Search results for '*Consciousness Disturbances' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Claudio Bassetti (2001). Disturbances of Consciousness and Sleep-Wake Functions. In Julien Bogousslavsky & Louis R. Caplan (eds.), Stroke Syndromes. Cambridge University Press 192-210.
  2. Kai Vogeley & Christian Kupke (2007). Disturbances of Time Consciousness From a Phenomenological and Neuroscientific Perspective. Schizophrenia Bulletin 33 (1):157-165.
  3.  23
    George P. Prigatano & Sterling C. Johnson (2003). The Three Vectors of Consciousness and Their Disturbances After Brain Injury. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 13 (1):13-29.
  4.  14
    Hamish J. McLeod, Mitchell K. Byrne & Rachel Aitken (2004). Automatism and Dissociation: Disturbances of Consciousness and Volition From a Psychological Perspective. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5):471-487.
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  5. Dagmar Koethe, Christoph W. Gerth, Miriam A. Neatby, Anita Haensel, Martin Thies, Udo Schneider, Hinderk M. Emrich, Joachim Klosterkötter, Frauke Schultze-Lutter & F. Markus Leweke (2006). Disturbances of Visual Information Processing in Early States of Psychosis and Experimental Delta-9-Tetrahydrocannabinol Altered States of Consciousness. Schizophrenia Research 88 (1-3):142-150.
     
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  6.  1
    G. Ballard Clive, A. Jennifer, Piggott Margaret, Johnson Mary, O'Brien John, McKeith Ian, Clive Holmes, Peter Lantos, Evelyn Jaros & Robert Perry (2002). Disturbances of Consciousness in Dementia with Lewy Bodies Associated with Alteration in Nicotinic Receptor Binding in the Temporal Cortex. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (3).
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  7. Alfred Schutz (forthcoming). Language, Language Disturbances, and the Texture of Consciousness. Social Research.
     
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  8.  17
    Clive Ballard (2002). Disturbances of Conscious in Dementia with Lewy Bodies Assocated with Alterantion in Nicotonic Receoptor Binding in the Temporal Cortex. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (3):461-474.
    Disturbances of consciousness, including fluctuations in attention and awareness, are a common and clinically important symptom in dementia with Lewy bodies . In the present study we investigate potential mechanisms of such disturbances of consciousness in a clinicopathological study evaluating specific components of the cholinergic system. [3H]Epibatidine binding to the high-affinity nicotinic receptor in the temporal cortex differentiated DLB cases with and without DOC, being 62–66% higher in those with DOC . The were no differences between DLB patients (...)
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  9.  5
    D. von Cramon (1978). Consciousness and Disturbances of Consciousness. Journal of Neurology 219:1-13.
  10.  37
    G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham (2000). When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts. MIT Press.
  11. Dieter Vaitl, Niels Birbaumer, John Gruzelier, Graham A. Jamieson, Boris Kotchoubey, Andrea Kübler, Dietrich Lehmann, Wolfgang H. R. Miltner, Ulrich Ott, Peter Pütz, Gebhard Sammer, Inge Strauch, Ute Strehl, Jiri Wackermann & Thomas Weiss (2005). Psychobiology of Altered States of Consciousness. Psychological Bulletin 131 (1):98-127.
  12.  43
    Tristan Bekinschtein, Cecilia Tiberti, Jorge Niklison, Mercedes Tamashiro, Melania Ron, Silvina Carpintiero, Mirta Villarreal, Cecilia Forcato, Ramon Leiguarda & Facundo Manes (2005). Assessing Level of Consciousness and Cognitive Changes From Vegetative State to Full Recovery. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation. Vol 15 (3-4):307-322.
  13.  31
    Joseph T. Giacino & Charlotte T. Trott (2004). Rehabilitative Management of Patients with Disorders of Consciousness: Grand Rounds. Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation 19 (3):254-265.
  14. Pascale Piolino, Serge Belliard, Béatrice Desgranges, Mélisa Perron & Francis Eustache (2003). Autobiographical Memory and Autonoetic Consciousness in a Case of Semantic Dementia. Cognitive Neuropsychology 20 (7):619-639.
  15.  17
    Nicholas D. Schiff (2006). Multimodal Neuroimaging Approaches to Disorders of Consciousness. Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation. Special Issue 21 (5):388-397.
  16. Nicholas D. Schiff (2004). The Neurology of Impaired Consciousness: Challenges for Cognitive Neuroscience. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences. MIT Press 1121-1132.
  17. José M. Villagrán (2003). Consciousness Disorders in Schizophrenia: A Forgotten Land for Psychopathology. International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy 3 (2):209-234.
  18. Martha J. Farah (2001). Consciousness. In B. Rapp (ed.), The Handbook of Cognitive Neuropsychology: What Deficits Reveal About the Human Mind. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis
     
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  19.  7
    Wing K. Ng, Risa N. Thompson, Stuart A. Yablon & Mark Sherer (2001). Conceptual Dilemmas in Evaluating Individuals with Severely Impaired Consciousness. Brain Injury 15 (7):639-643.
  20. Fred M. Levin & Colwyn Trevarthen (2000). Subtle is the Lord: The Relationship Between Consciousness, the Unconscious, and the Executive Control Network (ECN) of the Brain. Annual of Psychoanalysis 28:105-125.
     
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  21.  74
    Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (2003). The Multiplicity of Consciousness and the Emergence of the Self. In A. S. David & T. T. J. Kircher (eds.), The Self and Schizophrenia: A Neuropsychological Perspective. Cambridge University Press 107--120.
    I look out the window and I think that the garden looks nice and the grass looks cool, but the
    thoughts of Eammon Andrews come into my mind.
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  22.  28
    Stephen L. Thaler (2014). Synaptic Perturbation and Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 6 (2):75-108.
    By allowing one artificial neural network to govern the synaptic noise injected into another based upon its appraisal of patterns nucleating from such disturbances, a contemplative form of artificial intelligence is formed whose creativity and pattern delivery closely parallels that of human cognition. Drawing upon the theory of fractional Brownian motion we may derive an equation, verifiable through statistical mechanics, which governs both the novelty and rhythm of pattern turnover within such neural systems. Through this equation we gain valuable (...)
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  23.  21
    Brian O'Shaughnessy (1972). Mental Structure and Self-Consciousness. Inquiry 15 (1-4):30-63.
    Mental health, in one awake, guarantees that person knowledge of the central phenomenon-contents of his own mind, under an adequate classificatory heading. This is the primary thesis of the paper. That knowledge is not itself a phenomenon-content, and usually is achieved in no way. Rather, it stems from the natural accessibility of mental phenomenon-contents to wakeful consciousness. More precisely, when mental normality obtains, such knowledge necessarily obtains in wakeful consciousness. This thesis conjoins a version of Cartesianism with the concepts of (...)
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  24.  10
    Michael H. Joseph & Samuel R. H. Joseph (2001). The Contents of Consciousness: From C to Shining C++. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):188-189.
    We suggest that consciousness (C) should be addressed as a multilevel concept. We can provisionally identify at least three, rather than two, levels: Gray's system should relate at least to the lowest of these three levels. Although it is unlikely to be possible to develop a behavioural test for C, it is possible to speculate as to the evolutionary advantages offered by C and how C evolved through succeeding levels. Disturbances in the relationships between the levels of C could (...)
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  25. Heather Ashton (2002). Delirium and Hallucinations. In Elaine Perry, Heather Ashton & Allan Young (eds.), Neurochemistry of Consciousness: Neurotransmitters in Mind. John Benjamins 181-203.
  26.  33
    Joseph T. Giacino & Childs N. Ashwal S. (2002). The Minimally Conscious State: Definition and Diagnostic Criteria. Neurology 58 (3):349-353.
  27.  8
    Hans J. Markowitsch & Angelica Staniloiu (2011). Memory, Autonoetic Consciousness, and the Self. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):16-39.
    Memory is a general attribute of living species, whose diversification reflects both evolutionary and developmental processes. Episodic-autobiographical memory is regarded as the highest human ontogenetic achievement and as probably being uniquely human. EAM, autonoetic consciousness and the self are intimately linked, grounding, supporting and enriching each other’s development and cohesiveness. Their development is influenced by the socio-cultural–linguistic environment in which an individual grows up or lives. On the other hand, through language, textualization and social exchange, all three elements leak into (...)
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  28. Diane Coleman, D. Alan Shewmon & J. T. Giacino (2002). "The Minimally Conscious State: Definition and Diagnostic Criteria": Comments and Reply. Neurology 58 (3):506-507.
  29.  56
    Giulio Srinivasan Tononi & Gerald M. Edelman (2000). Schizophrenia and the Mechanisms of Conscious Integration. Brain Research Reviews 31 (2):391-400.
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  30.  51
    James L. Bernat (2002). Questions Remaining About the Minimally Conscious State. Neurology 58 (3):337-338.
  31.  2
    Stephen L. Thaler (2014). Synaptic Perturbation and Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 6 (2):75-107.
    By allowing one artificial neural network to govern the synaptic noise injected into another based upon its appraisal of patterns nucleating from such disturbances, a contemplative form of artificial intelligence is formed whose creativity and pattern delivery closely parallels that of human cognition. Drawing upon the theory of fractional Brownian motion, we may derive an equation, verifiable through statistical mechanics, which governs both the novelty and rhythm of pattern turnover within such neural systems. Through this equation, we gain valuable (...)
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  32.  28
    Erik J. Kobylarz & Nicholas D. Schiff (2005). Neurophysiological Correlates of Persistent Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation. Vol 15 (3-4):323-332.
  33. Martha J. Farah & Todd E. Feinberg (2000). Disorders of Perception and Awareness. In Martha J. Farah & Todd E. Feinberg (eds.), Patient-Based Approaches to Cognitive Neuroscience. MIT Press
     
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  34. Joseph T. Giacino & Kathleen Kalmar (2005). Diagnostic and Prognostic Guidelines for the Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation. Vol 15 (3-4):166-174.
  35. Jean-Michel Guérit (2005). Neurophysiological Patterns of Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation. Vol 15 (3-4):357-371.
  36. Hans Flohr (1990). Brain Processes and Phenomenal Consciousness: A New and Specific Hypothesis. Theory and Psychology 1:245-62.
    A hypothesis on the physiological conditions for the occurrence of phenomenal states is presented. It is suggested that the presence of phenomenal states depends on the rate at which neural assemblies are formed. Unconsciousness and various disturbances of phenomenal consciousness occur if the assembly formation rate is below a certain threshold level; if this level is surpassed, phenomenal states necessarily result. A critical production rate of neural assemblies is the necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of phenomenal states.
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  37.  35
    Roger Gil, E. M. Arroyo-Anllo, P. Ingrand, M. Gil, J. P. Neau, C. Ornon & V. Bonnaud (2001). Self-Consciousness and Alzheimer's Disease. Acta Neurologica Scandinavica 104 (5):296-300.
    Gil R, Arroyo-Anllo EM, Ingrand P, Gil M, Neau JP, Ornon C, Bonnaud V. Self-consciousness and Alzheimer’s disease. Acta Neurol Scand 2001: 104: 296–300. # Munksgaard 2001. Objectives – To propose a neuropsychological study of the various aspects of self-consciousness (SC) in Alzheimer’s disease. Methods – Forty-five patients with probable mild or moderate AD were included in the study. Severity of their dementia was assessed by the Mini Mental State (MMS). Fourteen questions were prepared to evaluate SC. Results – No (...)
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  38. Sidonie A. Smith (2003). Material Selves: Bodies, Memory, and Autobiographical Narrating. In Gary D. Fireman, Ted E. McVay Jr & Owen J. Flanagan (eds.), Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology, and the Brain. Oxford University Press 86-111.
     
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  39.  5
    Andrew R. Whatham, Patrik Vuilleumier, Theodor Landis & Avinoam B. Safran (2003). Visual Consciousness in Health and Disease. Neurologic Clinics 21 (3):647-686.
  40.  6
    Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza (2015). From Clumsy Failure to Skillful Fluency: A Phenomenological Analysis of and Eastern Solution to Sport’s Choking Effect. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):397-421.
    Excellent performance in sport involves specialized and refined skills within very narrow applications. Choking throws a wrench in the works of finely tuned performances. Functionally, and reduced to its simplest expression, choking is severe underperformance when engaging already mastered skills. Choking is a complex phenomenon with many intersecting facets: its dysfunctions result from the multifaceted interaction of cognitive and psychological processes, neurophysiological mechanisms, and phenomenological dynamics. This article develops a phenomenological model that, complementing empirical and theoretical research, helps understand and (...)
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  41.  3
    Jean‐Baptiste Pettier (2016). The Affective Scope: Entering China's Urban Moral and Economic World Through Its Emotional Disturbances. Anthropology of Consciousness 27 (1):75-96.
    From an outsider's perspective, today's Popular China might appear as a self-confident and triumphant country. However, a large-scale examination of the country's recent moral controversies reveals a very different picture, one that has much to do with the widespread local public perception of an ongoing “moral crisis”, whose examination requires careful attention placed on the ethical and affective aspects of the everyday lives of today's Chinese people. In this article, I propose to examine the anguish that Chinese bachelor youths and (...)
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  42.  46
    Joshua Shepherd & Neil Levy (forthcoming). Consciousness and Morality. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press
    It is well known that the nature of consciousness is elusive, and that attempts to understand it generate problems in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, psychology, and neuroscience. Less appreciated are the important – even if still elusive – connections between consciousness and issues in ethics. In this chapter we consider three such connections. First, we consider the relevance of consciousness for questions surrounding an entity’s moral status. Second, we consider the relevance of consciousness for questions surrounding moral responsibility for action. (...)
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  43. Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. OUP
    The centerpiece of the scientific study of consciousness is the search for the neural correlates of consciousness. Yet science is typically interested not only in correlation relations, but also – and more deeply – in causal and constitutive relations. When faced with a correlation between two phenomena in nature, we typically feel compelled to produce an explanation of why the two correlate. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. The first half attempts to lay out the various possible explanations of (...)
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  44. Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.) (1988). Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
    The significance of consciousness in modern science is discussed by leading authorities from a variety of disciplines. Presenting a wide-ranging survey of current thinking on this important topic, the contributors address such issues as the status of different aspects of consciousness; the criteria for using the concept of consciousness and identifying instances of it; the basis of consciousness in functional brain organization; the relationship between different levels of theoretical discourse; and the functions of consciousness.
     
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  45. Timothy Lane (2015). Self, Belonging, and Conscious Experience: A Critique of Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness. In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed consciousness: New essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness. MIT Press
    Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to having conscious experience. These theories differ with respect to how many levels they posit and to whether self-reference is conscious or not. But all treat self-referencing as a process that transpires at the personal level, rather than at the subpersonal level, the level of mechanism. -/- Working with conceptual resources afforded by pre-existing theories of consciousness that take self-reference to be essential, several attempts have been made to explain seemingly (...)
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  46. Christopher Mole (2008). Attention and Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):86-104.
    According to commonsense psychology, one is conscious of everything that one pays attention to, but one does not pay attention to all the things that one is conscious of. Recent lines of research purport to show that commonsense is mistaken on both of these points: Mack and Rock (1998) tell us that attention is necessary for consciousness, while Kentridge and Heywood (2001) claim that consciousness is not necessary for attention. If these lines of research were successful they would have important (...)
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  47. Alexandre Billon & Uriah Kriegel (2015). Jaspers' Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness. In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. MIT Press 29-54.
    According to what we will call subjectivity theories of consciousness, there is a constitutive connection between phenomenal consciousness and subjectivity: there is something it is like for a subject to have mental state M only if M is characterized by a certain mine-ness or for-me-ness. Such theories appear to face certain psychopathological counterexamples: patients appear to report conscious experiences that lack this subjective element. A subsidiary goal of this chapter is to articulate with greater precision both subjectivity theories and the (...)
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  48. J. McFadden (2002). Synchronous Firing and its Influence on the Brain's Electromagnetic Field: Evidence for an Electromagnetic Field Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (4):23-50.
    The human brain consists of approximately 100 billion electrically active neurones that generate an endogenous electromagnetic field, whose role in neuronal computing has not been fully examined. The source, magnitude and likely influence of the brain's endogenous em field are here considered. An estimate of the strength and magnitude of the brain's em field is gained from theoretical considerations, brain scanning and microelectrode data. An estimate of the likely influence of the brain's em field is gained from theoretical principles and (...)
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  49. Anil K. Seth, Bernard J. Baars & D. B. Edelman (2005). Criteria for Consciousness in Humans and Other Mammals. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):119-39.
    The standard behavioral index for human consciousness is the ability to report events with accuracy. While this method is routinely used for scientific and medical applications in humans, it is not easy to generalize to other species. Brain evidence may lend itself more easily to comparative testing. Human consciousness involves widespread, relatively fast low-amplitude interactions in the thalamocortical core of the brain, driven by current tasks and conditions. These features have also been found in other mammals, which suggests that consciousness (...)
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  50. J. Campbell (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    John Campbell investigates how consciousness of the world explains our ability to think about the world; how our ability to think about objects we can see depends on our capacity for conscious visual attention to those things. He illuminates classical problems about thought, reference, and experience by looking at the underlying psychological mechanisms on which conscious attention depends.
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