Medium- and high-spin states of Pr-134 were populated using the Cd-116(Na-23, 5n) reaction and studied with the GAMMASPHERE spectrometer. Several new bands have been found in this nucleus, one of them being linked to the previously observed chiral-candidate twin-band structure. The ground state of Pr-134 could be determined through establishing a level structure that connects the two previously known long-lived isomeric states. Unambiguous spin-parity assignments for the excited states could be performed based on the known 2(-) spin-parity of the ground (...) state combined with the present experimental data. Intrinsic single-particle configurations have been assigned to the newly observed bands on the basis of the measured B(M1)/B(E2) ratios, alignments, band-crossing frequencies, bandhead spins, the observed single-particle configurations in the neighboring nuclei, and taking into account the predictions of total Routhian surface and tilted-axis cranking calculations. (shrink)
Future work is needed to establish that pure short-term memory is a coherent individual difference attribute that is separable from traditional compound short-term memory measures. Psychometric support for latent pure short-term memory capacity will provide an important starting point for future fine-grained analyses of the intrinsic factors that influence individual differences in math skills.
High-spin states have been studied in Pr-135(59), populated through the Cd-116(Na-23,4n) reaction at 115 MeV, using the Gammasphere gamma-ray spectrometer. The negative-parity yrast band has been significantly extended to spin similar to 45 (h) over bar and excitation energy 21.5 MeV, showing evidence for several rotational alignments. The positive-parity yrast band of Ce-135(58), populated through the p4n channel of this reaction, was also populated to spin similar to 38 (h) over bar and excitation energy 18 MeV. Cranking calculations indicate that (...) these nuclei are soft with respect to the triaxiality parameter gamma and that several competing nuclear shapes occur at high spin. (shrink)
In this paper one aspect of Leibniz' optical ideas, the law of refraction, is the main topic. This law had been formulated before him by Snellius, Descartes and Fermat. Their mathematical equations are analogous in the relations between the geometrical parameters and the optical resistances, but they differ concerning the velocities of light. From the Leibnitian point of view this situation has its reasons in uncompletely developed principles. Leibniz had shown that the solution of this problem requires a new metaphysics (...) as well as other mathematical, namely infinitesimal methods, which are connected in Leibniz by his dynamics. As one of the influences of his dynamical statement, the beginning of a new type of physical explanation will be demonstrated, which replaced the construction of mechanical models in the 18th century. (shrink)
The notion of internalization put forth by Roger Shepard continues to be appealing and challenging. He suggests that we have internalized, during our evolutionary development, environmental regularities, or constraints. Internalization solves one of the hardest problems of perceptual psychology: the underspecification problem. That is the problem of how well-defined perceptual experience is generated from the often ambiguous and incomplete sensory stimulation. Yet, the notion of internalization creates new problems that may outweigh the solution of the underspecification problem. To support this (...) claim, I first examine the concept of internalization, breaking it down into several distinct interpretations. These range from well-resolved dynamic regularities to ill-resolved statistical regularities. As a function of the interpretation the researcher selects, an empirical test of the internalization hypothesis may be straightforward or it may become virtually impossible. I then attempt to cover the range of interpretations by drawing on examples from different domains of visual event perception. Unfortunately, the experimental tests regarding most candidate regularities, such as gravitational acceleration, fail to support the concept of internalization. This suggests that narrow interpretations of the concept should be given up in favor of more abstract interpretations. However, the latter are not easily amenable to empirical testing. There is nonetheless a way to test these abstract interpretations by contrasting internalization with the opposite concept: externalization of body dynamics. I summarize evidence for such a projection of body constraints onto external objects. Based on the combined evidence of well-resolved and ill- resolved regularities, the value of the notion of internalization has to be reassessed. Key Words: event perception; evolution; internalization. (shrink)
We share the authors' general approach to the study of perception and action, but rather than singling out a particular level of “late perceptual” and “early motor” processing for sensorimotor interactions, we argue that these can arise at multiple levels during action preparation and execution. Recent data on action-perception transfer are used to illustrate this perspective.
Shepard's notion of “internalisation” is better interpreted as a simile than a metaphor. A fractal encoding model of visual perception is sketched, in which image elements are transformed in such a way as to maximise symmetry with the current input. This view, in which the transforming system embodies what has been internalised, resolves some problems raised by the metaphoric interpretation. [Hecht; Shepard].
As Hecht points out, finding unequivocal evidence for phylogenetic knowledge structures is problematic, if not impossible. But if phylogeny could be dropped, then internalization starts to resemble the “theory theory” approaches of developmental psychology. For example, an appreciation of falling objects leads to a very strong bias that could be regarded as internalized knowledge acquired during ontogeny. [Hecht; Shepard].
According to the standard (recent) history of connectionism (see for example the accounts offered by Hecht-Nielsen (1990: pp. 14-19) and Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1988), or Papert's (1988: pp. 3-4) somewhat whimsical description), in the early days of Classical Computational Theory of Mind (CCTM) based AI research, there was also another allegedly distinct approach, one based upon network models. The work on network models seems to fall broadly within the scope of the term 'connectionist' (see Aizawa 1992), although the term (...) had yet to be coined at the time. These two approaches were "two daughter sciences" according to Papert (1988: p. 3). The fundamental difference between these two 'daughters', lay (according to Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1988: p. 16)) in what they took to be the paradigm of intelligence. Whereas the early connectionists took learning to be fundamental, the traditional school concentrated upon problem solving. (shrink)
We argue four points. First, perception always relies on environmental constraints, not only in special cases. Second, constraints are taken advantage of by detecting information granted by the constraints rather than by internalizing them. Third, apparent motion phenomena reveal reliance on constraints that are irrelevant in everyday perception. Fourth, constraints are selected through individual learning as well as evolution. The “perceptual-concept-of-velocity” phenomenon is featured as a relevant case. [Hecht; Kubovy & Epstein; Shepard].
Shepard's analysis of how shape, motion, and color are perceptually represented can be generalized. Apparent motion and shape may be associated with a group of spatial transformations, accounting for rigid and plastic motion, and perceived object color may be associated with a group of illuminant transformations, accounting for the discriminability of surface-reflectance changes and illuminant changes beyond daylight. The phenomenological and mathematical parallels between these perceptual domains may indicate common organizational rules, rather than specific ecological adaptations. [Barlow; Hecht; Kubovy (...) & Epstein; Schwartz; Shepard; Todorovic]. (shrink)
Behavioral regularities are open to both representationist (hence internalist) and non-representationist explanations. Shepard improvidently favors internalism, which is burdened with severe conceptual and empirical shortcomings. Hecht and Kubovy & Epstein half-heartedly criticize internalism by tracing it back to “unconscious” metaphors or by replacing it with weak externalism. Explanations of behavioral regularities are better relocated within a radical embodiment approach. [Hecht; Kubovy & Epstein; Shepard].
The limitations of the concept of internalised kinematic geometry have been recognised by Barlow, Hecht, Kubovy & Epstein, and Todorovic. I am in agreement but I still find the perception of curvature in two frames of apparent motion fascinating and I suggest some new directions. [Barlow; Hecht; Kubovy & Epstein; Shepard; Todorovic].
Shepard's internalization concept is defended against Hecht's criticisms. By ignoring both Shepard's evolutionary perspective and the fact that internalization does not preclude modularization, Hecht advances inconclusive evidence. Developmental research supports Shepard's conclusion that kinematic geometry may be more deeply internalized than physical dynamics. This research also suggests that the internalization concept should be broadened to include representations acquired during ontogeny. [Hecht; Shepard].
The evidence for a kinematics of the mind is confounded by uncontrolled properties of pictures. Effects of illumination and of picture-plane geometry may underlie some evidence given for a process of mental rotation. Pictured rotation is confounded by picture similarity, gauged by gray-level correlations. An example is given involving the depicted rotation of Shepard-Metzler solids in depth. [Hecht; Kubovy & Epstein; Shepard; Todorovic].
We explore the evidential relationships that connect two standard claims of modern evolutionary biology. The hypothesis of common ancestry (which says that all organisms now on earth trace back to a single progenitor) and the hypothesis of natural selection (which says that natural selection has been an important influence on the traits exhibited by organisms) are logically independent; however, this leaves open whether testing one requires assumptions about the status of the other. Darwin noted that an extreme version of adaptationism (...) would undercut the possibility of making inferences about common ancestry. Here we develop a converse claim—hypotheses that assert that natural selection has been an important influence on trait values are untestable unless supplemented by suitable background assumptions. The fact of common ancestry and a claim about quantitative genetics together suffice to render such hypotheses testable. Furthermore, we see no plausible alternative to these assumptions; we hypothesize that they are necessary as well as sufficient for adaptive hypotheses to be tested. This point has important implications for biological practice, since biologists standardly assume that adaptive hypotheses predict trait associations among tip species. Another consequence is that adaptive hypotheses cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed by a trait value that is universal within a single species, if that trait value deviates even slightly from the optimum. 1 Two Darwinian hypotheses 2 Logical independence 3 How adaptive hypotheses bear on the tree of life hypothesis 4 How the tree of life hypothesis bears on adaptive hypotheses 5 What do adaptive hypotheses predict? 6 Common ancestry and quantitative genetics to the rescue 7 Conclusion. (shrink)
