Search results for 'A priori thesis' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. I. Rey’S. Reliablist A. Priori (1998). Naturalism and the A Priori. Philosophical Studies 92:45-65.score: 1080.0
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  2. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2013). Empirical Evidence Claims Are a Priori. Synthese 190 (14):2821-2834.score: 393.0
    This paper responds to Achinstein’s criticism of the thesis that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim such as ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e. It shows that cases involving evidential flaws, which form the basis for Achinstein’s objections to the thesis, can satisfactorily be accounted for by appeal to changes in background information and working assumptions. The paper also argues (...)
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  3. Frederick Eberhardt (2011). Reliability Via Synthetic a Priori: Reichenbach's Doctoral Thesis on Probability. Synthese 181 (1):125 - 136.score: 348.0
    Hans Reichenbach is well known for his limiting frequency view of probability, with his most thorough account given in The Theory of Probability in 1935/1949. Perhaps less known are Reichenbach's early views on probability and its epistemology. In his doctoral thesis from 1915, Reichenbach espouses a Kantian view of probability, where the convergence limit of an empirical frequency distribution is guaranteed to exist thanks to the synthetic a priori principle of lawful distribution. Reichenbach claims to have given a (...)
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  4. Sören Häggqvist (2007). The A Priori Thesis. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):47-61.score: 306.0
    Recent debates about thought experiments have focused on a perceived epistemological problem: how do thought experiments manage to provide knowledge when they yield no new empirical data? A bold answer to this question is provided by James Robert Brown’s platonisrn, according to which a certain class of thought experiments allow a sort of intellectual perception of laws of nature, understood as relations between universals. I suggest that there are three main problems with platonism. First, it is restricted to a very (...)
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  5. Hamid Vahid (2013). Skepticism, A Priori Skepticism, and the Possibility of Error. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (4):235-252.score: 300.0
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  6. Lisa Warenski (2009). Naturalism, Fallibilism, and the a Priori. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403 - 426.score: 297.0
    This paper argues that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism—if the a priori is understood in a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept. I argue that empirical indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a priori; however, the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted in such a way that we can be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a priori (...)
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  7. Glen Hoffmann (2012). Infallible A Priori Self-Justifying Propositions. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):55-68.score: 297.0
    On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified, i.e., justified in a way that is truth-entailing. In this paper, I examine the second thesis of rationalist infallibilism, what might be called ‘synthetic a priori infallibilism’. Exploring the seemingly only potentially plausible species of synthetic a priori infallibility, I reject the infallible justification of so-called self-justifying propositions.
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  8. D. Gene Witmer (2006). How to Be a (Sort of) A Priori Physicalist. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):185-225.score: 297.0
    What has come to be known as “a priori physicalism” is the thesis, roughly, that the non-physical truths in the actual world can be deduced a priori from a complete physical description of the actual world. To many contemporary philosophers, a priori physicalism seems extremely implausible. In this paper I distinguish two kinds of a priori physicalism. One sort – strict a priori physicalism – I reject as both unmotivated and implausible. The other sort (...)
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  9. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2006). Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of the World: Why Privileged Access is Not the Issue. Dialectica 60 (4):433-445.score: 297.0
    I look at incompatibilist arguments aimed at showing that the conjunction of the thesis that a subject has privileged, a priori access to the contents of her own thoughts, on the one hand, and of semantic externalism, on the other, lead to a putatively absurd conclusion, namely, a priori knowledge of the external world. I focus on arguments involving a variety of externalism resulting from the singularity or object-dependence of certain terms such as the demonstrative ‘that’. McKinsey (...)
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  10. Mikael Janvid (2008). The Experiential Defeasibility and Overdetermination of A Priori Justification. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:271-278.score: 297.0
    In a recent and interesting paper “Experientially Defeasible A Priori Justification,” Joshua Thurow argues that many a priori justified beliefs are defeasible by experience. The argument takes the form of an objection against Albert Casullo’s recent book, A Priori Justification, where Casullo, according to Thurow, denies that if a justified belief is non-experientially defeasible, then that belief is also experientially defeasible. This paper critically examines Thurow’s two arguments in the first two sections I–II. In the last section, (...)
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  11. E. Diaz-Leon (2011). Reductive Explanation, Concepts, and a Priori Entailment. Philosophical Studies 155 (1):99-116.score: 291.0
    In this paper I examine Chalmers and Jackson’s defence of the a <span class='Hi'>priori</span> entailment thesis, that is, the claim that microphysical truths a <span class='Hi'>priori</span> entail ordinary non-phenomenal truths such as ‘water covers 60% of the Earth surface’, which they use as a premise for an argument against the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness. Their argument relies on a certain view about the possession conditions of macroscopic concepts such as WATER, known as ascriptivism. In (...)
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  12. Adrian Boutel (2013). How to Be a Type-C Physicalist. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):301-320.score: 288.0
    This paper advances a version of physicalism which reconciles the “a priori entailment thesis” (APET) with the analytic independence of our phenomenal and physical vocabularies. The APET is the claim that, if physicalism is true, the complete truths of physics imply every other truth a priori. If so, “cosmic hermeneutics” is possible: a demon having only complete knowledge of physics could deduce every truth about the world. Analytic independence is a popular physicalist explanation for the apparent “epistemic (...)
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  13. Jacob Archambault (2013). Aquinas, the a Priori/a Posteriori Distinction, and the Kantian Dependency Thesis. Religious Studies:1-18.score: 270.0
    This article re-examines the applicability of Kant's dependency thesis to Aquinas argument hinges respective logical apparatus that would have to be addressed prior to the more specific question of whether Kant's critique of the cosmological argument is applicable to Aquinas.
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  14. Paul A. Boghossian (1997). What the Externalist Can Know A Priori. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (2):161-75.score: 255.0
    Controversy continues to attach to the question whether an externalism about mental content is compatible with a traditional doctrine of privileged self-knowledge. By an externalism about mental content, I mean the view that what concepts our thoughts involve may depend not only on facts that are internal to us, but on facts about our environment. It is worth emphasizing, if only because it is still occasionally misperceived, that this thesis is supposed to apply at the level of sense and (...)
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  15. Oliver A. Johnson (1960). Denial of the Synthetic "A Priori". Philosophy 35 (134):255 - 264.score: 222.0
    In his essay “Logical Empiricism”, in the anthology Twentieth Century Philosophy, Professor Feigl writes: “All forms of empiricism agree in repudiating the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge.” Schlick makes the same point even more forcibly: “The empiricism which I represent believes itself to be clear on the point that, as a matter of principle, all propositions are either synthetic a posteriori or tautologous; synthetic a priori propositions seem to it to be a logical impossibility.” The denial of (...)
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  16. Peter Achinstein (1995). Are Empirical Evidence Claims a Priori? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):447-473.score: 216.0
    An a priori thesis about evidence, defended by many, states that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim of the form ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e; all other considerations are a priori. By examining cases involving evidential flaws, I challange this claim and defend an empirical concept of evidence. In accordance with such a concept, whether, and the extent (...)
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  17. Joachim Horvath (2009). The Modal Argument for a Priori Justification. Ratio 22 (2):191-205.score: 213.0
    Kant famously argued that, from experience, we can only learn how something actually is, but not that it must be so. In this paper, I defend an improved version of Kant's argument for the existence of a priori knowledge, the Modal Argument , against recent objections by Casullo and Kitcher. For the sake of the argument, I concede Casullo's claim that we may know certain counterfactuals in an empirical way and thereby gain epistemic access to some nearby, nomologically possible (...)
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  18. Daniel Howard-Snyder & John Hawthorne (1994). On the a Priori Rejection of Evidential Arguments From Evil. Sophia:33-47.score: 213.0
    Recent work on the evidential argument from evil offers us sundry considerations which are intended to weigh against this form of atheological arguments. By far the most provocative is that on a priori grounds alone, evil can be shown to be evidentially impotent. This astonishing thesis has been given a vigorous defense by Keith Yandell. In this paper, we shall measure the prospects for an a priori dismissal of evidential arguments from evil.
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  19. Elliott Sober (2011). A Priori Causal Models of Natural Selection. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):571 - 589.score: 213.0
    To evaluate Hume's thesis that causal claims are always empirical, I consider three kinds of causal statement: ?e1 caused e2 ?, ?e1 promoted e2 ?, and ?e1 would promote e2 ?. Restricting my attention to cases in which ?e1 occurred? and ?e2 occurred? are both empirical, I argue that Hume was right about the first two, but wrong about the third. Standard causal models of natural selection that have this third form are a priori mathematical truths. Some are (...)
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  20. Heimir Geirsson (1991). The Contingent a Priori: Kripke's Two Types of Examples. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2):195 – 205.score: 213.0
    In Naming and Necessity' Saul A. Kripke gives two types of examples of contingent truths knowable a priori. So he disagrees with the first leg of the thesis. As we will see later, his examples depend on the direct designation theory of names. While there have been attempts to provide examples of the contingent a priori that do not depend on that theory, most of those examples should be viewed as expansions, or modifications, of Kripke's examples. Philip (...)
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  21. Marc Lange & Alexander Rosenberg (2011). Can There Be A Priori Causal Models of Natural Selection? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):591 - 599.score: 213.0
    Sober 2011 argues that, contrary to Hume, some causal statements can be known a priori to be true?notably, some ?would promote? statements figuring in causal models of natural selection. We find Sober's argument unconvincing. We regard the Humean thesis as denying that causal explanations contain any a priori knowable statements specifying certain features of events to be causally relevant. We argue that not every ?would promote? statement is genuinely causal, and we suggest that Sober has not shown (...)
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  22. Fabio Minazzi (2008). Preti's Philosophical Thought and His Contribution to A Priori Historization. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 30:31-45.score: 213.0
    TGiulio Preti, born in Pavia (Italy) in 1911 and dead in Djerba (Tunisia) in 1972, represents one of the most subtle Italian thinkers of the latter half of the twentieth century. After graduating in 1933 discussing a thesis about The Husserl’s historical significance, he connected more and more to the Antonio Banfi’s lesson of critical rationalism and he elected him as his master. Starting from Banfi’s The principles of a reason theory (1927), Preti studied in depth the program of (...)
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  23. Dan McArthur (2005). Normative Naturalism and the Relativised a Priori. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 36 (2):331 - 350.score: 213.0
    In this paper I address some shortcomings in Larry Laudan's normative naturalism. I make it clear that Laudan's rejection of the "meta-methodology thesis", or MMT is unnecessary, and that a reformulated version MMT can be sustained. I contend that a major difficulty that attends Laudan's account is his contention that a naturalistic philosophy of science cannot accommodate any a priori justification of methodological rules, and consider what sort of naturalism might best replace Laudan's. To do this, I discuss (...)
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  24. David Shier (2000). Can Human Rationality Be Defended "A Priori"? Behavior and Philosophy 28 (1/2):67 - 81.score: 213.0
    In this paper, I develop two criticisms of L. Jonathan Cohen's influential a priori argument that human irrationality cannot be experimentally demonstrated. The first is that the argument depends crucially on the concept of a normal human but that no such concept suitable for Cohen's purposes is available. The second is that even if his argument were granted, his thesis of an unimpeachable human capacity for reasoning is not a defense of human reasoning, but rather amounts to the (...)
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  25. Joseph Shieber (2012). A Partial Defense of Intuition on Naturalist Grounds. Synthese 187 (2):321-341.score: 201.0
    The debate concerning the role of intuitions in philosophy has been characterized by a fundamental disagreement between two main camps. The first, the autonomists, hold that, due to the use in philosophical investigation of appeals to intuition, most of the central questions of philosophy can in principle be answered by philosophical investigation and argument without relying on the sciences. The second, the naturalists, deny the possibility of a priori knowledge and are skeptical of the role of intuition in providing (...)
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  26. M. J. Garcia-Encinas (2012). On Categories and A Posteriori Necessity: A Phenomenological Echo. Metaphilosophy 43 (1-2):147-164.score: 198.0
    This article argues for two related theses. First, it defends a general thesis: any kind of necessity, including metaphysical necessity, can only be known a priori. Second, however, it also argues that the sort of a priori involved in modal metaphysical knowledge is not related to imagination or any sort of so-called epistemic possibility. Imagination is neither a proof of possibility nor a limit to necessity. Rather, modal metaphysical knowledge is built on intuition of philosophical categories and (...)
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  27. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2008). Why the Externalist is Better Off Without Free Logic: A Reply to McKinsey. Dialectica 62 (4):535-540.score: 198.0
    McKinsey-style incompatibilist arguments attempt to show that the thesis that subjects have privileged, a priori access to the contents of their thoughts is incompatible with semantic externalism. This incompatibility follows – it is urged – from the fact that these theses jointly entail an absurd conclusion, namely, the possibility of a priori knowledge of the world. In a recent paper I argued that a large and important class of such arguments exemplifies a dialectical failure: if they are (...)
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  28. Nicholas Maxwell (2011). A Priori Conjectural Knowledge in Physics: The Comprehensibility of the Universe. In Mkichael Shaffer & Michael Veber (eds.), What Place for the A Priori? Open Court.score: 196.0
    In this paper I argue for a priori conjectural scientific knowledge about the world. Physics persistently only accepts unified theories, even though endlessly many empirically more successful disunified rivals are always available. This persistent preference for unified theories, against empirical considerations, means that physics makes a substantial, persistent metaphysical assumption, to the effect that the universe has a (more or less) unified dynamic structure. In order to clarify what this assumption amounts to, I solve the problem of what it (...)
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  29. George Bealer (1987). The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism. Philosophical Perspectives 1:289-365.score: 171.0
    Scientific essentialism is the view that some necessities (e.g., water = H2O) can be known only with the aid of empirical science. The thesis of the paper is that scientific essentialism does not extend to the central questions of philosophy and that these questions can be answered a priori. The argument is that the evidence required for the defense of scientific essentialism (e.g., twin earth intuitions) is reliable only if the intuitions required by philosophy to answer its central (...)
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  30. Paul A. Boghossian (1998). What the Externalist Can Know "a Priori". Philosophical Issues 9:197-211.score: 171.0
    Controversy continues to attach to the question whether an externalism about mental content is compatible with a traditional doctrine of privileged self-knowledge. By an externalism about mental content, I mean the view that what concepts our thoughts involve may depend not only on facts that are internal to us, but on facts about our environment. It is worth emphasizing, if only because it is still occasionally misperceived, that this thesis is supposed to apply at the level of sense and (...)
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  31. Marc Champagne (2013). Can “I” Prevent You From Entering My Mind? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):145-162.score: 171.0
    Shaun Gallagher has actively looked into the possibility that psychopathologies involving “thought insertion” might supply a counterexample to the Cartesian principle according to which one can always recognize one’s own thoughts as one’s own. Animated by a general distrust of a priori demonstrations, Gallagher is convinced that pitting clinical cases against philosophical arguments is a worthwhile endeavor. There is no doubt that, if true, a falsification of the immunity to error through misidentification would entail drastic revisions in how we (...)
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  32. Matti Eklund (2012). Multitude, Tolerance and Language-Transcendence. Synthese 187 (3):833-847.score: 171.0
    Rudolf Carnap's 1930s philosophy of logic, including his adherence to the principle of tolerance, is discussed. What theses did Carnap commit himself to, exactly? I argue that while Carnap did commit himself to a certain multitude thesis—there are different logics of different languages, and the choice between these languages is merely a matter of expediency—there is no evidence that he rejected a language-transcendent notion of fact, contrary to what Warren Goldfarb and Thomas Ricketts have prominently argued. (In fact, it (...)
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  33. Kevin J. Corcoran (1998). Persons and Bodies. Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):324-340.score: 171.0
    Defenders of a priori arguments for dualism assume that the Cartesian thesis that possibly, I exist but no bodies exist and the physicalist thesis that I am identical with my body, are logically inconsistent. Trenton Merricks offers an argument for the compatibility of those theses. In this paper I examine several objections to Merricks’ argument. I show that none is ultimately persuasive. Nevertheless I claim that Merricks’ argument should not be accepted. I next propose a view of (...)
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  34. Steffen Borge (2003). The Word of Others. Journal of Applied Logic 1 (1-2):107-118.score: 171.0
    Tyler Burge has argued that one has an a priori prima facie entitlement to believe in the truth of what one takes to have been presented as true by an interlocutor. This thesis, however, is problematic, since the alleged a priori prima facie entitlement to believe in the truth of our seeming understanding of things presented as true to us, rests on the possibility of determining assertoric force on a purely intellectual basis. This thesis is not (...)
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  35. Eftichios Bitsakis (2005). Space and Time: The Ongoing Quest. [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 35 (1):57-83.score: 171.0
    In this paper, I try to refute the Kantian a priorism. At the same time, I try to explain the existence of an a priori concerning space and time on the basis of contemporary neuro-physiology. This a priori is the opposite of the a-historical a priori of Kant. Concerning space and time, I argue that relativity concords with the philosophical thesis that space and time are forms of existence of matter. On the basis of this ontological (...)
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  36. Darius Koriako (2003). Ist Die Linguistische Theorie Des Logischen Apriori Obsolet? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 34 (1):43-68.score: 171.0
    The linguistic theory of the logical A Priori: is it obsolete In holistic interpretations, the logical truths are considered as continuous with empirical science: they are revisable, a posteriori, though very near to the centre of our web of belief. In this paper, we consider the merits and demerits of this approach, and we propose that it is necessary to revaluate holistic philosophies of logic. Some arguments are put forward which point in favour of the logical empiricists’ theory of (...)
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  37. Jürgen Schröder (2006). Physicalism and Strict Implication. Synthese 151 (3):537 - 545.score: 171.0
    The aim of this paper is to determine the plausibility of Robert Kirk's strict implication thesis as an explication of physicalism and its relation to Jackson and Chalmer's notion of application conditionals, to the notion of global supervenience and to a posteriori identities. It is argued that the strict implication thesis is subject to the same objection that affects the notion of global supervenience. Furthermore, reference to an idealised physics in the formulation of strict implication threatens to make (...)
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  38. Alejandro Cassini (2007). Sobre el carácter no empírico de los enunciados de confirmación. Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 31 (2):135-153.score: 171.0
    According to all traditional theories of confirmation, statements such as “E confirms H” (where H is a hypothesis and E is the evidence that supports H) are a priori. Peter Achinstein has recently challenged this orthodox position. He claims that at least some confirmation statements are empirical. In this paper I criticize this thesis. I first show that Achinstein´s arguments are either flawed or inconclusive. I then argue that there are strong reasons to conceive of all confirmation statements (...)
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  39. Tuomas E. Tahko (2008). A New Definition of A Priori Knowledge: In Search of a Modal Basis. Metaphysica 9 (2):57-68.score: 168.0
    In this paper I will offer a novel understanding of a priori knowledge. My claim is that the sharp distinction that is usually made between a priori and a posteriori knowledge is groundless. It will be argued that a plausible understanding of a priori and a posteriori knowledge has to acknowledge that they are in a constant bootstrapping relationship. It is also crucial that we distinguish between a priori propositions that hold in the actual world and (...)
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  40. Glen Hoffmann (2011). Two Kinds of A Priori Infallibility. Synthese 181 (2):241-253.score: 168.0
    On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified (or absolutely warranted), i.e., justified to a degree that entails their truth and precludes their falsity. Though rationalist infallibilism is indisputably running its course, adherence to at least one of the two species of infallible a priori justification refuses to disappear from mainstream epistemology. Among others, Putnam (1978) still professes the a priori infallibility of some category (i) (...)
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  41. Tuomas E. Tahko (2011). A Priori and A Posteriori: A Bootstrapping Relationship. Metaphysica 12 (2):151-164.score: 168.0
    The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge has been the subject of an enormous amount of discussion, but the literature is biased against recognizing the intimate relationship between these forms of knowledge. For instance, it seems to be almost impossible to find a sample of pure a priori or a posteriori knowledge. In this paper, it will be suggested that distinguishing between a priori and a posteriori is more problematic than is often suggested, and that (...)
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  42. John Turri (2011). Contingent A Priori Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.score: 168.0
    I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. You can know a priori contingent propositions that you recognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contemporary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at least to truths that appear necessary.
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  43. Nate Charlow (2013). Presupposition and the a Priori. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):509-526.score: 168.0
    This paper argues for and explores the implications of the following epistemological principle for knowability a priori (with ‘ $\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{A}$ ’ abbreviating ‘it is knowable a priori that’).(AK) For all ϕ, ψ such that ϕ semantically presupposes ψ: if $\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{A}\phi, \,\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{A}\psi .$ Well-known arguments for the contingent a priori and a priori knowledge of logical truth founder when the semantic presuppositions of the putative items of knowledge are made explicit. Likewise, certain kinds of analytic truth turn (...)
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  44. Jason S. Baehr, A Priori and a Posteriori. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 168.0
    The terms "a priori" and "a posteriori" refer primarily to how or on what basis a proposition might be known. A proposition is knowable a priori if it is knowable independently of experience. A proposition is knowable a posteriori if it is knowable on the basis of experience. The a priori/a posteriori distinction is epistemological and should not be confused with the metaphysical distinction between the necessary and the contingent or the semantical or logical distinction between the (...)
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  45. Jeremy Fantl (2003). An Analysis of the a Priori and a Posteriori. Acta Analytica 18 (1-2):43-69.score: 168.0
    I present and defend a unified, non-reductive analysis of the a priori and a posteriori. It is a mistake to remove all epistemic conditions from the analysis of the a priori (as, for example, Alvin Goldman has recently suggested doing). We can keep epistemic conditions (like unrevisability) in the analysis as long as we insist that a priori and a posteriori justification admit of degrees. I recommend making the degree to which a belief’s justification is a (...) or a posteriori solely dependent on the revisability relations that obtain among the faculties that deliver the belief and all other faculties. (shrink)
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  46. Colin Marshall (2014). Does Kant Demand Explanations for All Synthetic A Priori Claims? Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (3):549-576.score: 168.0
    in his prolegomena to any future metaphysics, Kant states that “[a]ll metaphysicians are … suspended from their occupations until such a time as they will have satisfactorily answered the question: How are synthetic cognitions a priori possible?” (Prolegomena, 4:278).1 In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant describes the issue of the synthetic a priori as “[t]he real problem of pure reason” (B19), and in the Critique of the Power of Judgment as “the general problem of transcendental philosophy” (Judgment, (...)
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  47. Albert Casullo (2003). A Priori Justification. Oxford University Press.score: 168.0
    The major divide in contemporary epistemology is between those who embrace and those who reject a priori knowledge. Albert Casullo provides a systematic treatment of the primary epistemological issues associated with the controversy. By freeing the a priori from traditional assumptions about the nature of knowledge and justification, he offers a novel approach to resolving these issues which assigns a prominent role to empirical evidence. He concludes by arguing that traditional approaches to the a priori, which focus (...)
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  48. Daniel Z. Korman (2010). The Contingent a Priori and the Publicity of a Priori Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):387 - 393.score: 168.0
    Kripke maintains that one who stipulatively introduces the term ' one meter' as a rigid designator for the length of a certain stick s at time t is in a position to know a priori that if s exists at t then the length of s at t is one meter. Some (e.g., Soames 2003) have objected to this alleged instance of the contingent a priori on the grounds that the stipulator's knowledge would have to be based in (...)
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  49. Flavia Padovani (2011). Relativizing the Relativized a Priori: Reichenbach's Axioms of Coordination Divided. Synthese 181 (1):41 - 62.score: 168.0
    In recent years, Reichenbach's 1920 conception of the principles of coordination has attracted increased attention after Michael Friedman's attempt to revive Reichenbach's idea of a "relativized a priori". This paper follows the origin and development of this idea in the framework of Reichenbach's distinction between the axioms of coordination and the axioms of connection. It suggests a further differentiation among the coordinating axioms and accordingly proposes a different account of Reichenbach's "relativized a priori".
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  50. Robert Greenberg (2001). Kant's Theory of a Priori Knowledge. Pennsylvania State University Press.score: 168.0
    Instead, Robert Greenberg argues that Kant is more fundamentally concerned with the possibility of a priori knowledge -- the very possibility of the possibility ...
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