Search results for '*Cognitive Psychology' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  91
    J. A. Fodor (1980). Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63.
  2.  15
    Philip T. Dunwoody (2006). The Neglect of the Environment by Cognitive Psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 26 (1-2):139-153.
    In 1955, Egon Brunswik presented a paper in which he argued that neglect of the environment and over emphasis of the organism was the major downfall of cognitive psychology. His critiques have largely been ignored and research is discussed that demonstrates the same organismic- asymmetry Brunswik detailed in 1955. This research is discussed in attribution terms since experimental psychologists make behavioral attributions. This organismic-asymmetry has resulted in a body of research that is guilty of the fundamental attribution error. Brunswik's (...)
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  3.  20
    Joseph M. Notterman (2000). Note on Reductionism in Cognitive Psychology: Reification of Cognitive Processes Into Mind, Mind-Brain Equivalence, and Brain-Computer Analogy. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):116-121.
    This note brings together three phenomena leading to a tendency toward reductionism in cognitive psychology. They are the reification of cognitive processes into an entity called mind; the identification of the mind with the brain; and the congruence by analogy of the brain with the digital computer. Also indicated is the need to continue studying the effects upon behavior of variables other than brain function. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
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  4.  15
    Frederick J. Wertz (1993). Cognitive Psychology: A Phenomenological Critique. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):2-24.
    Reviews the general orientation of cognitive psychology, some contemporary difficulties and problems noted by cognitive psychologists, and apparent commonalities between phenomenological and cognitive psychologies. It is argued that the problems of cognitive psychology are inevitable consequences of its natural scientific orientation, which is far more traditional than it is revolutionary. A phenomenologically based, human science approach to psychology is offered as a solution of fundamental disciplinary problems. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
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  5. Anna Estany (2001). The Thesis of Theory-Laden Observation in the Light of Cognitive Psychology. Philosophy of Science 68 (2):203-217.
    The aim of this paper is to analyze a philosophical question (neutrality vs. theory-ladenness of observation) taking into consideration the empirical results of Cognitive Psychology (theories of perception). This is an important debate because the objectivity of science is at stake. In the Philosophy of Science there are two main positions with regard to observation, those of C. Hempel and N. R. Hanson. In the Philosophy of Mind there are also two important contrasting positions, those of J. Fodor and (...)
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  6.  78
    Carsten Held, Markus Knauff & Gottfried Vosgerau (eds.) (2006). Mental Models and the Mind: Current Developments in Cognitive Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind. Elsevier.
    "Cognitive psychology," "cognitive neuroscience," and "philosophy of mind" are names for three very different scientific fields, but they label aspects of the same scientific goal: to understand the nature of mental phenomena. Today, the three disciplines strongly overlap under the roof of the cognitive sciences. The book's purpose is to present views from the different disciplines on one of the central theories in cognitive science: the theory of mental models. Cognitive psychologists report their (...)
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  7. David Fewtrell (1995). Clinical Phenomenology and Cognitive Psychology. Routledge.
    Cognitive therapies are often biased in their assessment of clinical problems by their emphasis on the role of verbally-mediated thought in shaping our emotions, and in stressing the influence of thought upon feeling. Alternatively, a more phenomenological appraisal of psychological dysfunction suggests that emotion and thinking are complementary processes which influence each other. Cognitive psychology developed out of information-processing models, whereas phenomenological psychology is rooted in a philosophical perspective which avoids the assumptions of positivist methodology. But, despite their (...)
     
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  8. Stephen P. Stich (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. MIT Press.
  9.  9
    Earl S. Hishinuma (1998). Pre-Unified Separatism and Rapprochement Between Behaviorism and Cognitive Psychology: The Case of the Reinforcer. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):1-15.
    Psychology is in a preparadigmatic or pre-unified stage of scientific development. Two characteristics of psychology's status are: lack of cumulative scientific growth and experimental-theoretical overgeneralization. The reinforcer, as a construct in theories and as a critical element of behavioral change, has been a casualty of the separatism between such factions as radical behaviorism and cognitive psychology. In the end, psychology as a progressive science has been impeded, and psychological practitioners have been left to use intervention techniques (...)
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  10. Philip M. Merikle & Daniel Smilek (2001). Perception Without Awareness: Perspectives From Cognitive Psychology. Cognition 79 (1):115-34.
  11.  11
    Michael W. Barclay (2000). The Inadvertent Emergence of a Phenomenological Perspective in the Philosophy of Cognitive Psychology and Psychoanalytic Developmental Psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):140-166.
    The phenomenological perspective described by M. Merleau-Ponty seems to be emerging in the context of contemporary developmental research, theories of communication, metaphor theory, and cognitive neuroscience. This emergence is not always accompanied by reference to Merleau-Ponty, however, or appropriate interpretation. On some cases, the emergence of the perspective seems rather inadvertent. The purpose of this essay is to ferret out some of the points which contemporary thinking has in common with Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. Though it may appear that the examples chosen (...)
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  12.  59
    Richard Montgomery (1990). The Reductionist Ideal in Cognitive Psychology. Synthese 85 (November):279-314.
    I offer support for the view that physicalist theories of cognition don't reduce to neurophysiological theories. On my view, the mind-brain relationship is to be explained in terms of evolutionary forces, some of which tug in the direction of a reductionistic mind-brain relationship, and some of which which tug in the opposite direction. This theory of forces makes possible an anti-reductionist account of the cognitive mind-brain relationship which avoids psychophysical anomalism. This theory thus also responds to the complaint which arguably (...)
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  13.  33
    Graeme S. Halford, William H. Wilson & Steven Phillips (1998). Processing Capacity Defined by Relational Complexity: Implications for Comparative, Developmental, and Cognitive Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):803-831.
    Working memory limits are best defined in terms of the complexity of the relations that can be processed in parallel. Complexity is defined as the number of related dimensions or sources of variation. A unary relation has one argument and one source of variation; its argument can be instantiated in only one way at a time. A binary relation has two arguments, two sources of variation, and two instantiations, and so on. Dimensionality is related to the number of chunks, because (...)
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  14. Alan Costall & Arthur Still (1991). Against Cognitivism Alternative Foundations for Cognitive Psychology.
  15. Joseph Bulbulia (2004). The Cognitive and Evolutionary Psychology of Religion. Biology and Philosophy 19 (5):655-686.
    The following reviews recent developments in the cognitive and evolutionary psychology of religion, and argues for an adaptationist stance.
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  16.  24
    Rom Harre (1990). Vigotsky and Artificial Intelligence: What Could Cognitive Psychology Possibly Be About? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):389-399.
  17. Anthony P. Atkinson (1998). Systems, Subsystems and Persons: The Explanatory Scope of Cognitive Psychology. Acta Analytica 20 (20):43-60.
  18. Alan Gauld (1989). Cognitive Psychology, Entrapment, and the Philosophy of Mind. In The Case for Dualism. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia
     
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  19. Simon Kemp (1996). Cognitive Psychology in the Middle Ages. Greenwood Press.
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  20. Lawrence A. Shapiro & William M. Epstein (1998). Evolutionary Theory Meets Cognitive Psychology: A More Selective Perspective. Mind and Language 13 (2):171-94.
    Quite unexpectedly, cognitive psychologists find their field intimately connected to a whole new intellectual landscape that had previously seemed remote, unfamiliar, and all but irrelevant. Yet the proliferating connections tying together the cognitive and evolutionary communities promise to transform both fields, with each supplying necessary principles, methods, and a species of rigor that the other lacks. (Cosmides and Tooby, 1994, p. 85).
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  21.  27
    Guy Widdershoven (1999). Cognitive Psychology and Hermeneutics: Two Approaches to Meaning and Mental Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (4):245-253.
  22.  67
    Dedre Gentner (2010). Psychology in Cognitive Science: 1978–2038. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):328-344.
    This paper considers the past and future of Psychology within Cognitive Science. In the history section, I focus on three questions: (a) how has the position of Psychology evolved within Cognitive Science, relative to the other disciplines that make up Cognitive Science; (b) how have particular Cognitive Science areas within Psychology waxed or waned; and (c) what have we gained and lost. After discussing what’s happened since the late 1970s, when the Society and (...)
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  23.  34
    Mike Oaksford, Nick Chater & Keith Stenning (1990). Connectionism, Classical Cognitive Science and Experimental Psychology. AI and Society 4 (1):73-90.
    Classical symbolic computational models of cognition are at variance with the empirical findings in the cognitive psychology of memory and inference. Standard symbolic computers are well suited to remembering arbitrary lists of symbols and performing logical inferences. In contrast, human performance on such tasks is extremely limited. Standard models donot easily capture content addressable memory or context sensitive defeasible inference, which are natural and effortless for people. We argue that Connectionism provides a more natural framework in which to model (...)
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  24.  34
    Lilly-Marlene Russow (1987). Stich on the Foundations of Cognitive Psychology. Synthese 70 (March):401-413.
  25. Robert E. Haskell (1986). Cognitive Psychology and Dream Research: Historical, Conceptual, and Epistemological Considerations. Journal of Mind and Behavior 7 (2-3):131-159.
     
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  26. Wolfgang Tschacher & Christian Scheier (1996). The Perspective of Situated and Self-Organizing Cognition in Cognitive Psychology. Communication and Cognition-Artificial Intelligence 13 (2-3):163-189.
  27. Marcello Frixione & Antonio Lieto (2013). Dealing with Concepts: From Cognitive Psychology to Knowledge Representation. Frontiers of Psychological and Behevioural Science 2 (3):96-106.
    Concept representation is still an open problem in the field of ontology engineering and, more generally, of knowledge representation. In particular, the issue of representing “non classical” concepts, i.e. concepts that cannot be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, remains unresolved. In this paper we review empirical evidence from cognitive psychology, according to which concept representation is not a unitary phenomenon. On this basis, we sketch some proposals for concept representation, taking into account suggestions from psychological research. (...)
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  28. Gary Hatfield (2002). Psychology, Philosophy, and Cognitive Science: Reflections on the History and Philosophy of Experimental Psychology. Mind and Language 17 (3):207-232.
    This article critically examines the views that psychology ?rst came into existence as a discipline ca. 1879, that philosophy and psychology were estranged in the ensuing decades, that psychology ?nally became scienti?c through the in?uence of logical empiricism, and that it should now disappear in favor of cognitive science and neuroscience. It argues that psychology had a natural philosophical phase (from antiquity) that waxed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that this (...)
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  29.  83
    Frances Egan (1995). Folk Psychology and Cognitive Architecture. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):179-96.
    It has recently been argued that the success of the connectionist program in cognitive science would threaten folk psychology. I articulate and defend a "minimalist" construal of folk psychology that comports well with empirical evidence on the folk understanding of belief and is compatible with even the most radical developments in cognitive science.
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  30.  80
    Paul Thagard (ed.) (2007). Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. North-Holland.
    Psychology is the study of thinking, and cognitive science is the interdisciplinary investigation of mind and intelligence that also includes philosophy, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology. In these investigations, many philosophical issues arise concerning methods and central concepts. The Handbook of Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science contains 16 essays by leading philosophers of science that illuminate the nature of the theories and explanations used in the investigation of minds. Topics discussed include representation, mechanisms, reduction, perception, consciousness, (...)
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  31.  82
    Martin J. Pickering & Nick Chater (1995). Why Cognitive Science is Not Formalized Folk Psychology. Minds and Machines 5 (3):309-337.
    It is often assumed that cognitive science is built upon folk psychology, and that challenges to folk psychology are therefore challenges to cognitive science itself. We argue that, in practice, cognitive science and folk psychology treat entirely non-overlapping domains: cognitive science considers aspects of mental life which do not depend on general knowledge, whereas folk psychology considers aspects of mental life which do depend on general knowledge. We back up our argument on theoretical grounds, and also (...)
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  32.  67
    Jonathan Knowles (2001). Does Intentional Psychology Need Vindicating by Cognitive Science? Minds and Machines 11 (3):347-377.
    I argue that intentional psychology does not stand in need of vindication by a lower-level implementation theory from cognitive science, in particular the representational theory of mind (RTM), as most famously Jerry Fodor has argued. The stance of the paper is novel in that I claim this holds even if one, in line with Fodor, views intentional psychology as an empirical theory, and its theoretical posits as as real as those of other sciences. I consider four metaphysical arguments (...)
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  33.  11
    Jonathan Jong (2014). Ernest Becker's Psychology of Religion Forty Years On: A View From Social Cognitive Psychology. Zygon 49 (4):875-889.
    This article distinguishes between three projects in Ernest Becker's later work: his psychology of “religion,” his psychology of religion, and his psychology of Religion . The first is an analysis of culture and civilization as immortality projects, means by which to deny death. The second, which overlaps with the first, is a characterization of religion-as-practiced as a particularly effective immortality project vis-à-vis death anxiety. The third is less social scientific and more theological; Becker argues for a view (...)
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  34.  21
    William E. Morris & Robert C. Richardson (1995). How Not to Demarcate Cognitive Science and Folk Psychology: A Response to Pickering and Chater. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 5 (3):339-355.
    Pickering and Chater (P&C) maintain that folk psychology and cognitive science should neither compete nor cooperate. Each is an independent enterprise, with a distinct subject matter and characteristic modes of explanation. P&C''s case depends upon their characterizations of cognitive science and folk psychology. We question the basis for their characterizations, challenge both the coherence and the individual adequacy of their contrasts between the two, and show that they waver in their views about the scope of each. We conclude (...)
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  35. William F. Brewer (ed.) (2012). The Theory Ladenness of the Mental Processes Used in the Scientific Enterprise: Evidence From Cognitive Psychology and the History of Science. In R. W. Proctor & E. J. Capaldi (Eds.). Psychology of Science: Implicit and Explicit Processes (289-334). New York: Oxford University Press. Oxford.
    This chapter takes a naturalized approach to the philosophy of science using evidence from cognitive psychology and from the history of science. It first describes the problem of the theory ladenness of perception. Then it provides a general top-down/bottom-up framework from cognitive psychology that is used to organize and evaluate the evidence for theory ladenness throughout the process of carrying out science (perception, attention, thinking, experimenting, memory, and communication). The chapter highlights both the facilitatory and inhibitory role of (...)
     
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  36.  66
    H. Andersen, P. Barker & X. Chen (1998). Kuhn's Theory of Scientific Revolutions and Cognitive Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):5-28.
    In a previous article we have shown that Kuhn's theory of concepts is independently supported by recent research in cognitive psychology. In this paper we propose a cognitive re?reading of Kuhn's cyclical model of scientific revolutions: all of the important features of the model may now be seen as consequences of a more fundamental account of the nature of concepts and their dynamics. We begin by examining incommensurability, the central theme of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, according to two (...)
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  37.  39
    John D. Greenwood (ed.) (1991). The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press.
    The essays in this volume are concerned with our everyday and developed scientific systems of explanation of human behavior in terms of beliefs, attitudes,...
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  38. Xiang Chen, Hanne Andersen & Peter Barker (1998). Kuhn's Theory of Scientific Revolutions and Cognitive Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):5 – 28.
    In a previous article we have shown that Kuhn's theory of concepts is independently supported by recent research in cognitive psychology. In this paper we propose a cognitive re-reading of Kuhn's cyclical model of scientific revolutions: all of the important features of the model may now be seen as consequences of a more fundamental account of the nature of concepts and their dynamics. We begin by examining incommensurability, the central theme of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, according to two (...)
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  39.  13
    Louis Narens (2014). Alternative Probability Theories for Cognitive Psychology. Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (1):114-120.
    Various proposals for generalizing event spaces for probability functions have been put forth in the mathematical, scientific, and philosophic literatures. In cognitive psychology such generalizations are used for explaining puzzling results in decision theory and for modeling the influence of context effects. This commentary discusses proposals for generalizing probability theory to event spaces that are not necessarily boolean algebras. Two prominent examples are quantum probability theory, which is based on the set of closed subspaces of a Hilbert space, and (...)
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  40.  34
    J. Christopher Maloney (1985). Methodological Solipsism Reconsidered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology. Philosophy of Science 52 (September):451-69.
    Current computational psychology, especially as described by Fodor (1975, 1980, 1981), Pylyshyn (1980), and Stich (1983), is both a bold, promising program for cognitive science and an alternative to naturalistic psychology (Putnam 1975). Whereas naturalistic psychology depends on the general scientific framework to fix the meanings of general terms and, hence, the content of thoughts utilizing or expressed in those terms, computational cognitive theory banishes semantical considerations in psychological investigations, embracing methodological, not ontological, solipsism. I intend to (...)
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  41.  21
    Robert William Fischer (2013). Lines of Thought: Central Concepts in Cognitive Psychology. Philosophical Psychology (3):1-5.
    (2014). Lines of thought: Central concepts in cognitive psychology. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 445-449. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2012.732338.
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  42.  9
    Richard Rojcewicz (1987). Merleau-Ponty and Cognitive Child Psychology. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 18 (2):201-221.
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  43.  9
    Daniel Burston (1987). Review of Psychoanalysis: Freud's Cognitive Psychology. [REVIEW] Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):124-129.
    Reviews the book, Psychoanalysis: Freud’s cognitive psychology by Matthew Hugh Erdelyi . Few psychoanalytic clinicians or experimental psychologists ever bother to develop a historical or meta-theoretical perspective on their discipline, or pause to ponder the obstacles encountered and avenues taken or ignored en route to a synthesis between psychoanalytic, experimental and cognitive psychology. For those who have already pondered these issues somewhat, Erdelyi's book is a positive pleasure, full of penetrating insights, programmatic suggestions and astute historical reflections. For (...)
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  44.  1
    Edwin E. Gantt (1994). Review of The Mind's We: Contextualism in Cognitive Psychology. [REVIEW] Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):209-214.
    Reviews the book, The mind's we: Contextualism in cognitive psychology by Diane Gillespie . In this text the author has both expanded on several of the key insights previously outlined in the critical literature and provided a congenial introductory text for the newcomer; a text to serve as a conceptual bridge between traditional cognitive psychological approaches and their newly emergent contextualist alternatives. As stated in her preface, Gillespie's purpose in preparing this book was to "bring together the work of (...)
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  45. Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker & Xiang Chen (1996). Kuhn's Mature Philosophy of Science and Cognitive Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):347 – 363.
    Drawing on the results of modem psychology and cognitive science we suggest that the traditional theory of concepts is no longer tenable, and that the alternative account proposed by Kuhn may now be seen to have independent empirical support quite apart from its success as part of an account of scientific change. We suggest that these mechanisms can also be understood as special cases of general cognitive structures revealed by cognitive science. Against this background, incommensurability is not an insurmountable (...)
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  46.  51
    Carole J. Lee (2008). Applied Cognitive Psychology and the "Strong Replacement" of Epistemology by Normative Psychology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (1):55-75.
    is normative in the sense that it aims to make recommendations for improving human judgment; it aims to have a practical impact on morally and politically significant human decisions and actions; and it studies normative, rational judgment qua rational judgment. These nonstandard ways of understanding ACP as normative collectively suggest a new interpretation of the strong replacement thesis that does not call for replacing normative epistemic concepts, relations, and inquiries with descriptive, causal ones. Rather, it calls for recognizing that the (...)
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  47. Anthony P. Atkinson, Wholes and Their Parts in Cognitive Psychology: Systems, Subsystems and Persons.
    Decompositional analysis is the process of constructing explanations of the characteristics of whole systems in terms of characteristics of parts of those whole systems. Cognitive psychology is an endeavour that develops explanations of the capacities of the human organism in terms of descriptions of the brain's functionally defined information-processing components. This paper details the nature of this explanatory strategy, known as functional analysis. Functional analysis is contrasted with two other varieties of decompositional analysis, namely, structural analysis and capacity analysis. (...)
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  48. David C. Rubin (1995). Memory in Oral Traditions: The Cognitive Psychology of Epic, Ballads, and Counting-Out Rhymes. Oxford University Press Usa.
    "Dr. Rubin has brought cognitive psychology into a wholly unprecedented dialogue with studies in oral tradition. The result is a truly new perspective on memory and the processes of oral tradition." --John Miles Foley, University of Missouri.
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  49.  13
    Daniel Levitin (ed.) (2002). Foundations of Cognitive Psychology: Core Readings. MIT Press.
    An anthology of core readings on cognitive psychology.
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  50.  48
    Gerard Casey, The Computational Metaphor and Cognitive Psychology.
    The past three decades have witnessed a remarkable growth of research interest in the mind. This trend has been acclaimed as the ‘cognitive revolution’ in psychology. At the heart of this revolution lies the claim that the mind is a computational system. The purpose of this paper is both to elucidate this claim and to evaluate its implications for cognitive psychology. The nature and scope of cognitive psychology and cognitive science are outlined, the principal assumptions underlying the (...)
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