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  1. Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (2011). Romantic Compromises. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press. 95.
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  2. Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (2010). The Thing Called Emotion. In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press. 41--61.
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  3. Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (2008). Hating the One You Love. Philosophia 36 (3):277-283.
    Many testimonies, as well as fictional works, describe situations in which people find themselves hating the person that they love. This might initially appear to be contradiction, as how can one love and hate the same person at the same time? A discussion of this problem requires making a distinction between logical consistency and psychologically compatibility. Hating the one you love may be a consistent experience, but it raises difficulties concerning its psychological compatibility.
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  4. Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (2008). Intellectual Autobiography. Philosophia 36 (3):255-276.
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  5. Aaron Ben-Ze’Ev (2004). Emotions Are Not Mere Judgments. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):450-457.
  6. Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (2000). Emotions, Responsibility and Morality. In A. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Kluwer. 219--231.
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  7. Aaron Ben-Ze’Ev (1997). Appraisal Theories of Emotions. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:129-143.
    Today appraisal theories are the foremost approach to emotions in philosophy and psychology. The general assumption underlying these theories is that evaluations (appraisals) are the most crucial factor in emotions. This assumption may imply that: (a) evaluative pattems distinguish one emotion from another; (b) evaluative pattems distinguish emotions from nonemotions; (e) emotional evaluations of the eliciting event determine emotional intensity. These claims are not necessarily related. Accepting one of them does not necessarily imply acceptance of the others. I believe that (...)
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  8. Aaron Ben-Ze’Ev (1993). Envy and Pity. International Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1):3-19.
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  9. Aaron Ben-Ze’Ev (1990). Envy and Jealousy. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):487-516.
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  10. Aaron Ben-Ze’Ev (1988). Conscious and Unconscious States. Philosophical Studies 32:44-62.
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