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  1. Aaron Z. Zimmerman, Infallible Introspection.
  2. Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2009). A Conflict in Common Sense Moral Psychology. Utilitas 21 (4):401-423.
    Ordinary moral thinking about morality and rationality is inconsistent. To arrive at a view of morality that is as faithful to common thought as consistency will allow we must admit that it is not always irrational to knowingly act against the weight of reasons.
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  3. Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2008). Review of Jennifer Lackey, Learning From Words: Testimony As a Source of Knowledge. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (7).
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  4. Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2008). Self-Knowledge: Rationalism Vs. Empiricism. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):325–352.
    Recent philosophical discussions of self-knowledge have focused on basic cases: our knowledge of our own thoughts, beliefs, sensations, experiences, preferences, and intentions. Empiricists argue that we acquire this sort of self-knowledge through inner perception; rationalists assign basic self-knowledge an even more secure source in reason and conceptual understanding. I try to split the difference. Although our knowledge of our own beliefs and thoughts is conceptually insured, our knowledge of our experiences is relevantly like our perceptual knowledge of the external world.
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  5. Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2007). Against Relativism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 133 (3):313-348.
    Recent years have brought relativistic accounts of knowledge, first-person belief, and future contingents to prominence. I discuss these views, distinguish non-trivial from trivial forms of relativism, and then argue against relativism in all of its substantive varieties.
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  6. Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2007). Hume's Reasons. Hume Studies 33 (2):211-256.
    Hume's claim that reason is a slave to the passions involves both a causal thesis: reason cannot cause action without the aid of the passions, and an evaluative thesis: it is improper to evaluate our actions in terms of their reasonableness. On my reading, Hume motivates his causal thesis by arguing that accurate representation is the function of reason, where a faculty of this kind cannot produce action on its own. (The interpretation helps vindicate Hume of the common charge that (...)
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  7. Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2007). Review of Paul Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge. [REVIEW] Ars Disputandi 7.
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  8. Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2007). The Nature of Belief. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (11):61-82.
    Neo-Cartesian approaches to belief place greater evidential weight on a subject's introspective judgments than do neo-behaviorist accounts. As a result, the two views differ on whether our absent-minded and weak-willed actions are guided by belief. I argue that simulationist accounts of the concept of belief are committed to neo-Cartesianism, and, though the conceptual and empirical issues that arise are inextricably intertwined, I discuss experimental results that should point theory-theorists in that direction as well. Belief is even less closely connected to (...)
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  9. Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2006). By Maria Baghramian. Ars Disputandi 6:1566-5399.
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  10. Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2006). Basic Self-Knowledge: Answering Peacocke's Criticisms of Constitutivism. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):337-379.
    Constitutivist accounts of self-knowledge argue that a noncontingent, conceptual relation holds between our first-order mental states and our introspective awareness of them. I explicate a constitutivist account of our knowledge of our own beliefs and defend it against criticisms recently raised by Christopher Peacocke. According to Peacocke, constitutivism says that our second-order introspective beliefs are groundless. I show that Peacocke’s arguments apply to reliabilism not to constitutivism per se, and that by adopting a functionalist account of direct accessibility a constitutivist (...)
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  11. Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2006). Review of Maria Baghramian, Relativism. [REVIEW] Ars Disputandi 6.
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  12. Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2006). Self-Verification and the Content of Thought. Synthese 149 (1):59-75.
    Burge follows Descartes in claiming that the category of conceptually self-verifying judgments includes (but is not restricted to) judgments that give rise to sincere assertions of sentences of the form, 'I am thinking that p'. In this paper I argue that Burge’s Cartesian insight is hard to reconcile with Fregean accounts of the content of thought. Burge's intuitively compelling claim that cogito judgments are conceptually self-verifying poses a real challenge to neo-Fregean theories of content.
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  13. Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2005). Putting Extrospection to Rest. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):658-661.
    Jordi Fernández has recently responded to my objection that his 'extrospectionist' account of self-knowledge posits necessary and sufficient conditions for introspective justification which are neither necessary nor sufficient. I show that my criticisms survive his response unscathed.
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  14. Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2005). Self-Verification and the Content of Thought. Synthese 149 (1):59 - 75.
    Descartes famously argued, on purely conceptual grounds, that even an extremely powerful being could not trick him into mistakenly judging that he was thinking. Of course, it is not necessarily true that Descartes is thinking. Still, Descartes claimed, it is necessarily true that if a person judges that she is thinking, that person is thinking. Following Tyler Burge (1988) we call such judgments ‘self-verifying.’ More exactly, a judgment j performed by a subject S at a time t is selfverifying if (...)
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  15. Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2004). Unnatural Access. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):435-38.
    Jordi Fernandez has recently offered an interesting account of introspective justification according to which the very states that (subjectively) justify one's first-order belief that p justify one's second order belief that one believes that p. I provide two objections to Fernandez's account.
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