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  1. Raghav Ramachandran, Abhaya C. Nayak & Mehmet A. Orgun (2012). Three Approaches to Iterated Belief Contraction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):115-142.
    In this paper we investigate three approaches to iterated contraction, namely: the Moderate (or Priority) contraction, the Natural (or Conservative) contraction, and the Lexicographic contraction. We characterise these three contraction functions using certain, arguably plausible, properties of an iterated contraction function. While we provide the characterisation of the first two contraction operations using rationality postulates of the standard variety for iterated contraction, we found doing the same for the Lexicographic contraction more challenging. We provide its characterisation using a variation of (...)
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  2. Raghav Ramachandran, Arthur Ramer & Abhaya C. Nayak (2012). Probabilistic Belief Contraction. Minds and Machines 22 (4):325-351.
    Probabilistic belief contraction has been a much neglected topic in the field of probabilistic reasoning. This is due to the difficulty in establishing a reasonable reversal of the effect of Bayesian conditionalization on a probabilistic distribution. We show that indifferent contraction, a solution proposed by Ramer to this problem through a judicious use of the principle of maximum entropy, is a probabilistic version of a full meet contraction. We then propose variations of indifferent contraction, using both the Shannon entropy measure (...)
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  3. James P. Delgrande, Abhaya C. Nayak & Maurice Pagnucco (2005). Gricean Belief Change. Studia Logica 79 (1):97 - 113.
    One of the standard principles of rationality guiding traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change: a reasoner's belief corpus should be modified in a minimal fashion when assimilating new information. This rationality principle has stood belief change in good stead. However, it does not deal properly with all belief change scenarios. We introduce a novel account of belief change motivated by one of Grice's maxims of conversational implicature: the reasoner's belief corpus is modified in a minimal (...)
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  4. Abhaya C. Nayak, Paul Nelson & Hanan Polansky (1996). Belief Change as Change in Epistemic Entrenchment. Synthese 109 (2):143 - 174.
    In this paper, it is argued that both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation, and an axiomatic characterization of this operation is given. Unlike most belief revision operations, the one developed here can handle both multiple belief revision and iterated belief revision.
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  5. Abhaya C. Nayak & Eric Sotnak (1995). Kant on the Impossibility of the "Soft Sciences&Quot;. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):133-151.
  6. Abhaya C. Nayak (1994). Foundational Belief Change. Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (5):495 - 533.
    This paper is concerned with the construction of a base contraction (revision) operation such that the theory contraction (revision) operation generated by it will be fully AGM-rational. It is shown that the theory contraction operation generated by Fuhrmann's minimal base contraction operation, even under quite strong restrictions, fails to satisfy the "supplementary postulates" of belief contraction. Finally Fuhrmann's construction is appropriately modified so as to yield the desired properties. The new construction may be described as involving a modification of safe (...)
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  7. Abhaya C. Nayak (1994). Iterated Belief Change Based on Epistemic Entrenchment. Erkenntnis 41 (3):353-390.
    In this paper it is argued that, in order to solve the problem of iterated belief change, both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation. It is shown that the operation in question satisfies generalized versions of the Gärdenfors revision postulates. The account offered is motivated by Spohn's ordinal conditionalization functions, (...)
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