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  1.  643 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1993). Parfit on What Matters in Survival. Philosophical Studies 70 (1):1-22.
    Parfit's most controversial claim about personal identity is that personal identity does not matter in the way we uncritically think it does) I would like to analyze Parfit's reasons for making this claim. These reasons are complex, and they stand in some tension with one another. I would like to examine them carefully and to try to arrive at the strongest case that can be made for Parfit's controversial claim about what matters.
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  2.  325 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner (2001). Chalmers' Conceivability Argument for Dualism. Analysis 61 (3):187-193.
    In The Conscious Mind, D. Chalmers appeals to his semantic framework in order to show that conceivability, as employed in his "zombie" argument for dualism , is sufficient for genuine possibility. I criticize this attempt.
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  3.  312 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1986). Brains in a Vat. Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):148-167.
    In chapter 1 of Reason, Truth, and History, Hilary Putnam argues from some plausible assumptions about the nature of reference to the conclusion that it is not possible that all sentient creatures are brains in a vat. If this argument is successful, it seemingly refutes an updated form of Cartesian skepticism concerning knowledge of physical objects. In this paper, I will state what I take to be the most promising interpretation of Putnam's argument. My reconstructed argument differs from an argument (...)
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  4.  150 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). Contents Just Aren't in the Head. Erkenntnis 58 (1):1-6.
    A. Horowitz has recently argued against semantic externalism. In this paper, I will show that his arguments are unsuccessful, owing to misconceptions regarding the nature of that semantic view.
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  5.  147 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (1992). If I Am a Brain in a Vat, Then I Am Not a Brain in a Vat. Mind 101 (401):123-128.
    Massimo Dell'Utri (1990) provides a reconstruction of Hilary Putnam's argument (1981, chapter 1) to show that the hypothesis that we are brains in a vat is self-refuting. I will explain why the argument Dell'Utri offers us is, on the face of it, quite problematic. Then I will provide a way out of the difficulty.
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  6.  144 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner & E. Beroukhim (2003). McGinn on Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press
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  7.  142 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (1996). Modest Transcendental Arguments. Philosophical Perspectives 10 (Metaphysics):265-280.
    Kantian transcendental arguments are aimed at uncovering the necessary conditions for the possibility of thought and experience. If such arguments are to have any force against Cartesian skepticism about knowledge of the external world, then it would seem that the conditions the transcendental argument uncovers must be non-psychological in nature, and their special status must be knowable a priori. In "Transcendental Arguments", Barry Stroud raised the question whether there are any such conditions., He answered that it was very doubtful that (...)
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  8.  141 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner (2005). Branching in the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Analysis 65 (288):294-301.
    In this introduction to the special issue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics on the topic of personal identity and bioethics, I provide a background for the topic and then discuss the contributions in the special issue by Eric Olson, Marya Schechtman, Tim Campbell and Jeff McMahan, James Delaney and David Hershenov, and David DeGrazia.
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  9.  137 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (1983). Transcendental Arguments I. Noûs 17 (4):551-575.
    A Kantian transcendental argument is an argument which purports to show that the existence of physical objects of a certain general character is a condition for the possibility of self-conscious experience. Both the Transcendental Deduction and the Refutation of Idealism satisfy this characterization. But we have seen that even a successful Kantian transcendental argument would be somewhat disappointing. Even though such an argument would refute the extreme Cartesian skepticism about the very existence of physical objects, it would not certify any (...)
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  10.  130 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (2009). Endurantism and the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Theoria 75 (1):28-33.
    This paper considers the question whether a psychological approach to personal identity can be formulated within an endurantist, as opposed to four-dimensionalist, framework. Trenton Merricks has argued that this cannot be done. I argue to the contrary: a perfectly coherent endurantist version of the psychological approach can indeed be formulated.
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  11.  129 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer (1986). Why is Death Bad? Philosophical Studies 50 (2):213-221.
    It seems that, whereas a person's death needn't be a bad thing for him, it can be. In some circumstances, death isn't a "bad thing" or an "evil" for a person. For instance, if a person has a terminal and very painful disease, he might rationally regard his own death as a good thing for him, or at least, he may regard it as something whose prospective occurrence shouldn't be regretted. But the attitude of a "normal" and healthy human being (...)
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  12.  124 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (2009). Moore-Paradoxicality and the Principle of Charity. Theoria 75 (3):245-247.
    In a recent article in Theoria , Hamid Vahid offered an explanation of the phenomenon of Moore-paradoxicality which employed Davidson's Principle of Charity regarding radical interpretation. I argue here that Vahid's explanation fails.
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  13.  123 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (2004). Strategies for Refuting Closure for Knowledge. Analysis 64 (4):333–335.
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  14.  113 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (2008). The Simulation Argument Again. Analysis 68 (299):224–226.
  15.  109 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2009). Thinking Animals and Epistemology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):310-314.
    We consider one of Eric Olson's chief arguments for animalism about personal identity: the view that we are each identical to a human animal. The argument was originally given in Olson's book The Human Animal . Olson's argument presupposes an epistemological premise which we examine in detail. We argue that the premise is implausible and that Olson's defense of animalism is therefore in trouble.
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  16.  108 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (2006). Justification and Moore's Paradox. Analysis 66 (291):264–266.
  17.  99 DLs
    A. Brueckner (2011). Debasing scepticism. Analysis 71 (2):295-297.
    In this paper, I will clarify Jonathan Schaffer's; debasing scepticism, highlighting its logical structure. 1 In many current discussions of scepticism, its scope is limited to propositions about the external world which, if known at all, are known a posteriori. The standard sceptical set-up goes as follows. The sceptic specifies a sceptical hypothesis, or counterpossibility, that is incompatible with the external-world propositions that I claim to know. The hypothesis – e.g. that I am a brain in a vat – is (...)
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  18.  97 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (2013). Bootstrapping, Evidentialist Internalism, and Rule Circularity. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):591-597.
    Bootstrapping, evidentialist internalism, and rule circularity Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-7 DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9876-9 Authors Anthony Brueckner, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  19.  95 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (2001). BonJour's a Priori Justification of Induction. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (1):1–10.
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  20.  93 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (1995). Scepticism and the Causal Theory of Reference. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (179):199-201.
  21.  92 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1995). The Characteristic Thesis of Anti-Individualism. Analysis 55 (3):146-48.
    This is a response to an argument (by Michael McKinsey) purporting to show that anti-individualism is trivially true. I show that this argument rests upon a misconception of the basic claim of anti-individualism.
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  22.  88 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). The Coherence of Scepticism About Self-Knowledge. Analysis 63 (1):41-48.
  23.  88 DLs
    A. Brueckner (2012). Against an Argument Against Justification Internalism. Analysis 72 (4):745-746.
    A novel (and surprising) argument against justification internalism. Analysis 72: 239–43, Sanford Goldberg uses the New Evil Demon thought experiment in an attempt to argue as in the foregoing title. I respond by maintaining that his argument fails when aimed at a prominent version of internalism, viz. evidentialism.
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  24.  85 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1984). Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument Against Metaphysical Realism. Analysis 44 (3):134--40.
  25.  84 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner & M. Oreste Fiocco (2002). Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):285–293.
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  26.  84 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1990). Scepticism About Knowledge of Content. Mind 99 (395):447-51.
    Focuses on the arguments that show the externalism of mental content. Discussion on the principle of knowledge identification; Account of basic self-knowledge; Interpretations of sentence content; Skepticism of knowledge content.
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  27.  83 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (2005). Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):436–443.
  28.  82 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (1994). The Structure of the Skeptical Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):827-835.
    Much has been written about epistemological skepticism in the last ten or so years, but there remain some unanswered questions concerning the structure of what has become the canonical Cartesian skeptical argument. In this paper, I would like to take a closer look at this structure in order to determine just which epistemic principles are required by the argument.
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  29.  79 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2009). Bootstrapping and Knowledge of Reliability. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):407–412.
    This is a critical discussion of a paper on the problem of bootstrapping by Jose Zalabardo.
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  30.  78 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (2010). Essays on Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
    The guiding questions of this volume are: Can we have knowledge of the external world of things outside our minds?
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  31.  77 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1992). What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori. Analysis 52 (2):111-18.
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  32.  75 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (2002). Williamson on the Primeness of Knowing. Analysis 62 (275):197–202.
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  33.  74 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). Self-Knowledge Via Inner Observation of External Objects? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):118-122.
    Harold Langsam has recently presented a novel observational account of self-knowledge. I critically discuss this account and argue that it fails to provide a uniform understanding of how we are able to know the contents of our own thoughts.
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  34.  72 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2009). Contextualism, SSI and the Factivity Problem. Analysis 69 (3):431-438.
    There is an apparent problem stemming from the factivity of knowledge that seems to afflict both contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism . 1 In this article, we will first explain how the problem arises for each theory, and then we will propose a uniform resolution.1. The factivity problem for contextualismLet K t stands for X knows _ at t. Let h stand for S has hands. According to contextualism, ‘K t’ is true as uttered in some ordinary conversational contexts. Let O (...)
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  35.  72 DLs
    John Martin Fischer & Anthony Brueckner (2013). The Evil of Death and the Lucretian Symmetry: A Reply to Feldman. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):783-789.
    In previous work we have defended the deprivation account of death’s badness against worries stemming from the Lucretian point that prenatal and posthumous nonexistence are deprivations of the same sort. In a recent article in this journal, Fred Feldman has offered an insightful critique of our Parfitian strategy for defending the deprivation account of death’s badness. Here we adjust, clarify, and defend our strategy for reply to Lucretian worries on behalf of the deprivation account.
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  36.  71 DLs
    Yuval Avnur, Anthony Brueckner & Christopher Buford (2011). No Closure On Skepticism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):439-447.
    This article is a response to an important objection that Sherrilyn Roush has made to the standard closure-based argument for skepticism, an argument that has been studied over the past couple of decades. If Roush's objection is on the mark, then this would be a quite significant finding. We argue that her objection fails.
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  37.  69 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1985). Transmission for Knowledge Not Established. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (139):193-195.
    In "Nozick on Scepticism", Graeme Forbes attempts to establish a Transmission Principle for knowledge which has been challenged by a number of anti-sceptical philosophers (such as Nozick). This principle (or something like it) seems to be required by Cartesian sceptical arguments, so if it could be refuted, this would apparently rid us of such scepticism. I do not believe that Nozick or anyone else has refuted the principle, yet I will argue that Forbes has certainly failed to establish it.
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  38.  69 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1991). The Omniscient Interpreter Rides Again. Analysis (October) 199 (October):199-205.
  39.  68 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1997). Is Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Incoherent? Analysis 57 (4):287-90.
    Gary Ebbs has argued that skepticism regarding knowledge of the contents of one's own mental states cannot even be coherently formulated. This articles is a reply to that argument.
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  40.  68 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1985). Skepticism and Epistemic Closure. Philosophical Topics 13 (3):89-117.
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  41.  68 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (2009). Internalism and Evidence of Reliability. Philosophia 37 (1):47-54.
    This paper concerns various competing views on the nature of perceptual justification. Various thought experiments that motivate various views are discussed. Once reliabilism is rejected and some form of internalism is instead embraced, the following issue arises: must an internalist nevertheless require that perceptual justification involve the possession of evidence for the reliability of our perceptual processes? Matthias Steup answers in the affirmative, espousing what he calls internalist reliabilism. Some problems are raised for this form of internalism.
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  42.  65 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (2001). Van Inwagen on the Cosmological Argument. Philosophical Papers 30 (1):31-40.
    Abstract In his book Metaphysics, Peter van Inwagen constructs a version of the Cosmological Argument which does not depend on the Principle of Sufficient Reason. He goes on to reject the argument. In this paper, I construct an alternative version of the Cosmological Argument that uses some of van Inwagen's insights and yet is immune to his criticisms. If we suppose that for each contingent truth, there is some at least partial explanation, then it follows that there is some necessary (...)
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  43.  64 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1993). Skepticism and Externalism. Philosophia 22 (1-2):169-71.
  44.  64 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner (2000). Ambiguity and Knowledge of Content. Analysis 60 (3):257-60.
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  45.  63 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (2009). More on Justification and Moore's Paradox. Analysis 69 (3):497-499.
    In his , Williams offered a solution to Moore's paradox that centred on the concept of justification. Consider the omissive Moore-paradoxical sentence: p and I do not believe that p.Williams appealed to the principle Whatever justifies me in believing that p justifies me in believing that I believe that p.Suppose that I am justified in believing . Then I am justified in believing its first conjunct. By I am justified in believing that I believe that p. Since I am also (...)
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  46.  62 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (2007). Hinge Propositions and Epistemic Justification. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):285–287.
    Michael Williams and Crispin Wright have claimed that we are epistemically justified in believing hinge propositions, such as there is an external world. In a recent paper Allan Hazlett puts forward an argument that purports to elucidate the source of such justification. This paper reconstructs Hazlett's argument and offers a criticism of it.
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  47.  61 DLs
    Anthony L. Brueckner (2002). Anti-Individualism and Analyticity. Analysis 62 (1):87-91.
  48.  60 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner & John Martin Fischer (1993). The Asymmetry of Early Death and Late Birth. Philosophical Studies 71 (3):327-331.
    In a previous paper, we argued that death's badness consists in the deprivation of pleasurable experiences which one would have had, had one died later rather than at the time of one's actual death. Thus, we argued that death can be a bad thing for the individual who dies, even if it is an experiential blank. But there is a pressing objection to this view, for if the view is correct, then it seems that it should also be the case (...)
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  49.  59 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (2011). Idealism and Scepticism. Theoria 77 (4):368-371.
    It is argued that contrary to appearances, Berkeleyan Idealism lacks anti-sceptical force. The problem stems from the way in which the idealist draws the appearance/reality distinction.
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  50.  59 DLs
    Anthony Brueckner (1999). Difficulties in Generating Scepticism About Knowledge of Content. Analysis 59 (1):59–62.
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