Search results for 'A Posteriori' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Tuomas E. Tahko (2011). A Priori and A Posteriori: A Bootstrapping Relationship. Metaphysica 12 (2):151-164.score: 240.0
    The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge has been the subject of an enormous amount of discussion, but the literature is biased against recognizing the intimate relationship between these forms of knowledge. For instance, it seems to be almost impossible to find a sample of pure a priori or a posteriori knowledge. In this paper, it will be suggested that distinguishing between a priori and a posteriori is more problematic than is often suggested, and that (...)
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  2. Tuomas E. Tahko (2009). On the Modal Content of A Posteriori Necessities. Theoria 75 (4):344-357.score: 240.0
    This paper challenges the Kripkean interpretation of a posteriori necessities. It will be demonstrated, by an analysis of classic examples, that the modal content of supposed a posteriori necessities is more complicated than the Kripkean line suggests. We will see that further research is needed concerning the a priori principles underlying all a posteriori necessities. In the course of this analysis it will emerge that the modal content of a posteriori necessities can be best described in (...)
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  3. Jason S. Baehr, A Priori and a Posteriori. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 240.0
    The terms "a priori" and "a posteriori" refer primarily to how or on what basis a proposition might be known. A proposition is knowable a priori if it is knowable independently of experience. A proposition is knowable a posteriori if it is knowable on the basis of experience. The a priori/a posteriori distinction is epistemological and should not be confused with the metaphysical distinction between the necessary and the contingent or the semantical or logical distinction between the (...)
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  4. Jeremy Fantl (2003). An Analysis of the a Priori and a Posteriori. Acta Analytica 18 (1-2):43-69.score: 240.0
    I present and defend a unified, non-reductive analysis of the a priori and a posteriori. It is a mistake to remove all epistemic conditions from the analysis of the a priori (as, for example, Alvin Goldman has recently suggested doing). We can keep epistemic conditions (like unrevisability) in the analysis as long as we insist that a priori and a posteriori justification admit of degrees. I recommend making the degree to which a belief’s justification is a priori or (...)
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  5. Asa Maria Wikforss & Soren Haggqvist (2007). Externalism and a Posteriori Semantics. Erkenntnis 67 (3):373 - 386.score: 240.0
    It is widely held that the meaning of certain types of terms, such as natural kind terms, is individuated externalistically, in terms of the individual's external environment. Recently a more radical thesis has emerged, a thesis we dub 'a posteriori semantics.' The suggestion is that not only does a term's meaning depend on the external environment, but so does its semantics. One motivation for this is the aim to account for cases where a putative natural kind term fails to (...)
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  6. Albert Casullo (2013). Four Challenges to the a Priori—a Posteriori Distinction. Synthese:1-24.score: 240.0
    During the past decade a new twist in the debate regarding the a priori has unfolded. A number of prominent epistemologists have challenged the coherence or importance of the a priori—a posteriori distinction or, alternatively, of the concept of a priori knowledge. My focus in this paper is on these new challenges to the a priori. My goals are to (1) provide a framework for organizing the challenges, (2) articulate and assess a range of the challenges, and (3) present (...)
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  7. Sören Häggqvist & Åsa Wikforss (2007). Externalism and a Posteriori Semantics. Erkenntnis 67 (3):373 - 386.score: 240.0
    It is widely held that the meaning of certain types of terms, such as natural kind terms, is individuated externalistically, in terms of the individual's external environment. Recently a more radical thesis has emerged, a thesis we dub 'a posteriori semantics.' The suggestion is that not only does a term's meaning depend on the external environment, but so does its semantics. One motivation for this is the aim to account for cases where a putative natural kind term fails to (...)
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  8. A. Posteriori (1998). Quentin Smith. In J. H. Fetzer & P. Humphreys (eds.), The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and its Origins. Kluwer. 270--137.score: 240.0
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  9. Kai-Yee Wong (2006). Two-Dimensionalism and Kripkean A Posteriori Necessity. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Josep Macià (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford University Press.score: 216.0
    The essence of the associated-proposition strategy is to distinguish the necessary proposition _expressed by_ a sentence.
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  10. Stephen Palmquist (1987). A Priori Knowledge in Perspective: Naming, Necessity and the Analytic a Posteriori. Review of Metaphysics 41 (2):255 - 282.score: 216.0
    This is the second in a two part series of articles that attempt to clarify the nature and enduring relevance of Kant's concept of a priori knowledge. (For Part I, see below.) In this article I focus mainly on Saul Kripke's critique of Kant, in Naming and Necessity. I argue that Kripke draws attention to a genuine defect in Kant's epistemological framework, but that he used definitions of certain key terms that were quite different from Kant's definitions. When Kripke's definitions (...)
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  11. Penelope Mackie (2002). Deep Contingency and Necessary a Posteriori Truth. Analysis 62 (3):225-236.score: 210.0
  12. Scott Soames (2006). Kripke, the Necessary a Posteriori, and the Two-Dimensionalist Heresy. In Garc (ed.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 272--292.score: 210.0
     
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  13. Daniel Dohrn (2011). Are There a Posteriori Conceptual Necessities? Philosophical Studies 155 (2):181-197.score: 192.0
    I critically assess Stephen Yablo’s claim that cassinis are ovals is an a posteriori conceptual necessity. One does not know it simply by mastering the relevant concepts but by substantial empirical scrutiny. Yablo represents narrow content by would have turned out -conditionals. An epistemic reading of such conditionals does not bear Yablo’s claim. Two metaphysically laden readings are considered. In one reading, Yablo’s conditionals test under what circumstances concepts remain the same while their extensions diverge. As an alternative, I (...)
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  14. Timothy Williamson, How Deep is the Distinction Between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge?score: 180.0
    The paper argues that, although a distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge (or justification) can be drawn, it is a superficial one, of little theoretical significance. The point is not that the distinction has borderline cases, for virtually all useful distinctions have such cases. Rather, it is argued by means of an example, the differences even between a clear case of a priori knowledge and a clear case of a posteriori knowledge may be superficial ones. In (...)
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  15. Karol Polcyn (2006). Conceivability, Possibility, and a Posteriori Necessity: On Chalmers' Argument for Dualism. Diametros 7 (March):37-55.score: 180.0
    Chalmers argues that zombies are possible and that therefore consciousness does not supervene on physical facts, which shows the falsity of materialism. The crucial step in this argument – that zombies are possible – follows from their conceivability and hence depends on assuming that conceivability implies possibility. But while Chalmers’s defense of this assumption – call it the conceivability principle – is the key part of his argument, it has not been well understood. As I see it, Chalmers’s defense of (...)
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  16. David Barnett (2002). Against a Posteriori Moral Naturalism. Philosophical Studies 107 (3):239 - 257.score: 180.0
    A posteriori Moral Naturalism posits a posteriorimoral/naturalistic identities. Versions of this view thatposit necessary identities purport to rely on theKripke/Putnam doctrine of scientific essentialism.Versions that posit only contingent identities requirethat moral terms are non-rigid designators. I argue thatmetaethics does not fall within the scope of scientificessentialism and that moral terms are not non-rigid designators.
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  17. Alexander Bird (2005). Unexpected a Posteriori Necessary Laws of Nature. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):533 – 548.score: 180.0
    In this paper I argue that it is not a priori that all the laws of nature are contingent. I assume that the fundamental laws are contingent and show that some non-trivial, a posteriori, non-basic laws may nonetheless be necessary in the sense of having no counterinstances in any possible world. I consider a law LS (such as 'salt dissolves in water') that concerns a substance S. Kripke's arguments concerning constitution show that the existence of S requires that a (...)
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  18. Chen Bo (2011). Proper Names, Contingency A Priori and Necessity A Posteriori. History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (2):119 - 138.score: 180.0
    After a brief review of the notions of necessity and a priority, this paper scrutinizes Kripke's arguments for supposedly contingent a priori propositions and necessary a posteriori propositions involving proper names, and reaches a negative conclusion, i.e. there are no such propositions, or at least the propositions Kripke gives as examples are not such propositions. All of us, including Kripke himself, still have to face the old question raised by Hume, i.e. how can we justify the necessity and universality (...)
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  19. Philip Goff (2011). A Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.score: 180.0
    Dualists say plausible things about our mental concepts: there is a way of thinking of pain, in terms of how it feels, which is independent of causal role. Physicalists make attractive ontological claims: the world is wholly physical. The attraction of a posteriori physicalism is that it has seemed to do both: to agree with the dualist about our mental concepts, whilst retaining a physicalist ontology. In this paper I argue that, in fact, a posteriori physicalism departs from (...)
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  20. Kathrin Glüer (2006). The Status of Charity I: Conceptual Truth or a Posteriori Necessity? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):337 – 359.score: 180.0
    According to Donald Davidson, linguistic meaning is determined by the principle of charity. Because of Davidson's semantic behaviourism, charity's significance is both epistemic and metaphysical: charity not only provides the radical interpreter with a method for constructing a semantic theory on the basis of his data, but it does so because it is the principle metaphysically determining meaning. In this paper, I assume that charity does determine meaning. On this assumption, I investigate both its epistemic and metaphysical status: is charity (...)
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  21. Curtis Brown (1984). The Necessary a Posteriori: A Response to Tichý. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 45 (3):379 - 397.score: 180.0
    Some of Tichý's conclusions rest on an assumption about substitutivity which Kripke would not accept. If we grant the assumption, then Tichý successfully shows that we can discover true identity statements involving names a priori, but not that we can discover a priori what properties things have essentially. Many of Tichý's arguments require an implausible rejection of the possibility of indirect belief as described in Section III. 25Are there necessary a posteriori propositions? I have argued that we certainly can (...)
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  22. Michael Watkins (2010). A Posteriori Primitivism. Philosophical Studies 150 (1):123 - 137.score: 180.0
    Recent criticisms of non-reductive accounts of color assume that the only arguments for such accounts are a priori arguments. I put forward a posteriori arguments for a non-reductive account of colors which avoids those criticisms.
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  23. Åsa Maria Wikforss (2003). An a Posteriori Conception of Analyticity? Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):119-139.score: 180.0
    At the time that Quine wrote "Two Dogmas" an attack on analyticity was considered a simultaneous attack on the very idea of necessary truth. This all changed with Kripke's revival of a non-epistemic, non-linguistic notion of necessity. My paper discusses the question whether we can take Kripke one step further and free analyticity from its epistemic ties, thereby reinstating a notion of analyticity that is immune to Quine's attack, and compatible with his epistemic holism. I discuss this question by examining (...)
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  24. Daniel Nolan (forthcoming). The A Posteriori Armchair. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-21.score: 180.0
    A lot of good philosophy is done in the armchair, but is nevertheless a posteriori. This paper clarifies and then defends that claim. Among the a posteriori activities done in the armchair are assembling and evaluating commonplaces; formulating theoretical alternatives; and integrating well-known past a posteriori discoveries. The activity that receives the most discussion, however, is the application of theoretical virtues to choose philosophical theories: the paper argues that much of this is properly seen as a (...). (shrink)
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  25. Peter Murphy (2008). Rewriting the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:279-284.score: 180.0
    The traditional way of drawing the a priori/a posteriori distinction, bequeathed to us by Kant, leads to overestimating the role that experience plays in justifying ourbeliefs. There is an irony in this: though Kant was in the rationalist camp, his way of drawing the distinction gives an unfair advantage to radical empiricism. I offer an alternative way of drawing the distinction, one that does not bias the rationalist/empiricist debate.
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  26. Don Dedrick (2003). Productance Physicalism and a Posteriori Necessity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):28-29.score: 180.0
    The problem of nonreflectors perceived as colored is the central problem for Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) physicalism. Vision scientists and other interested parties need to consider the motivation for their account of “productance physicalism.” Is B&H's theory motivated by scientific concerns or by philosophical interests intended to preserve a physicalist account of color as a posteriori necessary?
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  27. Steven Horst, New Semantics, Physicalism and a Posteriori Necessity.score: 180.0
    The New Semantics (NS) introduced by Kripke and Putnam is often thought to block antiphysicalist arguments that involve an inference from an explanatory gap to a failure of supervenience. But this “NS Rebuttal” depends upon two assumptions that are shown to be dubious. First, it assumes that mental-kind terms are among the kinds of terms to which NS analysis is properly applied. However, there are important differences in this regard between the behavior of notions like ‘pain’ and notions like ‘water’, (...)
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  28. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.score: 180.0
    Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this paper, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present (...)
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  29. Richard Swinburne (2013). A Posteriori Arguments for the Trinity. Studia Neoaristotelica 10 (1):13-27.score: 180.0
    There is a good a priori argument for the doctrine of the Trinity, from the need for any divine being to have another divine being to love suffi ciently to provide for him a third divine being whom to love and by whom to be loved. But most people who have believed the doctrine of the Trinity have believed it on the basis of the teaching of Jesus as interpreted by the church. The only reason for believing this teaching would (...)
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  30. Manuel Liz (2008). Substantive, a Posteriori, Type Disjunctivism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:165-170.score: 180.0
    Disjunctivism in philosophy of perception maintains that whereas veridical perceptions are relational states involving objects of the external world, illusions and hallucinations are non-relational states of the subjects. Veridical and non veridical perceptions could be subjectively indistinguishable, but this fact would not be able to support fundamental psychological explanations. Disjunctivism has to face some important problems. The aim of this paper is to explore a peculiar elaboration of disjunctivism able to face them. Our proposal intends to be substantive, offering a (...)
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  31. E. Diaz‐Leon (2014). Do a Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong? Ratio 27 (1):1-16.score: 180.0
    A posteriori physicalism is the combination of two appealing views: physicalism (i.e. the view that all facts are either physical or entailed by the physical), and conceptual dualism (i.e. the view that phenomenal truths are not entailed a priori by physical truths). Recently, some philosophers such as Goff (2011), Levine (2007) and Nida-Rümelin (2007), among others, have suggested that a posteriori physicalism cannot explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal the nature of phenomenal properties. In this paper, I wish (...)
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  32. Alexander Rueger (1998). Local Theories of Causation and the a Posteriori Identification of the Causal Relation. Erkenntnis 48 (1):27-40.score: 180.0
    The need to find an intrinsic characterization of what makes a relation between events causal arises not only in local theories of causation like Salmon's process theory but also in global approaches like Lewis' counterfactual theory. According to the localist intuition, whether a process connecting two events is causal should depend only on what goes on between the events, not on conditions that hold elsewhere in the world. If such intrinsic characterizations could be found, an identification of the causal relation (...)
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  33. Richard Swinburne (1991). Necessary a Posteriori Truth. American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (2):113 - 123.score: 180.0
    Two sentences express the same proposition if they are synonymous; they express the same statement if they attribute the same properties to the same objects at the same time (however objects and times are picked out). Neither propositions nor statements are necessary a posteriori. Suggested examples of the necessary a posteriori, such as "Hesperus is Phosphorus", or "water is H2O", only appear to be such because of a confusion between proposition and statement.
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  34. Ray Monk (2014). The Temptations of Phenomenology: Wittgenstein, the Synthetic a Priori and the 'Analytic a Posteriori'. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (3):312-340.score: 180.0
    (2014). The Temptations of Phenomenology: Wittgenstein, the Synthetic a Priori and the ‘Analytic a Posteriori’. International Journal of Philosophical Studies: Vol. 22, Continental Engagement with Analytic Philosophy, pp. 312-340. doi: 10.1080/09672559.2014.913884.
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  35. Peter Nicholls & Dan Passell (1985). Kripke's Contingent A Priori and Necessary A Posteriori. Philosophy Research Archives 11:481-489.score: 180.0
    We think that Kripke’s arguments that there are contingent a priori truths and that there are necessary a posteriori truths about named and essentially described entities fail. They fail for the reasons that there are ambiguities in each of the three eases. In the first ease, what is known apriori is not what is contingent. In the latter two cases, what is necessary or essential is not what is known a posteriori.
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  36. Daniel von Wachter (1996). Weshalb analytische Urteile kontingent und a posteriori sind. In A. Schramm (ed.), Philosophie in Österreich 1996. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky. 227-230.score: 180.0
    Analytic judgements are contingent and a posteriori.
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  37. Michaelis Michael (1998). Tichý on Kripke on A Posteriori Necessities. Philosophical Studies 92 (1/2):113 - 126.score: 180.0
    In Tichy's influential attack, a number of egregious errors are attributed to Kripke's seminal distinction of epistemic and metaphysical dimensions in meaning. I argue that Tichy's work is based on important misunderstandings. In particular Tichy attributes to Kripke the mistaken view that it is propositions, that is sets of worlds, which are the proper object of the appellation "a priori" and "a posteriori". I show that this is a mistaken attribution. Further, I argue that propositions cannot be uniquely associated (...)
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  38. Irwin Goldstein (2004). Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities. In Maite Ezcurdia, Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind. University of Calgary Press. 261-273.score: 174.0
    Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. Opposing (...)
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  39. M. J. Garcia-Encinas (2012). On Categories and A Posteriori Necessity: A Phenomenological Echo. Metaphilosophy 43 (1-2):147-164.score: 168.0
    This article argues for two related theses. First, it defends a general thesis: any kind of necessity, including metaphysical necessity, can only be known a priori. Second, however, it also argues that the sort of a priori involved in modal metaphysical knowledge is not related to imagination or any sort of so-called epistemic possibility. Imagination is neither a proof of possibility nor a limit to necessity. Rather, modal metaphysical knowledge is built on intuition of philosophical categories and the structures they (...)
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  40. Paul Noordhof (2005). The Transmogrification of a Posteriori Knowledge: Reply to Brueckner. Analysis 65 (285):88-89.score: 162.0
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  41. Marc A. Moffett (2010). Against a Posteriori Functionalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):pp. 83-106.score: 162.0
    There are two constraints on any functionalist solution to the Mind-Body Problem construed as an answer to the question, “What is the relationship between the mental properties and relations (hereafter, simply the mental properties) and physical properties and relations?” The first constraint is that it must actually address the Mind-Body Problem and not simply redefine the debate in terms of other, more tractable, properties (e.g., the species-specific property of having human-pain). Such moves can be seen to be spurious by the (...)
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  42. Alexander Bird (2007). A Posteriori Knowledge of Natural Kind Essences. Philosophical Topics 35 (1-2):293-312.score: 156.0
    I defend this claim that some natural essences can be known (only) a pos- teriori against two philosophers who accept essentialism but who hold that essences are known a priori: Joseph LaPorte, who argues from the use of kind terms in science, and E. J. Lowe, who argues from general metaphysical and epistemological principles.
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  43. Albert Casullo, Articulating the A Priori-A Posteriori Distinction.score: 156.0
    It seems to me that discussions of the past decades have made clear how intricate and complex the classical notion of the a priori is, and neither the Strong conception nor the Weak conception (nor anything else) can provide a coherent explication. (Kitcher 2000.
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  44. Marc Moffett (2010). Against A Posteriori Functionalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):83-106.score: 156.0
    There are two constraints on any functionalist solution to the Mind-Body Problem construed as an answer to the question, “What is the relationship between the mental properties and relations (hereafter, simply the mental properties) and physical properties and relations?” The first constraint is that it must actually address the Mind-Body Problem and not simply redefine the debate in terms of other, more tractable, properties (e.g., the species-specific property of having human-pain). Such moves can be seen to be spurious by the (...)
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  45. Tom Polger, A Posteriori Physicalism.score: 156.0
    A consideration of the benefits of taking physicalism to be necessarily true if true, against the standard view that physicalism is at best contingently true. Presented at the 2006 Central Division meeting of the APA, in the session Themes from Jaegwon Kim, sponsored by the Society for Asian and Asian-American Philosophy.
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  46. José A. Benardete (1958). The Analytic a Posteriori and the Foundations of Metaphysics. Journal of Philosophy 55 (12):503-514.score: 156.0
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  47. John A. Bailey (1978). Are Value Judgments Synthetic a Posteriori? Ethics 89 (1):35-57.score: 156.0
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  48. Daniel Stoljar (2000). Physicalism and the Necessary A Posteriori. Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):33-55.score: 150.0
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  49. E. J. Lowe (2007). A Problem for a Posteriori Essentialism Concerning Natural Kinds. Analysis 67 (296):286–292.score: 150.0
  50. Alexander Bird (2008). Lowe on a Posteriori Essentialism. Analysis 68 (4):336 - 344.score: 150.0
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