The paper sets out to offer an alternative to the function/argument approach to the most essential aspects of natural language meanings. That is, we question the assumption that semantic completeness (of, e.g., propositions) or incompleteness (of, e.g., predicates) exactly replicate the corresponding grammatical concepts (of, e.g., sentences and verbs, respectively). We argue that even if one gives up this assumption, it is still possible to keep the compositionality of the semantic interpretation of simple predicate/argument structures. In our opinion, compositionality presupposes (...) that we are able to compare arbitrary meanings in term of information content. This is why our proposal relies on an ‘intrinsically’ type free algebraic semantic theory. The basic entities in our models are neither individuals, nor eventualities, nor their properties, but ‘pieces of evidence’ for believing in the ‘truth’ or ‘existence’ or ‘identity’ of any kind of phenomenon. Our formal language contains a single binary non-associative constructor used for creating structured complex terms representing arbitrary phenomena. We give a finite Hilbert-style axiomatisation and a decision algorithm for the entailment problem of the suggested system. (shrink)
We solve a major open problem concerning algorithmic properties of products of 'transitive' modal logics by showing that products and commutators of such standard logics as K4. S4. S4.1 K4.3. GL. or Grz are undecidable and do not have the finite model property. More generally, we prove that no Kripke complete extension of the commutator [K4. K4] with product frames of arbitrary finite or infinite depth (with respect to both accessibility relations) can be decidable. In particular, if C₁ and C₂ (...) are classes of transitive frames such that their depth cannot be bounded by any fixed n < ω, then the logic of the class {F₁ × F₂| F₁ ∈ C₁. F₂ ∈ C₂} is undecidable. (On the contrary, the product of. say. K4 and the logic of all transitive Kripke frames of depth ≤ n, for some fixed n < ω, is decidable.) The complexity of these undecidable logics ranges from r.e. to co-r.e. and $\Pi _{1}^{1}$ -complete. As a consequence, we give the first known examples of Kripke incomplete commutators of Kripke complete logics. (shrink)
We prove that the two-variable fragment of first-order intuitionistic logic is undecidable, even without constants and equality. We also show that the two-variable fragment of a quantified modal logic L with expanding first-order domains is undecidable whenever there is a Kripke frame for L with a point having infinitely many successors (such are, in particular, the first-order extensions of practically all standard modal logics like K, K4, GL, S4, S5, K4.1, S4.2, GL.3, etc.). For many quantified modal logics, including those (...) in the standard nomenclature above, even the monadic two-variable fragments turn out to be undecidable. (shrink)
We prove that every n-modal logic between K n and S5 n is undecidable, whenever n ≥ 3. We also show that each of these logics is non- finitely axiomatizable, lacks the product finite model property, and there is no algorithm deciding whether a finite frame validates the logic. These results answer several questions of Gabbay and Shehtman. The proofs combine the modal logic technique of Yankov-Fine frame formulas with algebraic logic results of Halmos, Johnson and Monk, and give a (...) reduction of the (undecidable) representation problem of finite relation algebras. (shrink)
We consider arrow logics (i.e., propositional multi-modal logics having three -- a dyadic, a monadic, and a constant -- modal operators) augmented with various kinds of infinite counting modalities, such as 'much more', 'of good quantity', 'many times'. It is shown that the addition of these modal operators to weakly associative arrow logic results in finitely axiomatizable and decidable logics, which fail to have the finite base property.
It is shown that the many-dimensional modal logic K n , determined by products of n-many Kripke frames, is not finitely axiomatisable in the n-modal language, for any $n > 2$ . On the other hand, K n is determined by a class of frames satisfying a single first-order sentence.
We give an overview of decidability results for modal logics having a binary modality. We put an emphasis on the demonstration of proof-techniques, and hope that this will also help in finding the borderlines between decidable and undecidable fragments of usual first-order logic.
One of the basic theorems in universal algebra is Birkhoff's variety theorem: the smallest equationally axiomatizable class containing a class K of algebras coincides with the class obtained by taking homomorphic images of subalgebras of direct products of elements of K. G. Gratzer asked whether the variety theorem is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice. In 1980, two of the present authors proved that Birkhoff's theorem can already be derived in ZF. Surprisingly, the Axiom of Foundation plays a crucial role (...) here: we show that Birkhoff's theorem cannot be derived in ZF + AC {Foundation}. even if we add Foundation for Finite Sets. We also prove that the variety theorem is equivalent to a purely set-theoretical statement, the Collection Principle. This principle is independent of $ZF \{\operatorname{Foundation}$ . The second part of the paper deals with further connections between axioms of ZF-set theory and theorems of universal algebra. (shrink)