For teaching purposes this work is divided into sections to which instructors can readily refer: this is supplemented with a comprehensive list of references, ...
Francis Guibal | : Pour relever le défi de l’irruption dans notre modernité d’une violence radicale, il faut, selon Éric Weil, inscrire la cohérence des discours dans l’espace premier du langage et de sa négativité créatrice. S’il est possible, alors, de procéder à une mise en ordre logique des divers types d’intelligibilité élaborés dans l’histoire, c’est en subordonnant l’ensemble de ces catégories concrètes aux deux catégories formelles du sens et de la sagesse, de la compréhension et de la vie (...) selon la compréhension. La philosophie se comprend ainsi dans le tout de la réalité qui se révèle en elle : sa systématicité dialogique a pour corollaire une ouverture sans réserve à l’extériorité du monde et de l’histoire. Cette transcendance dans l’immanence, à l’épreuve de la relativité de la condition, est-elle susceptible de rencontrer et d’accueillir l’attestation religieuse d’une transcendance absolue ? C’est la question que l’on se risque à poser pour finir. | : In order to face the challenge of the irruption in our modernity of a radical violence, one must, according to Eric Weil, inscribe the coherence of discourses into the primary space of language and of its creative negativity. If it is possible, then, to proceed to put in logical order diverse types of intelligibility elaborated through history, it has to be by subordinating the whole of those concrete categories under the two formal categories of meaning and wisdom, of comprehension and of life in accordance with comprehension. Philosophy is thus understood within the whole of reality that reveals itself in it ; its systematic dialogical character has as a corollary an unreserved opening to the external character of the world and of history. Is this transcendence in immanence, while being proof resistant to the relativity of the condition, able to meet and receive the religious testimony of an absolute transcendence ? Such is the question that is risked at the end. (shrink)
The idea that intuition plays a basic role in moral knowledge and moral philosophy probably began in the eighteenth century. British philosophers such as Anthony Shaftsbury, Francis Hutcheson, Thomas Reid, and later David Hume talk about a “moral sense” that they place in John Locke’s theory of knowledge in terms of Lockean reflexive perceptions, while Richard Price seeks a faculty by which we obtain our ideas of right and wrong. (...) In the twentieth century intuitionism in moral philosophy was revived by the works of G. E. Moore, H. A. Prichard, and W. D. Ross. These philosophers reject Kantian deontological ethics and utilitarianism insisting that intuition is the only source of moral knowledge. Recently, there is a renewed interest in intuition by philosophers doing meta-philosophy by reflecting on what philosophers do, and why they disagree. In this essay we plan to take some of this recent literature on intuition and apply it to moral philosophy. We will proceed by (1) defining a conception of intuition, (2) answering some skeptical challenges, (3) delimiting its target, and (4) arguing that intuition is often a source of moral knowledge. (shrink)
In contrast to many of his contemporaries, A. J. Ayer was an analytic philosopher who had sustained throughout his career some interest in developments in the work of his ‘continental’ peers. Ayer, who spoke French, held friendships with some important Parisian intellectuals, such as Camus, Bataille, Wahl and Merleau-Ponty. This paper examines the circumstances of a meeting between Ayer, Merleau-Ponty, Wahl, Ambrosino and Bataille, which took place in 1951 at some Parisian bar. The question under discussion during this meeting was (...) whether the sun existed before humans did, over which the various philosophers disagreed. This disagreement is tangled with a variety of issues, such as Ayer’s critique of Heidegger and Sartre (inherited from Carnap), Ayer’s response to Merleau-Ponty’s critique of empiricism, and Bataille’s response to Sartre’s critique of his notion of ‘unknowing’, which uncannily resembles Ayer’s critique of Sartre. Amidst this tangle one finds Bataille’s statement that an ‘abyss’ separates English from French and German philosophy, the first recorded announcement of the analytic-continental divide in the twentieth century. References H. B. Acton. Philosophy in France. Philosophy, 22(82):161-166, 1947. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100025365 A. J. Ayer & T. Honderich. An Interview with A. J. Ayer. In A. P. Griffiths, editor, A.J. Ayer Memorial Essays, pages 209-226. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991. A. J. Ayer. Language, Truth and Logic. London, Gollancz, 1936. A. J. Ayer. Novelist-Philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre. Horizon, 12(67):12–26, & 12(68):101-110, 1945. A. J. Ayer. Novelist-Philosopher, Albert Camus. Horizon, 13(75):155-168, 1946a. A. J. Ayer. Secret Session. Polemic, 2:60-63, 1946b. A. J. Ayer. Some Aspects of Existentialism. In F. Watts, editor, H. B. Acton. Philosophy in France. Philosophy, 22(82):161-166, 1947. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100025365 A. J. Ayer & T. Honderich. An Interview with A. J. Ayer. In A. P. Griffiths, editor, A.J. Ayer Memorial Essays, pages 209-226. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991. A. J. Ayer. Language, Truth and Logic. London, Gollancz, 1936. A. J. Ayer. Novelist-Philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre. Horizon, 12(67):12–26, & 12(68):101-110, 1945. A. J. Ayer. Novelist-Philosopher, Albert Camus. Horizon, 13(75): 155-168, 1946a. A. J. Ayer. Secret Session. Polemic, 2:60-63, 1946b. A. J. Ayer. Some Aspects of Existentialism. In F. Watts, editor, The Rationalist Annual, pages 5-13. London, Watts & Co, 1948. A. J. Ayer. The Definition of Liberty: Jean-Paul Sartre’s Doctrine of Commitment. The Listener, 44(1135):633-634, 1950. A. J. Ayer. Jean-Paul Sartre. Encounter, 15(4):75-77, 1961. A. J. Ayer. On Existentialism. Modern Languages, 48(1):1-12, 1967. A. J. Ayer. Sartre on the Jews. The Spectator, 211(7317):394-395, 1968. A. J. Ayer. Reflections on Existentialism. In Metaphysics and Common Sense, pages 203-218. London, Macmillan,1969. A. J. Ayer. Part of my Life: The Memoirs of a Philosopher. New York, Harcourt Brace Janovich, 1977. A. J. Ayer. Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. London, Unwinn, 1984. A. J. Ayer. A Defence of Empiricism. In A. P. Griffiths, editor, A.J. Ayer Memorial Essays, pages 1-16. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991. G. Bataille. Un-knowing and its Consequences. A. Michelson, translator, October, 36:80-85, 1986. G. Bataille. On Nietzsche. B. Boone, translator. London, Continuum, 2004. G. Bataille, I. Waldberg, & R. Lebel, editors, Encyclopaedia Acephalica. (I. White, D. Faccini, A. Michelson, J. Harman, A. Lykiard, et al., translators.) London, Atlas Press, 1995. I. Berlin. Review of My Philosophy (And other Essays on the Moral and Political Problems of our Time) by Benedetto Croce. Mind, 61(244):574-584, 1952. T. Carman. Continental Themes in Analytic Philosophy. In C. V. Boundas, editor, Columbia Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophies, pages 351-366. New York, Columbia University Press, 2007. R. Carnap. The Elimination Of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language (A. Pap, translator). In A. J. Ayer, editor, Logical Positivism, pages 60-81. Glencoe, IL, The Free Press, 1959. J. Chase & J. Reynolds. Analytic versus Continental: Arguments on the Methods and Value of Philosophy. Durham, Acumen, 2010. S. Collini. Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. S. Critchley. Very Short Introduction to Continental Philosophy. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001. H. J. Dahms. Neue Sachlichkeit in the Architecture and Philosophy of the 1920s. In S. Awodey & C. Klein, editors, Carnap Brought Home: The View From Jena, pages 357-376. Chicago, Open Court, 2004. P. J. R. Dempsey. The Psychology of Sartre. Cork, Cork University Press,1950. V. Descombes. Modern French Philosophy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980. B. Flynn. Merleau-Ponty. In E. N. Zalta, editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, , 2004. M. Friedman. A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger. Chicago, Open Court, 2000. G. Gabriel. Carnap’s “Elimination of Metaphysics Through the Logical Analysis of Language:” A Retrospective Consideration of the Relationship between Continental and Analytic Philosophy. In P. Parrini, W. C. Salmon, & M. H. Salmon, editors, Logical Empiricism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, pages 30-42. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003. P. Galison. Constructing Modernism: The Cultural Location of Aufbau. In R. N. Giere, A. Richardson, editors, Origins of Logical Empiricism, pages 17-44. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, 1996. S. Glendinning. In the Name of Phenomenology. London, Routledge, 2007. Gary Gutting. Continental Philosophy of Science. Oxford, Blackwell, 2005. M. Hammond, J. Howarth, & R. Kent. Understanding Phenomenology. Oxford, Blackwell, 1995. M. Heidegger. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. R. Taft, translator. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997. M. Heidegger. Pathmarks. W. MacNeil, editor. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998. J. M. Heimonet. Bataille and Sartre: The Modernity of Mysticism. Diacritics, 26(2):59-73, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/dia.1996.0016 J. Himanka. Does the Earth Move?: A Search for a Dialogue Between Two Traditions of Contemporary Philosophy. The Philosophical Forum, 31(1):57-83, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0031-806X.00028 A. M. Hollywood. The Philosopher – Sartre – and Me. In Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexual Difference and the Demands of History, pages 25-36. Chigago, University of Chicago Press, 2002. T. E. Hulme. A Note-Book. The New Age, 18(8):186-189, 1915. T. E. Hulme. A Note-Book. The New Age, 18(10):234-236, 1916. S. P. James. Merleau-Ponty, Metaphysical Realism and the Natural World. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 15(4): 501-519, 2007. S. Käufer. Logic. In H. Dreyfus & M. Wrathall, editors, A Companion to Heidegger, pages 141-155. Oxford, Blackwell, 2005. E. W. Knight. Literature Considered as Philosophy: The French Example. New York, Macmillan, 1958. C. A. Mace. Review of The Psychology of Sartre by Peter J. R. Dempsey. Mind, 61(243):425-427, 1952. B. Magee. Men of Ideas: Some Creators of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982. A. R. Manser. Sartre and "Le Néant." Philosophy, 36(137):177-187, 1961. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100058022 M. Martin. Sensible Appearances. In T. Baldwin, editor, The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1870-1945, pages 521-532. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521591041.044 PMid:14585038 F. Maubert. Francis Bacon, sa dernière interview: “Je poursois le peinture car je sais qu’il n’est pas possible de l’arreter.” Paris-Match, 2242:92-93, 1992. J. M. E. McTaggart. The Unreality of Time. Mind, 17:457-474, 1908. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/XVII.4.457 M. Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology of Perception. C. Smith, translator. London, Routledge, 2002. M. Merleau-Ponty. Texts and Dialogues: On Philosophy, Politics, and Culture. H. J. Silverman, editor (M. B. Smith, et al., translators). New York: Humanity Books, 2005. M. Merleau-Ponty & T. Baldwin. Maurice Merleau-Ponty. London, Routledge, 2004. H. Meyerhoff. Emotive and Existentialist Theories of Ethics. The Journal of Philosophy, 48(25):769-783, 1951. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2021208 I. Murdoch. Sartre, Romantic Rationalist. Cambridge, Bowes and Bowes, 1953. I. Murdoch. The Idea of Perfection. In The Sovereignty of Good, pages 1-44. London, Routledge, 2001. A. Oliver. A Few More Remarks on Logical Form. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99:247-272, 1999. A. Plantinga. An Existentialist’s Ethics. Review of Metaphysics, 12(2):235-56, 1958. S. Priest. Merleau-Ponty. New York, Routledge, 2003. W. V. Quine. Word and Object. M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1960. A. Quinton. Which Philosophy is Modernistic? In Thoughts and Thinkers, pages 39-51. New York, Holmes and Meier, 1982. J. Rée. English Philosophy in the Fifties. Radical Philosophy, 65:3-21, 1993. S. Richmond. Sartre and Bergson: A Disagreement about Nothingness. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 15(1):77-95, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672550601143201 B. Rogers. Ayer: A Life. New York, Grove Press, 2002. K. Romdenh-Romluc. Merleau-Ponty and Phenomenology of Perception. London, Routledge, 2009. G. E. Rosado Haddock. The Young Carnap’s Unknown Master: Husserl's Influence on Der Raum and Der logische Aufbau der Welt. Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008. B. Russell. Nightmares of Eminent Persons And Other Stories. London, The Bodley Head, 1954. G. Ryle, H. A. Hodges, & H. B. Acton. Symposium: Phenomenology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 11:68-115, 1932. G. Ryle. Phenomenology vs. The Concept of Mind. In Collected Papers: Critical Essays, Vol. 1, pages 179-196. London, Hutchinson, 1971. J. P. Sartre. Un nouveau mystique. In Critiques littéraires (Situations I), pages 174-229. Paris, Gallimard, 1975. J. Skorupski. The Presidential Address: The Legacy of Modernism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 91:1-19, 1990. A. Stone. Heidegger and Carnap on the Overcoming of Metaphysics. In S. Mulhall editor, Martin Heidegger, pages 217-244. Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006. M. Surya, K.Fijalkowski, & M. Richardson. Georges Bataille: An Intellectual Biography. K. Fijalkowski & M. Richardson, translators. London, Verso, 2002. C. Taylor, & Alfred J. Ayer. Symposium: Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 33:93-124, 1959. N. Trakakis. Meta-philosophy of Religion: The Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy of Religion. Ars Disputandi, 7, 2007. J. Wahl. The Pluralist Philosophies of England and America. F. Rothwell, translator. London, The Open Court Company, 1925. J. Wahl. Vers le Concret. Paris, Vrin, 1932. J. Wahl. Nietzsche et la mort de dieu: note a propos du “Nietzsche” de Jaspers. Acéphale, 2:22-24, 1937. I. Waldberg & Patrick Waldberg. Un Amour Acéphale, Correspondence 1940-49. Paris, Editions de la Différence, 1992. M. Warnock. The Philosophy of Sartre. London, Hutchinson, 1965. D. Wiggins. Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life. In G. Sayre-McCord, editor, Essays on Moral Realism, pages 127-65. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1988. C. Wilson. The Outsider. London, Gollancz, 1956. D. Zahavi. Phenomenology and Metaphysics. In D. Zahavi, S. Heinämaa, & H. Ruin, editors, Metaphysics, Facticity, Interpretation: Phenomenology in the Nordic Countries, pages 3-22. Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2003. (shrink)
David Hume's relatively short essay 'Of the Standard of Taste' deals with some of the most difficult issues in aesthetic theory. Apart from giving a few pregnant remarks, near the end of his discussion, on the role of morality in aesthetic evaluation, Hume tries to reconcile the idea that tastes are subjective (in the sense of not being answerable to the facts) with the idea that some objects of taste are better than others. 'Tastes', in this context, are the pleasures (...) or displeasures that a person can take in the beauties of poems, paintings, and other artistic compositions (though Hume also wants to stress the continuities between tastes, so understood, and the bodily sense of taste). The position at which Hume arrives in the essay (despite some dialectical unclarity) is that some people – the 'true judges'– determine by their 'joint verdict' which works are meritorious. This solution continues to exercise a fascination, as does Hume's complicated route to it. Author Recommends: Paul Guyer, 'The Standard of Taste and the "Most Ardent Desire of Society" ', Values of Beauty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 37–76. This paper places 'Of the Standard of Taste' in an especially rich context, and asks why Hume concentrates on true judges instead of the improvement of one's own taste. Mary Mothersill, 'Hume: "Of the Standard of Taste" ', Beauty Restored (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 177–208. This chapter, embedded in an exposition of Mothersill's 'First Thesis' (the denial that there are principles of taste) and 'Second Thesis' (the affirmation that some judgments of taste are genuine judgments), gives a detailed running commentary on Hume's essay. A shorter self-contained version of the chapter appeared as 'Hume and the Paradox of Taste' in Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology , 2nd ed., eds. George Dickie, Richard Sclafani, and Ronald Roblin (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1989, 269–86). Jerrold Levinson, 'Hume's Standard of Taste: The Real Problem', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (2002): 227–38. An importance recent article, Levinson's piece argues that the 'real' difficulty with Hume's essay has gone unnoticed: why should I care about what Hume's true judges think? Christopher Williams, 'Some Questions in Hume's Aesthetics', Philosophy Compass 2/2 (2007). This article provides a brief overview of the topics discussed under weeks 3–5 in the sample syllabus below. It is intended to provide a roadmap for the particular set of readings listed there. David Wiggins, 'A Sensible Subjectivism?', Needs, Values, and Truth , 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 185–214. This is a stimulating paper in moral philosophy that treats Hume's essay on taste as a model for a serious subjectivism. Wiggins then presents his own brand of subjectivism as an alternative to Hume's. Online Materials: Hume's Aesthetics (Ted Gracyk): http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-aesthetics/ Sample Syllabus: Recommended background reading on Hume's historical context: Peter Kivy, The Seventh Sense: Francis Hutcheson and Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetics , 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), especially Part III. Recommended background reading on the general topic of taste: David A. Whewell, 'Taste', Blackwell Companion to Aesthetics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 415–18. Dabney Townsend and Carolyn Korsmeyer, 'Taste', Encyclopedia of Aesthetics , ed. Michael Kelly (New York, NY and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 4:355–62. Ted Cohen, 'The Philosophy of Taste: Thoughts on the Idea', Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics , ed. Peter Kivy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 167–73. Week 1: Hume on beauty, art, and aesthetic judgment in the Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals The following references are usable for any complete edition of the Treatise or Enquiry Treatise , 2.1.8 ('Of Beauty and Deformity') Treatise , 2.2.5 ('Of Our Esteem for the Rich and Powerful') Treatise , 2.2.8 ('Of Malice and Envy'), final three paragraphs Treatise , 2.2.11 ('Of the Amorous Passion, or Love Betwixt the Sexes') Treatise , 3.1.2 ('Moral Distinctions Deriv'd from a Moral Sense') Treatise , 3.3.1 ('Of the Origin of the Natural Virtues') Treatise , 3.3.5 ('Some Farther Reflexions Concerning the Natural Virtues') Enquiry , Appendix 1 ('Of moral sentiment') Week 2: Hume's essays Essays Moral, Political, and Literary , ed. Eugene Miller (Indianapolis, IN: LibertyClassics, 1985) is the most commonly used edition today. 'Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion' 'Of Eloquence' 'Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences' 'Of Simplicity and Refinement in Writing' 'Of Tragedy' 'Of the Standard of Taste' Week 3: Circularity–Virtuous or Vicious? Peter Kivy, 'Hume's Standard of Taste: Breaking the Circle', British Journal of Aesthetics (1967): 57–66. David Wiggins, 'A Sensible Subjectivism?', Needs, Values, and Truth , 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 185–214. Week 4: Rules of Art Mary Mothersill, 'Hume: "Of the Standard of Taste" ', Beauty Restored (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 177–208. James Shelley, 'Hume's Double Standard of Taste', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (1994): 437–45. Nick Zangwill, 'Hume, Taste, and Teleology', The Metaphysics of Beauty (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 149–65. Week 5: The True Judge Malcolm Budd, 'Hume and Kant', 'Hume's Standard of Taste', 'Hume and Human Nature', Values of Art (London: Allen Lane, 1995), 16–24 . Paul Guyer, 'The Standard of Taste and the "Most Ardent Desire of Society" ', Values of Beauty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 37–76. Jerrold Levinson, 'Hume's Standard of Taste: The Real Problem', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (2002): 227–38. Week 6: Moralism in Aesthetic Judgment: Hume and Beyond Kendall Walton, 'Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1994): 27–50. Richard Moran, 'The Expression of Feeling in Imagination', Philosophical Review (1994): 75–106. Tamar Szabo-Gendler, 'The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance', Journal of Philosophy (2000): 55–81. Focus Questions 1. How does Hume distinguish between matters of 'fact' and 'sentiment'? 2. What is a 'rule of art', and are there any rules? 3. Can a bad critic be 'silenced'? 4. What are the characteristics of good critics? 5. Should we expect good critics to agree on the merits of a work, and should I care about becoming a good critic myself? 6. Is it possible to distinguish variations in taste for which we should expect a standard and variations for which it is 'vain' to have such an expectation? 7. How is the excellence of a work related to the exercise of taste? 8. If a work of literature has a moral outlook that differs from our own, should we consider the work defective on literary grounds? (shrink)
Justification for public funding of academic research is based on the linear model of technological advance first proposed by Francis Bacon. The model hypothesizes that government subsidized science generates new technology which creates new wealth. Mainstream economics supports Bacons model by arguing that academic research is a public good. The Bayh–Dole Act allows universities to privatize federally funded research and development (R&D) which is in direct conflict with the public good argument. Diminishing returns to university R&D, challenges to Bacons (...) linear model and the labor exploitation of young scientists by research universities suggest that policy makers may want to reconsider the system for allocating federal R&D to universities and colleges. (shrink)
Does the philosophy of history have a future? In 1949 Karl Jaspers, echoing Hegel, still identified history as the “great question” in philosophy; but in 1966 Karl Löwith observed that the philosophy of history had been reduced to little more than “epochal consciousness.” During the 1970s analytical philosophers endorsed the critical-speculative distinction of C. D. Broad and the question of universal history was effectively bracketed. Post-structuralists and feminists during the 70s and 80s endorsed the observation of Michel Foucault that history (...) is “the Western myth” and, more recently in 1989, Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the “end of history.” In this essay I explore some of the developments contributing to the marginalization of the philosophy of history during the latter half of the twentieth century. Following this, I offer some comments regarding the persistence of the question of universal history. (shrink)
Louis Agassiz.--Address at the Emerson Centenary in Concord.--Robert Gould Shaw.--Francis Boott.--Thomas Davidson: a knight-errant of the intellectual life.--Herbert Spencer's autobiography.--Frederick Myers' services to psychology.--Final impressions of a psychical researcher.--On some mental effects of the earthquake.--The energies of men.--The moral equivalent of war.--Remarks at the peace banquet.--The social value of the college-bred.--The university and the individual: The Ph.D. octopus. The true Harvard. Stanford's ideal destiny.--A pluralistic mystic.
This is the first volume of a two-volume set containing the most important secondary literature on Hume on Religion (Volume 2, to be published in August 1996, deals with general remarks on Hume and Natural Religion). Focusing on responses to the Essay on Miracles , the material included in this volume ranges from 1751 to 1883. Authors include: T. Rutherford, William Adams, John Leland, George Campbell, Revd. S. Vince, John Hollis, Revd. James Somerville, Dr. Wately, Revd. A. C. L. D'Arblay, (...) Revd. Francis Kilvert, Malthus, Joseph Napier, Joseph Mazzini Wheeler, Sir Edmund Beckett, James McCosh, and Huxley. (shrink)
Le débat entre relativistes, affirmant la pluralité irréconciliable des cultures, et absolutistes, défendant la supériorité de la culture humaniste, peut être depasse si I’on définit correctement la “cultureuniverselle.” Elle est recherche infinie de la compréhension la plus complète et la plus cohérente possible à travers le dialogue, c’est-à-dire dans des discours à la validité véritiable. Elle n’a d’autre fondement que la raison. Ainsi relativistes et absolutistes, en tant qu’ils argumentent, appartiennent à cette culture que pourtant ils interpètent mal, en oubliant (...) que I’universel ne peut être qu’une exigence que I’on impose librement. Cependant cette culture désintéressée et formelle a des effets historiques, notamment les ciences modernes. De tene sorte que le problème contemporain est de savoir si on peut articuler la pluralité des cultures, la civilisation scientifique et technique et la réflexxion libre. (shrink)
It is unfortunate that Francis Y. Lin, in ‘Chomsky on the “ordinary language” view of language’ pays little attention to his own remark, ‘Chomsky’s criticisms make us realize that we should not be content with general and vague formulations of convention, ability, and so on. We must make such notions precise and provide details’ Lin speaks so imprecisely and provides so few details of notions on which he relies heavily, such as ‘general learning mechanism’ and ‘sentence frame’, that readers (...) must employ large amounts of guesswork to place even a halfway specific interpretation on his proposals and claims. (shrink)
Recent scholars have examined the important role of English Deism in the formation of a modern naturalistic approach to the study of human religiosity. Despite the volume of important studies of various aspects of his thought, the role of Francis Hutcheson (1694?1746) in this development has been overlooked. The aim of this paper is to show how Hutcheson develops his own account of the origins of religion, consonant with his more well-known theories in aesthetics and moral philosophy, that diverges (...) sharply from the then-prevailing Deist views. Hutcheson pioneers a psychological account of religion that anticipates the work of nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars in important ways. At the same time, Hutcheson incorporates his account of the origins of religion into an overall vision of human flourishing. (shrink)
This paper develops a detailed reading of Deleuze's philosophical study of Bacon's triptychs in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. It examines his claims regarding their apparent non-narrative status, and explores the capacity of the triptychs to embody and express a spiritual sensation of the eternity of time.
Différence, référence, communicabilité : trois mots-clés pour dessiner la structure originaire et élémentaire de la signifiance. Or, l'interrogation change de nature quand on la déplace du signifié vers le sens, puis vers la signifiance. Il ne s'agit ni d'une action, ni d'un événement, mais d'un processus. Trois conditions nécessaires : présence d'un matériel signifiant (sonore, graphique, électronique) ; aptitude à se référer à une réalité extérieure ; énonciateurs en relation binaire entre lesquels et pour lesquels les énoncés signifient. L'auteur examine (...) les conséquences de leur considération groupée en philosophie du langage. Difference, reference and communicability are three key-words to outline the original and elementary structure of« signifying ». Now, the nature of philosophical interrogation changes when it shifts from the saussurian « signifié » towards the meaning, a fortiori towards signifying. It is neither an action nor an event but a process. Three conditions are necessary : the presence of specific material (whether acoustic, graphic or electronical) ; an aptitude to refer to an outside reality ; speakers standing in binary relationship. The writer examines the consequences of considering the constraints as gathered in a philosophy of language. (shrink)
Je crois que le secret de la littérature est là, et qu’un livre n’est beau qu’habilement paré de l’indifférence des ruines. Il y a un mystère dans les phrases que chacun retient pour soi, ces phrases qui hantent ou soulèvent ; ces phrases auxquelles on revient ou qui plutôt reviennent, elles, comme reviennent les rêves et les chansons. Qu’elles ne soient pas communes à tous, sauf exceptions, à moins que l’institution ou quelque hasard les aient homologuées, qu’elles restent singulières et (...) bien cachées, devrait convaincre, mais de quoi ? Mon propos, Madeline Chalon, ou ce que je tenterai d’en faire, répondra d’autant mieux à votre invitation, qu’il prendra la forme d’une lettre, d’une réponse, d’un envoi. C’est à la fois naïf et prétentieux, mais depuis le début je ne peux me séparer de ce pari qui est bien plus qu’un désir, et moins qu’une facilité. Si j’en profite pour reprendre un motif – l’incitation – qui m’aura fait pas mal cavaler, c’est aussi pour l’éclaircir, une dernière fois, (...). (shrink)
Faut-il abandonner l'idée de catégorisation ou lui conserver une fonction plus restreinte, diversifiée, domaniale ? On se demande ce qui peut être préservé de la conception transcendantale pour prolonger son évolution récente au-delà de Wittgenstein, Goodman et Peirce. On propose une approche interrogative, présuppositionnelle et textologique qui lui conserve assez de fonctions (sémantique, judicatoire, heuristique, interprétative), pour qu'il reste significatif de parler de catégorisation. Au lieu d'être immobiles, les catégories ont vocation à commander la recherche, qu'elle soit enquête scientifique ou (...) même quête religieuse. Un concept devient catégorial pour autant qu'il ouvre un domaine à la recherche, la guide ou lui permet de se réorganiser. A first question is raised, whether the idea of categorisation should be altogether dismissed or retained, but with more restricted, diversified and less extensive functions. The second question deals with what of the transcendantal dogma can be maintained in order to extend its recent developments beyond Wittgenstein, Goodman and Peirce. An interrogative, pre suppositional and textological approach is put forward, which could preserve enough functions (of semantic, judicatory, heuristic or interpretative types) to allow to go on speaking of categorisation with some kind of relevance. Far from being immovable, the categories indeed call for leadership in matters of research, be it scientific investigation or sacred religious quest. It appears that a concept becomes categorial in so far as it breaks fresh ground for research, provides guidance and enables it to perform self reorganisation. (shrink)
Different researchers use "the philosophy of automated theorem p r o v i n g " t o cover d i f f e r e n t concepts, indeed, different levels of concepts. Some w o u l d count such issues as h o w to e f f i c i e n t l y i n d e x databases as part of the philosophy of automated theorem p r o v i n g . (...) Others wonder about whether f o r m u l a s should be represented as strings or as trees or as lists, and call this part of the philosophy of automated theorem p r o v i n g . Yet others concern themselves w i t h what k i n d o f search should b e embodied i n a n y automated theorem prover, or to what degree any automated theorem prover should resemble Prolog. Still others debate whether natural deduction or semantic tableaux or resolution is " b e t t e r " , a n d c a l l t h i s a part of the p h i l o s o p h y of automated theorem p r o v i n g . Some people wonder whether automated theorem p r o v i n g should be " h u m a n oriented" or "machine o r i e n t e d " — sometimes arguing about whether the internal p r o o f methods should be " h u m a n - I i k e " or not, sometimes arguing about whether the generated proof should be output in a f o r m u n d e r s t a n d a b l e by p e o p l e , and sometimes a r g u i n g a b o u t the d e s i r a b i l i t y o f h u m a n intervention in the process of constructing a proof. There are also those w h o ask such questions as whether we s h o u l d even be concerned w i t h completeness or w i t h soundness of a system, or perhaps we should instead look at very efficient (but i n c o m p l e t e ) subsystems or look at methods of generating models w h i c h might nevertheless validate invalid arguments. A n d a l l of these have been v i e w e d as issues in the philosophy of automated theorem proving. Here, I w o u l d l i k e to step back from such i m p l e m e n t - ation issues and ask: " W h a t do we really think we are doing when we w r i t e an automated theorem prover?" My reflections are perhaps idiosyncratic, but I do think that they put the different researchers* efforts into a broader perspective, and give us some k i n d of handle on w h i c h directions we ourselves m i g h t w i s h to pursue when constructing (or extending) an automated theorem proving system. A logic is defined to be (i) a vocabulary and formation rules ( w h i c h tells us w h a t strings of symbols are w e l l - formed formulas in the logic), and ( i i ) a definition of ' p r o o f in that system ( w h i c h tells us the conditions under which an arrangement of formulas in the system constitutes a proof). Historically speaking, definitions of ' p r o o f have been given in various different manners: the most c o m m o n have been H i l b e r t - s t y l e ( a x i o m a t i c ) , Gentzen-style (consecution, or sequent), F i t c h - s t y l e (natural deduction), and Beth-style (tableaux).. (shrink)
