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Alexandra Zinck [7]A. Zinck [1]
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Profile: Alexandra Zinck (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
  1. Tobias Schlicht, Anne Springer, Kirsten G. Volz, Gottfried Vosgerau, Martin Schmidt-Daffy, Daniela Simon & Alexandra Zinck (2009). Self as Cultural Construct? An Argument for Levels of Self-Representations. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):687 – 709.
    In this paper, we put forward an interdisciplinary framework describing different levels of self-representations, namely non-conceptual, conceptual and propositional self-representations. We argue that these different levels of self-representation are differently affected by cultural upbringing: while propositional self-representations rely on “theoretical” concepts and are thus strongly influenced by cultural upbringing, non-conceptual self-representations are uniform across cultures and thus universal. This differentiation offers a theoretical specification of the distinction between an independent and interdependent self-construal put forward in cross-cultural psychology. Hence, this does (...)
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  2. Alexandra Zinck, Sanne Lodahl & Chris D. Frith (2009). Making a Case for Introspection. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):163-164.
    Defending first-person introspective access to own mental states, we argue against Carruthers' claim of mindreading being prior to meta-cognition and for a fundamental difference between how we understand our own and others' mental states. We conclude that a model based on one mechanism but involving two different kinds of access for self and other is sufficient and more consistent with the evidence.
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  3. Alexandra Zinck, Daniela Simon, Martin Schmidt-Daffy, Gottfried Vosgerau, Kirsten G. Volz, Anne Springer & Tobias Schlicht (2009). Self as Cultural Construct? An Argument for Levels of Self-Representations. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):687-709.
    In this paper, we put forward an interdisciplinary framework describing different levels of self-representations, namely non-conceptual, conceptual and propositional self-representations. We argue that these different levels of self-representation are differently affected by cultural upbringing: while propositional self-representations rely on “theoretical” concepts and are thus strongly influenced by cultural upbringing, non-conceptual self-representations are uniform across cultures and thus universal. This differentiation offers a theoretical specification of the distinction between an independent and interdependent self-construal put forward in cross-cultural psychology. Hence, this does (...)
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  4. A. Newen, K. Vogeley & A. Zinck (2008). Social Cognition, Emotion and Self-Consciousness: A Preface. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):409-410.
  5. Alexandra Zinck (2008). Self-Referential Emotions. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):496-505.
    The aim of this paper is to examine a special subgroup of emotion: self-referential emo- tions such as shame, pride and guilt. Self-referential emotions are usually conceptualized as (i) essentially involving the subject herself and as (ii) having complex conditions such as the capacity to represent others’ thoughts. I will show that rather than depending on a fully fledged ‘theory of mind’ and an explicit language-based self-representation, (i) pre-forms of self-referential emotions appear at early developmental stages already exhib- iting their (...)
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  6. Alexandra Zinck & Albert Newen (2008). Classifying Emotion: A Developmental Account. Synthese 161 (1):1 - 25.
    The aim of this paper is to propose a systematic classification of emotions which can also characterize their nature. The first challenge we address is the submission of clear criteria for a theory of emotions that determine which mental phenomena are emotions and which are not. We suggest that emotions as a subclass of mental states are determined by their functional roles. The second and main challenge is the presentation of a classification and theory of emotions that can account for (...)
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  7. P. Philipp, Alexandra Zinck & Uwe Scheffler (2005). REVIEWS-Logisch-philosophische Untersuchungen. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (1):63-64.
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  8. Alexandra Zinck & Uwe Scheffler (2005). Philipp Peter. Logisch-Philosophische Untersuchungen, Edited by Max Ingolf and Raatsch Richard, Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy, Vol. 20. De Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1998, Xvii+ 433 Pp. [REVIEW] Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (1):63-65.
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