Search results for '*Consciousness Disturbances' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Claudio Bassetti (2001). Disturbances of Consciousness and Sleep-Wake Functions. In Julien Bogousslavsky & Louis R. Caplan (eds.), Stroke Syndromes. Cambridge University Press. 192-210.score: 127.0
  2. Kai Vogeley & Christian Kupke (2007). Disturbances of Time Consciousness From a Phenomenological and Neuroscientific Perspective. Schizophrenia Bulletin 33 (1):157-165.score: 93.0
  3. Hamish J. McLeod, Mitchell K. Byrne & Rachel Aitken (2004). Automatism and Dissociation: Disturbances of Consciousness and Volition From a Psychological Perspective. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5):471-487.score: 93.0
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  4. George P. Prigatano & Sterling C. Johnson (2003). The Three Vectors of Consciousness and Their Disturbances After Brain Injury. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 13 (1):13-29.score: 93.0
  5. Dagmar Koethe, Christoph W. Gerth, Miriam A. Neatby, Anita Haensel, Martin Thies, Udo Schneider, Hinderk M. Emrich, Joachim Klosterkötter, Frauke Schultze-Lutter & F. Markus Leweke (2006). Disturbances of Visual Information Processing in Early States of Psychosis and Experimental Delta-9-Tetrahydrocannabinol Altered States of Consciousness. Schizophrenia Research 88 (1-3):142-150.score: 93.0
  6. G. Ballard Clive, A. Jennifer, Piggott Margaret, Johnson Mary, O'Brien John, McKeith Ian, Clive Holmes, Peter Lantos, Evelyn Jaros & Robert Perry (2002). Disturbances of Consciousness in Dementia with Lewy Bodies Associated with Alteration in Nicotinic Receptor Binding in the Temporal Cortex. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (3).score: 89.0
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  7. D. von Cramon (1978). Consciousness and Disturbances of Consciousness. Journal of Neurology 219:1-13.score: 85.0
  8. Alfred Schutz (forthcoming). Language, Language Disturbances, and the Texture of Consciousness. Social Research.score: 85.0
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  9. Clive Ballard (2002). Disturbances of Conscious in Dementia with Lewy Bodies Assocated with Alterantion in Nicotonic Receoptor Binding in the Temporal Cortex. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (3):461-474.score: 71.0
  10. Dieter Vaitl, Niels Birbaumer, John Gruzelier, Graham A. Jamieson, Boris Kotchoubey, Andrea Kübler, Dietrich Lehmann, Wolfgang H. R. Miltner, Ulrich Ott, Peter Pütz, Gebhard Sammer, Inge Strauch, Ute Strehl, Jiri Wackermann & Thomas Weiss (2005). Psychobiology of Altered States of Consciousness. Psychological Bulletin 131 (1):98-127.score: 62.0
  11. Tristan Bekinschtein, Cecilia Tiberti, Jorge Niklison, Mercedes Tamashiro, Melania Ron, Silvina Carpintiero, Mirta Villarreal, Cecilia Forcato, Ramon Leiguarda & Facundo Manes (2005). Assessing Level of Consciousness and Cognitive Changes From Vegetative State to Full Recovery. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation. Vol 15 (3-4):307-322.score: 62.0
  12. Joseph T. Giacino & Charlotte T. Trott (2004). Rehabilitative Management of Patients with Disorders of Consciousness: Grand Rounds. Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation 19 (3):254-265.score: 62.0
  13. G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham (2000). When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts. MIT Press.score: 62.0
  14. Nicholas D. Schiff (2006). Multimodal Neuroimaging Approaches to Disorders of Consciousness. Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation. Special Issue 21 (5):388-397.score: 62.0
  15. Wing K. Ng, Risa N. Thompson, Stuart A. Yablon & Mark Sherer (2001). Conceptual Dilemmas in Evaluating Individuals with Severely Impaired Consciousness. Brain Injury 15 (7):639-643.score: 62.0
  16. Martha J. Farah (2001). Consciousness. In B. Rapp (ed.), The Handbook of Cognitive Neuropsychology: What Deficits Reveal About the Human Mind. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.score: 62.0
     
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  17. Fred M. Levin & Colwyn Trevarthen (2000). Subtle is the Lord: The Relationship Between Consciousness, the Unconscious, and the Executive Control Network (ECN) of the Brain. Annual of Psychoanalysis 28:105-125.score: 62.0
     
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  18. Pascale Piolino, Serge Belliard, Béatrice Desgranges, Mélisa Perron & Francis Eustache (2003). Autobiographical Memory and Autonoetic Consciousness in a Case of Semantic Dementia. Cognitive Neuropsychology 20 (7):619-639.score: 62.0
  19. Nicholas D. Schiff (2004). The Neurology of Impaired Consciousness: Challenges for Cognitive Neuroscience. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences. Mit Press. 1121-1132.score: 62.0
  20. José M. Villagrán (2003). Consciousness Disorders in Schizophrenia: A Forgotten Land for Psychopathology. International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy 3 (2):209-234.score: 62.0
  21. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (2003). The Multiplicity of Consciousness and the Emergence of the Self. In A. S. David & T. T. J. Kircher (eds.), The Self and Schizophrenia: A Neuropsychological Perspective. Cambridge University Press. 107--120.score: 54.0
    I look out the window and I think that the garden looks nice and the grass looks cool, but the
    thoughts of Eammon Andrews come into my mind.
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  22. Stephen L. Thaler (2014). Synaptic Perturbation and Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 6 (2):75-108.score: 49.0
    By allowing one artificial neural network to govern the synaptic noise injected into another based upon its appraisal of patterns nucleating from such disturbances, a contemplative form of artificial intelligence is formed whose creativity and pattern delivery closely parallels that of human cognition. Drawing upon the theory of fractional Brownian motion we may derive an equation, verifiable through statistical mechanics, which governs both the novelty and rhythm of pattern turnover within such neural systems. Through this equation we gain valuable (...)
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  23. Heather Ashton (2002). Delirium and Hallucinations. In Elaine Perry, Heather Ashton & Allan Young (eds.), Neurochemistry of Consciousness: Neurotransmitters in Mind. John Benjamins. 181-203.score: 46.0
  24. Brian O'Shaughnessy (1972). Mental Structure and Self-Consciousness. Inquiry 15 (1-4):30-63.score: 45.0
    Mental health, in one awake, guarantees that person knowledge of the central phenomenon-contents of his own mind, under an adequate classificatory heading. This is the primary thesis of the paper. That knowledge is not itself a phenomenon-content, and usually is achieved in no way. Rather, it stems from the natural accessibility of mental phenomenon-contents to wakeful consciousness. More precisely, when mental normality obtains, such knowledge necessarily obtains in wakeful consciousness. This thesis conjoins a version of Cartesianism with the concepts of (...)
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  25. Michael H. Joseph & Samuel R. H. Joseph (2001). The Contents of Consciousness: From C to Shining C++. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):188-189.score: 45.0
    We suggest that consciousness (C) should be addressed as a multilevel concept. We can provisionally identify at least three, rather than two, levels: Gray's system should relate at least to the lowest of these three levels. Although it is unlikely to be possible to develop a behavioural test for C, it is possible to speculate as to the evolutionary advantages offered by C and how C evolved through succeeding levels. Disturbances in the relationships between the levels of C could (...)
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  26. James L. Bernat (2002). Questions Remaining About the Minimally Conscious State. Neurology 58 (3):337-338.score: 42.0
  27. Giulio Srinivasan Tononi & Gerald M. Edelman (2000). Schizophrenia and the Mechanisms of Conscious Integration. Brain Research Reviews 31 (2):391-400.score: 42.0
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  28. Joseph T. Giacino & Childs N. Ashwal S. (2002). The Minimally Conscious State: Definition and Diagnostic Criteria. Neurology 58 (3):349-353.score: 42.0
  29. Erik J. Kobylarz & Nicholas D. Schiff (2005). Neurophysiological Correlates of Persistent Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation. Vol 15 (3-4):323-332.score: 42.0
  30. Diane Coleman, D. Alan Shewmon & J. T. Giacino (2002). "The Minimally Conscious State: Definition and Diagnostic Criteria": Comments and Reply. Neurology 58 (3):506-507.score: 42.0
  31. Martha J. Farah & Todd E. Feinberg (2000). Disorders of Perception and Awareness. In Martha J. Farah & Todd E. Feinberg (eds.), Patient-Based Approaches to Cognitive Neuroscience. MIT Press.score: 42.0
     
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  32. Joseph T. Giacino & Kathleen Kalmar (2005). Diagnostic and Prognostic Guidelines for the Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation. Vol 15 (3-4):166-174.score: 42.0
  33. Jean-Michel Guérit (2005). Neurophysiological Patterns of Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation. Vol 15 (3-4):357-371.score: 42.0
  34. Sidonie A. Smith (2003). Material Selves: Bodies, Memory, and Autobiographical Narrating. In Gary D. Fireman, Ted E. McVay Jr & Owen J. Flanagan (eds.), Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology, and the Brain. Oxford University Press. 86-111.score: 38.0
  35. Andrew R. Whatham, Patrik Vuilleumier, Theodor Landis & Avinoam B. Safran (2003). Visual Consciousness in Health and Disease. Neurologic Clinics 21 (3):647-686.score: 30.0
  36. Timothy Lane (2015). Self, Belonging, and Conscious Experience: A Critique of Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness. In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed consciousness: New essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness. MIT Press.score: 19.0
    Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to having conscious experience. These theories differ with respect to how many levels they posit and to whether self-reference is conscious or not. But all treat self-referencing as a process that transpires at the personal level, rather than at the subpersonal level, the level of mechanism. -/- Working with conceptual resources afforded by pre-existing theories of consciousness that take self-reference to be essential, several attempts have been made to explain seemingly (...)
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  37. Alexandre Billon & Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Jaspers' Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness. In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. MIT Press.score: 19.0
    According to what we will call subjectivity theories of consciousness, there is a constitutive connection between phenomenal consciousness and subjectivity: there is something it is like for a subject to have mental state M only if M is characterized by a certain mine-ness or for-me-ness. Such theories appear to face certain psychopathological counterexamples: patients appear to report conscious experiences that lack this subjective element. A subsidiary goal of this chapter is to articulate with greater precision both subjectivity theories and the (...)
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  38. Bernhard Hommel (2007). Consciousness and Control: Not Identical Twins. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):155-176.score: 19.0
    Human cognition and action are intentional and goal-directed, and explaining how they are controlled is one of the most important tasks of the cognitive sciences. After half a century of benign neglect this task is enjoying increased attention. Unfortunately, however, current theorizing about control in general, and the role of consciousness for/in control in particular, suffers from major conceptual flaws that lead to confusion regarding the following distinctions: (i) automatic and unintentional processes, (ii) exogenous control and disturbance (in a control-theoretical (...)
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  39. Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2012). EEG Oscillatory States as Neuro-Phenomenology of Consciousness as Revealed From Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):149-169.score: 19.0
    The value of resting electroencephalogram (EEG) in revealing neural constitutes of consciousness (NCC) was examined. We quantified the dynamic repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in eyes-closed rest in relation to the degree of expression of clinical self-consciousness. For NCC a model was suggested that contrasted normal, severely disturbed state of consciousness and state without consciousness. Patients with disorders of consciousness were used. Results suggested that the repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in resting condition quantitatively (...)
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  40. Christopher Mole (2008). Attention and Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):86-104.score: 18.0
    According to commonsense psychology, one is conscious of everything that one pays attention to, but one does not pay attention to all the things that one is conscious of. Recent lines of research purport to show that commonsense is mistaken on both of these points: Mack and Rock (1998) tell us that attention is necessary for consciousness, while Kentridge and Heywood (2001) claim that consciousness is not necessary for attention. If these lines of research were successful they would have important (...)
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  41. David J. Chalmers (2000). What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. 17--39.score: 18.0
    The search for neural correlates of consciousness (or NCCs) is arguably the cornerstone in the recent resurgence of the science of consciousness. The search poses many difficult empirical problems, but it seems to be tractable in principle, and some ingenious studies in recent years have led to considerable progress. A number of proposals have been put forward concerning the nature and location of neural correlates of consciousness. A few of these include.
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  42. David J. Chalmers (1997). Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (1):3-46.score: 18.0
    This paper is a response to the 26 commentaries on my paper "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness". First, I respond to deflationary critiques, including those that argue that there is no "hard" problem of consciousness or that it can be accommodated within a materialist framework. Second, I respond to nonreductive critiques, including those that argue that the problems of consciousness are harder than I have suggested, or that my framework for addressing them is flawed. Third, I address positive (...)
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  43. Igor Aleksander, Susan Stuart & Tom Ziemke (2008). Assessing Artificial Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (7):95-110.score: 18.0
    While the recent special issue of JCS on machine consciousness (Volume 14, Issue 7) was in preparation, a collection of papers on the same topic, entitled Artificial Consciousness and edited by Antonio Chella and Riccardo Manzotti, was published. 1 The editors of the JCS special issue, Ron Chrisley, Robert Clowes and Steve Torrance, thought it would be a timely and productive move to have authors of papers in their collection review the papers in the Chella and Manzotti book, and include (...)
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  44. David M. Rosenthal (2002). How Many Kinds of Consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):653-665.score: 18.0
    Ned BlockÕs influential distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has become a staple of current discussions of consciousness. It is not often noted, however, that his distinction tacitly embodies unargued theoretical assumptions that favor some theoretical treatments at the expense of others. This is equally so for his less widely discussed distinction between phenomenal consciousness and what he calls reflexive consciousness. I argue that the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, as Block draws it, is untenable. Though mental states that (...)
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  45. Daniel C. Dennett (1996). Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):4-6.score: 18.0
    The strategy of divide and conquer is usually an excellent one, but it all depends on how you do the carving. Chalmer's attempt to sort the "easy" problems of consciousness from the "really hard" problem is not, I think, a useful contribution to research, but a major misdirector of attention, an illusion-generator. How could this be? Let me describe two somewhat similar strategic proposals, and compare them to Chalmers' recommendation.
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  46. David Papineau (2003). Theories of Consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 353.score: 18.0
    My target in this paper is "theories of consciousness". There are many theories of consciousness around, and my view is that they are all misconceived. Consciousness is not a normal scientific subject, and needs handling with special care. It is foolhardy to jump straight in and start building a theory, as if consciousness were just like electricity or chemical valency. We will do much better to reflect explicitly on our methodology first. When we do this, we will see that theories (...)
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  47. John Barresi (2007). Consciousness and Intentionality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):77-93.score: 18.0
    My goal is to try to understand the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. My basic methodological assumption is that embodied agents, through their sensory-motor, affective, and cognitive activities directed at objects, engage in intentional relations with these objects. Furthermore, I assume that intentional relations can be viewed from a first- and a third-person perspective. What is called primary consciousness is the first-person perspective of the agent engaged in a current intentional relation. While primary consciousness posits an implicit.
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  48. Michael V. Antony (2001). Is 'Consciousness' Ambiguous? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2):19-44.score: 18.0
    It is widely assumed that ‘consciousness’ (and its cognates) is multiply ambiguous within the consciousness literature. Some alleged senses of the term are access consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, state consciousness, creature consciousness, introspective consciousness, self consciousness, to name a few. In the paper I argue for two points. First, there are few if any good reasons for thinking that such alleged senses are genuine: ‘consciousness’ is best viewed as univocal within the literature. The second point is that researchers would do best (...)
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  49. Alva Noë & Evan Thompson (2004). Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):3-28.score: 18.0
    In the past decade, the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness (or NCC) has become a focal point for scientific research on consciousness (Metzinger, 2000a). A growing number of investigators believe that the first step toward a science of consciousness is to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. Indeed, Francis Crick has gone so far as to proclaim that ‘we … need to discover the neural correlates of consciousness.… For this task the primate visual system seems especially attractive.… No (...)
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  50. Evan Thompson (2001). Empathy and Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):1-32.score: 18.0
    This article makes five main points. (1) Individual human consciousness is formed in the dynamic interrelation of self and other, and therefore is inherently intersubjective. (2) The concrete encounter of self and other fundamentally involves empathy, under- stood as a unique and irreducible kind of intentionality. (3) Empathy is the precondi- tion (the condition of possibility) of the science of consciousness. (4) Human empathy.
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