Search results for '*Introspection' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Declan Smithies (2012). A Simple Theory of Introspection. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    This chapter develops a simple theory of introspection on which a mental state is introspectively accessible just by virtue of the fact that one is in that mental state. This theory raises two questions: first, a generalization question: which mental states are introspectively accessible; and second, an explanatory question: why are some mental states introspectively accessible, rather than others, or none at all? In response to the generalization question, I argue that a mental state is introspectively accessible if and only (...)
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  2. Daniel Stoljar & Declan Smithies (2012). Introspection and Consciousness: An Overview. In Daniel Stoljar & Declan Smithies (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Introspection stands at the interface between two major currents in philosophy and related areas of science: on the one hand, there are metaphysical and scientific questions about the nature of consciousness; and on the other hand, there are normative and epistemological questions about the nature of self-knowledge. Introspection seems tied up with consciousness, to the point that some writers define consciousness in terms of introspection; and it is also tied up with self-knowledge, since introspection is the distinctive way in which (...)
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  3. Michael Beaton (2009). Qualia and Introspection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):88-110.score: 16.0
    The claim that behaviourally undetectable inverted spectra are possible has been endorsed by many physicalists. I explain why this starting point rules out standard forms of scientific explanation for qualia. The modern ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ is an updated way of defending problematic intuitions like these, but I show that it cannot help to recover standard scientific explanation. I argue that Chalmers is right: we should accept the falsity of physicalism if we accept this problematic starting point. I further argue that (...)
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  4. Declan Smithies (2013). On the Unreliability of Introspection. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1177-1186.score: 16.0
    In his provocative and engaging new book, Perplexities of Consciousness, Eric Schwitzgebel makes a compelling case that introspection is unreliable in the sense that we are prone to ignorance and error in making introspective judgments about our own conscious experience. My aim in this commentary is to argue that Schwitzgebel’s thesis about the unreliability of introspection does not have the damaging implications that he claims it does for the prospects of a broadly Cartesian approach to epistemology.
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  5. Edouard Machery (2005). You Don't Know How You Think: Introspection and Language of Thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):469-485.score: 16.0
    recent cognitive theories into two antagonistic groups. Sententialists claim that we think in some language, while advocates of non-linguistic views of cognition deny this claim. The Introspective Argument for Sententialism is one of the most appealing arguments for sententialism. In substance, it claims that the introspective fact of inner speech provides strong evidence that our thoughts are linguistic. This article challenges this argument. I claim that the Introspective Argument for Sententialism confuses the content of our thoughts with their vehicles: while (...)
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  6. Murat Aydede (2001). Naturalism, Introspection, and Direct Realism About Pain. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):29-73.score: 16.0
    This paper examines pain states (and other intransitive bodily sensations) from the perspective of the problems they pose for pure informational/representational approaches to naturalizing qualia. I start with a comprehensive critical and quasi-historical discussion of so-called Perceptual Theories of Pain (e.g., Armstrong, Pitcher), as these were the natural predecessors of the more modern direct realist views. I describe the theoretical backdrop (indirect realism, sense-data theories) against which the perceptual theories were developed. The conclusion drawn is that pure representationalism about pain (...)
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  7. Murat Aydede (2003). Is Introspection Inferential? In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.score: 16.0
    I introduce the Displaced Perception Model of Introspection developed by Dretske which treats introspection of phenomenal states as inferential and criticize it.
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  8. Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) (2012). Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.score: 16.0
    The topic of introspection stands at the interface between questions in epistemology about the nature of self-knowledge and questions in the philosophy of mind about the nature of consciousness. What is the nature of introspection such that it provides us with a distinctive way of knowing about our own conscious mental states? And what is the nature of consciousness such that we can know about our own conscious mental states by introspection? How should we understand the relationship between consciousness and (...)
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  9. Mattia Riccardi (2014). Inner Opacity. Nietzsche on Introspection and Agency. Inquiry:1-23.score: 16.0
    Inner Opacity. Nietzsche on Introspection and Agency. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2013.855659.
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  10. Denis G. Arnold (1997). Introspection and its Objects. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):87-94.score: 16.0
    Traditionally conceived, introspection is a form of nonsensuous perception that allows the mind to scrutinize at least some of its own states while it is experiencing them. The traditional account of introspection has been in disrepute ever since Ryle argued that the very idea of introspection is a logical muddle. Recent critics such as William Lyons, John Searle, and Sydney Shoemaker argue that this disrepute is well-deserved. Three distinct objections to the traditional account of introspection are considered and rejected. It (...)
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  11. Denis Bonnay & Paul Égré (2009). Inexact Knowledge with Introspection. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2):179 - 227.score: 16.0
    Standard Kripke models are inadequate to model situations of inexact knowledge with introspection, since positive and negative introspection force the relation of epistemic indiscernibility to be transitive and euclidean. Correlatively, Williamson’s margin for error semantics for inexact knowledge invalidates axioms 4 and 5. We present a new semantics for modal logic which is shown to be complete for K45, without constraining the accessibility relation to be transitive or euclidean. The semantics corresponds to a system of modular knowledge, in which iterated (...)
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  12. Thomas Zoega Ramsøy & Morten Overgaard (2004). Introspection and Subliminal Perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):1-23.score: 16.0
    Subliminal perception (SP) is today considered a well-supported theory stating that perception can occur without conscious awareness and have a significant impact on later behaviour and thought. In this article, we first present and discuss different approaches to the study of SP. In doing this, we claim that most approaches are based on a dichotomic measure of awareness. Drawing upon recent advances and discussions in the study of introspection and phenomenological psychology, we argue for both the possibility and necessity of (...)
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  13. Patrick Allo (2013). The Many Faces of Closure and Introspection. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):91-124.score: 16.0
    In this paper I present a more refined analysis of the principles of deductive closure and positive introspection. This analysis uses the expressive resources of logics for different types of group knowledge, and discriminates between aspects of closure and computation that are often conflated. The resulting model also yields a more fine-grained distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, and places Hintikka’s original argument for positive introspection in a new perspective.
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  14. Uriah Kriegel (2013). A Hesitant Defense of Introspection. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1165-1176.score: 16.0
    Consider the following argument: when a phenomenon P is observable, any legitimate understanding of P must take account of observations of P; some mental phenomena—certain conscious experiences—are introspectively observable; so, any legitimate understanding of the mind must take account of introspective observations of conscious experiences. This paper offers a (preliminary and partial) defense of this line of thought. Much of the paper focuses on a specific challenge to it, which I call Schwitzgebel’s Challenge: the claim that introspection is so untrustworthy (...)
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  15. Natika Newton (1988). Introspection and Perception. Topoi 7 (March):25-30.score: 16.0
    Sydney Shoemaker argues that introspection, unlike perception, provides no identification information about the self, and that knowledge of one''s mental states should be conceived as arising in a direct and unmediated fashion from one''s being in those states. I argue that while one does not identify aself as the subject of one''s states, one does frequently identify and misidentify thestates, in ways analogous to the identification of objects in perception, and that in discourse about one''s mental states the self plays (...)
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  16. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.score: 16.0
    Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this paper, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present the nature (...)
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  17. Murat Aydede & D. Price (2005). The Experimental Use of Introspection in the Scientific Study of Pain and its Integration with Third-Person Methodologies: The Experiential-Phenomenological Approach. In , Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Mit Press. 243--273.score: 16.0
    Understanding the nature of pain depends, at least partly, on recognizing its subjectivity (thus, its first-person epistemology). This in turn requires using a first-person experiential method in addition to third-person experimental approaches to study it. This paper is an attempt to spell out what the former approach is and how it can be integrated with the latter. We start our discussion by examining some foundational issues raised by the use of introspection. We argue that such a first-person method in the (...)
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  18. Gerald E. Myers (1986). Introspection and Self-Knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (April):199-207.score: 16.0
    Since locke, introspection has been generally defined as a form of observation. this is true, for example, of the classical tradition in psychology exemplified by wundt and titchener. recent experimental work by cognitive psychologists continues to treat introspection as a mode of observation while denying its alleged success in identifying cognitive processes. besides psychologists, philosophers such as james, ryle, and quinton are discussed, and they, too, define introspection as a type of observation analogous to perception. the present article calls attention (...)
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  19. Michael Roche (2013). A Difficulty for Testing the Inner Sense Theory of Introspection. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1019-1030.score: 16.0
    A common way of testing the inner sense theory of introspection exploits the possibility of damage to inner sense. Such damage is expected to lead to first-personal deficits/impairments of one kind or another. I raise various problems for this way of testing the theory. The main difficulty, I argue, stems from the existence of the method subserving confabulation.
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  20. Jeffery Geller (1988). Introspection in Psychology and Philosophy. Philosophy Research Archives 13:471-480.score: 16.0
    This article analyzes Wittgenstein’s position on the grammatical incorrigibility of psychological self-ascriptions and shows how introspective statements can be of use to philosophers. In Wittgenstein On Rules and Private Language, Kripke notes Wittgenstein’s puzzling ambivalence toward introspection. On the one hand Wittgenstein repudiates introspection and on the other he uses it in his own philosophical investigations. To resolve the paradox, this paper distinguishes between introspective methodology in psychological and philosophical investigations. Wittgenstein’s arguments against introspection are specifically directed at introspective methodology (...)
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  21. Michael Roche (2013). Povinelli's Problem and Introspection. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):559-576.score: 16.0
    Povinelli’s Problem is a well-known methodological problem confronting those researching nonhuman primate cognition. In this paper I add a new wrinkle to this problem. The wrinkle concerns introspection, i.e., the ability to detect one’s own mental states. I argue that introspection either creates a new obstacle to solving Povinelli’s Problem, or creates a slightly different, but closely related, problem. I apply these arguments to Robert Lurz and Carla Krachun’s (Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2: 449–481, 2011) recent attempt at solving (...)
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  22. Wolfgang Barz (2014). Introspection as a Game of Make‐Believe. Theoria 80 (4):350-367.score: 16.0
    The aim of this article is to provide an account of introspective knowledge concerning visual experiences that is in accordance with the idea of transparent introspection. According to transparent introspection, a person gains knowledge of her own current mental state M solely by paying attention to those aspects of the external world which M is about. In my view, transparent introspection is a promising alternative to inner sense theories. However, it raises the fundamental question why a person who pays attention (...)
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  23. Wolfgang Barz (forthcoming). Transparent Introspection of Wishes. Philosophical Studies:1-31.score: 16.0
    The aim of this paper is to lay the groundwork for extending the idea of transparent introspection to wishes. First, I elucidate the notion of transparent introspection and highlight its advantages over rival accounts of self-knowledge (Sect. 1). Then I pose several problems that seem to obstruct the extension of transparent introspection to wishes (Sect. 2). In order to overcome these problems, I call into question the standard propositional attitude analysis of non-doxastic attitudes (Sect. 3). My considerations lead to a (...)
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  24. Olivier Gossner & Elias Tsakas (2012). Reasoning-Based Introspection. Theory and Decision 73 (4):513-523.score: 16.0
    We show that if an agent reasons according to standard inference rules, the truth and introspection axioms extend from the set of non-epistemic propositions to the whole set of propositions. This implies that the usual axiomatization of partitional possibility correspondences is redundant, and provides a justification for truth and introspection that is partly based on reasoning.
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  25. Robert H. Wozniak (ed.) (1884/1993). Theoretical Roots of Early Behaviourism: Functionalism, the Critique of Introspection, and the Nature and Evolution of Consciousness. Routledge/Thoemmes Press.score: 16.0
    While John B. Watson articulated the intellectual commitments of behaviorism with clarity and force, wove them into a coherent perspective, gave the perspective a name, and made it a cause, these commitments had adherents before him. To document the origins of behaviorism, this series collects the articles that set the terms of the behaviorist debate, includes the most important pre-Watsonian contributions to objectivism, and reprints the first full text of the new behaviorism. Contents: Functionalism, the Critque of Introspection, and the (...)
     
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  26. Paul M. Churchland (1985). Reduction, Qualia and the Direct Introspection of Brain States. Journal of Philosophy 82 (January):8-28.score: 14.0
  27. Quassim Cassam (2004). Introspection, Perception, and Epistemic Privilege. The Monist 87 (2):255-274.score: 14.0
  28. Nicholas Silins (2013). Introspection and Inference. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):291-315.score: 14.0
    In this paper I develop the idea that, by answering the question whether p, you can answer the question whether you believe that p. In particular, I argue that judging that p is a fallible yet basic guide to whether one believes that p. I go on to defend my view from an important skeptical challenge, according to which my view would make it too easy to reject skeptical hypotheses about our access to our minds. I close by responding to (...)
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  29. Christopher D. Frith & Hakwan C. Lau (2006). The Problem of Introspection. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):761-764.score: 14.0
  30. Jesse J. Prinz (2004). The Fractionation of Introspection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):40-57.score: 14.0
  31. Eric Schwitzgebel (2008). The Unreliability of Naive Introspection. Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.score: 14.0
    We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. Examples highlighted in this paper include: emotional experience, peripheral vision, and the phenomenology of thought. Philosophical foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward.
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  32. Bruce Aune (1963). Feelings, Moods, and Introspection. Mind 72 (April):187-208.score: 14.0
  33. Jonathan W. Schooler (2004). Experience, Meta-Consciousness, and the Paradox of Introspection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7):17-39.score: 14.0
  34. Timothy D. Wilson (2003). Knowing When to Ask: Introspection and the Adaptive Unconscious. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9):131-140.score: 14.0
  35. Jay L. Garfield (1989). The Myth of Jones and the Mirror of Nature: Reflections on Introspection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (September):1-26.score: 14.0
  36. Komarine Romdenh-Romluc (2011). Time for Consciousness: Intention and Introspection. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):369-376.score: 14.0
    We assume that we can act—in at least some cases—by consciously intending to do so. Wegner (2002) appeals to empirical research carried out by Libet et al. (1983) to challenge this assumption. I argue that his conclusion presupposes a particular view of conscious intention. But there is an alternative model available, which has been developed by various writers in the phenomenological tradition, and most recently defended by Moran (2001). If we adopt this alternative account of conscious intention, Wegner’s argument no (...)
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  37. William E. Lyons (1986). The Disappearance of Introspection. MIT Press.score: 14.0
  38. William E. Seager (2002). Emotional Introspection. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):666-687.score: 14.0
  39. Johannes Roessler (1999). Perception, Introspection and Attention. European Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):47-64.score: 14.0
  40. Morten Overgaard (2006). Introspection in Science. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):629-633.score: 14.0
  41. John Dilworth (2006). Perception, Introspection, and Functional Consonance. Theoria 72 (4):299-318.score: 14.0
    What is the relation between a perceptual experience of an object X as being red, and one's belief, if any, as to the nature of that experience? A traditional Cartesian view would be that, if indeed object X does seem to be red to oneself, then one's resulting introspective belief about it could only be a _conforming _belief, i.e., a belief that X perceptually seems to be _red _to oneself--rather than, for instance, a belief that X perceptually seems to be (...)
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  42. Fred Dretske (1994). Introspection. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:263-278.score: 14.0
  43. Pierre Vermersch (1999). Introspection as Practice. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):17-42.score: 14.0
  44. Amie L. Thomasson (2003). Introspection and Phenomenological Method. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):239-54.score: 14.0
    It is argued that the work of Husserl offers a model for self-knowledge that avoids the disadvantages of standard introspectionist accounts and of a Sellarsian view of the relation between our perceptual judgements and derived judgements about appearances. Self-knowledge is based on externally directed knowledge of the world that is then subjected to a cognitive transformation analogous to the move from a statement to the activity of stating. Appearance talk is (contra Sellars) not an epistemically non-committal form of speech, but (...)
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  45. Philip Robbins (2004). Knowing Me, Knowing You: Theory of Mind and the Machinery of Introspection. In Anthony I. Jack & Andreas Roepstorff (eds.), Trusting the Subject? The Use of Introspective Evidence in Cognitive Science Volume 2. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. 129-143.score: 14.0
  46. Josef Perner, Daniela Kloo & Elisabeth Stöttinger (2007). Introspection & Remembering. Synthese 159 (2):253 - 270.score: 14.0
    We argue that episodic remembering, understood as the ability to re-experience past events, requires a particular kind of introspective ability and understanding. It requires the understanding that first person experiences can represent actual events. In this respect it differs from the understanding required by the traditional false belief test for children, where a third person attribution (to others or self) of a behavior governing representation is sufficient. The understanding of first person experiences as representations is also required for problem solving (...)
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  47. Charles Raff (1966). Introspection and Incorrigibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (September):69-73.score: 14.0
  48. Keith Lehrer (1960). Can We Know That We Have Free Will by Introspection? Journal of Philosophy 57 (March):145-156.score: 14.0
  49. Petter Johansson, Lars Hall, Sverker Sikström, Betty Tärning & Andreas Lind (2006). How Something Can Be Said About Telling More Than We Can Know: On Choice Blindness and Introspection. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):673-692.score: 14.0
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