In traditional rebates, consumers submit proof of purchase for an item and then receive a portion of the purchase price, usually in the form of a check or gift card. In contrast, when a consumer redeems a cause rebate, a cash reward is given not to the consumer but to a non-profit organization (Ellis & McCall, 2011). In this paper, we aim to determine the attitudes toward and effectiveness of cause rebates versus traditional rebates. This will help marketers develop more (...) effective rebate programs for their products. We also will investigate characteristics of consumers more likely to redeem cause rebates. Cause rebates represent a mechanism by which businesses can promote personal responsibility on the part of consumers and help draw attention to and raise funds for social and environmental issues. (shrink)
Many organizations are utilizing corporate social responsibility initiatives that require employee participation. These initiatives, which involve social action at work (SAW), can be a source of reputational gains, benefit the community, and increase employee organizational identification (Ellis, 2009). Although research has been conducted on employee volunteer programs (EVP), one aspect of SAW, those studies have not identified the characteristics of employees who are most likely to participate in EVP nor have they considered the wide range of SAW programs. In the (...) field of Sociology, extensive research has been conducted to identify characteristics of volunteers, but these volunteer programs are outside the context of CSR initiatives. This research addresses this gap by identifying the characteristics of those who engage in SAW across a wide range of activities. The results of the study can help hone future research questions and aid practitioners in developing and marketing SAW programs that resonate with employees and maximize participation for the good of the employees, organization, and community as a whole. (shrink)
As a subject of study, rebates have been investigated by researchers who are interested in understanding the characteristics of individuals who are likely to use rebates as well as the decision-making process that leads shoppers to redeem rebates or not. Additionally, researchers have studied the most effective rebate vehicles. An unrelated, but well-established research stream is dedicated to cause marketing. No extant studies, however, look at cause marketing campaigns that utilize rebates. In this theoretical paper, we review the key findings (...) of the literature on rebates, discuss how cause rebates and typical rebates differ, and offer propositions to guide future research on rebates for a cause. (shrink)
This paper argues that there is a default presumption that punishment has some deterrent effect, and that the burden of proof is upon those who allege that the costs of any particular penal system are insufficient to offset its deterrent benefits. This burden of proof transmits to the discussion of international law, with the conclusion that it is those who oppose international jurisdiction, rather than their opponents, who must prove their position. This they have so far failed to do.
In this paper, I provide a number of suggested exercises and assignments for integrating sustainability into Corporate Social Responsibility and Business Ethics classes, as well as other classes offered in Business Schools. I developed or adapted these activities and have successfully used them in a range of classes. Not only do these activities engage students and promote creativity, they also promote critical thinking in the classroom.
In my 'A Deterrence Theory of Punishment', I argued that a deterrence system of punishment can avoid the charge that it illegitimately uses offenders if its punishments are carried out 'quasiautomatically': threats are issued by a legislature for deterrent purposes, but those who carry out the punishments have no authority to take deterrent considerations into account. Sprague has objected that under such a system, those who carry out punishments will be unable to justify their actions. I reply that if it (...) is justifiable to set up the system in this way in the first place, then this justification will transmit to all actions carried out under it; and that it is justifiable to set up an institution of punishment in this way. (shrink)
Do minority groups have a right to the preservation of their language? I argue that the rights of groups are always reducible to the rights of individuals. In that case, the question whether minorities have a right to the preservation of their language is a question of whether individuals have a right to it. I argue that, in the only relevant sense of ‘right’, they do not. They may have an interest in the preservation of their language, but, if so, (...) that interest must be weighed against the costs of satisfying it, and, normally at least, we should expect that the costs will be quite out of proportion to the weight of the interests involved. (shrink)
I start from the presupposition that the use of force against another is justified only in self-defence or in defence of others against aggression. If so, the main work of justifying punishment must rely on its deterrent effect, since most punishments have no other significant self-defensive effect. It has often been objected to the deterrent justification of punishment that it commits us to using offenders unacceptably, and that it is unable to deliver acceptable limits on punishment. I describe a sort (...) of deterrent theory which can avoid both of these objections. (shrink)
What I call the Just Distribution theory of punishment holds that the justification of punishment is that it rectifies the social distribution of benefits and burdens which has been upset by the offender. I argue that a recent version of this theory is no more viable than earlier versions. Like them, it fails in its avowed intention to deliver fundamental intuitions about crime and punishment. The root problem is its foundation in Hart's Principle of Fair Play, a foundation which, I (...) argue, is inappropriate for a theory of punishment. (shrink)
Judith Jarvis Thomson has argued that any acceptable-- and perhaps even imaginable-- legal system must assign to citizens certain rights not to be aggressed against. I argue that this is not so. Typical legal systems certain assign duties of non-aggression; but the criminal branches of those systems do not assign corresponding rights. The civil branches may, but not to an extent that supports Thomson's thesis.