Search results for '*Psychology' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Ned Block (ed.) (1980). Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    ... PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY is the study of conceptual issues in psychology. For the most part, these issues fall equally well in psychology as in..
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  2. David J. Buller (2005). Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature. MIT Press.
    In the carefully argued central chapters of Adapting Minds, Buller scrutinizes several of evolutionary psychology's most highly publicized "...
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  3. Gregory Currie & Ian Ravenscroft (2002). Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    Recreative Minds develops a philosophical theory of imagination that draws upon the latest work in psychology. This theory illuminates the use of imagination in coming to terms with art, its role in enabling us to live as social beings, and the psychological consequences of disordered imagination. The authors offer a lucid exploration of a fascinating subject.
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  4.  29
    Daniel C. Dennett (ed.) (1978). Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Bradford Books.
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  5.  90
    William James (1890/1981). The Principles of Psychology. Dover Publications.
  6. Stephen P. Stich (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. MIT Press.
  7. Stan Klein (2014). What Can Recent Replication Failures Tell Us About the Theoretical Commitments of Psychology? Theory and Psychology 24:326-338.
    I suggest that the recent, highly visible, and often heated debate over failures to replicate the results in the social sciences reveals more than the need for greater attention to the pragmatics and value of empirical falsification. It also is a symptom of a serious issue -- the underdeveloped state of theory in many areas of psychology. While I focus on the phenomenon of “social priming” -- since it figures centrally in current debate -- it is not the only area (...)
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  8. Eric T. Olson (1997). The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    Most philosophers writing about personal identity in recent years claim that what it takes for us to persist through time is a matter of psychology. In this groundbreaking new book, Eric Olson argues that such approaches face daunting problems, and he defends in their place a radically non-psychological account of personal identity. He defines human beings as biological organisms, and claims that no psychological relation is either sufficient or necessary for an organism to persist. Olson rejects several famous (...)
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  9. Christine M. Korsgaard (2008). The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    Christine M. Korsgaard is one of today's leading moral philosophers: this volume collects ten influential papers by her on practical reason and moral psychology ...
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  10. Adam Arico (2010). Folk Psychology, Consciousness, and Context Effects. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):371-393.
    Traditionally, the philosophical study of Folk Psychology has focused on how ordinary people (i.e., those without formal training in academic fields like Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, etc.) go about attributing mental states. Those working in this tradition have tended to focus primarily on intentional states, like beliefs and desires . Recently, though a body of work has emerged in the growing field of Experimental Philosophy that focuses on folk attributions of mental states that are not paradigmatically considered intentional. (...)
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  11.  10
    Ludwig Wittgenstein (1980). Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Basil Blackwell.
    Wittgenstein finished part 1 of the Philosophical Investigations in the spring of 1945. From 1946 to 1949 he worked on the philosophy of psychology almost without interruption. The present two-volume work comprises many of his writings over this period. Some of the remarks contained here were culled for part 2 of the Investigations ; others were set aside and appear in the collection known as Zettel . The great majority, however, although of excellent quality, have hitherto remained unpublished. This bilingual (...)
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  12. Stephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols (2002). Folk Psychology. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Blackwell 35-71.
    For the last 25 years discussions and debates about commonsense psychology (or “folk psychology,” as it is often called) have been center stage in the philosophy of mind. There have been heated disagreements both about what folk psychology is and about how it is related to the scientific understanding of the mind/brain that is emerging in psychology and the neurosciences. In this chapter we will begin by explaining why folk psychology plays such an important role in the philosophy of mind. (...)
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  13. Matthew Ratcliffe (2007). Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book proposes a series of interconnected arguments against the view that interpersonal understanding involves the use of a 'folk' or 'commonsense' psychology. Ratcliffe suggests that folk psychology, construed as the attribution of internal mental states in order to predict and explain behaviour, is a theoretically motivated and misleading abstraction from social life. He draws on phenomenology, neuroscience and developmental psychology to offer an alternative account that emphasizes patterned interactions between people in shared social situations.
     
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  14. Brendan Dill & Stephen Darwall (2014). Moral Psychology as Accountability. In Justin D'Arms Daniel Jacobson (ed.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics. Oxford University Press 40-83.
    Recent work in moral philosophy has emphasized the foundational role played by interpersonal accountability in the analysis of moral concepts such as moral right and wrong, moral obligation and duty, blameworthiness, and moral responsibility (Darwall 2006; 2013a; 2013b). Extending this framework to the field of moral psychology, we hypothesize that our moral attitudes, emotions, and motives are also best understood as based in accountability. Drawing on a large body of empirical evidence, we argue that the implicit aim of the central (...)
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  15.  78
    Ulf Hlobil (2016). Chains of Inferences and the New Paradigm in the Psychology of Reasoning. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):1-16.
    The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning draws on Bayesian formal frameworks, and some advocates of the new paradigm think of these formal frameworks as providing a computational-level theory of rational human inference. I argue that Bayesian theories should not be seen as providing a computational-level theory of rational human inference, where by “Bayesian theories” I mean theories that claim that all rational credal states are probabilistically coherent and that rational adjustments of degrees of belief in the light of (...)
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  16.  23
    Konrad Banicki (2014). Positive Psychology on Character Strengths and Virtues. A Disquieting Suggestion. New Ideas in Psychology 33:21-34.
    The Values in Action (VIA) classification of character strengths and virtues has been recently proposed by two leading positive psychologists, Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman as “the social science equivalent of virtue ethics.” The very possibility of developing this kind of an “equivalent,” however, is very doubtful in the light of the cogent criticism that has been leveled at modern moral theory by Alasdair MacIntyre as well as the well argued accusations that positive psychology, despite its official normative neutrality, is (...)
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  17. Joshua Knobe (2006). The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):203-231.
    It is widely believed that the primary function of folk psychology lies in the prediction, explanation and control of behavior. A question arises, however, as to whether folk psychology has also been shaped in fundamental ways by the various other roles it plays in people’s lives. Here I approach that question by considering one particular aspect of folk psychology – the distinction between intentional and unintentional behaviors. The aim is to determine whether this distinction is best understood as a tool (...)
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  18. Sunil Bhatia (2007). Rethinking Culture and Identity in Psychology: Towards a Transnational Cultural Psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (2-1):301-321.
    This article shows how the construction of transnational migrant communities across international borders poses a challenge to the assumed "natural" isomorphism of space, nations, and cultures that typically exists in theories of cultural and cross-cultural psychology. One of the principal aims of this article is to add to the critical impulse that initially defined the vision of cultural psychology by analyzing how transnational diaspora communities have become new sites for the rethinking of core concepts such as culture, self, nation and (...)
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  19.  52
    Niki Pfeifer & Igor Douven (2013). Formal Epistemology and the New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning. Review of Philosophy and Psychology (2):1-23.
    This position paper advocates combining formal epistemology and the new paradigm psychology of reasoning in the studies of conditionals and reasoning with uncertainty. The new paradigm psychology of reasoning is characterized by the use of probability theory as a rationality framework instead of classical logic, used by more traditional approaches to the psychology of reasoning. This paper presents a new interdisciplinary research program which involves both formal and experimental work. To illustrate the program, the paper discusses recent work on the (...)
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  20. Thomas D. Senor (1992). Two Factor Theories, Meaning Wholism and Intentionalistic Psychology: A Reply to Fodor. Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):133-151.
    In the third chapter of his book Psychosemantics , Jerry A. Fodor argues that the truth of meaning holism (the thesis that the content of a psychological state is determined by the totality of that state's epistemic liaisons) would be fatal for intentionalistic psychology. This is because holism suggests that no two people are ever in the same intentional state, and so a psychological theory that generalizes over such states will be composed of generalizations which fail to generalize. Fodor then (...)
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  21.  95
    Joshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo & Edouard Machery (2010). Editorial: Psychology and Experimental Philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):157-160.
    Recent years have seen an explosion of new work at the intersection of philosophy and experimental psychology. This work takes the concerns with moral and conceptual issues that have so long been associated with philosophy and connects them with the use of systematic and well-controlled empirical investigations that one more typically finds in psychology. Work in this new field often goes under the name "experimental philosophy".
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  22.  48
    Adam Morton (2007). Folk Psychology Does Not Exist. In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press 211--221.
    I discuss the possibility that there is no intrinsic unity to the capacities which are bundled under the label "folk psychology". Cooperative skills, attributional skills, and predictive skills may be scattered as parts of other non--psychological capacities. I discuss how some forms of social life bring these different skills together. I end with some remarks on how abilities that are not unified in their essential mechanisms may still form a rough practical unity. (Remark: the paper is conjectural. It describes a (...)
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  23. Joshua Knobe (2003). Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):309-325.
    Four experiments examined people’s folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not _evaluative _considerations — considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame — played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people’s judgements as to whether or not that behavior should be considered ‘intentional.’ After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained by (...)
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  24.  21
    Kristján Kristjánsson (2012). Virtue Development and Psychology's Fear of Normativity. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 32 (2):103-118.
    This paper explores the idea—rife in various recent theories in moral education—that virtue ethicists, psychologists, and educators interested in the cultivation of character should pool their resources in order to launch wide-ranging initiatives in virtue development. I uncover the roots of this idea and maintain that the reason why the desired cooperation has not yet come about lies primarily in psychology's failure to deliver the required empirical evidence about the ingredients of a morally good life. I trace the origin of (...)
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  25.  20
    Frank C. Richardson (2012). On Psychology and Virtue Ethics. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 32 (1):24-34.
    Virtue and Psychology: Pursuing Excellence in Ordinary Practices by Fowers represents the most extensive effort to date to mine the resources of virtue ethics for theory and practice in psychology. Building on this work, I explore some of the implications of the virtue ethics perspective for the fields of psychology and psychotherapy, including helping to overcome individualism and instrumentalism, elaborating a conception of “internal” as opposed to merely “external” goods, clarifying the nature of “character strengths,” (...)
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  26. A. Goldman (1993). The Psychology of Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
    The central mission of cognitive science is to reveal the real nature of the mind, however familiar or foreign that nature may be to naive preconceptions. The existence of naive conceptions is also important, however. Prescientific thought and language contain concepts of the mental, and these concepts deserve attention from cognitive science. Just as scientific psychology studies folk physics (McCloskey 1983, Hayes 1985), viz., the common understanding (or misunderstanding) of physical phenomena, so it must study folk psychology, the common understanding (...)
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  27.  88
    Huib L. de Jong (2002). Levels of Explanation in Biological Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):441-462.
    Until recently, the notions of function and multiple realization were supposed to save the autonomy of psychological explanations. Furthermore, the concept of supervenience presumably allows both dependence of mind on brain and non-reducibility of mind to brain, reconciling materialism with an independent explanatory role for mental and functional concepts and explanations. Eliminativism is often seen as the main or only alternative to such autonomy. It gladly accepts abandoning or thoroughly reconstructing the psychological level, and considers reduction if successful as equivalent (...)
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  28.  24
    Herbert Spiegelberg (1972). Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry. Evanston [Ill.]Northwestern University Press.
    Phenomenological Psychology in Phenomenological Philosophy [i] Introductory Remarks The chief purpose of the present chapter is to serve as a reminder. ...
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  29. Robert Lockie (2003). Depth Psychology and Self-Deception. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):127-148.
    This paper argues that self-deception cannot be explained without employing a depth-psychological ("psychodynamic") notion of the unconscious, and therefore that mainstream academic psychology must make space for such approaches. The paper begins by explicating the notion of a dynamic unconscious. Then a brief account is given of the "paradoxes" of self-deception. It is shown that a depth-psychological self of parts and subceptive agency removes any such paradoxes. Next, several competing accounts of self-deception are considered: an attentional account, a constructivist account, (...)
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  30.  48
    Matthew Rellihan (2012). Adaptationism and Adaptive Thinking in Evolutionary Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):245-277.
    Evolutionary psychologists attempt to infer our evolved psychology from the selection pressures present in our ancestral environments. Their use of this inference strategy?often called ?adaptive thinking??is thought to be justified by way of appeal to a rather modest form of adaptationism, according to which the mind's adaptive complexity reveals it to be a product of selection. I argue, on the contrary, that the mind's being an adaptation is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for the validity of adaptive (...)
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  31.  87
    Malcolm Forster & Eric Saidel (1994). Connectionism and the Fate of Folk Psychology: A Reply to Ramsey, Stich and Garon. Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):437 – 452.
    Ramsey, Stick and Garon (1991) argue that if the correct theory of mind is some parallel distributed processing theory, then folk psychology must be false. Their idea is that if the nodes and connections that encode one representation are causally active then all representations encoded by the same set of nodes and connections are also causally active. We present a clear, and concrete, counterexample to RSG's argument. In conclusion, we suggest that folk psychology and connectionism are best understood as complementary (...)
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  32.  33
    Charles Guignon (2002). Hermeneutics, Authenticity and the Aims of Psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):83-102.
    The contribution hermeneutic philosophy can make to reflection on issues in psychology is shown through a critique of the "positive psychology" movements inaugurated in the special issue of the American Psychologist edited by M. Seligman and M. Csikszentmihalyi in 2000. Drawing on the broad historical sense advocated by hermeneutics, it is shown that the conceptions of the good life defended by the contributors to the special issue might turn out to be limited to the rather narrow range of questionable and (...)
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  33.  37
    Louise Sundararajan (2005). Happiness Donut: A Confucian Critique of Positive Psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):35-60.
    An empirically based version of the good life as proposed by positive psychology is a donut with something missing at the core--the moral map. This paper addresses ramifications of this lacuna, and suggests ways to narrow the gap between science and life. By applying an extended version of the self-regulation theory of Higgins to a cross cultural analysis of the good life as envisioned by Seligman and Confucius, respectively, this paper sheds light on the culturally encapsulated value judgments behind positive (...)
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  34.  40
    Katarzyna Paprzycka (2002). False Consciousness of Intentional Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):271-295.
    According to explanatory individualism, every action must be explained in terms of an agent's desire. According to explanatory nonindividualism, we sometimes act on our desires, but it is also possible for us to act on others' desires without acting on desires of our own. While explanatory nonindividualism has guided the thinking of many social scientists, it is considered to be incoherent by most philosophers of mind who insist that actions must be explained ultimately in terms of some desire of the (...)
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  35.  82
    David Morrow (2009). Moral Psychology and the Mencian Creature. Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):281-304.
    Recent work in various branches of philosophy has reinvigorated debate over the psychology behind moral judgment. Using Marc Hauser's categorization of theories as “Kantian,” “Humean,” or “Rawlsian” to frame the discussion, I argue that the existing evidence weighs against the Kantian model and partly in favor of both the Humean and the Rawlsian models. Emotions do play a causal role in the formation of our moral judgments, as the Humean model claims, but there are also unconscious principles shaping our moral (...)
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  36.  56
    K. C. Stotz & Paul E. Griffiths (2002). Dancing in the Dark: Evolutionary Psychology and the Argument From Design. In S. J. Scher & F. Rauscher (eds.), Evolutionary Psychology: Alternative Approaches. Kluwer 135--160.
    The Narrow Evolutionary Psychology Movement represents itself as a major reorientation of the social/behavioral sciences, a group of sciences previously dominated by something called the ‘Standard Social Science Model’. Narrow Evolutionary Psychology alleges that the SSSM treated the mind, and particularly those aspects of the mind that exhibit cultural variation, as devoid of any marks of its evolutionary history. Adherents of Narrow Evolutionary Psychology often suggest that the SSSM owed more to ideology than to evidence. It was the child of (...)
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  37.  38
    Jeffery Yen (2010). Authorizing Happiness: Rhetorical Demarcation of Science and Society in Historical Narratives of Positive Psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 30 (2):67.
    Notwithstanding the numerous critiques that have been leveled at the field of positive psychology over its short history, the field and its practitioners continue to enjoy substantial growth and popularity. Although several factors have no doubt contributed to their advancement, work in the field of science studies suggests that rhetorical demarcation in scientific writing, by which scientific fields establish their domains and distinguish themselves from other forms of intellectual activity, may be equally significant. Such “boundary work” is an important means (...)
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  38.  18
    Blaine J. Fowers (2012). Placing Virtue and the Human Good in Psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 32 (1):1-9.
    This article contextualizes and critiques the recent increase in interest in virtue ethics and the good life in psychology. Theoretically, psychologists' interests in virtue and eudaimonia have followed the philosophical revival of these topics, but this work has been subject to persistent, disguised commitments to the ideologies of individualism and instrumentalism. Moreover, psychologists' tendency to separate the topics of virtue and eudaimonia is described and critiqued as theoretically misguided, particularly because Aristotle, the originator of these concepts, saw them as mutually (...)
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  39.  58
    John D. Greenwood (1992). Against Eliminative Materialism: From Folk Psychology to Volkerpsychologie. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):349-68.
    In this paper it is argued that we would not be logically obliged or rationally inclined to reject the ontology of contentful psychological states postulated by folk psychology even if the explanations advanced by folk psychology turned out to be generally inaccurate or inadequate. Moreover, it is argued that eliminativists such as Paul Churchland do not establish that folk psychological explanations are, or are likely to prove, generally inaccurate or inadequate. Most of Churchland's arguments—based upon developments within connectionist neuroscience—only cast (...)
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  40.  20
    George Mandler (2011). Crises and Problems Seen From Experimental Psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):240-246.
    Experimental psychology in the early 20th century was targeted by several authors who described a crisis— often expressed as a lack of theoretical and experimental progress. In the 21st century, the crisis of competing theories has been largely overcome but several current emphases hinder the development of a mature experimental science. Central among these are an ethnocentrism that focuses on Western standards and populations, neuroscientism which often treats neurological evidence independently of mental and behavioral events, and the tendency for demonstration (...)
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  41.  25
    Dario Taraborelli, Roberto Casati, Paul Egré & Christophe Heintz (2010). Preface: The Review of Philosophy and Psychology. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (1):1-3.
    Preface: The Review of Philosophy and Psychology Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s13164-010-0024-1 Authors Dario Taraborelli, University of Surrey Centre for Research in Social Simulation Guilford GU2 7XH United Kingdom Roberto Casati, Institut Jean Nicod, Ecole Normale Supérieure 29 rue d’Ulm 75005 Paris France Paul Egré, Institut Jean Nicod, Ecole Normale Supérieure 29 rue d’Ulm 75005 Paris France Christophe Heintz, Central European University Budapest Hungary Journal Review of Philosophy and Psychology Online ISSN 1878-5166 Print ISSN 1878-5158 Journal Volume (...)
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  42.  56
    G. Fletcher (1995). Two Uses of Folk Psychology: Implications for Psychological Science. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):375-88.
    This article describes two uses of folk psychology in scientific psychology. Use 1 deals with the way in which folk theories and beliefs are imported into social psychological models on the basis that they exert causal influences on cognition or behavior (regardless of their validity or scientific usefulness). Use 2 describes the practice of mining elements from folk psychology for building an overarching psychological theory that goes beyond common sense (and assumes such elements are valid or scientifically useful). This distinction (...)
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  43.  13
    Brent D. Slife & Jeffrey S. Reber (2009). Is There a Pervasive Implicit Bias Against Theism in Psychology? Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):63-79.
    To address the title question, the authors first conceptualize the worldview of theism in relation to its historical counterpart in Western culture, naturalism. Many scholars view the worldview of naturalism as not only important to traditional science but also neutral to theism. This neutrality has long provided the justification for psychological science to inform and even correct theistic understandings. Still, this view of neutrality, as the authors show, stems from the presumption that these two worldviews are philosophically compatible. The authors’ (...)
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  44.  26
    George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (1988). How to Be Realistic About Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):69-81.
    Folk psychological realism is the view that folk psychology is true and that people really do have propositional attitudes, whereas anti-realism is the view that folk psychology is false and people really do not have propositional attitudes. We argue that anti-realism is not worthy of acceptance and that realism is eminently worthy of acceptance. However, it is plainly epistemically possible to favor either of two forms of folk realism: scientific or non-scientific. We argue that non-scientific realism, while perhaps unpopular among (...)
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  45.  1
    Gary Hatfield (2009). Psychology in Philosophy: Historical Perspectives. In Sara Heinamaa & Martina Reuter (eds.), Psychology and Philosophy: Inquiries into the Soul from Late Scholasticism to Contemporary Thought. Springer 1-25.
    The chapter examines some common assumptions regarding the shape of the history of theories of mind. It questions the conception that the Scientific Revolution resulted in placing the mind “outside of nature.” During the seventeenth century, the followers of Descartes routinely placed study of the mind, or, at least, mind–body interaction, within “physics” considered as a science of nature in general (and so including physics in the narrow sense, biology, and psychology). By the end of the eighteenth century, many authors (...)
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  46.  14
    Lester Embree (2008). The Nature and Role of Phenomenological Psychology in Alfred Schutz. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 39 (2):141-150.
    The essay reviews how phenomenological psychology can draw on Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology in order to clarify the foundations of the cultural sciences and then explicates the theory of this psychology implicit in Schutz's oeuvre. Max Weber has shown that all phenomena of the socio-cultural world originate in social interaction and can be referred to it. According to him, it is the central task of sociology to understand the meaning which the actor bestows on his action . But what (...)
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  47.  45
    Elizabeth Valentine (1988). Teleological Explanations and Their Relation to Causal Explanation in Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):61-68.
    The relation of teleological to causal explanations in psychology is examined. Nagel's claim that they are logically equivalent is rejected. Two arguments for their non-equivalence are considered: (i) the impossibility of specifying initial conditions in the case of teleological explanations and (ii) the claim that different kinds of logic are involved. The view that causal explanations provide only necessary conditions whereas teleological explanations provide sufficient conditions is rejected: causal explanations can provide sufficient conditions, typically being unable to provide necessary ones, (...)
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  48.  72
    Bill Wringe (2002). Is Folk Psychology a Lakatosian Research Program? Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):343-358.
    It has often been argued, by philosophers and more recently by developmental psychologists, that our common-sense conception of the mind should be regarded as a scientific theory. However, those who advance this view rarely say much about what they take a scientific theory to be. In this paper, I look at one specific proposal as to how we should interpret the theory view of folk psychology--namely, by seeing it as having a structure analogous to that of a Lakatosian research program. (...)
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  49.  70
    Bradley Franks (2005). The Role of "the Environment" in Cognitive and Evolutionary Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):59-82.
    Evolutionary psychology is widely understood as involving an integration of evolutionary theory and cognitive psychology, in which the former promises to revolutionise the latter. In this paper, I suggest some reasons to doubt that the assumptions of evolutionary theory and of cognitive psychology are as directly compatible as is widely assumed. These reasons relate to three different problems of specifying adaptive functions as the basis for characterising cognitive mechanisms: the disjunction problem, the grain problem (...)
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  50.  15
    Philip T. Dunwoody (2006). The Neglect of the Environment by Cognitive Psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 26 (1-2):139-153.
    In 1955, Egon Brunswik presented a paper in which he argued that neglect of the environment and over emphasis of the organism was the major downfall of cognitive psychology. His critiques have largely been ignored and research is discussed that demonstrates the same organismic- asymmetry Brunswik detailed in 1955. This research is discussed in attribution terms since experimental psychologists make behavioral attributions. This organismic-asymmetry has resulted in a body of research that is guilty of the fundamental attribution error. Brunswik's theory (...)
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