Search results for '*Physiological Correlates' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  2
    Bernard T. Engel (1959). Some Physiological Correlates of Hunger and Pain. Journal of Experimental Psychology 57 (6):389.
  2.  3
    V. A. Volkovich (1934). Different Qualitative Forms of Psychical Fatigue and Their Physiological Correlates. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):229 – 232.
    (1934). Different qualitative forms of psychical fatigue and their physiological correlates. Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy: Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 229-232.
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  3.  49
    Frederick T. Travis & C. Pearson (2000). Pure Consciousness: Distinct Phenomenological and Physiological Correlates of "Consciousness Itself". International Journal of Neuroscience 100 (1):77-89.
  4.  6
    Catherine Chapados & Daniel J. Levitin (2008). Cross-Modal Interactions in the Experience of Musical Performances: Physiological Correlates. Cognition 108 (3):639-651.
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  5.  23
    S. LaBerge, L. Levitan & W. C. Dement (1986). Lucid Dreaming: Physiological Correlates of Consciousness During Rem Sleep. Journal of Mind and Behavior 7 (2-3):251-258.
  6.  2
    Barbara E. Jones (1981). Understanding the Physiological Correlates of a Behavioral State as a Constellation of Events. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):482.
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  7.  3
    E. Pöppel & Nikos Logothetis (1988). Psychophysical Correlates of Physiological Functions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):308.
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  8.  88
    Thomas Metzinger (2000). Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. MIT Press.
  9. Gerald M. Edelman & Giulio Srinivasan Tononi (2000). Reentry and the Dynamic Core: Neural Correlates of Conscious Experience. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press
  10. D. B. Edelman, Bernard J. Baars & Anil K. Seth (2005). Identifying Hallmarks of Consciousness in Non-Mammalian Species. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):169-87.
    Most early studies of consciousness have focused on human subjects. This is understandable, given that humans are capable of reporting accurately the events they experience through language or by way of other kinds of voluntary response. As researchers turn their attention to other animals, “accurate report” methodologies become increasingly difficult to apply. Alternative strategies for amassing evidence for consciousness in non-human species include searching for evolutionary homologies in anatomical substrates and measurement of physiological correlates of conscious states. In addition, (...)
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  11. Delphine Pins & D. H. Ffytche (2003). The Neural Correlates of Conscious Vision. Cerebral Cortex 13 (5):461-74.
  12.  16
    Philip S. Wong, Edward Bernat, Michael Snodgrass & Howard Shevrin (2004). Event-Related Brain Correlates of Associative Learning Without Awareness. International Journal of Psychophysiology 53 (3):217-231.
  13. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Phenomenal Holism, Internalism and the Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Comment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):32-37.
  14. Brian P. McLaughlin & Gary Bartlett (2004). Have Noe and Thompson Cast Doubt on the Neural Correlates of Consciousness Programme? Comment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):56-67.
  15.  28
    Jakob Hohwy & Christopher D. Frith (2004). The Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Room for Improvement, but on the Right Track: Comment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):45-51.
  16.  21
    Jeffrey D. Schall (2000). Investigating Neural Correlates of Consciousness with Ambiguous Stimuli. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):32-35.
  17. Andreas K. Engel (2003). Temporal Binding and the Neural Correlates of Consciousness. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press
  18. Laura A. Flashman & Robert M. Roth (2004). Neural Correlates of Unawareness of Illness in Psychosis. In Xavier F. Amador & Anthony S. David (eds.), Insight and Psychosis: Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia and Related Disorders. Oxford University Press 157-176.
  19. John R. Searle (2004). Comments on Noe and Thompson, Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):80-82.
  20. David J. Chalmers (2000). What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press 17--39.
    The search for neural correlates of consciousness (or NCCs) is arguably the cornerstone in the recent resurgence of the science of consciousness. The search poses many difficult empirical problems, but it seems to be tractable in principle, and some ingenious studies in recent years have led to considerable progress. A number of proposals have been put forward concerning the nature and location of neural correlates of consciousness. A few of these include.
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  21. Thomas Metzinger (2000). The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective. In Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press 285--306.
    This is a brief and accessible English summary of the "Self-model Theory of Subjectivity" (SMT), which is only available as German book in this archive. It introduces two new theoretical entities, the "phenomenal self-model" (PSM) and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation" PMIR. A representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person persepctive is offered. This is a revised version, including two pictures.
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  22. Joelle Proust (2000). Awareness of Agency: Three Levels of Analysis. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press 307--24.
    This paper discusses the content of agency awareness. It contrast three elements in content: what the goal is, how it is to be reached, and who is having the goal/performing the action ? Marc Jeannerod's claim that goal representations are self-other neutral is discussed. If goal representations are essentially sharable, then we do not understand other people by projecting a piece of internal knowledge on to them, as often assumed. The problem which our brain has to solve is the converse (...)
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  23. Ansgar Beckermann (2000). The Perennial Problem of the Reductive Explainability of Phenomenal Consciousness: C. D. Broad on the Explanatory Gap. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press
    At the start of the 20th century the question of whether life could be explained in purely me- chanical terms was as hotly debated as the mind-body problem is today. Two factions opposed each other: Biological mechanists claimed that the properties characteristic of living organisms could be ex- plained mechanistically, in the way the behavior of a clock can be explained by the properties and the arrangement of its cogs, springs, and weights. Substantial vitalists, on the other hand, maintained that (...)
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  24. Francis Crick & Christof Koch (2000). The Unconscious Homunculus. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press 3-11.
  25. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2000). How to Understand the N in NCC. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press
  26. Judy A. Trevena & Jeff G. Miller (2002). Cortical Movement Preparation Before and After a Conscious Decision to Move. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (2):162-90.
    The idea that our conscious decisions determine our actions has been challenged by a report suggesting that the brain starts to prepare for a movement before the person concerned has consciously decided to move . Libet et al. claimed that their results show that our actions are not consciously initiated. The current article describes two experiments in which we attempted to replicate Libet et al.'s comparison of participants' movement-related brain activity with the reported times of their decisions to move and (...)
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  27.  12
    Susan Pockett (2002). On Subjective Back-Referral and How Long It Takes to Become Conscious of a Stimulus: A Reinterpretation of Libet's Data. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):141-61.
    The original data reported by Benjamin Libet and colleagues are reinterpreted, taking into account the facilitation which is experimentally demonstrated in the first of their series of articles. It is shown that the original data equally well or better support a quite different set of conclusions from those drawn by Libet. The new conclusions are that it takes only 80 ms for stimuli to come to consciousness and that “subjective back-referral of sensations in time” to the time of the stimulus (...)
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  28. Gilberto Gomes (2002). Problems in the Timing of Conscious Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):191-97.
    Libet's arguments in defense of his interpretation of his experimental results are insufficient. The claims of my critical review do not suffer with his new statements.
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  29.  22
    Wim van de Grind (2002). Physical, Neural, and Mental Timing. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):241-64.
    The conclusions drawn by Benjamin Libet from his work with collegues on the timing of somatosensorial conscious experiences has met with a lot of praise and criticism. In this issue we find three examples of the latter. Here I attempt to place the divide between the two opponent camps in a broader perspective by analyzing the question of the relation between physical timing, neural timing, and experiential timing. The nervous system does a sophisticated job of recombining and recoding messages from (...)
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  30.  36
    S. Joordens, Marc van Duijn & T. M. Spalek (2002). When Timing the Mind Should Also Mind the Timing: Biases in the Measurement of Voluntary Actions. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):231-40.
    Trevena and Miller provide further evidence that readiness potentials occur in the brain prior to the time that participants claim to have initiated a voluntary movement, a contention originally forwarded by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl . In their examination of this issue, though, aspects of their data lead them to question whether their measurement of the initiation of a voluntary movement was accurate. The current article addresses this concern by providing a direct analysis of biases in this task. This (...)
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  31. Gilberto Gomes (2002). The Interpretation of Libet's Results on the Timing of Conscious Events: A Commentary. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):221-230.
    A commentary on articles by Klein, Pockett, and Trevena and Miller, in this issue, is given. Average shift in the point of subjective equality , calculated by Klein on Libet's data, and corresponding change in mean shift, calculated by Libet et al. , may be “corrected,” taking as a reference point the end of the minimum train duration. Values obtained, if significant, indicate a latency for conscious sensation of the skin stimulus of at least 230 ms. Pockett's main conclusions are (...)
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  32.  52
    S. A. Klein (2002). Libet's Temporal Anomalies: A Reassessment of the Data. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):198-214.
    Benjamin Libet compared the perceived time of direct brain stimulation to the perceived time of skin stimulation. His results are among the most controversial experiments at the interface between psychology and philosophy. The new element that I bring to this discussion is a reanalysis of Libet's raw data. Libet's original data were difficult to interpret because of the manner in which they were presented in tables. Plotting the data as psychometric functions shows that the observers have great uncertainty about the (...)
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  33. Frank H. Durgin & Saul Sternberg (2002). The Time of Consciousness and Vice Versa. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):284-290.
    The temporal granularity of consciousness may be far less fine than the real-time information processing mechanisms that underlie our sensitivity to small temporal differences. It is suggested that conscious time perception, like space perception, is subject to errors that belie a unitary underlying representation. E. R. Clay's concept of the “specious present,” an extended moment represented in consciousness, is suggested as an alternative to the more common notion of instantaneous experience that underlies much reasoning based on the “time of arrival” (...)
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  34.  18
    Maria Wilenius & Antti Revonsuo (2007). Timing of the Earliest ERP Correlate of Visual Awareness. Psychophysiology 44 (5):703-710.
  35. David M. Rosenthal (2002). The Timing of Conscious States. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):215-20.
    Striking experimental results by Benjamin Libet and colleagues have had an impor- tant impact on much recent discussion of consciousness. Some investigators have sought to replicate or extend Libet’s results (Haggard, 1999; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002), while others have focused on how to interpret those findings (e.g., Gomes, 1998, 1999, 2002; Pockett, 2002), which many have seen as conflicting with our commonsense picture of mental functioning.
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  36.  96
    Benjamin W. Libet (2002). The Timing of Mental Events: Libet's Experimental Findings and Their Implications. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):291-99.
    The major findings by Libet et al. are briefly summarized. The criticisms and alternative proposals by Trevena and Miller, Pockett, and Gomes are analyzed and found to be largely unwarranted.
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  37.  64
    Stanley Klein (2002). Libet's Research on the Timing of Conscious Intention to Act: A Commentary. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):273-279.
    S. Pockett and G. Gomes discuss a possible bias in the method by which Libet's subjects estimated the time at which they became aware of their intent to move their hands. The bias, caused by sensory delay processing the clock information, would be sufficient to alter Trevena and Miller's conclusions regarding the timing of the lateralized readiness potential. I show that the flash-lag effect would compensate for that bias. In the last part of my commentary I note that the other (...)
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  38.  20
    Susan Pockett (2002). Backward Referral, Flash-Lags, and Quantum Free Will: A Response to Commentaries on Articles by Pockett, Klein, Gomes, and Trevena and Miller. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):314-325.
    The first priority of this response is to address Libet's rebuttal of my reinterpretation of his data. Then, because many authors have commented on various aspects of the debate, the rest of the response is organized in terms of subject matter, not as replies to each individual commentator. First, I reply to an objection expressed by two separate commentators to part of my reinterpretation of those of Libet's data supposedly supporting backward referral. This leads to a brief discussion of the (...)
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  39.  14
    Bruno G. Breitmeyer (2002). In Support of Pockett's Critique of Libet's Studies of the Time Course of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):280-283.
    Susan Pockett presents sound arguments supporting her reinterpretations of data that Libet and co-workers used to support a number of intriguing and influential conclusions regarding the microgenesis and timing of conscious sensory experience and volitionally controlled motor responses. The following analysis, extending and elaborating some of her main arguments, proposes that Libet's experimental methodologies and rationales, and thus also his interpretation of data, are flawed and that neglect or ignorance of methodological and empirical constraints well known to sensory psychologists risks (...)
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  40.  80
    Stanley Klein (2002). Libet's Timing of Mental Events: Commentary on the Commentaries. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):326-333.
    This issue of Consciousness and Cognition presents four target articles and eight commentaries on the target articles. The present article presents comments on those commentaries, grouped into backward referral and volition categories. Regarding backward referral: I disagree with my fellow commentators and take the unpopular position of defending Libet's notion of backward referral. I join my fellow commentators in critiquing Libet's notion of a 500-ms delay. I examine several of the hypotheses suggested by other commentators for why cortical and lateral (...)
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  41. Gilberto Gomes (2002). On Experimental and Philosophical Investigations of Mental Timing: A Response to Commentary. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):304-307.
    Reinterpretations of Libet's results have received support from most commentaries. Libet's arguments against alternative hypotheses are contested. Latency depends on intensity. Integration of intensity and duration explains the Minimum Train Duration. Analogies of Libet's timing of intentions with control experiments indicate biases of opposite signs, according to intramodal or intermodal results. Rosenthal's view of nonconscious intentions becoming conscious after a delay is favored. Compatibilist free will is discussed.
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  42.  62
    Jeff G. Miller & Judy A. Trevena (2002). Cortical Movement Preparation and Conscious Decisions: Averaging Artifacts and Timing Biases. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):308-313.
  43.  16
    Amanda R. Bolbecker, Zixi Cheng, Gary Felsten, King-Leung Kong, Corrinne C. M. Lim, Sheryl J. Nisly-Nagele, Lolin T. Wang-Bennett & Gerald S. Wasserman (2002). Two Asymmetries Governing Neural and Mental Timing. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):265-272.
    Mental timing studies may be influenced by powerful cognitive illusions that can produce an asymmetry in their rate of progress relative to neuronal timing studies. Both types of timing research are also governed by a temporal asymmetry, expressed by the fact that the direction of causation must follow time's arrow. Here we refresh our earlier suggestion that the temporal asymmetry offers promise as a means of timing mental activities. We update our earlier analysis of Libet's data within this framework. Then (...)
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  44.  13
    S. Kitazawa (2002). Where Conscious Sensation Takes Place. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (3):475-477.
    Pockett has drawn an alternative conclusion from the data of Libet, Alberts, Wright, and Feinstein , and suggested that it takes 80 ms, rather than 500 ms, for the sensation evoked by a stimulus to enter awareness. Here, I suggest that our conscious sensation evolves over time, during the period from 80 to 500 ms after a stimulus, until the sensation is stably localized in space.
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  45.  10
    Chakravarthi Ramakrishna (2002). Real Latencies and Facilitation. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):300-303.
  46. Steven Jay Lynn, Irving Kirsch, Josh Knox, Oliver Fassler & Scott O. Lilienfeld (2007). Hypnosis and Neuroscience: Implications for the Altered State Debate. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press 145-165.
     
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  47.  16
    Howard Shevrin, Jess H. Ghannam & Benjamin W. Libet (2002). A Neural Correlate of Consciousness Related to Repression. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2):334-41.
    In previous research Libet discovered that a critical time period for neural activation is necessary in order for a stimulus to become conscious. This necessary time period varies from subject to subject. In this current study, six subjects for whom the time for neural activation of consciousness had been previously determined were administered a battery of psychological tests on the basis of which ratings were made of degree of repressiveness. As hypothesized, repressive subjects had a longer critical time period for (...)
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  48.  95
    Benjamin W. Libet (2000). Conscious and Unconscious Mental Activity. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):21-24.
  49.  31
    Sander M. Daselaar, Mathias S. Fleck, Steven E. Prince & Roberto Cabeza (2006). The Medial Temporal Lobe Distinguishes Old From New Independently of Consciousness. Journal of Neuroscience 26 (21):5835-5839.
  50.  58
    Ray S. Jackendoff (2000). Unconscious, Yes; Homunculus,??? Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):17-20.
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