Online research in philosophy

We praise Arbib et al.'s Neural organization for its support of the integration of different levels of analysis, while noting that it does not always achieve what it advocates. We extend this approach into an area of neuropsychological activity in need of the structure offered by Organization at the intersection of the conflated fields of executive function and frontal lobe function.

Any study of the 'Scientific Revolution' and particularly Descartes' role in the debates surrounding the conception of nature (atoms and the void v. plenum theory, the role of mathematics and experiment in natural knowledge, the status and derivation of the laws of nature, the eternality and necessity of eternal truths, etc.) should be placed in the philosophical, scientific, theological, and sociological context of its time. Seventeenth-century debates concerning the nature of the eternal truths such as '2 + 2 = 4' (...) or the law of inertia turn on the question of whether these truths were created along with nature, or were uncreated and subsisting in God's mind. One's answer to that question has direct consequences for conceptions of the necessity/contingency of mathematical and natural knowledge, how knowledge of such truths is accomplished by humans, and what grounds these truths. In this paper, I review the positions of four successors to Descartes' philosophy on the question of the eternal truths to illustrate how in specific ways that question with its theological, metaphysical, modal, and epistemological dimensions concerned the objectivity and certainty of the discoveries of the new science. Author Recommends: Clarke, Desmond. Descartes' Philosophy of Science . University Park, Penn State Press, 1982. This work provides an account of Descartes as a practicing scientist whose rationalism is mitigated by reliance on experiment and experience. Author re-examines Descartes' philosophical and scientific works in this new light. Dear, Peter. Revolutionizing the Sciences: European Knowledge and its Ambitions, 1500–1700 . Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001. This work provides a useful overview of the issues and thinkers of the Scientific Revolution. Of particular relevance is chapter 8 on Cartesian and Newtonian science. Funkenstein, Amos. Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century . Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986. This work is an advanced study of the theological and metaphysical foundations of early modern science. Discussions include questions of God's nature, God's knowledge in relation to human knowledge, providence, the laws of nature, and the truths of mathematics. In particular, chapter 3 discusses Descartes' account of the eternal truths and divine omnipotence. Garber, Daniel. Descartes' Metaphysical Physics . Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992. This work examines how Descartes' metaphysical doctrines of God, soul, and body set the groundwork for his physics. It includes a study of God and the grounds for the laws of physics (chapter 9). Henry, John. The Scientific Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science . 3rd ed. New York, Palgrave, Macmillan Press, 2008. This work provides a brief, general, and informative overview of the Scientific Revolution, including the themes of method, magic, religion, and culture. Osler, Margaret J. Divine Will and the Mechanical Philosophy: Gassendi and Descartes on Contingency and Necessity in the Created World . Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994. This work is an examination and comparison of the mechanical philosophies of Gassendi and Descartes. It offers in-depth discussion of the issue of voluntarism and intellectualism in the period and how that related to conceptions of laws of nature and the eternal truths. Shapin, Steven. The Scientific Revolution . Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996. This work provides a critical synthesis of as well as a guide to recent scholarship in the history of science for a general readership. Online Materials Dr. Robert A. Hatch's Scientific Revolution Website: http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/rhatch/pages/03-Sci-Rev/SCI-REV-Home/ A compendium of resources for the study of Scientific Revolution. Early English Books Online: http://eebo.chadwyck.com/home Early English Books Online (EEBO) contains digital facsimile page images of virtually every work printed in England, Ireland, Scotland, Wales and British North America and works in English printed elsewhere from 1473 to 1700. Early Modern Resources: http://www.earlymodernweb.org.uk/emr/ Early Modern Resources is a gateway for all those interested in finding electronic resources relating to the early modern period in history. Gallica, the Digital Library of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France: http://gallica.bnf.fr/ An ever-growing digital library which includes numerous primary and secondary texts of relevance to Descartes and his role in Scientific Revolution. Hatfield, Gary, 'René Descartes', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2009 ed. Ed. Edward N. Zalta; URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/descartes/ Slowik, Edward, 'Descartes' Physics', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2008 ed. Ed. Edward N. Zalta; URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/descartes-physics/ Syllabus Sample Syllabus: Cartesian Science The following is five weeks covering Cartesian Science in a course on Descartes or the Scientific Revolution, or 17th-century theories of matter, or related themes on early modern truth and method, especially on the continent. This material is best suited to a graduate level audience, but it could be modified to suit an upper-division undergraduate course, as the readings are basically primary texts whose context and background can be explained in lectures. Week 1: Cartesian Revolution in France • Scientific method • Role of mathematics and experiment • Certainty of scientific knowledge Readings: Hatfield, Gary, 'René Descartes', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2009 ed. Ed. Edward N. Zalta; URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/descartes/ Descartes, Discourse on Method , Parts 1–3 Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy , First Meditation. Week 2: Descartes' Scientific Treatises • Mechanization and mathematization of nature • Primary–secondary quality distinction Readings: Discourse on Method, Parts 4–6 Selections from Descartes' Scientific Essays: The World or Treatise on Light (ATXI 3–48); Treatise on Man (ATXI 119–202); Optics (ATVI 82–147). Slowik, Edward, 'Descartes' Physics', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2008 ed. Ed. Edward N. Zalta; URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/descartes-physics/ Henry, John, 'The Mechanical Philosophy,' chapter 5. The Scientific Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science . 3rd ed. Macmillan, 2008. Week 3: Descartes' Theory of Nature • Descartes' derivation of the law of conservation and the three laws of motion • God's role in the metaphysics and physics of nature Readings: Selections from Principles of Philosophy, Preface (all); Letter to Elizabeth; Part I: 1–8; Part II: 1–45, 55, 64; Part III: 1–4, 15–19, 45–47; Part IV: 187–207. John Henry, 'Religion and Science,' chapter 6. The Scientific Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science . 3rd ed. Macmillan, 2008. Week 4: Post-1650 Cartesian Science: Necessity and Contingency in Nature • Debates on God, Creation, and Causes Readings: Easton, Patricia, 'What is at Stake in the Cartesian Debates on the Eternal Truths?' Philosophy Compass 4.2 (2009): 348–62. Malebranche, Nicolas, 'Elucidation 10', from The Search after Truth (1674). Note: All selections available in Nicolas Malebranche (1992). Philosophical Selections , edited by S. Nadler, Hackett. Gottfried Leibniz (1714) Monadology . Week 5: Causes in Nature and Morals • Theodicy as an explanation of defect and evil in a lawful universe: Malebranche v. Leibniz Readings: Nicolas Malebranche, Elucidation XVI (on occasionalism), and Treatise on Nature and Grace, Discourse One, Part 1. Gottfried Leibniz (1706), Theodicy. Focus Questions Weekly questions can be used to focus the readings. This can be done in a web or e-mail discussion thread, as a weekly assignment, or for in class discussion. I require students to post a short paragraph in response to the question or some posting by a classmate on the question. Students are required to post by 10 a.m. the day before we meet for class on a course website. Week 1: According to Descartes, what role does skepticism play in scientific reasoning? Week 2: Comment on the following: 'But I am supposing this machine to be made by the hands of God, and so I think you may reasonably think it capable of a greater variety of movements than I could possibly imagine in it, and of exhibiting more artistry than I could possibly ascribe to it' [ Treatise on Man ; ATXI 120]. Week 3: What is Descartes' conception of the relation between the metaphysics and physics of nature? Week 4: Critically discuss the positions of Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz on what provides the foundation for the certitude of natural knowledge? Week 5: Explain why both Malebranche and Leibniz consider moral sin to be analogous to natural defect? Seminar/Project Idea Hold a debate on the question of the status of the eternal truths. The proposition will be Descartes' position: 'Eternal truths must be both created and necessary if certainty in science is to be possible'. Format: 1. At the beginning of the 5-week module, students will be assigned to one of three roles: Team A, Team B, and judge's panel. Students will be given the debate proposition, but will not be told which team will take the affirmative and which team the negative until the time of the debate. 2. Recommend a variation on the Classic Debate Format to encourage the development of argument: sequence begins with affirmative construction (8 minutes), negative construction (8 minutes), second affirmative construction (8 minutes), second negative construction (8 minutes), first negative rebuttal (4 minutes), first affirmative rebuttal (4 minutes), final negative rebuttal (4 minutes) and final affirmative rebuttal (4 minutes). 3. Judges Panel: will consist of 3–4 judges who will assess the performance of Teams A and B. Judgment should be based on the persuasiveness of the team position. 4. Debate will be held at the end of the fifth week, or semester, whichever makes most sense given the course length and structure. Acknowledgements The author gratefully acknowledges the immensely helpful comments and suggestions by the participants in her graduate seminar on the Scientific Revolution: Benjamin Chicka, Sarah Jacques-Ross, Richard Ross, Marcella Stockstill, and Zohra Wolters. (shrink)

Since rationality is a normative ideal, it is difficult to see how a theory of rationality might be subjected to empirical evaluation. This paper explores various aspects of this problem in relation to the work of L. J. Cohen, Amos Tversky and Daviel Kahneman, Ellery Eells, Isaac Levi, and Henry Kyburg. Special consideration is given to its significance for testing systems of inductive logic.

The ethics of the Egyptian religion, by S. A. B. Mercer.--The ethics of Confucianism, by H. P. Beach.--The ethics of the Babylonian and Assyrian religion, by G. A. Barton.--The history of Hindu ethics, by E. W. Hopkins.--The ethics of Zoroastrianism, by A. V. W. Jackson.--Early Hebrew ethics, by L. B. Paton.--The ethics of the Hebrew prophets - from Amos to the Deuteronomic reformation, by L. B. Paton.--The ethics of the Greek religion, by P. Shorey.--The ethics of the Gospels, by (...) E. F. Scott.--The ethics of the Pauline epistles, by C. H. Dodd.--Moslem ethics, by J. C. Archer.--The moral values of religion, by E. H. Sneath. (shrink)

This paper provides further evidence to the argument that Smith' theory of justice did not follow the natural justice school and that subsequently the ethical position on acquiring private property is not independent of the effects which such acquisition may have on the property-less individuals. I will show that the justification for private ownership is based on “reasonable expectations” which owners of assets have with regard to the fruits of the asset. The expectation to subsist through the use of one's (...) natural assets is equally reasonable. This is not to say that Smith believed that society should equally distribute income. But it does mean that the acquisition of private property must not interfere with the rights of individuals to subsist. Consequently, distribution is clearly an important part of Smith's conception of justice. Footnotes1 I am in debt to P. Bridel, A. Cot, J. Young and the anonymous referees of this Journal for helpful comments. (shrink)

How to Cure a Fanatic by the internationally acclaimed mately mean “compromise,” not surrender. novelist and peace activist Amos Oz, is a book I took with me on a recent trip to the Balkans. I decided to read the book and write my review in my flat on Gradacacka Street in the Otoka neighborhood of Sarajevo, given the book’s topic and the problems that have plagued the people of Bosnia for the past fifteen years.

In modern economics, the firm is a means of overcoming the inefficiencies generated by transaction costs and incomplete contracts. Its boundaries, therefore, are the means by which the efficiency of competition can be salvaged. Whether or not agents feel comfortable with the values which underlie various ownership structures remains outside this theory. Moreover, the working of different ownership structures is entirely based on the presumption that agents' motivation (as opposed to incentives) will remain constant. This, of course, is typical of (...) methodological individualism where the analysis is one directional: from the agent to society. However, methodological individualism does not have to be confined to such narrow analytical conceptions. It would still be methodological individualism if social institutions would feedback into the behaviour (motivation) of agents. The main purpose of this paper is to show that a more socially conscious methodological individualism was employed in the analysis of the firm by classical economists like J.S. Mill. I will show that Mill was acutely aware of the significance of the proximity of ownership to the productivity of the operator. However, he was also aware of the function of the larger social context within which the operator worked. While Mill recognised the technological benefits of larger operations (corporations), he also recognised that in an environment where the system repeatedly fails the expectation of the larger body of workers, the gains from large enterprises may be completely undermined. Given Mill's general belief in the progress of humanity and in the possible improvement in the characteristics of individual members of society, he thought that in the future, such large enterprises may work well if ownership was given to all those engaged in the production process. While the work of J.S. Mill is clearly incomplete, he has rightly drawn attention to the neglected interrelationship between social arrangements and economic agents. In this respect, he offers a far more comprehensive insight into the possible cause and boundaries of the firm. (shrink)

In this article I respond to James Martel’s essay ‘ Amo: Volu ut sis : Love, willing, and Arendt’s reluctant embrace of sovereignty’. Martel offers us a provocative account of how Arendt might have attenuated her most severe rejections of the concept of sovereignty in light of the necessity of some version of sovereignty in modern times. However, I argue that Martel misreads Arendt, drawing inferences from Arendt’s inner/outer distinction that do not follow from Arendt’s own logic. Instead of this (...) distinction, I claim that Arendt’s rejection of sovereignty must be understood in the context of her affirmation of natality, and that a consistent reading of Arendt reveals an unstinting rejection of sovereignty, for both good and ill. (shrink)

In his debates with Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Gerd Gigerenzer puts forward a stricter standard for the proper representation of judgment heuristics. I argue that Gigerenzer’s stricter standard contributes to naturalized epistemology in two ways. First, Gigerenzer’s standard can be used to winnow away cognitive processes that are inappropriately characterized and should not be used in the epistemic evaluation of belief. Second, Gigerenzer’s critique helps to recast the generality problem in naturalized epistemology and cognitive psychology as the methodological (...) problem of identifying criteria for the appropriate specification and characterization of cognitive processes in psychological explanations. I conclude that naturalized epistemologists seeking to address the generality problem should turn their focus to methodological questions about the proper characterization of cognitive processes for the purposes of psychological explanation. (shrink)

‘Probability dynamics’ (PD) is a second-order probabilistic theory in which probability distribution d X = (P(X 1), . . . , P(X m )) on partition U m X of sample space Ω is weighted by ‘credence’ (c) ranging from −∞ to +∞. c is the relative degree of certainty of d X in ‘α-evidence’ α X =[c; d X ] on U m X . It is shown that higher-order probabilities cannot provide a theory of PD. PD applies to (...) both subjectivist and frequentist theories. ‘Straight PD’ (SPD) produces associative and commutative mergers of evidence, in which evidences of positive credence are mutually reinforcing. ‘Offsetting PD’ (OPD) sets off conflicting evidences against each other. Subjectivist PD is a quantified second-order logic of action. Frequentist PD relates to descriptions of physical states of affairs. Acceptance of evidence α 1 X = [c 1; d 1 X ] at t 1 updates α 0 X = [c 0; d 0 X ] at t 0 into SPD-merger or OPD-merger . Given ‘co-evidence’ at t 0 < t 1, ‘indirect’ PD accepts evidence at t 1 and produces support for update α 10 X = [c10;d 10 X α 0 X such that in SPD and in OPD. For binary X and Y, with α 0 X = [c 0; P 0(X)] at t 0 (short-hand for ) and the accepted evidence, the support is ; ; where ρ0(X, Y) is the correlation coefficient of X and Y, and update α 10 X of α 0 X is with ‘accord’ λ = 1 in SPD and in OPD. As , tends toward update P 1(Y) of P 0(Y), but P 10(X) does not converge toward ‘ ’ of ‘probability kinematics’. Therefore PD is not compatible with probability kinematics. A process of ‘normalization’ interprets ‘β-evidence’ [[c 1; q 1]& . . . &[c m ; q m ]; U m X ]] with [c j ; q j ] on and m ≥ 3, as an α-evidence on {X 1, . . . , X m }. It is shown that SPD- and OPD-updates can be derived from updated cumulative functions. Time-biased updates are discussed. A PD-based theory of confirmation (PDCT) is presented. (shrink)