Why do humans reason? Many animals draw inferences, but reasoning—the tendency to produce and respond to reason-giving performances—is biologically unusual, and demands evolutionary explanation. Mercier and Sperber advance our understanding of reason’s adaptive function with their argumentative theory of reason. On this account, the “function of reason is argumentative… to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade.” ATR, they argue, helps to explain several well-known cognitive biases. In this paper, I develop a neighboring hypothesis called the intention alignment model and (...) contrast it with ATR. I conjecture that reasoning evolved primarily because it helped social hominins more readily and fully align their intentions. We use reasons to advance various proximal ends, but in the main, we do it to overwrite the beliefs and desires of others: to get others to think like us. Reason afforded our ancestors a powerful way to build and maintain the shared outlooks necessary for a highly collaborative existence. Yes, we sometimes argue so as to gain argumentative advantage over others, or otherwise advantage ourselves at the expense of those we argue with, but more often, we reason in ways that are mutually advantageous. In fact, there are excellent reasons for thinking this must be so. IAM, I suggest, neatly explains the available evidence, while also providing a more coherent account of reason’s origins. (shrink)

One of humanity's most respected figures presents a plan for a new human and social paradigm, arguing that humankind is not inherently sinful, and discussing how redirection in the perception of our fundamental natures can bring powerful and positive change. 50,000 first printing.

Sweeping denials of the story's capacity to accurately reflect the past are ever catalyzing equally misleading global affirmations. The impositionalists, such as theorist Hayden White, view historical narratives as imposing a falsifying narrative structure on the past, and conclude that narratives cannot be true. Plot-reifiers, such as Alasdair MacIntyre, David Carr, and Frederick Olafson, posit that the past is already narratively structured; historical plots are reified in order for there to be something in the world to which narrative structures can (...) correspond in being true. The antireferentialists such as JeanFrançois Lyotard and Roland Barthes deny that narrative histories even claim truth. Escaping this trilemma of theoretical interpretation involves accepting the idea that construction of a history does not entail its falsification. Historical narrative need to be allowed to function both figurally, in the sense of generating new discursive figures, and at the same time literally, in the sense of asking to be understood literally. Narratives need to be understood on their own terms, and not treated as an approximation to some foreign ideal. (shrink)

Existing solutions to the epistemic regress problem, and the theories of justification built upon them, are inadequate, for they fail to diagnose the root source of the problem. The problem is rooted in our attachment to a pernicious dogma of modern epistemology: the idea that a judgement must be supported by some kind of reason or evidence to be justified. The epistemic analogue of the doctrine of original sin, this idea renders every judgement in need of redemption – guilty until (...) shown to be innocent – distorting our understanding of reason at a very deep level, and preventing us from conceptualizing a satisfactory solution to the problem. If we opt for a more context–sensitive mechanism for assigning default epistemic status, however, we get a more plausible picture of justification, an epistemology more in tune with epistemic practice, and an elegant solution to the regress problem. (shrink)

This passage seems to have escaped identification so far. This is somewhat surprising, since it clearly refers to an incident at the sack of Maiozamalcha during Julian's Persian campaign which has been much discussed by editors ind critics of Ammianus and Zosimus. The reason may well be that in some ilder editions of Suidas the name appears as.

This passage was attributed to Menander Protector by Bernhardy, who, influenced apparently by Men. Prot. fr. 43 , suggested that here the name disguised the of Menander. This explanation, besides interfering with the text without due cause, ignores altogether the name . In fact, the incident occurs a century earlier, in the period A.D. 467–70. Anagastes is then found in Roman service in Thrace during the reign of Leo . Moreover, the name of Anagastes is linked with an easily recognized (...) variant of in Jo. Ant., fr. 205. (shrink)

An investigation into the prosopography of Libanius shows a confusion of identity in the following cases. The textual references are to Foerster's Teubner edition, of which the index compiled by Richtsteig is to be handled with caution.

I show that resolution-oriented discourse has a distinctive normative structure, partially subject to theoretical explication.Those with a keen commitment to the idea of working out differences of opinion dialogically may fail to grasp what such a commitment entails. In the heat of discursive conflict, discerning our obligations is often difficult. These difficulties yield a general lack of clarity concerning the norms in question. Yet theory can inform reason-giving practice by clarifying the normative structures underlying such discourse. A logic of disputation (...) must be anchored in the relevant features of concrete discursive contexts, even as it abstracts from their particularities. Different types of challenge present claimants with different options for redeeming the claim challenged, and defending moves, too, open up and close off various options for the challenger. I show that the structure of the normative "field" at any point in the dialectic can be characterized with surprising precision. (shrink)

Resolution-oriented dialogue has a normative structure that is largely subject to theoretical explication. This paper develops a simple model that sheds light on how moves in a reason-giving game alter the distribution of discursive commitments and entitlements. By clarifying the practice of deontic scorekeeping, we can enhance our collective capacity to resolve conflicts dialogically.