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André Kukla [32]A. Kukla [7]Andr Kukla [2]Andy Kukla [1]
  1. A. Kukla (2010). Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, by P. Kyle Stanford. Mind 119 (473):243-246.
  2. André Kukla (2008). The One World, One Science Argument. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):73-88.
    The one world, one science argument (so named by Rescher) is advanced by Carl Sagan and others to support the thesis that we will be able to learn to converse with intelligent extraterrestrials if and when we encounter them. The prima facie obstacle to extraterrestrial communication is that the aliens’ culture and geography are bound to be so different from ours that we would find it extremely difficult, if not practically impossible, to find a common topic on which we can (...)
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  3. A. Kukla (2008). Observation. In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Routledge.
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  4. A. Kukla (2007). Review: Scientific Perspectivism. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (464):1122-1125.
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  5. Mikael Karlsson, Andre Kukla, Jarrett Leplin, David Papineau, Stathis Psillos & Howard Sankey (2006). Scientific Realism. In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press.
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  6. André Kukla & Joel Walmsley (2006). Mind: A Historical and Philosophical Introduction to the Major Theories. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub.
     
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  7. André Kukla (2005). Ineffability and Philosophy. Routledge.
    Are there truths, states of affairs or knowledge that cannot be put into words? This book distinguishes several varieties and grades of ineffability and tries to ascertain whether they are coherent notions and whether they actually obtain. It is concluded that the weaker grades of ineffability do obtain, and that even the strongest grades have not been shown to be incoherent.
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  8. André Kukla & Joel Walmsley (2004). Mysticism and Social Epistemology. Episteme 1 (2):139-158.
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  9. Joel Walmsley & André Kukla (2004). Mysticism and Social Epistemology. Episteme 1 (2):139-158.
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  10. André Kukla (2001). SETI: On the Prospects and Pursuitworthiness of the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 32 (1):31-67.
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  11. André Kukla (2001). Theoreticity, Underdetermination, and the Disregard for Bizarre Scientific Hypotheses. Philosophy of Science 68 (1):21-35.
    The problem of scientific disregard is the problem of accounting for why some putative theories that appear to be well-supported by empirical evidence nevertheless play no role in the scientific enterprise. Laudan and Leplin suggest (and Hoefer and Rosenberg concur) that at least some of these putative theories fail to be genuine theoretical rivals because they lack some non-empirical property of theoreticity. This solution also supports their repudiation of the thesis of underdetermination. I argue that the attempt to provide criteria (...)
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  12. André Kukla (2000). Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Science. Routledge.
    Social constructivists maintain that we invent the properties of the world rather than discover them. Is reality constructed by our own activity? Or, more provocatively, are scientific facts--is everything --constructed? Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Science is a clear assessment of this critical and increasingly important debate. Andre Kukla presents a comprehensive discussion of the philosophical issues involved and analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of a range of constructivist arguments, illustrating the divide between the sociology and the philosophy of (...)
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  13. Andre Kukla & James Page (2000). Reviews-Studies in Scientific Realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):957-962.
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  14. André Kukla (1998). Studies in Scientific Realism. Oxford University Press.
    This book offers a superbly clear analysis of the standard arguments for and against scientific realism. In surveying claims on both sides of the debate, Kukla organizes them in ways that expose unnoticed connections. He identifies broad patterns of error, reconciles seemingly incompatible positions, and discovers unoccupied positions with the potential to influence further debate. Kukla's overall assessment is that neither the realists nor the antirealists may claim a decisive victory.
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  15. A. Kukla (1997). Review. Beyond Positivism and Relativism: Theory, Method, and Evidence. Larry Laudan. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):447-454.
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  16. André Kukla (1997). Review. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):447-454.
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  17. D. L. Chiappe & A. Kukla (1996). Context Selection and the Frame Problem. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3):529-530.
    Sperber and Wilson (1987) have criticised Fodor's (1983) pessimistic view about the possibility of a science of central systems. Fodor's pessimism stems from the holistic nature of central systems – people can access anything that they know when engaging in belief fixation. It is argued that Sperber and Wilsons theory of how relevance is realized during verbal comprehension fails to elucidate this crucial aspect of central processes. Their claims about how a context is selected are shown to presuppose the ability (...)
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  18. Andre Kukla (1996). Antirealist Explanations of the Success of Science. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):305.
    Scientific realists have argued that the truth(likeness) of our theories provides the only explanation for the success of science. I consider alternative explanations proposed by antirealists. I endorse Leplin's contention that neither van Fraassen's Darwinist explanation nor Laudan's methodological explanation provides the sort of explanatory alternative which is called for in this debate. Fine's suggestion--that the empirical adequacy of our theories already explains their success--is more promising for antirealists. Leplin claims that this putative explanation collapses into realism on one reading (...)
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  19. Andre Kukla (1996). Does Every Theory Have Empirically Equivalent Rivals? Erkenntnis 44 (2):137 - 166.
    The instrumentalist argument from the underdetermination of theories by data runs as follows: (1) every theory has empirically equivalent rivals; (2) the only warrant for believing one theory over another is its possession of a greater measure of empirical virtue; (3) therefore belief in any theory is arbitrary. In this paper, I examine the status of the first premise. Several arguments against the universal availability of empirically equivalent theoretical rivals are criticized, and four algorithms for producing empirically equivalent rivals are (...)
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  20. Andre Kukla (1996). The Theory-Observation Distinction. Philosophical Review 105 (2):173-230.
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  21. A. Kukla (1995). The Two Antirealisms of Bas Van Fraassen. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (3):431-454.
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  22. Andr Kukla (1995). Mystery, Mind, and Materialism. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):255-64.
    McGinn claims that (1) there is nothing “inherently mysterious” about consciousness, even though (2) we will never be able to understand it. The first claim is no more than a rhetorical flourish. The second may be read either as a claim (1) that we are unable to construct an explanatory theory of consciousness, or (2) that any such theory must strike us as unintelligible, in the sense in which quantum mechanics is sometimes said to be unintelligible. On the first reading, (...)
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  23. André Kukla (1995). Forster and Sober on the Curve-Fitting Problem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (2):248-252.
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  24. Andre Kukla (1995). Is There a Logic of Incoherence? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (1):59 – 71.
    Abstract What should we do when we discover that our assessment of probabilities is incoherent? I explore the hypothesis that there is a logic of incoherence?a set of universally valid rules that specify how incoherent probability assessments are to be repaired. I examine a pair of candidate?rules of incoherence logic that have been employed in philosophical reconstructions of scientific arguments. Despite their intuitive plausibility, both rules turn out to be invalid. There are presently no viable candidate?rules for an incoherence logic (...)
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  25. André Kukla (1995). Scientific Realism and Theoretical Unification. Analysis 55 (4):230 - 238.
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  26. André Kukla (1994). Medium AI and Experimental Science. Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):493-5012.
    It has been claimed that a great deal of AI research is an attempt to discover the empirical laws describing a new type of entity in the world—the artificial computing system. I call this enterprise 'medium AI', since it is in some respects stronger than Searle's 'weak AI', and in other respects weaker than 'strong AI'. Bruce Buchanan, among others, conceives of medium AI as an empirical science entirely on a par with psychology or chemistry. I argue that medium AI (...)
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  27. Andre Kukla (1994). Non-Empirical Theoretical Virtues and the Argument From Underdetermination. Erkenntnis 41 (2):157 - 170.
    The antirealist argument from the underdetermination of theories by data relies on the premise that the empirical content of a theory is the only determinant of its belief-worthiness (premise NN). Several authors have claimed that the antirealist cannot endorse NN, on pain of internal inconsistency. I concede this point. Nevertheless, this refutation of the underdetermination argument fails because there are weaker substitutes for NN that will serve just as well as a premise to the argument. On the other hand, antirealists (...)
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  28. André Kukla (1994). Some Limits to Empirical Inquiry. Analysis 54 (3):153 - 159.
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  29. André Kukla (1994). Scientific Realism, Scientific Practice, and the Natural Ontological Attitude. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (4):955-975.
    Both sides in the debate about scientific realism have argued that their view provides a better account of actual scientific practice. For example, it has been claimed that the practice of theory conjunction presupposes realism, and that scientists' use of multiple and incompatible models presupposes some form of instrumentalism. Assuming that the practices of science are rational, these conclusions cannot both be right. I argue that neither of them is right, and that, in fact, all scientific practices are compatible with (...)
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  30. Andre Kukla (1993). Epistemic Boundedness. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (2):121 – 126.
    Abstract Fodor defines epistemic boundedness as a condition wherein there are epistemi?cally significant constraints on the beliefs that a mind is capable of entertaining. He discusses a type of (epistemic) boundedness wherein a hypothesis cannot be entertained because it is inexpressible in terms of the mind's stock of concepts. In addition to this semantic boundedness, I describe a number of different sources of boundedness having to do with syntactic, abductive, and implementational limitations. I also discuss the similarities and differences between (...)
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  31. André Kukla (1993). Laudan, Leplin, Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination. Analysis 53 (1):1 - 7.
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  32. Andre Kukla (1992). Endogenous Constraints on Inductive Reasoning. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):411 – 425.
    It is widely recognized that computational theories of learning must posit the existence of a priori constraints on hypothesis selection. The present article surveys the theoretical options available for modelling the dynamic process whereby the constraints have their effect. According to the 'simplicity' theory (exemplified by Fodor's treatment), hypotheses are preference-ordered in terms of their syntactic or semantic properties. It is argued that the same explanatory power can be obtained with a weaker (hence better) theory, the 'minimalist' theory, which dispenses (...)
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  33. Andre Kukla (1992). On the Coherence of Instrumentalism. Philosophy of Science 59 (3):492-497.
    According to a certain type of instrumentalist, we may have good reasons for accepting scientific theories, but never for believing more than their empirical consequences. Horwich (1991) considers several attempts to capture a difference between acceptance and belief, and claims that none of them succeed. He concludes that instrumentalism has not been shown to be a coherent position. However, in the course of his discussion, Horwich himself deploys a conceptual apparatus which is sufficient for formulating the instrumentalist doctrine in a (...)
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  34. Andre Kukla (1991). Criteria of Rationality and the Problem of Logical Sloth. Philosophy of Science 58 (3):486-490.
    Rationality demands at least that we eliminate incoherencies among our beliefs when we are apprised of them. This minimal requirement gives us no grounds for condemning a refusal to look for incoherencies, or indeed to deliberate altogether. Several stronger conditions on rationality are explored and rejected. There are presently no good arguments against logical sloth.
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  35. André Kukla (1990). Evolving Probability. Philosophical Studies 59 (2):213 - 224.
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  36. Andre Kukla (1990). Ten Types of Scientific Progress. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:457 - 466.
    The taxonomy of scientific problems constructed by Laudan is not exhaustive of all types of scientific work. For one thing, it does not take into account projects which produce an increase of theoretical virtue in a theory that does not suffer from conceptual problems. It is argued that any work which alters the amount of theoretical virtue possessed by a theory constitutes a scientific advance. A new taxonomy is proposed which distinguishes scientific contributions on the basis of which theoretical virtue (...)
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  37. Andr Kukla (1989). Meaning Holism and Intentional Psychology. Analysis 49 (October):173-175.
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  38. André Kukla (1989). Is AI an Empirical Science? Analysis 49 (March):56-60.
  39. André Kukla (1989). Non-Empirical Issues in Psychology. American Psychologist 44:485-94.
     
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  40. André Kukla (1983). Toward a Science of Experience. Journal of Mind and Behavior 4:231-246.
     
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  41. A. Kukla (1980). Determinism and Predictability: Reply to Dieks. Philosophy of Science 47 (1):131-133.
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  42. Andy Kukla (1978). On the Empirical Significance of Pure Determinism. Philosophy of Science 45 (1):141-144.
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