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  1. A. Minh Nguyen (2012). Study Abroad's Contribution to Critical Thinking and World Citizenship. Think 11 (31):27-40.
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  2. A. Minh Nguyen (2008). The Authority of Expressive Self-Ascriptions. Dialogue 47 (01):103-.
    ABSTRACT: What explains first-person authority? What explains the presumption that an utterance is true when it is a sincere intelligible determinate first-person singular simple present-tense ascription of intentional state? According to Rockney Jacobsen, self-ascriptions each enjoy a presumption of truth because they are systematically reliable. They are systematically reliable because they are typically both truth-assessable and expressive. Such self-ascriptions, if sincere, are certain to be true. This article presents a defence and a critique of Jacobsen's theory. It is argued that (...)
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  3. A. Minh Nguyen (2006). A Survey of Metaphysics. Teaching Philosophy 29 (4):384-387.
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  4. A. Minh Nguyen (2004). Davidson on First-Person Authority. Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (4):457-472.
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  5. A. Minh Nguyen (2003). Self-Knowledge, Other Minds and the Theoriticity of the Mental. Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (2):31-38.
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  6. A. Minh Nguyen (2001). A Critique of Dretske's Conception of State Consciousness. Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):187-206.
    In his recent work, Dretske offers a new account of what it is for a mental state, in particular, a sensory experience, to be conscious. According to Dretske’sproposal, subject S’s experience of object O is conscious if and only if it makes S aware of O. This proposal is argued to be open to only two serious interpretations. The first takes it to mean that S’s experience of O is conscious if and only if it constitutes S’s awareness of O, (...)
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  7. A. Minh Nguyen (2000). On a Searlean Objection to Rosenthal's Theory of State-Consciousness. Journal of Philosophical Research 25 (January):83-100.
    In a series of closely connected papers, Rosenthal has defended what has come to be known as “the higher-order thought theory of state-consciousness.” According to this theory, a mental state which one instantiates is conscious if and only if one is conscious of being in it in some relevant way, and one’s being conscious of being in the state which is conscious consists in one’s having a contemporaneous thought to the effect that one is in that state. The main aim (...)
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  8. A. Minh Nguyen (2000). Why There is No Such Thing as First Person Authority. Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (2):165-189.
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