This essay identifies two different methodological strategies used by the proponents of anarchism. In what is termed the "ontological" approach, the rationale for anarchism depends on a particular representation of human nature. That characterization of "being" determines the relation between the individual and the structures of social life. In the alternative approach, the epistemological status of "representation" is challenged, leaving human subjects without stable identities. Without the possibility of stable human representations, the foundations underlying the exercise of institutional power can (...) be challenged. This epistemological discussion is traced from Max Stirner to the twentieth-century movement known as poststructuralism. (shrink)
This article raises the question of whether or not a "neutral" stance can be found from which to engage in philosophical counseling. By drawing on the debate between absolutism and relativism, it is argued that no such neutral ground exists. The foundational premises of the transcendentalist tradition involve different assumptions than those of the materialist and relativist traditions. Such a distinction goes back to the earliest days of philosophy and today the new profession of philosophical counseling must address the multiplicity (...) of assumptions upon which philosophic discourse can be built. The paper concludes with a call for philosophical counseling to move beyond the focus on Socrates, and to embrace a wide variety of different positions within its domain. (shrink)
This paper addresses Koch's concern about whether a coresponsible theorist can engage in inquiry with a theorist who is "beyond the pale." On what grounds, he asks, can a coresponsible inquirer argue against one who uses a racist, sexist, or classist model for inquiry? I argue that, in such situations, the coresponsible inquirer brings to inquiry both a theoretical framework, or "attitude," and a set of practical concerns which manifest that attitude.
same thing, so the two concepts of consciousness may come to the same thing in the brain.Â The focus of this paper is on the problems that arise when these two concepts of consciousness are conflated. I will argue that John Searleâ€™s reasoning about the function of consciousness goes wrong because he conflates the two senses.Â And Francis Crick and Christof Koch fall afoul of the ambiguity in arguing that visual area V1 is not part of the neural correlate (...) of consciousness. Crick and Kochâ€™s work raises issues that suggest that these two concepts of consciousness may have different (though overlapping)Â neural correlates--despite Crick and Kochâ€™s implicit rejection of this idea. Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â I will start with two quotations from Searle.Â You will see what appears to be a contradiction, and I will later claim that the appearance of contradiction can be explained if one realizes that he is using two different concepts of consciousness.Â Iâ€™m not going to explain yet what the two concepts of consciousness are.Â That will come later, after Iâ€™ve presented Searleâ€™s apparent contradiction and Crick and Kochâ€™s surprising argument.Â. (shrink)
In addressing thescientific study of consciousness, Crick and Koch state, It is probable that at any moment some active neuronal processes in your head correlate with consciousness, while others do not: what is the difference between them? (1998, p. 97). Evidence from electrophysiological and brain-imaging studies of binocular rivalry supports the premise of this statement and answers to some extent, the question posed. I discuss these recent developments and outline the rationale and experimental evidence for the interhemispheric switch hypothesis (...) of perceptual rivalry. According to this model, the perceptual alternations of rivalry reflect hemispheric alternations, suggesting that visual consciousness of rivalling stimuli may be unihemispheric at any one time (Miller et al., 2000). However, in this paper, I suggest that interhemispheric switching could involve alternating unihemispheric attentional selection of neuronal processes for access to visual consciousness. On this view, visual consciousness during rivalry could be bi hemispheric because the processes constitutive of attentional selection may be distinct from those constitutive of visual consciousness. This is a special case of the important distinction between the neuronal correlates and constitution of visual consciousness. (shrink)