. To a first approximation, therefore, cognitive science is the science of knowing. Knowing is a relation between the knower and the known. Typically, although not always, what is known involves the environment external to the knower. Thus knowing typically involves a relation between the agent and the external environment. It is not internal to the agent, for (...)
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  44. Krist Vaesen (2011). Knowledge Without Credit, Exhibit 4: Extended Cognition. [REVIEW] Synthese 181 (515):529.score: 12.0
    The Credit Theory of Knowledge (CTK)—as expressed by such figures as John Greco, Wayne Riggs, and Ernest Sosa—holds that knowing that p implies deserving epistemic credit for truly believing that p . Opponents have presented three sorts of counterexamples to CTK: S might know that p without deserving credit in cases of (1) innate knowledge (Lackey, Kvanvig); (2) testimonial knowledge (Lackey); or (3) perceptual knowledge (Pritchard). The arguments of Lackey, Kvanvig and Pritchard, however, are effective only in so far as (...)
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  45. Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2010). The Value of Cognitivism in Thinking About Extended Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):579-603.score: 12.0
    This paper will defend the cognitivist view of cognition against recent challenges from Andy Clark and Richard Menary. It will also indicate the important theoretical role that cognitivism plays in understanding some of the core issues surrounding the hypothesis of extended cognition.
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  46. Matthew J. Brown (2011). Science as Socially Distributed Cognition: Bridging Philosophy and Sociology of Science. In Karen François, Benedikt Löwe, Thomas Müller & Bart van Kerkhove (eds.), Foundations of the Formal Sciences VII, Studies in Logic. College Publications.score: 12.0
    I want to make plausible the following claim:Analyzing scientific inquiry as a species of socially distributed cognition has a variety of advantages for science studies, among them the prospects of bringing together philosophy and sociology of science. This is not a particularly novel claim, but one that faces major obstacles. I will retrace some of the major steps that have been made in the pursuit of a distributed cognition approach to science studies, paying special attention to the promise that such (...)
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  47. Patricia Churchland (2003). The Neural Mechanisms of Moral Cognition: A Multiple-Aspect Approach to Moral Judgment and Decision-Making. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):169-194.score: 12.0
    We critically review themushrooming literature addressing the neuralmechanisms of moral cognition (NMMC), reachingthe following broad conclusions: (1) researchmainly focuses on three inter-relatedcategories: the moral emotions, moral socialcognition, and abstract moral reasoning. (2)Research varies in terms of whether it deploysecologically valid or experimentallysimplified conceptions of moral cognition. Themore ecologically valid the experimentalregime, the broader the brain areas involved.(3) Much of the research depends on simplifyingassumptions about the domain of moral reasoningthat are motivated by the need to makeexperimental progress. This is a (...)
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  48. Leon de Bruin & Lena Kästner (2012). Dynamic Embodied Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):541-563.score: 12.0
    Abstract In this article, we investigate the merits of an enactive view of cognition for the contemporary debate about social cognition. If enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able to bridge the “cognitive gap”, i.e. provide us with a convincing account of those higher forms of cognition that have traditionally been the focus of its cognitivist opponents. We show that, when it comes to social cognition, current articulations of enactivism are—despite their celebrated successes (...)
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  49. Stevan Harnad (2005). Distributed Processes, Distributed Cognizers and Collaborative Cognition. [Journal (Paginated)] (in Press) 13 (3):01-514.score: 12.0
    Cognition is thinking; it feels like something to think, and only those who can feel can think. There are also things that thinkers can do. We know neither how thinkers can think nor how they are able do what they can do. We are waiting for cognitive science to discover how. Cognitive science does this by testing hypotheses about what processes can generate what doing (“know-how”) This is called the Turing Test. It cannot test whether a process can generate feeling, (...)
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  50. Sven Walter (2010). Locked-in Syndrome, Bci, and a Confusion About Embodied, Embedded, Extended, and Enacted Cognition. Neuroethics 3 (1):61-72.score: 12.0
    In a recent contribution to this journal, Andrew Fenton and Sheri Alpert have argued that the so-called “extended mind hypothesis” allows us to understand why Brain Computer Interfaces (BCIs) have the potential to change the self of patients suffering from Locked-in syndrome (LIS) by extending their minds beyond their bodies. I deny that this can shed any light on the theoretical, or philosophical, underpinnings of BCIs as a tool for enabling communication with, or bodily action by, patients with LIS: BCIs (...)
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