Section 1 of this essay distinguishes between four interpretations of Socratic intellectualism, which are, very roughly: (1) a version in which on any given occasion desire, and then action, is determined by what we think will turn out best for us, that being what we all, always, really desire; (2) a version in which on any given occasion action is determined by what we think will best satisfy our permanent desire for what is really best for us; (3) a version (...) formed by the assimilation of (2) to (1), labelled the ‘standard’ version’ by Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, and treated by them as a single alternative to their own interpretation; and (4) Brickhouse and Smith’s own version. Section 2 considers, in particular, Brickhouse and Smith’s handling of the ‘appetites and passions’, which is the most distinctive feature of interpretation (4). Section 3 discusses Brickhouse and Smith’s defence of ‘Socratic studies’ in its historical context, and assesses the contribution made by their distinctive interpretation of ‘the philosophy of Socrates’. One question raised in this section, and one that is clearly fundamental to the existence of ‘Socratic studies’, is how different Brickhouse and Smith’s Socrates turns out to be from Plato himself, i.e., the Plato of the post-‘Socratic’ dialogues; to which the answer offered is that on Brickhouse and Smith’s interpretation Socratic moral psychology becomes rather less distinguishable from its ‘Platonic’ counterpart—as that is currently understood—than it is on the interpretation(s) they oppose. (shrink)
S'il reprend des thèmes chers à la patristique, Érigène adapte ces notions théologiques afin de penser non plus tant l'être divin, que l'être créé, en sa condition même de créature. Ainsi Érigène reconnaît-il aux êtres créés, qu'il nomme «existants» (existentia), une subsistence qui, si elle se fonde dans l'essence divine, s'en distingue toutefois.Quoi qu'il en soit du contexte néoplatonicien dans lequel intervient le terme subsistence (utilisé notamment pour traduire l'huparxis du Ps-Denys ou de Maxime le Confesseur), l'on ne saurait le (...) réduire à la nomination de la venue à l'être (c'est l'existence qui évoque cette idée). Réinvestissant la notion de subsistence qui s'est construite chez ses prédécesseurs latins, notre auteur s'en sert pour faire signe vers l'idée d'une permanence de ce qui est au-delà de la procession qui luia permis d'accéder à l'être. (shrink)
This issue of Mélusine pursues the research initiated in 1982 on the surrealist book, without giving the last word on such a complex subject. Demonstrating erudition worthy of La Revue d'histoire littéraire de la France, the contributors propose new ideas and points of view. By the sheer abundance of technical terms, the articles would have astonished the avant-garde poets and artists in question, who were so very fond of entertainment. Some contributors examine the illustrated book, the artist's book and the (...) book-object in general as surrealist publications, while others focus on a single book or even on the non-book imagined by André Breton.In her introduction, editor Andrea Oberhuber describes the evolution of .. (shrink)
Ne serait-ce que par son titre, dont l’oxymore est d’emblée assumée (p.11) et dont les protagonistes sont associés d’une manière qui ne laisse de surprendre, l’ouvrage de Julien Boudon publié dans la collection « Les sens du droit » des éditions Dalloz, mériterait de retenir l’attention.Dans ce court opus, l’auteur entend, à travers un examen qui puise tout à la fois aux sources de l’histoire, de la philosophie, du droit, de la science politique, et qui emprunte à la fois au (...) style de la monog.. (shrink)
This paper is a reply to D'Costa's article ("Religious Studies," 32, pp. 223-32) in which he argues that there is no such position as religious pluralism because in distinguishing between, e.g., Christianity or Buddhism, and Nazism or the Jim Jones cult, a criterion is involved and to use a criterion is a form of exclusivism. In reply I point out that this sense of 'exclusivism', as consisting in the use of criteria, is self-destructive; that the pluralistic hypothesis, as a meta-theory (...) about the religions, has a different logical status from the creeds of the historical religions; and I also show the origin of the ethnical criterion used by the religious pluralist who stands within one or other of the great world faiths. (shrink)
Nous nous sommes proposés ici de montrer qu’Aristote caractérise le fou (μαινόμενος) dans le cadre d’un système différencié d’autres notions, sans en faire seulement un cas limite, quasiment impensé. Le point de départ de l’étude est l’analyse de la triade ἀκούσιον/δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν/ἀγνοῶν qui convoque aux côtés du fou : l’homme en colère, l’homme pris de vin, celui qui dort, le méchant (μοχθηρός), l’intempérant/incontinent (ἀκρατής), le malade. Cela implique de déterminer les types d’ignorance en cause dans les actes accomplis dans chaque (...) cas et, a contrario, en contraste avec la position socratique, les différentes formes de «l’être dans le savoir» : le savoir en entéléchie première et le savoir en acte ; le savoir du général et celui du particulier ; le savoir en acte sans intervention des affections (πάθη) et le savoir avec affections. Dans l’ensemble des catégories d’acteurs envisagées qui, selon les cas ne mettent pas en acte leur savoir de la différence entre le bien et le mal temporairement, ou le font durablement au point de transformer leur ignorance un état stable (ἕξις) de méchanceté ou encore par choix, comme l’acratique, dans cet ensemble donc, le fou apparaît comme celui qui agit par ignorance (δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν) et non pas de l’un ou de l’autre des paramètres d’une action particulière, mais de tous, à l’exception d’un seul : l’agent car, dit Aristote, «comment s’ignorer soi-même» (ἑαυτόν). Un autre moment de l’article consiste à analyser ce qu’est le soi-même en question et conclut à la réduction de l’αὐτός à ce qui accompagne la mise en acte de l’existence (τὸ εἶναι) que ce soit dans l’agir (πραττειν), le faire (ποιεῖν) ou le vivre (ζῆν). Le fou, en agissant, activerait simplement son sentiment d’exister et en cela ne pourrait «s’ignorer lui-même». Mais il faudra qu’il sorte de cette position et que, revenu à la connaissance de tous les paramètres d’un acte, il se repente de ce qu’il a accompli, pour avoir droit à la qualification d’ἀκούσιος («qui a agi contre son gré»). Chez Aristote la folie semble donc ne pouvoir être philosophiquement prise en compte que comme une crise dont on sort pour mettre en acte son savoir des paramètres d’une action particulière et n’est pas excusable parce que le fou «n’aurait pas eu conscience de son acte» mais parce qu’il a retrouvé la connaissance de ce qui compose un acte. (shrink)
Abstract: The intent of this paper is to indicate a development in Sellars' writings which points in another direction than the interpretations offered by Brandom, McDowell, and A. D. Smith. Brandom and McDowell have long claimed to preserve central insights of Sellars's theory of perception; however, they disagree over what exactly these insights are. A. D. Smith has launched a critique of Sellars in chapter 2 of his book The Problem of Perception which is so penetrating that it would tear (...) Sellars' philosophy of perception apart if it were adequate. However, I try to show firstly that Brandom's and McDowell's interpretations are unsatisfying when Sellars' late writings are taking into consideration. And secondly that we can give another interpretation of Sellars that is not vulnerable to some of the problems of which Smith accuses Sellars. (shrink)
Dans cet article, nous introduisons le lecteur à une énigme qui a émergé récemment dans la littérature philosophique : celle de l’influence de nos évaluations morales sur nos intuitions au sujet de la nature des actions intentionnelle. En effet, certaines données issues de la philosophie expérimentale semblent suggérer que nos jugements quant au statut intentionnel d’une action dépendent de notre évaluation de ladite action. De nombreuses théories ont été proposées pour rendre compte de ces résultats. Nous défendons la thèse selon (...) laquelle aucune des théories existantes n’est satisfaisante et que le mystère reste pour l’instant entier. (shrink)
This paper presents an argument against A D Smith’s Direct Realist theory of perception, which attempts to defend Direct Realism against the argument from illusion by appealing to conscious perceptual states that are structured by the perceptual constancies. Smith’s contention is that the immediate objects of perceptual awareness are characterised by these constancies, which removes any difficulty there may be in identifying them with the external, or normal, objects of awareness. It is here argued that Smith’s theory does not provide (...) an adequate defence of Direct Realism because it does not adequately deal with the difficulties posed by the possibility of perceptual illusion. It is argued that there remain possible illusory experiences where the immediate objects of awareness, which in Smith’s account are those characterised by perceptual constancies, cannot be identified with the external objects of awareness, contrary to Direct Realism. A further argument is offered to extend this conclusion to all non-illusory cases, by adapting an argument of Smith’s own for the generalising step of the Argument from Illusion. The result is that Smith’s theory does not provide an adequate Direct Realist account of the possibility of perceptual illusion. (shrink)
Group selection is increasingly being viewed as an important force in human evolution. This paper examines the views of R.D. Alexander, one of the most influential thinkers about human behavior from an evolutionary perspective, on the subject of group selection. Alexander's general conception of evolution is based on the gene-centered approach of G.C. Williams, but he has also emphasized a potential role for group selection in the evolution of individual genomes and in human evolution. Alexander's views are internally inconsistent and (...) underestimate the importance of group selection. Specific themes that Alexander has developed in his account of human evolution are important but are best understood within the framework of multilevel selection theory. From this perspective, Alexander's views on moral systems are not the radical departure from conventional views that he claims, but remain radical in another way more compatible with conventional views. (shrink)
John Searle claims that social-scientific laws are impossible because social phenomena are physically open-ended. William Butchard and Robert D’Amico have recently argued that, by Searle’s own lights, money is a social phenomena that is physically closed. However, Butchard and D’Amico rely on a limited set of data in order to draw this conclusion, and fail to appreciate the implications of Searle’s theory of social ontology with regard to the physical open-endedness of money. Money is not physically open-ended in the strong (...) sense that Butchard and D’Amico require, and their argument for the possibility of social-scientific laws fails as a result. (shrink)
The goal of this article is to try to resolve two key problems in the duty-based approach of W. D. Ross: the source of principles and a process for moving from prima facie to actual duty. I use a naturalistic explanation for the former and a nine-step method for making concrete ethical decisions as they could be applied to journalism. Consistent with Ross's position, the process is complicated, particularly in tougher problems, and it cannot guarantee correct choices. Again consistent with (...) Ross, such complexity and uncertainty speak in the method's favor, given the difficulty?factual, motivational, and organizational?of ethics problems and decision making. (shrink)
The notion of a D-ring, generalizing that of a differential or a difference ring, is introduced. Quantifier elimination and a version of the Ax-Kochen-Eršov principle is proven for a theory of valued D-fields of residual characteristic zero.
Le but de cet article est de décrire le point de vue d?Henri Poincaré sur l'axiome du choix, dont 1?explication par Zermelo en 1904, déclencha une vive polémique. Agitant le monde mathématique de l'époque, cette polémique avait ses racines dans la diversité des conceptions philosophiques que les mathématiciens avaient sur les mathématiques. Poincaré avait une position originale; quelques lettres qu?il écrivit à Zermelo (1906?1907), ainsi que les articles publiés à la même époques dans la Revue de métaphysique et morale, éclairent (...) ce point de vue. The aim of this paper is to describe the views of Henri Poincaré concerning axiom of choice, of which the statement by Zermelo in 1904 launched a sharp polemic. Shaking the mathematical society of the time, this controversy had its roots into the diversity of philosophical conceptions that mathematicians held about mathematics. Poincaré had a particular point of view; a few letters from him to Zermelo (1906?1907), together with papers published in Revue de métaphysique et morale at the same time, throw light on this view. (shrink)
McFarland and Crouch (2002) reported substantial positive correlations (a) between the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and response speed and (b) between IATs assessing racism or self-esteem and ostensibly unrelated control IATs. Using an IAT measure in millisecond-difference score format, they concluded that the IAT was confounded with general cognitive ability. A reanalysis of these data using the D measure (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) eliminated the speed of responding confound, although it did not eliminate the correlation between the control (...) and racism IATs. The study was replicated and the two correlations, paralleling those in the original study, emerged for the millisecond-difference score. However, both were reduced to nonsignificance by use of the D measure. These findings are consistent with other recent studies (Mierke & Klauer, 2003) that document the protection afforded by D against cognitive skill confounds. (shrink)
I focus on D A Masolo’s discussion of morality as characteristically understood by African philosophers. My goals are both historical and substantive, meaning that I use reflection on Masolo’s book as an occasion to shed light not only on the nature of recent debates about African ethics, but also on African ethics itself. With regard to history, I argue that Masolo’s discussion of sub-Saharan morality suggests at least two major ways that the field has construed it, depending on which value (...) is taken to be basic and which ones are deemed derivative. According to one perspective, the ultimate aim of a moral agent should be to improve people’s quality of life, which she can reliably do by supporting community in certain ways, while the other view is that community should instead be valued for its own sake, with the enhancement of welfare being morally relevant only insofar as it is part of that. I claim that Masolo does not indicate a clear awareness of how these two perspectives differ and is not explicit about how they relate to one another. After pointing out that Masolo is not alone in these respects, I draw what is meant to be a definitive, clear distinction between the two major ethical philosophies. Then, I provide what I deem to be conclusive reason to prefer the community- based conception of sub-Saharan ethics to the welfare-based one. (shrink)
The strategies of action employed by a human subject in order to perceive simple 2-D forms on the basis of tactile sensory feedback have been modelled by an explicit computer algorithm. The modelling process has been constrained and informed by the capacity of human subjects both to consciously describe their own strategies, and to apply explicit strategies; thus, the strategies effectively employed by the human subject have been influenced by the modelling process itself. On this basis, good qualitative and semi-quantitative (...) agreement has been achieved between the trajectories produced by a human subject, and the traces produced by a computer algorithm. The advantage of this reciprocal modelling option, besides facilitating agreement between the algorithm and the empirically observed trajectories, is that the theoretical model provides an explanation, and not just a description, of the active perception of the human subject. (shrink)
Huey D. Johnson: Green Plans: Blueprint for a Sustainable Earth Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s10806-012-9388-9 Authors Devparna Roy, Polson Institute for Global Development, Department of Development Sociology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863.
S. A. Mrozowski, « Temps, rythme et espace. L'influence d'Henri Lefebvre dans le champ de l'archéologie historique », in P. Cingolani (dir.), Henri Lefebvre, une pensée devenue monde ?, 2013, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2013, p. 119-132. - Brèves.
L'autorite, « une cause perdue », ou « presque perdue » ? Si Ton en croit Hannah Arendt, qui s'exprime en ces termes, la notion d'autorite aurait ete ä la fois passablement obscurcie et fortement compromise par la « Modernite » ; elle aurait meme disparu de notre monde, tant sur le plan politique que prepolitique (qui renvoie ä la sphere de l'education familiale, scolaire). Nous voudrions montrer que cet effacement peut s'entendre avant tout comme une sorte d'eclipse, dans la (...) mesure ou la dimension fondatrice, institutrice de l'autorite est ä reconnaitre, dans le plan politique comme educatif, et que c'est ce qui permet d'etablir selon nous la permanence de sa necessite. Mais la condition pour en prendre la mesure est de proceder ä l'examen critique des confusions qui, «durcissant» et figeant la notion, empechent de penser l'autorite autrement que sous un jour repressif. De ce point de vue l'analyse arendtienne est selon nous ä poursuivre face ä une nouvelle forme de « crise », qui correspond ä un retour de l'autorite invoquee comme force, en des termes qui tendent plus ä la defigurer qu'ä la reinstaller dans sa legitimite. (shrink)
As its title indicates, this book is a study of the trip Nietzsche made to Sorrento in 1876, after the Bayreuth festival and before the publication of Human, All Too Human. Paolo D’Iorio’s main thesis is that at Sorrento Nietzsche became a true philosopher, abandoning his metaphysics of art together with his commitment to the Wagnerian cause in order to develop his philosophy of the free spirit. D’Iorio collects all of the available documents about the Sorrento trip, from Nietzsche’s allusions (...) to his Italian experiences in his notebooks and subsequent works to letters to and from his traveling companions and memoirs of friends and acquaintances. The chief interest of the book lies in this philological work, which .. (shrink)
The article responds to the objections M.D. Ashfield has raised to my recent attempt at saving epistemic contextualism from the knowability problem. First, it shows that Ashfield’s criticisms of my minimal conception of epistemic contextualism, even if correct, cannot reinstate the knowability problem. Second, it argues that these criticisms are based on a misunderstanding of the commitments of my minimal conception. I conclude that there is still no reason to maintain that epistemic contextualism has the knowability problem.
The title of Thomas James's 2011 In Face of Reality: The Constructive Theology of Gordon D. Kaufman echoes the title of Gordon Kaufman's 1993 In Face of Mystery: A Constructive Theology. Kaufman's theology evolved over his long career, but mystery became his principal metaphor for God. In substituting reality for mystery, James signals his central project, which is to argue that Kaufman's theology offers an objective God who "really acts in the world" (1).For James, God's providential activity is a touchstone (...) of Christian theology. However, he asserts, contemporary science has left little space for God to act. Most theologians have responded by: 1) limiting interaction with scientific findings to preserve .. (shrink)
La réflexion de Thomas d’Aquin sur les régimes de la cité présente l’inconvénient que ses oeuvres politiques sont restées inachevées. Significative pour pouvoir décider de l’appartenance de Thomas d’Aquin au côté de la doctrine gélasienne ou à celle du pape Grégoire VII, la comparaison du Super Sententiisavec le traité De regno, telle qu’elle a été faite par I.T. Eschmann, n’est pas bien riche en conclusions pour la question du consentement politique. Selon la position que nous avons assumée dans notre investigation (...) au sein des deux oeuvres de Thomas, il est possible d’affirmer que la notion de consentement n’introduit pas de fausses discontinuités entre des textes écrits à des périodes distinctes. En fin de compte, ce qui unit le Super Sententiis au De regno c’est, à notre avis, une sorte de prudence politique, issue de la lecture que Thomas d’Aquin fait des livres sapientiels de l’Ancien Testament. Sans avoir l’intention de nier les différences qui existent entre les deux textes thomasiens, il nous semble évident qu’ils dégagent plutôt la perspective d’une science politique attentive aux pratiques du temps, mais encore réservée quant aux concepts liés au consentement exprimé par le principe quod omnes tangit, principe que la prudence politique n’a pas encore assimilé. (shrink)
Alan Shewmons article, The brain and somatic integration: Insights into the standard biological rationale for equating brain death with death (2001), strikes at the heart of the standard justification for whole brain death criteria. The standard justification, which I call the standard paradigm, holds that the permanent loss of the functions of the entire brain marks the end of the integrative unity of the body. In my response to Shewmons article, I first offer a brief summary of the standard paradigm (...) and cite recent work by advocates of whole brain criteria who tenaciously cling to the standard paradigm despite increasing evidence showing that it has significant weaknesses. Second, I address Shewmons case against the standard paradigm, arguing that he is successful in showing that whole brain dead patients have integrated organic unity. Finally, I discuss some minor problems with Shewmons article, along with suggestions for further elaboration. (shrink)
Since antiquity many philosophers and grammarians were looking for what is “behind” the particular grammars, for something like “the unchangeable principles common to all languages”. Even limitingourselves to the most concrete aspects of such a general grammar, we may ask whether there is something realizable among the risky hipotheses and the vague projects.In this paper we do not try to discover something more or less hidden in the particular grammars, but to show, in a very general way, some directions for (...) constructing, eventually, an universal grammar. Four approaches are mentioned:(1) artificial universal languages like Esperanto,(2) systems of automatic analysis of a language,(3) programming languages,(4) the first-order systems of logic.It is shown how those approaches (and the experiences acquired in working with them might be combined; but wether this combination produces interesting results and brings us nearer to an universal and rational grammar of our computerized epoch is an open question, which can be answered only by practical experience. (shrink)
The so-called "biometric-Mendelian controversy" has received much attention from science studies scholars. This paper focuses on one scientist involved in this debate, Arthur Dukinfield Darbishire, who performed a series of hybridization experiments with mice beginning in 1901. Previous historical work on Darbishire's experiments and his later attempt to reconcile Mendelian and biometric views describe Darbishire as eventually being "converted" to Mendelism. I provide a new analysis of this episode in the context of Darbishire's experimental results, his underlying epistemology, and his (...) influence on the broader debate surrounding the rediscovery and acceptance of Mendelism. I investigate various historiographical issues raised by this episode in order to reflect on the idea of "conversion" to a scientific theory. Darbishire was an influential figure who resisted strong forces compelling him to convert prematurely due to his requirements that the new theory account for particularly important anomalous facts and answer the most pressing questions in the field. (shrink)
