Search results for 'A. Wager' (try it on Scholar)

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Profile: Amelie Wager (ecole pratique des hautes etudes)
  1. Kristen A. Lindquist, Tor D. Wager, Hedy Kober, Eliza Bliss-Moreau & Lisa Feldman Barrett (2012). The Brain Basis of Emotion: A Meta-Analytic Review. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (3):121-143.score: 660.0
    Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science. With a surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. In this target article, we present a meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories (...)
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  2. Tal Yarkoni, Russell A. Poldrack, David C. Van Essen & Tor D. Wager (2010). Cognitive Neuroscience 2.0: Building a Cumulative Science of Human Brain Function. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (11):489-496.score: 540.0
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  3. Peter Williams & Elizabeth Wager (2013). Exploring Why and How Journal Editors Retract Articles: Findings From a Qualitative Study. Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (1):1-11.score: 420.0
    Editors have a responsibility to retract seriously flawed articles from their journals. However, there appears to be little consistency in journals’ policies or procedures for this. In a qualitative study, we therefore interviewed editors of science journals using semi-structured interviews to investigate their experience of retracting articles. We identified potential barriers to retraction, difficulties in the process and also sources of support and encouragement. Our findings have been used as the basis for guidelines developed by the Committee on Publication Ethics.
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  4. A. Wager (1999). The Extra Qualia Problem: Synaesthesia and Representationism. Philosophical Psychology 12 (3):263-281.score: 300.0
    Representationism is the view that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on its representational content. Synaesthesia is a condition in which the phenomenal character of the experience produced in a subject by stimulation of one sensory modality contains elements characteristic of a second, unstimulated sensory modality. After reviewing some of the recent psychological literature on synaesthesia and one of the leading versions of representationism, I argue that cases of synaesthesia, as instances of what I call the extra qualia (...)
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  5. E. Wager, S. Fiack, C. Graf, A. Robinson & I. Rowlands (2009). Science Journal Editors' Views on Publication Ethics: Results of an International Survey. Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (6):348-353.score: 300.0
    Background: Breaches of publication ethics such as plagiarism, data fabrication and redundant publication are recognised as forms of research misconduct that can undermine the scientific literature. We surveyed journal editors to determine their views about a range of publication ethics issues. Methods: Questionnaire sent to 524 editors-in-chief of Wiley-Blackwell science journals asking about the severity and frequency of 16 ethical issues at their journals, their confidence in handling such issues, and their awareness and use of guidelines. Results: Responses were obtained (...)
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  6. David Sander, Kristen A. Lindquist, Tor D. Wager, Hedy Kober, Eliza Bliss-Moreau & Lisa Feldman Barrett (2012). The Role of the Amygdala in the Appraising Brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (3):161.score: 300.0
    Lindquist et al. convincingly argue that the brain implements psychological operations that are constitutive of emotion rather than modules subserving discrete emotions. However, the nature of such psychological operations is open to debate. I argue that considering appraisal theories may provide alternative interpretations of the neuroimaging data with respect to the psychological operations involved.
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  7. Katherine S. Button, Glyn Lewis, Marcus R. Munafò, Kristen A. Lindquist, Tor D. Wager, Hedy Kober, Eliza Bliss-Moreau & Lisa Feldman Barrett (2012). Understanding Emotion: Lessons From Anxiety. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (3):145.score: 300.0
    We agree that conceptualisation is key in understanding the brain basis of emotion. We argue that by conflating facial emotion recognition with subjective emotion experience, Lindquist et al. understate the importance of biological predisposition in emotion. We use examples from the anxiety disorders to illustrate the distinction between these two phenomena, emphasising the importance of both emotional hardware and contextual learning.
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  8. Kristen A. Lindquist, Tor D. Wager, Eliza Bliss-Moreau, Hedy Kober & Lisa Feldman Barrett (2012). What Are Emotions and How Are They Created in the Brain? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (3):172-202.score: 300.0
    In our response, we clarify important theoretical differences between basic emotion and psychological construction approaches. We evaluate the empirical status of the basic emotion approach, addressing whether it requires brain localization, whether localization can be observed with better analytic tools, and whether evidence for basic emotions exists in other types of measures. We then revisit the issue of whether the key hypotheses of psychological construction are supported by our meta-analytic findings. We close by elaborating on commentator suggestions for future research.
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  9. A. Wager (2001). Synaesthesia Misrepresented. Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):347-351.score: 240.0
    Gray argues that my three earlier counterexamples fail to refute representational theories of phenomenal character. I maintain that, despite Gray's arguments, each example does in fact work against the particular representational theory at which it is targeted. Further, I question whether my internalism regarding phenomenal character and Gray's externalism regarding modularity are in genuine conflict with one another.
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  10. Richard Gray (2001). Synaesthesia and Misrepresentation: A Reply to Wager. Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):339-46.score: 192.0
    Wager has argued that synaesthesia provides material for a counterexample to representational theories of the phenomenal character of experience. He gives a series of three cases based on synaesthesia; he requires the second and third cases to bolster the doubtfulness of the first. Here I further endorse the problematic nature of the first case and then show why the other two cases do not save his argument. I claim that whenever synaesthesia is a credible possibility its phenomenal character can (...)
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  11. Lawrence Pasternack (2012). The Many Gods Objection to Pascal's Wager: A Decision Theoretic Response. Philo 15 (2):158-178.score: 156.0
    The Many Gods Objection (MGO) is widely viewed as a decisive criticism of Pascal’s Wager. By introducing a plurality of hypotheses with infinite expected utility into the decision matrix, the wagerer is left without adequate grounds to decide between them. However, some have attempted to rebut this objection by employing various criteria drawn from the theological tradition. Unfortunately, such defenses do little good for an argument that is supposed to be an apologetic aimed at atheists and agnostics. The purpose (...)
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  12. David A. Sipfle (1968). A Wager on Freedom. International Philosophical Quarterly 8 (2):200-211.score: 156.0
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  13. Volker Dieringer (2009). Is a Jamesian Wager the Only Safe Bet? On Jeff Jordan's New Book on Pascal's Wager. Archiv für Geschichte Der Philosophie 91 (2):237-247.score: 144.0
    In his new book on Pascal's Wager, Jeff Jordan argues that only the ‘Jamesian’ version of the wager argument, as he sees it presented in William James' essay The Will to Believe , constitutes a sound pragmatic argument in favour of theism, whereas Pascal's original wager argument is doomed to fail on various grounds. This article argues that Jordan's theory is untenable. The many-gods objection is used as an example: it is demonstrated that the Jamesian Wager (...)
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  14. Kenny Easwaran & B. Monton (2012). Mixed Strategies, Uncountable Times, and Pascal's Wager: A Reply to Robertson. Analysis 72 (4):681-685.score: 144.0
    Pascal’s Wager holds that one has pragmatic reason to believe in God, since that course of action has infinite expected utility. The mixed strategy objection holds that one could just as well follow a course of action that has infinite expected utility but is unlikely to end with one believing in God. Monton (2011. Mixed strategies can’t evade Pascal’s Wager. Analysis 71: 642–45.) has argued that mixed strategies can’t evade Pascal’s Wager, while Robertson (2012. Some mixed strategies (...)
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  15. S. Robertson (2012). Some Mixed Strategies Can Evade Pascal's Wager: A Reply to Monton. Analysis 72 (2):295-298.score: 144.0
    The mixed strategy response to Pascal’s Wager avoids Pascal’s conclusion by noting that there are ways to obtain infinite expected utility other than believing in God. We can, for instance, flip a coin and believe in God if the coin lands heads. Bradley Monton has recently argued that rationality requires us to apply mixed strategies repeatedly until we believe in God, and thus that mixed strategies do not evade the Wager. I offer three mixed strategies meet the requirements (...)
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  16. Graham Oppy (1996). Pascal's Wager is a Possible Bet (but Not a Very Good One): Reply to Harmon Holcomb III. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 40 (2):101 - 116.score: 126.0
    In "To Bet The Impossible Bet", Harmon Holcomb III argues: (i) that Pascal's wager is structurally incoherent; (ii) that if it were not thus incoherent, then it would be successful; and (iii) that my earlier critique of Pascal's wager in "On Rescher On Pascal's Wager" is vitiated by its reliance on "logicist" presuppositions. I deny all three claims. If Pascal's wager is "incoherent", this is only because of its invocation of infinite utilities. However, even if infinite (...)
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  17. A. B. Carter (2002). Is the Wager Back On? A Response to Douglas Groothuis. Philosophia Christi 4 (2):493-500.score: 126.0
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  18. Geoffrey Brown (1984). A Defence of Pascal's Wager. Religious Studies 20 (3):465 - 479.score: 120.0
  19. E. Wager & P. Williams (2011). Why and How Do Journals Retract Articles? An Analysis of Medline Retractions 1988-2008. Journal of Medical Ethics 37 (9):567-570.score: 120.0
    Background Journal editors are responsible for what they publish and therefore have a duty to correct the record if published work is found to be unreliable. One method for such correction is retraction of an article. Anecdotal evidence suggested a lack of consistency in journal policies and practices regarding retraction. In order to develop guidelines, we reviewed retractions in Medline to discover how and why articles were retracted. Methods We retrieved all available Medline retractions from 2005 to 2008 and a (...)
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  20. Charles Taliaferro (1992). Imaginary Evil: A Sceptic's Wager. Philosophia 21 (3-4):221-233.score: 120.0
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  21. Alexander Tabarrok (2000). Believe in Pascal's Wager? Have I Got a Deal for You! Theory and Decision 48 (2):123-128.score: 120.0
  22. Mitchell Cohen (1995). Book Review: The Wager of Lucien Goldmann: Tragedy, Dialectics and a Hidden God. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Literature 19 (2).score: 120.0
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  23. Massimo La Torre (1995). Citizenship: A European Wager. Ratio Juris 8 (1):113-123.score: 120.0
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  24. E. Wager (2007). What Medical Writing Means To Me. Mens Sana Monographs 5 (1):169.score: 120.0
    _This is a personal account based on many years experience as a medical writer. It considers aspects of medical writing with particular focus on the intellectual and ethical dilemmas it can raise. What makes medical writing both so interesting and so challenging is the fact that it often takes place at the border between different disciplines. For example, it straddles both science and art. Ethical issues also arise at the boundaries between academia and commerce. Until recently there have been few (...)
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  25. David Wetsel (1995). Book Review: The Wager of Lucien Goldmann: Tragedy, Dialectics and a Hidden God. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Literature 19 (2):409-410.score: 120.0
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  26. Andrew Cruickshank (1984). After the Wager, the Dice, and the Games: Making Up a Quartet. Macdonald Publishers.score: 120.0
     
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  27. Arkady Plotnitsky (2012). The Singularity Wager A Response to David Chalmers. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (7-8):7-8.score: 120.0
     
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  28. Romanorum Fragmenta Liberae Rei Publicae & M. Porci Catonis Orationum Reliquiae (2000). Sponsio Quae in Verb a Fact a Est? Two Lost Speeches and the Formula of the Roman Legal Wager. Classical Quarterly 50:159-169.score: 120.0
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  29. Nicholas Rescher (1985). Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology. University of Notre Dame Press.score: 120.0
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  30. Mark Vorobej (1986). Nicholas Rescher, Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 6 (6):299-301.score: 120.0
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  31. Dominiek Hoens (2013). You Never Know Your Luck: Lacan Reads Pascal. [REVIEW] Continental Philosophy Review 46 (2):241-249.score: 72.0
    In this paper the question of the object in Freud’s metapsychology is sketched out from an economical point of view, that is in terms of pleasure and displeasure. This allows for a reading of Pascal’s wager that makes clear what interest Lacan had in discussing this one pensée at length in his Seminar on the Object of Psychoanalysis. The central issue in Lacan’s reading concerns the object a as a stake the subject has lost.
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  32. P. Bartha (2007). Taking Stock of Infinite Value: Pascal's Wager and Relative Utilities. Synthese 154 (1):5 - 52.score: 66.0
    Among recent objections to Pascal’s Wager, two are especially compelling. The first is that decision theory, and specifically the requirement of maximizing expected utility, is incompatible with infinite utility values. The second is that even if infinite utility values are admitted, the argument of the Wager is invalid provided that we allow mixed strategies. Furthermore, Hájek (Philosophical Review 112, 2003) has shown that reformulations of Pascal’s Wager that address these criticisms inevitably lead to arguments that are philosophically (...)
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  33. Jim Stone (2007). Pascal's Wager and the Persistent Vegetative State. Bioethics 21 (2):84–92.score: 66.0
    I argue that a version of Pascal's Wager applies to the persistent vegetative state with sufficient force that it ought to part of advance directives.
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  34. Antony Aumann (2014). On the Validity of Pascal's Wager. Heythrop Journal 55 (1):86-93.score: 66.0
    Recent scholarship has shown that the success of Pascal’s wager rests on precarious grounds. To avoid notorious problems, it must appeal to considerations such as what probability we assign to the existence of various gods and what religion we think provides the greatest happiness in this life. Rational judgments concerning these matters are subject to change over time. Some claim that the wager therefore cannot support a steadfast commitment to God. I argue that this conclusion does not follow. (...)
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  35. David Shaw & David Conway (2010). Pascal’s Wager, Infective Endocarditis and the “No-Lose” Philosophy in Medicine. Heart 96 (1):15-18.score: 66.0
    Doctors and dentists have traditionally used antibiotic prophylaxis in certain patient groups in order to prevent infective endocarditis (IE). New guidelines, however, suggest that the risk to patients from using antibiotics is higher than the risk from IE. This paper analyses the relative risks of prescribing and not prescribing antibiotic prophylaxis against the background of Pascal’s Wager, the infamous assertion that it is better to believe in God regardless of evidence, because of the prospective benefits should He exist. Many (...)
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  36. Gregory Mougin & Elliott Sober (1994). Betting Against Pascal's Wager. Noûs 28 (3):382-395.score: 60.0
    Only one traditional objection to Pascal's wager is telling: Pascal assumes a particular theology, but without justification. We produce two new objections that go deeper. We show that even if Pascal's theology is assumed to be probable, Pascal's argument does not go through. In addition, we describe a wager that Pascal never considered, which leads away from Pascal's conclusion. We then consider the impact of these considerations on other prudential arguments concerning what one should believe, and on the (...)
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  37. Alan Hájek, Pascal's Wager. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 60.0
    “Pascal's Wager” is the name given to an argument due to Blaise Pascal for believing, or for at least taking steps to believe, in God. The name is somewhat misleading, for in a single paragraph of his Pensées, Pascal apparently presents at least three such arguments, each of which might be called a ‘wager’ — it is only the final of these that is traditionally referred to as “Pascal's Wager”. We find in it the extraordinary confluence of (...)
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  38. Erik J. Olsson (2005). Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing: Pragmatism and Radical Doubt. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):98–126.score: 60.0
    Pragmatist responses to radical skepticism do not receive much attention in contemporary analytic epistemology. This observation is my motivation for undertaking a search for a coherent pragmatist reply to radical doubt, one that can compete, in terms of clarity and sophistication, with the currently most popular approaches, such as contextualism and relevant alternatives theory. As my point of departure I take the texts of C. S. Peirce and William James. The Jamesian response is seen to consist in the application of (...)
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  39. Jeff Jordan (2006). Pascal's Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God. Oxford University Press.score: 54.0
    Is it reasonable to believe in God even in the absence of strong evidence that God exists? Pragmatic arguments for theism are designed to support belief even if one lacks evidence that theism is more likely than not. Jeff Jordan proposes that there is a sound version of the most well-known argument of this kind, Pascal's Wager, and explores the issues involved - in epistemology, the ethics of belief, decision theory, and theology.
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  40. Graham Oppy (1991). On Rescher on Pascal's Wager. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (3):159 - 168.score: 54.0
    In Pascal's Wager: A Study Of Practical Reasoning In Philosophical Theology ,[1] Nicholas Rescher aims to show that, contrary to received philosophical opinion, Pascal's Wager argument is "the vehicle of a fruitful and valuable insight--one which not only represents a milestone in the development of an historically important tradition of thought but can still be seen as making an instructive contribution to philosophical theology".[2] In particular, Rescher argues that one only needs to adopt a correct perspective in order (...)
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  41. Bradley Monton (2011). Mixed Strategies Can't Evade Pascal's Wager. Analysis 71 (4):642-645.score: 54.0
    I defend Pascal's Wager from a particular way of evading it, the mixed strategy approach. The mixed strategies approach suggests that Pascal's Wager does not obligate one to believe in God, because one can get the same infinite expected utility from other strategies besides the strategy of believing in God. I will show that while there's nothing technically wrong with the mixed strategy approach, rationality requires it to be applied in such a way that Pascal's Wager doesn't (...)
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  42. Jeff Jordan (1998). Pascal's Wager Revisited. Religious Studies 34 (4):419-431.score: 54.0
    Pascal's wager attempts to provide a prudential reason in support of the rationality of believing that God exists. The wager employs the idea that the utility of theistic belief, if true, is infinite, and in this way, the expected utility of theism swamps that of any of its rivals. Not surprisingly the wager generates more than a good share of philosophical criticism. In this essay I examine two recent objections levelled against the wager and I argue (...)
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  43. Christina Van Dyke & Sam Baron (forthcoming). Animal Interrupted, or Why Accepting Pascal’s Wager Might Be the Last Thing You Ever Do. Southern Journal of Philosophy.score: 54.0
    According to conventionalist accounts of personal identity, persons are constituted in part by practices and attitudes of certain sorts of care. In this paper, we concentrate on the most well-developed and defended version of conventionalism currently on offer (namely, that proposed by David Braddon-Mitchell, Caroline West, and Kristie Miller) and discuss how the conventionalist appears forced either 1) to accept arbitrariness concerning from which perspective to judge one’s survival or 2) to maintain egalitarianism at the cost of making ‘transfiguring’ decisions (...)
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  44. Craig Duncan (2003). Do Vague Probabilities Really Scotch Pascal's Wager? Philosophical Studies 112 (3):279 - 290.score: 54.0
    Alan Hájek has recently argued that certain assignments of vague probability defeat Pascals Wager. In particular, he argues that skeptical agnostics – those whose probability for God''s existence is vague over an interval containing zero – have nothing to fear from Pascal. In this paper, I make two arguments against Hájek: (1) that skeptical agnosticism is a form of dogmatism, and as such should be rejected; (2) that in any case, choice situations with vague probability assignments ought to be (...)
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  45. Arthur Falk (2005). A Pascal-Type Justification of Faith in a Scientific Age. Philosophy 80 (4):543-563.score: 54.0
    The author argues that faith survives as a rational option, despite science rendering improbable distinctively theological claims about the world and history. After rejecting justifications of faith from natural theology and natural law, he defends a seemingly weaker strategy, a corrected version of Pascal's wager argument. The wager lets one's desires count toward showing one's faith to be rational, and the faith requires that oneÕs desires undergo radical transformation to protect the faith, making the wager argument really (...)
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  46. Virgil Martin Nemoianu (2010). The Insufficiency of the Many Gods Objection to Pascal's Wager. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):513-530.score: 54.0
    Perhaps the best known criticism of Pascal’s wager is the many Gods objection. As so often with anglophone criticisms of Pascal, the many Gods objectiontypically treats the wager in isolation from the rest of Pascal’s thought. In this case, the truncated reading has issued in the view that Pascal was indifferent toor ignorant of the possibility that Gods other than the one described by Catholic theology might exist. This view is false. Even a cursory glance beyond the wagerfragment (...)
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  47. Neil Levy (2011). Searle's Wager. AI and Society 26 (4):363-369.score: 54.0
    Nicholas Agar has recently argued that it would be irrational for future human beings to choose to radically enhance themselves by uploading their minds onto computers. Utilizing Searle’s argument that machines cannot think, he claims that uploading might entail death. He grants that Searle’s argument is controversial, but he claims, so long as there is a non-zero probability that uploading entails death, uploading is irrational. I argue that Agar’s argument, like Pascal’s wager on which it is modelled, fails, because (...)
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  48. Steve Petersen (2006). Construing Faith as Action Won't Save Pascal's Wager. Philo 9 (2):221-229.score: 54.0
    Arthur Falk has proposed a new construal of faith according to which it is not a mere species of belief, but has essential components in action. This twist on faith promises to resurrect Pascal’s Wager, making faith compatible with reason by believing as the scientist but acting as the theist. I argue that Falk’s proposal leaves religious faith in no better shape; in particular, it merely reframes the question in terms of rational desires rather than rational beliefs.
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  49. Christopher Toner (2006). Pascal's First Wager Reconsidered. International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (1):75-90.score: 54.0
    There are at least two versions of the famous Wager argument to be found in Pascal’s Pensées. In contemporary work on the Wager, attention is almost always focused on the second. In this paper, we take a look at the first, which is often quickly dismissed as a failure. Indeed, it seems to be generally believed that Pascal himself quickly dismissed it as a failure. We fi rst argue that Pascal himself accepted the argument. Then we argue (more (...)
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  50. Sam Baron & Christina Dyke (2014). Animal Interrupted, or Why Accepting Pascal's Wager Might Be the Last Thing You Ever Do. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):109-133.score: 54.0
    According to conventionalist accounts of personal identity, persons are constituted in part by practices and attitudes of certain sorts of care. In this paper, we concentrate on the most well-developed and defended version of conventionalism currently on offer (namely, that proposed by David Braddon-Mitchell, Caroline West, and Kristie Miller) and discuss how the conventionalist appears forced either (1) to accept arbitrariness concerning from which perspective to judge one's survival or (2) to maintain egalitarianism at the cost of making “transfiguring” decisions (...)
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