Search results for 'A Posteriori' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Tuomas E. Tahko (2011). A Priori and A Posteriori: A Bootstrapping Relationship. Metaphysica 12 (2):151-164.
    The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge has been the subject of an enormous amount of discussion, but the literature is biased against recognizing the intimate relationship between these forms of knowledge. For instance, it seems to be almost impossible to find a sample of pure a priori or a posteriori knowledge. In this paper, it will be suggested that distinguishing between a priori and a posteriori is more problematic than is often suggested, and that (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2. Sören Häggqvist & Åsa Wikforss (2007). Externalism and a Posteriori Semantics. Erkenntnis 67 (3):373 - 386.
    It is widely held that the meaning of certain types of terms, such as natural kind terms, is individuated externalistically, in terms of the individual's external environment. Recently a more radical thesis has emerged, a thesis we dub 'a posteriori semantics.' The suggestion is that not only does a term's meaning depend on the external environment, but so does its semantics. One motivation for this is the aim to account for cases where a putative natural kind term fails to (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  3. Tuomas E. Tahko (2009). On the Modal Content of A Posteriori Necessities. Theoria 75 (4):344-357.
    This paper challenges the Kripkean interpretation of a posteriori necessities. It will be demonstrated, by an analysis of classic examples, that the modal content of supposed a posteriori necessities is more complicated than the Kripkean line suggests. We will see that further research is needed concerning the a priori principles underlying all a posteriori necessities. In the course of this analysis it will emerge that the modal content of a posteriori necessities can be best described in (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  4. Albert Casullo (2013). Four Challenges to the a Priori—a Posteriori Distinction. Synthese 192 (9):1-24.
    During the past decade a new twist in the debate regarding the a priori has unfolded. A number of prominent epistemologists have challenged the coherence or importance of the a priori—a posteriori distinction or, alternatively, of the concept of a priori knowledge. My focus in this paper is on these new challenges to the a priori. My goals are to (1) provide a framework for organizing the challenges, (2) articulate and assess a range of the challenges, and (3) present (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5. Jason S. Baehr (2003). A Priori and a Posteriori. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The terms "a priori" and "a posteriori" refer primarily to how or on what basis a proposition might be known. A proposition is knowable a priori if it is knowable independently of experience. A proposition is knowable a posteriori if it is knowable on the basis of experience. The a priori/a posteriori distinction is epistemological and should not be confused with the metaphysical distinction between the necessary and the contingent or the semantical or logical distinction between the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6. Jeremy Fantl (2003). An Analysis of the a Priori and a Posteriori. Acta Analytica 18 (1-2):43-69.
    I present and defend a unified, non-reductive analysis of the a priori and a posteriori. It is a mistake to remove all epistemic conditions from the analysis of the a priori (as, for example, Alvin Goldman has recently suggested doing). We can keep epistemic conditions (like unrevisability) in the analysis as long as we insist that a priori and a posteriori justification admit of degrees. I recommend making the degree to which a belief’s justification is a priori or (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  65
    Graham Oppy (1994). Salmon on the Contingent a Priori and the Necessary a Posteriori. Philosophical Studies 73 (1):5 - 33.
    This paper is an examination of the contingent a priori and the necessary a posteriori. In particular, it considers -- and assesses -- the criticisms that Nathan Salmon makes of the views of Saul Kripke.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  8.  2
    Jacob Archambault (2014). Aquinas, the a Priori/a Posteriori Distinction, and the Kantian Dependency Thesis. Religious Studies 50 (2):175-192.
    This article re-examines the applicability of Kant's dependency thesis to Aquinas’ cosmological proofs for the existence of God. The first part of the article provides a summary of Kant's dependency thesis, followed by a review of a defence of Aquinas by J. William Forgie. The second part of the article explains some of the logical apparatus upon which Aquinas’ argument hinges – specifically his understanding of the a priori/a posteriori distinction. I conclude by calling attention to certain distinct metaphysical (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  1
    Anubav Vasudevan (2013). On the a Priori and a Posteriori Assessment of Probabilities. Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):440-451.
    We argue that in spite of their apparent dissimilarity, the methodologies employed in the a priori and a posteriori assessment of probabilities can both be justified by appeal to a single principle of inductive reasoning, viz., the principle of symmetry. The difference between these two methodologies consists in the way in which information about the single-trial probabilities in a repeatable chance process is extracted from the constraints imposed by this principle. In the case of a posteriori reasoning, these (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. A. Posteriori (1998). Quentin Smith. In J. H. Fetzer & P. Humphreys (eds.), The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and its Origins. Kluwer 270--137.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Stephen Palmquist (1987). A Priori Knowledge in Perspective: Naming, Necessity and the Analytic a Posteriori. Review of Metaphysics 41 (2):255 - 282.
    This is the second in a two part series of articles that attempt to clarify the nature and enduring relevance of Kant's concept of a priori knowledge. (For Part I, see below.) In this article I focus mainly on Saul Kripke's critique of Kant, in Naming and Necessity. I argue that Kripke draws attention to a genuine defect in Kant's epistemological framework, but that he used definitions of certain key terms that were quite different from Kant's definitions. When Kripke's definitions (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Kai-Yee Wong (2006). Two-Dimensionalism and Kripkean A Posteriori Necessity. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Josep Macià (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford University Press
    The essence of the associated-proposition strategy is to distinguish the necessary proposition _expressed by_ a sentence.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Penelope Mackie (2002). Deep Contingency and Necessary a Posteriori Truth. Analysis 62 (3):225-236.
  14. Scott Soames (2006). Kripke, the Necessary a Posteriori, and the Two-Dimensionalist Heresy. In Garc (ed.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press 272--292.
  15. Andreas Elpidorou (2015). A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16. Timothy Williamson (2013). How Deep is the Distinction Between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge? In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The A Priori in Philosophy. Oxford University Press 291-312.
    The paper argues that, although a distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge (or justification) can be drawn, it is a superficial one, of little theoretical significance. The point is not that the distinction has borderline cases, for virtually all useful distinctions have such cases. Rather, it is argued by means of an example, the differences even between a clear case of a priori knowledge and a clear case of a posteriori knowledge may be superficial ones. In (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  17. Philip Goff (2011). A Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.
    Dualists say plausible things about our mental concepts: there is a way of thinking of pain, in terms of how it feels, which is independent of causal role. Physicalists make attractive ontological claims: the world is wholly physical. The attraction of a posteriori physicalism is that it has seemed to do both: to agree with the dualist about our mental concepts, whilst retaining a physicalist ontology. In this paper I argue that, in fact, a posteriori physicalism departs from (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   21 citations  
  18. Daniel Dohrn (2011). Are There a Posteriori Conceptual Necessities? Philosophical Studies 155 (2):181-197.
    I critically assess Stephen Yablo’s claim that cassinis are ovals is an a posteriori conceptual necessity. One does not know it simply by mastering the relevant concepts but by substantial empirical scrutiny. Yablo represents narrow content by would have turned out -conditionals. An epistemic reading of such conditionals does not bear Yablo’s claim. Two metaphysically laden readings are considered. In one reading, Yablo’s conditionals test under what circumstances concepts remain the same while their extensions diverge. As an alternative, I (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  70
    E. Diaz‐Leon (2014). Do a Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong? Ratio 27 (1):1-16.
    A posteriori physicalism is the combination of two appealing views: physicalism (i.e. the view that all facts are either physical or entailed by the physical), and conceptual dualism (i.e. the view that phenomenal truths are not entailed a priori by physical truths). Recently, some philosophers such as Goff (2011), Levine (2007) and Nida-Rümelin (2007), among others, have suggested that a posteriori physicalism cannot explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal the nature of phenomenal properties. In this paper, I wish (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  20.  13
    Andreas Elpidorou (2015). A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21.  7
    Andreas Elpidorou (2015). A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22.  5
    Andreas Elpidorou (2015). A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23. Daniel Nolan (2015). The A Posteriori Armchair. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):211-231.
    A lot of good philosophy is done in the armchair, but is nevertheless a posteriori. This paper clarifies and then defends that claim. Among the a posteriori activities done in the armchair are assembling and evaluating commonplaces; formulating theoretical alternatives; and integrating well-known past a posteriori discoveries. The activity that receives the most discussion, however, is the application of theoretical virtues to choose philosophical theories: the paper argues that much of this is properly seen as a (...). (shrink)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24.  71
    Michael Watkins (2010). A Posteriori Primitivism. Philosophical Studies 150 (1):123 - 137.
    Recent criticisms of non-reductive accounts of color assume that the only arguments for such accounts are a priori arguments. I put forward a posteriori arguments for a non-reductive account of colors which avoids those criticisms.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  25.  53
    Ray Monk (2014). The Temptations of Phenomenology: Wittgenstein, the Synthetic a Priori and the 'Analytic a Posteriori'. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (3):312-340.
    (2014). The Temptations of Phenomenology: Wittgenstein, the Synthetic a Priori and the ‘Analytic a Posteriori’. International Journal of Philosophical Studies: Vol. 22, Continental Engagement with Analytic Philosophy, pp. 312-340. doi: 10.1080/09672559.2014.913884.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26. Alexander Bird (2005). Unexpected a Posteriori Necessary Laws of Nature. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):533 – 548.
    In this paper I argue that it is not a priori that all the laws of nature are contingent. I assume that the fundamental laws are contingent and show that some non-trivial, a posteriori, non-basic laws may nonetheless be necessary in the sense of having no counterinstances in any possible world. I consider a law LS (such as 'salt dissolves in water') that concerns a substance S. Kripke's arguments concerning constitution show that the existence of S requires that a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  27. Kathrin Glüer (2006). The Status of Charity I: Conceptual Truth or a Posteriori Necessity? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):337 – 359.
    According to Donald Davidson, linguistic meaning is determined by the principle of charity. Because of Davidson's semantic behaviourism, charity's significance is both epistemic and metaphysical: charity not only provides the radical interpreter with a method for constructing a semantic theory on the basis of his data, but it does so because it is the principle metaphysically determining meaning. In this paper, I assume that charity does determine meaning. On this assumption, I investigate both its epistemic and metaphysical status: is charity (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28.  23
    Robert J. Howell (2015). The Physicalist's Tight Squeeze: A Posteriori Physicalism Vs. A Priori Physicalism. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):905-913.
    Both a priori physicalism and a posteriori physicalism combine a metaphysical and an epistemological thesis. They agree about the metaphysical thesis: our world is wholly physical. Most agree that this requires everything that there is must be necessitated by the sort of truths described by physics. If we call the conjunction of the basic truths of physics P, all physicalists agree that P entails for any truth Q. Where they disagree is whether or not this entailment can be known (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  57
    Erin Eaker (2014). Kripke's Sole Route to the Necessary a Posteriori. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):388-406.
    In ‘Kripke on epistemic and metaphysical possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori’, Scott Soames identifies two arguments for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths in Naming and Necessity . He argues that Kripke's second argument relies on either of two principles, each of which leads to contradiction. He also claims that it has led to ‘two-dimensionalist’ approaches to the necessary a posteriori which are fundamentally at odds with the insights about meaning and modality expressed (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Karol Polcyn (2006). Conceivability, Possibility, and a Posteriori Necessity: On Chalmers' Argument for Dualism. Diametros 7 (March):37-55.
    Chalmers argues that zombies are possible and that therefore consciousness does not supervene on physical facts, which shows the falsity of materialism. The crucial step in this argument – that zombies are possible – follows from their conceivability and hence depends on assuming that conceivability implies possibility. But while Chalmers’s defense of this assumption – call it the conceivability principle – is the key part of his argument, it has not been well understood. As I see it, Chalmers’s defense of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  82
    Richard Swinburne (2013). A Posteriori Arguments for the Trinity. Studia Neoaristotelica 10 (1):13-27.
    There is a good a priori argument for the doctrine of the Trinity, from the need for any divine being to have another divine being to love suffi ciently to provide for him a third divine being whom to love and by whom to be loved. But most people who have believed the doctrine of the Trinity have believed it on the basis of the teaching of Jesus as interpreted by the church. The only reason for believing this teaching would (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. David Barnett (2002). Against a Posteriori Moral Naturalism. Philosophical Studies 107 (3):239 - 257.
    A posteriori Moral Naturalism posits a posteriorimoral/naturalistic identities. Versions of this view thatposit necessary identities purport to rely on theKripke/Putnam doctrine of scientific essentialism.Versions that posit only contingent identities requirethat moral terms are non-rigid designators. I argue thatmetaethics does not fall within the scope of scientificessentialism and that moral terms are not non-rigid designators.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Chen Bo (2011). Proper Names, Contingency A Priori and Necessity A Posteriori. History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (2):119 - 138.
    After a brief review of the notions of necessity and a priority, this paper scrutinizes Kripke's arguments for supposedly contingent a priori propositions and necessary a posteriori propositions involving proper names, and reaches a negative conclusion, i.e. there are no such propositions, or at least the propositions Kripke gives as examples are not such propositions. All of us, including Kripke himself, still have to face the old question raised by Hume, i.e. how can we justify the necessity and universality (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  44
    M. J. García-encinas (2003). A Posteriori Necessity in Singular Causation and the Humean Argument. Dialectica 57 (1):41–55.
    The absence of a necessary connection in singular causation is a key step in the Humean argument against any form of necessity in causation. I argue that Hume's defence of this step is unsuccessful, and that the step could be skipped, accepting the possibility of necessary a posteriori truths. Still this does not suffice to guarantee a necessary connection in singular causation. Necessary a posteriori truths should be backed by necessary a priori truths. Thus, a main object of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  35.  5
    Joshua Rosaler, Reduction as an A Posteriori Relation.
    Reduction between theories in physics is often approached as an a priori relation in the sense that reduction is often taken to depend only on a comparison of the mathematical structures of two theories. I argue that such approaches fail to capture one crucial sense of “reduction,” whereby one theory encompasses the set of real behaviors that are well-modeled by the other. Reduction in this sense depends not only on the mathematical structures of the theories, but also on empirical facts (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  91
    Peter Murphy (2008). Rewriting the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:279-284.
    The traditional way of drawing the a priori/a posteriori distinction, bequeathed to us by Kant, leads to overestimating the role that experience plays in justifying ourbeliefs. There is an irony in this: though Kant was in the rationalist camp, his way of drawing the distinction gives an unfair advantage to radical empiricism. I offer an alternative way of drawing the distinction, one that does not bias the rationalist/empiricist debate.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  74
    Åsa Maria Wikforss (2003). An a Posteriori Conception of Analyticity? Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):119-139.
    At the time that Quine wrote "Two Dogmas" an attack on analyticity was considered a simultaneous attack on the very idea of necessary truth. This all changed with Kripke's revival of a non-epistemic, non-linguistic notion of necessity. My paper discusses the question whether we can take Kripke one step further and free analyticity from its epistemic ties, thereby reinstating a notion of analyticity that is immune to Quine's attack, and compatible with his epistemic holism. I discuss this question by examining (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  38.  30
    Alexander Rueger (1998). Local Theories of Causation and the a Posteriori Identification of the Causal Relation. Erkenntnis 48 (1):27-40.
    The need to find an intrinsic characterization of what makes a relation between events causal arises not only in local theories of causation like Salmon's process theory but also in global approaches like Lewis' counterfactual theory. According to the localist intuition, whether a process connecting two events is causal should depend only on what goes on between the events, not on conditions that hold elsewhere in the world. If such intrinsic characterizations could be found, an identification of the causal relation (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  39.  88
    Steven Horst, New Semantics, Physicalism and a Posteriori Necessity.
    The New Semantics (NS) introduced by Kripke and Putnam is often thought to block antiphysicalist arguments that involve an inference from an explanatory gap to a failure of supervenience. But this “NS Rebuttal” depends upon two assumptions that are shown to be dubious. First, it assumes that mental-kind terms are among the kinds of terms to which NS analysis is properly applied. However, there are important differences in this regard between the behavior of notions like ‘pain’ and notions like ‘water’, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  4
    Albert Casullo (2015). Four Challenges to the a Priori—a Posteriori Distinction. Synthese 192 (9):2701-2724.
    During the past decade a new twist in the debate regarding the a priori has unfolded. A number of prominent epistemologists have challenged the coherence or importance of the a priori—a posteriori distinction or, alternatively, of the concept of a priori knowledge. My focus in this paper is on these new challenges to the a priori. My goals are to provide a framework for organizing the challenges, articulate and assess a range of the challenges, and present two challenges of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  81
    Curtis Brown (1984). The Necessary a Posteriori: A Response to Tichý. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 45 (3):379 - 397.
    Some of Tichý's conclusions rest on an assumption about substitutivity which Kripke would not accept. If we grant the assumption, then Tichý successfully shows that we can discover true identity statements involving names a priori, but not that we can discover a priori what properties things have essentially. Many of Tichý's arguments require an implausible rejection of the possibility of indirect belief as described in Section III. 25Are there necessary a posteriori propositions? I have argued that we certainly can (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  12
    Michaelis Michael (1998). Tichý on Kripke on A Posteriori Necessities. Philosophical Studies 92 (1/2):113 - 126.
    In Tichy's influential attack, a number of egregious errors are attributed to Kripke's seminal distinction of epistemic and metaphysical dimensions in meaning. I argue that Tichy's work is based on important misunderstandings. In particular Tichy attributes to Kripke the mistaken view that it is propositions, that is sets of worlds, which are the proper object of the appellation "a priori" and "a posteriori". I show that this is a mistaken attribution. Further, I argue that propositions cannot be uniquely associated (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  43.  35
    Manuel Liz (2008). Substantive, a Posteriori, Type Disjunctivism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:165-170.
    Disjunctivism in philosophy of perception maintains that whereas veridical perceptions are relational states involving objects of the external world, illusions and hallucinations are non-relational states of the subjects. Veridical and non veridical perceptions could be subjectively indistinguishable, but this fact would not be able to support fundamental psychological explanations. Disjunctivism has to face some important problems. The aim of this paper is to explore a peculiar elaboration of disjunctivism able to face them. Our proposal intends to be substantive, offering a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  61
    Don Dedrick (2003). Productance Physicalism and a Posteriori Necessity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):28-29.
    The problem of nonreflectors perceived as colored is the central problem for Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) physicalism. Vision scientists and other interested parties need to consider the motivation for their account of “productance physicalism.” Is B&H's theory motivated by scientific concerns or by philosophical interests intended to preserve a physicalist account of color as a posteriori necessary?
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  27
    Richard Swinburne (1991). Necessary a Posteriori Truth. American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (2):113 - 123.
    Two sentences express the same proposition if they are synonymous; they express the same statement if they attribute the same properties to the same objects at the same time (however objects and times are picked out). Neither propositions nor statements are necessary a posteriori. Suggested examples of the necessary a posteriori, such as "Hesperus is Phosphorus", or "water is H2O", only appear to be such because of a confusion between proposition and statement.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  46.  2
    Rafael Miranda Rojas (2016). A Posteriori Necessary Sentences, Weak Necessity and Rationalism. Ideas Y Valores 65 (160):49-74.
    Se afirma que los enunciados necesarios a posteriori, propuestos por S. Kripke, exigen una comprensión débil de la necesidad; esto quiere decir: a) existencia contingente del designatum y b) dependencia racionalista en principios lógicos a priori, particularmente los de diferencia y de identidad. La principal consecuencia es que los enunciados necesarios a posteriori corresponden a instancias de dichos principios lógicos. Contrario al racionalismo, esto no exige que dichos enunciados sean a priori, pues su justificación requiere información empírica. Finalmente, (...)
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  31
    Peter Nicholls & Dan Passell (1985). Kripke's Contingent A Priori and Necessary A Posteriori. Philosophy Research Archives 11:481-489.
    We think that Kripke’s arguments that there are contingent a priori truths and that there are necessary a posteriori truths about named and essentially described entities fail. They fail for the reasons that there are ambiguities in each of the three eases. In the first ease, what is known apriori is not what is contingent. In the latter two cases, what is necessary or essential is not what is known a posteriori.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  14
    Daniel von Wachter (1996). Weshalb analytische Urteile kontingent und a posteriori sind. In A. Schramm (ed.), Philosophie in Österreich 1996. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 227-230.
    Analytic judgements are contingent and a posteriori.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  2
    Andrew Cutrofello (1997). Imagining Otherwise: Metapsychology and the Analytic a Posteriori. Northwestern University Press.
    This work sets out to perform a psychoanalytic inversion of transcendental philosophy, taking Kant's synthetic a priori judgments and reading them in terms of a foreclosed Kantian category, that of the analytic a posteriori.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Hans de Nivelle (2000). Deciding the E+-Class by an a Posteriori, Liftable Order. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 104 (1-3):219-232.
    We show that the E + -class can be decided by resolution using a liftable order, when the order is applied a posteriori. This is a surprising result, because the decision procedure for the E + -class was one of the motivations for the study of non-liftable orders. Also surprising is the behaviour of the resolution process. Initially the maximal depth at which a variable occurs can increase, but it will not increase more than a certain bound. We do (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000