Search results for 'Absence Causation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Physical Causation (2008). To Psychological Causation. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press. 71--184.score: 120.0
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  2. Joseph A. Baltimore (2011). Lewis' Modal Realism and Absence Causation. Metaphysica 12 (2):117-124.score: 90.0
    A major criticism of David Lewis’ counterfactual theory of causation is that it allows too many things to count as causes, especially since Lewis allows, in addition to events, absences to be causes as well. Peter Menzies has advanced this concern under the title “the problem of profligate causation.” In this paper, I argue that the problem of profligate causation provides resources for exposing a tension between Lewis’ acceptance of absence causation and his modal realism. (...)
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  3. Brannon McDaniel (2009). Presentism and Absence Causation: An Exercise in Mimicry. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):323-332.score: 78.0
    If _presentism_ is true, then no wholly non-present events exist. If _absence orthodoxy_ is true, then no absences exist. I discuss a well-known causal argument against presentism, and develop a very similar argument against absence orthodoxy. I argue that solutions to the argument against absence orthodoxy can be adopted by the presentist as solutions to the argument against presentism. The upshot is that if the argument against absence orthodoxy fails, then so does the argument against presentism.
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  4. Miklos Redei (1993). Are Prohibitions of Superluminal Causation by Stochastic Einstein Locality and by Absence of Lewisian Probabilistic Counterfactual Causality Equivalent? Philosophy of Science 60 (4):608-618.score: 39.0
    Butterfield's (1992a,b,c) claim of the equivalence of absence of Lewisian probabilistic counterfactual causality (LC) to Hellman's stochastic Einstein locality (SEL) is questioned. Butterfield's assumption on which the proof of his claim is based would suffice to prove that SEL implies absence of LC also for appropriately given versions of these notions in algebraic quantum field theory, but the assumption is not an admissible one. The conclusion must be that the relation of SEL and absence of LC is (...)
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  5. Jonathan Livengood & Edouard Machery (2007). The Folk Probably Don't Think What You Think They Think: Experiments on Causation by Absence. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):107–127.score: 36.0
    Folk theories—untutored people’s (often implicit) theories about various features of the world—have been fashionable objects of inquiry in psychology for almost two decades now (e.g., Hirschfeld and Gelman 1994), and more recently they have been of interest in experimental philosophy (Nichols 2004). Folk theories of psy- chology, physics, biology, and ethics have all come under investigation. Folk meta- physics, however, has not been as extensively studied. That so little is known about folk metaphysics is unfortunate for (at least) two reasons. (...)
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  6. Brendan S. Gillon & Richard P. Hayes (2008). Dharmakīrti on the Role of Causation in Inference as Presented in Pramāṇavārttika Svopajñavṛtti 11–38. Journal of Indian Philosophy 36 (3):335-404.score: 36.0
    In the svārthānumāna chapter of his Pramāṇavārttika, the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti presented a defense of his claim that legitimate inference must rest on a metaphysical basis if it is to be immune from the risks ordinarily involved in inducing general principles from a finite number of observations. Even if one repeatedly observes that x occurs with y and never observes y in the absence of x, there is no guarantee, on the basis of observation alone, that one will never (...)
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  7. Phil Dowe (2009). Absences, Possible Causation, and the Problem of Non-Locality. The Monist 92 (1):23-40.score: 33.0
    I argue that so-called ‘absence causation’must be treated in terms of counterfactuals about causation such as ‘had a occurred, a would have caused b’. First, I argue that some theories of causation that accept absence causation are unattractive because they undermine the idea of possible causation. And second, I argue that accepting absence causation violates a principle commonly associated with relativity.
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  8. Jane Suilin Lavelle, George Botterill & Suzanne Lock (2013). Contrastive Explanation and the Many Absences Problem. Synthese 190 (16):3495-3510.score: 30.0
    We often explain by citing an absence or an omission. Apart from the problem of assigning a causal role to such apparently negative factors as absences and omissions, there is a puzzle as to why only some absences and omissions, out of indefinitely many, should figure in explanations. In this paper we solve this ’many absences problem’ by using the contrastive model of explanation. The contrastive model of explanation is developed by adapting Peter Lipton’s account. What initially appears to (...)
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  9. Stephen Mumford & Rani Lill Anjum (2010). A Powerful Theory of Causation. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge. 143--159.score: 27.0
    Hume thought that if you believed in powers, you believed in necessary connections in nature. He was then able to argue that there were none such because anything could follow anything else. But Hume wrong-footed his opponents. A power does not necessitate its manifestations: rather, it disposes towards them in a way that is less than necessary but more than purely contingent. -/- In this paper a dispositional theory of causation is offered. Causes dispose towards their effects and often (...)
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  10. Brendan Clarke (2011). Causation and Melanoma Classification. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 32 (1):19-32.score: 27.0
    In this article, I begin by giving a brief history of melanoma causation. I then discuss the current manner in which malignant melanoma is classified. In general, these systems of classification do not take account of the manner of tumour causation. Instead, they are based on phenomenological features of the tumour, such as size, spread, and morphology. I go on to suggest that misclassification of melanoma is a major problem in clinical practice. I therefore outline an alternative means (...)
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  11. Phil Dowe, The Power of Possible Causation.score: 24.0
    In this paper I consider possible causation, specifically, would-cause counterfactuals of the form ‘had an event of kind A occurred, it would have caused an event of kind B’. I outline some difficulties for the Lewis program for understanding would-cause counterfactuals, and canvass an alternative. I then spell out a view on their significance, in relation to (i) absence causation, where claims such as ‘A’s not occurring caused B’s not occurring’ seem to make sense when understood in (...)
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  12. Johannes Persson (2002). Cause, Effect, and Fake Causation. Synthese 131 (1):129 - 143.score: 24.0
    The possibility of apparently negative causation has been discussed in a number of recent works on causation, but the discussion has suffered from beingscattered. In this paper, the problem of apparently negative causation and its attemptedsolutions are examined in more detail. I discuss and discard three attempts that have beensuggested in the literature. My conclusion is negative: Negative causation shows that thetraditional cause & effect view is inadequate. A more unified causal perspective is needed.
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  13. Jonathan Schaffer (2004). Causes Need Not Be Physically Connected to Their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation. In Christopher Read Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Basil Blackwell. 197--216.score: 21.0
    Negative causation occurs when an absence serves as cause, effect, or causal intermediary. Negative causation is genuine causation, or so I shall argue. It involves no physical connection between cause and effect. Thus causes need not be physically connected to their effects.
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  14. David Papineau (2013). Causation is Macroscopic but Not Irreducible. In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press. 126.score: 21.0
    In this paper I argue that causation is an essentially macroscopic phenomenon, and that mental causes are therefore capable of outcompeting their more specific physical realizers as causes of physical effects. But I also argue that any causes must be type-identical with physical properties, on pain of positing inexplicable physical conspiracies. I therefore allow macroscopic mental causation, but only when it is physically reducible.
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  15. Douglas Kutach (2007). The Physical Foundations of Causation. In Huw Price & Richard Corry (eds.), Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Russell's Republic Revisited. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    I defend what may loosely be called an eliminativist account of causation by showing how several of the main features of causation, namely asymmetry, transitivity, and necessitation (or sometimes probability-raising), arise from the combination of fundamental dynamical laws and a special constraint on the macroscopic structure of matter in the past. At the microscopic level, the causal features of necessitation and transitivity are grounded, but not the asymmetry. At the coarse-grained level of the macroscopic physics, the causal asymmetry (...)
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  16. Lynne Rudder Baker (1993). Metaphysics and Mental Causation. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. 75-96.score: 21.0
    My aim is twofold: first, to root out the metaphysical assumptions that generate the problem of mental causation and to show that they preclude its solution; second, to dissolve the problem of mental causation by motivating rejection of one of the metaphysical assumptions that give rise to it. There are three features of this metaphysical background picture that are important for our purposes. The first concerns the nature of reality: all reality depends on physical reality, where physical reality (...)
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  17. Ted Honderich, Thomas Hobbes: Causation, Determinism, and Their Compatibility with Freedom.score: 21.0
    _What Thomas Hobbes has to say of the nature of causation itself in_ _Entire Causes_ _and Their Only Possible Effects_ _is carried further in the first of the two excerpts here_ _-- although not at its start. His second subject in this imperfectly sequential piece of_ _writing is determinism itself -- a deterministic philosophy of mind. In the mind, as_ _elsewhere, each event has a 'necessary cause' -- a cause that necessitates the event._ _His third subject in the first (...)
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  18. Luke Glynn (2011). A Probabilistic Analysis of Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):343-392.score: 21.0
    The starting point in the development of probabilistic analyses of token causation has usually been the naïve intuition that, in some relevant sense, a cause raises the probability of its effect. But there are well-known examples both of non-probability-raising causation and of probability-raising non-causation. Sophisticated extant probabilistic analyses treat many such cases correctly, but only at the cost of excluding the possibilities of direct non-probability-raising causation, failures of causal transitivity, action-at-a-distance, prevention, and causation by (...) and omission. I show that an examination of the structure of these problem cases suggests a different treatment, one which avoids the costs of extant probabilistic analyses. (shrink)
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  19. Jonathan Schaffer (2000). Causation by Disconnection. Philosophy of Science 67 (2):285-300.score: 21.0
    The physical and/or intrinsic connection approach to causation has become prominent in the recent literature, with Salmon, Dowe, Menzies, and Armstrong among its leading proponents. I show that there is a type of causation, causation by disconnection, with no physical or intrinsic connection between cause and effect. Only Hume-style conditions approaches and hybrid conditions-connections approaches appear to be able to handle causation by disconnection. Some Hume-style, extrinsic, absence-relating, necessary and/or sufficient condition component of the causal (...)
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  20. Jody Azzouni (2008). A Cause for Concern: Standard Abstracta and Causation. Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):397-401.score: 21.0
    Benjamin Callard has recently suggested that causation between Platonic objects—standardly understood as atemporal and non-spatial—and spatio-temporal objects is not ‘a priori’ unintelligible. He considers the reasons some have given for its purported unintelligibility: apparent impossibility of energy transference, absence of physical contact, etc. He suggests that these considerations fail to rule out a priori Platonic-object causation. However, he has overlooked one important issue. Platonic objects must causally affect different objects differently, and different Platonic objects must causally affect (...)
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  21. Rani Lill Anjum & Stephen Mumford, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility - On Causation and Responsibility in Spider-Man, and Possibly Moore. Critical Essays on Causation and Responsibility.score: 21.0
    Omissions are sometimes linked to responsibility. A harm can counterfactually depend on an omission to prevent it. If someone had the ability to prevent a harm but didn’t, this could suffice to ground their responsibility for the harm. We present an argument for this based on the WGPCGR-thesis: With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility. -/- We argue, with reference to Moore’s account in Causation and Responsibility (Moore 2009), that moral and legal responsibility is based on the power we have (...)
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  22. H. Price (2012). Causation, Chance, and the Rational Significance of Supernatural Evidence. Philosophical Review 121 (4):483-538.score: 21.0
    In “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance,” David Lewis says that he is “led to wonder whether anyone but a subjectivist is in a position to understand objective chance.” The present essay aims to motivate this same Lewisean attitude, and a similar degree of modest subjectivism, with respect to objective causation. The essay begins with Newcomb problems, which turn on an apparent tension between two principles of choice: roughly, a principle sensitive to the causal features of the relevant situation, (...)
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  23. John Heil & Alfred Mele (eds.) (1993). Mental Causation. Clarendon Press.score: 21.0
    I argue that the two standard models of mental causation fail to capture the crucial causal relevance of the reason-giving relations involved. Their common error is an exclusively mechanical conception of causation, on which any justification is bound to be independent of the causal process involved, based upon a general rule from which the correctness of the particular case follows only by subsumption. I establish possibility of an alternative model, by sketching an account of the causal dependence of (...)
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  24. Joonsung Kim (2008). Against the Monolithic Way of Explicating Causation. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 43:95-100.score: 21.0
    Glennan (2002) argues for the mechanism theory of causation that it explicates both type-level and token-level causation in terms of mechanism. I argue against the mechanism theory that it is not sufficient for explicating cause-effect relations at the token-level. I put forth two counterexamples (first, absence of causes and second, a cause preempting another cause) to the theory, and show that descriptions of a mechanism are inert in explicating cause-effect relations at the token level. I point out (...)
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  25. E. J. Lowe (2006). Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 65 (1):5-23.score: 18.0
    Non-Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD) maintains that persons or selves are distinct from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as ‘substances’ in their own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being capable of disembodied existence. In this paper, it is urged that NCSD is better equipped than either Cartesian dualism or standard forms of physicalism to explain the possibility of mental (...). A model of mental causation adopting the NCSD perspective is proposed which, it is argued, is consistent with all that is currently known about the operations of the human central nervous system, including the brain. Physicalism, by contrast, seems ill-equipped to explain the distinctively intentional or teleological character of mental causation, because it effectively reduces all such causation to ‘blind’ physical causation at a neurological level. (shrink)
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  26. Mark A. Bedau (2002). Downward Causation and the Autonomy of Weak Emergence. Principia 6 (1):5-50.score: 18.0
    Weak emergence has been offered as an explication of the ubiquitous notion of emergence used in complexity science (Bedau 1997). After outlining the problem of emergence and comparing weak emergence with the two other main objectivist approaches to emergence, this paper explains a version of weak emergence and illustrates it with cellular automata. Then it explains the sort of downward causation and explanatory autonomy involved in weak emergence.
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  27. David Danks, David Rose & Edouard Machery (2013). Demoralizing Causation. Philosophical Studies:1-27.score: 18.0
    There have recently been a number of strong claims that normative considerations, broadly construed, influence many philosophically important folk concepts and perhaps are even a constitutive component of various cognitive processes. Many such claims have been made about the influence of such factors on our folk notion of causation. In this paper, we argue that the strong claims found in the recent literature on causal cognition are overstated, as they are based on one narrow type of data about a (...)
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  28. Douglas Kutach (2013). Causation and Its Basis in Fundamental Physics. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    I provide a comprehensive metaphysics of causation based on the idea that fundamentally things are governed by the laws of physics, and that derivatively difference-making can be assessed in terms of what fundamental laws of physics imply for hypothesized events. Highlights include a general philosophical methodology, the fundamental/derivative distinction, and my mature account of causal asymmetry.
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  29. Markus E. Schlosser (2012). Causally Efficacious Intentions and the Sense of Agency: In Defense of Real Mental Causation. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):135-160.score: 18.0
    Empirical evidence, it has often been argued, undermines our commonsense assumptions concerning the efficacy of conscious intentions. One of the most influential advocates of this challenge has been Daniel Wegner, who has presented an impressive amount of evidence in support of a model of "apparent mental causation". According to Wegner, this model provides the best explanation of numerous curious and pathological cases of behavior. Further, it seems that Benjamin Libet's classic experiment on the initiation of action and the empirical (...)
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  30. David Yates (2009). Emergence, Downwards Causation and the Completeness of Physics. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):110 - 131.score: 18.0
    The 'completeness of physics' is the key premise in the causal argument for physicalism. Standard formulations of it fail to rule out emergent downwards causation. I argue that it must do this if it is tare in a valid causal argument for physicalism. Drawing on the notion of conferring causal power, I formulate a suitable principle, 'strong completeness'. I investigate the metaphysical implications of distinguishing this principle from emergent downwards causation, and I argue that categoricalist accounts of properties (...)
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  31. Stephen Mumford & Rani Lill Anjum (2009). Double Prevention and Powers. Journal of Critical Realism 8 (3):277-293.score: 18.0
    Does A cause B simply if A prevents what would have prevented B? Such a case is known as double prevention: where we have the prevention of a prevention. One theory of causation is that A causes B when B counterfactually depends on A and, as there is such a dependence, proponents of the view must rule that double prevention is causation.<br><br>However, if double prevention is causation, it means that causation can be an extrinsic matter, that (...)
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  32. Ned Markosian (2012). Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist's Problems. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383 - 398.score: 18.0
    In a recent paper I argued that agent causation theorists should be compatibilists. In this paper, I argue that compatibilists should be agent causation theorists. I consider six of the main problems facing compatibilism: (i) the powerful intuition that one can't be responsible for actions that were somehow determined before one was born; (ii) Peter van Inwagen's modal argument, involving the inference rule (β); (iii) the objection to compatibilism that is based on claiming that the ability to do (...)
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  33. Matt Farr & Alexander Reutlinger (2013). A Relic of a Bygone Age? Causation, Time Symmetry and the Directionality Argument. Erkenntnis 78 (2):215-235.score: 18.0
    Bertrand Russell famously argued that causation is not part of the fundamental physical description of the world, describing the notion of cause as “a relic of a bygone age” (Russell in Proc Aristot Soc 13:1–26, 1913). This paper assesses one of Russell’s arguments for this conclusion: the ‘Directionality Argument’, which holds that the time symmetry of fundamental physics is inconsistent with the time asymmetry of causation. We claim that the coherence and success of the Directionality Argument crucially depends (...)
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  34. Helen Beebee (2006). Hume on Causation. Routledge.score: 18.0
    Causation is one of the most important and enduring topics in philosophy, going back to Aristotle. In this important book, Helen Beebee covers all the major debates and issues in the philosophy of causation. Beginning with an introduction to the concept, Causation examines the most important philosopher of causation, David Hume, and assesses the problems of induction and necessary connection in light of Hume's thought. Beebee then investigates different theories of causation and challenges to the (...)
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  35. Simona Aimar (2011). Counterfactuals, Overdetermination and Mental Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3):469-477.score: 18.0
    The Exclusion Problem (EP) for mental causation suggests that there is a tension between the claim that the mental causes physical effects, and the claim that the mental does not overdetermine its physical effects. In response, Karen Bennett (2008, 2003) puts forward an extra necessary condition for overdetermination: if one candidate cause were to occur but the other were not to occur, the effect would still occur. She thus denies one of the assumptions of EP, the assumption that if (...)
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  36. Stephen Mumford & Rani Lill Anjum (2011). Spoils to the Vector - How to Model Causes If You Are a Realist About Powers. The Monist 94 (1):54-80.score: 18.0
    A standard way of representing causation is with neuron diagrams. This has become popular since the influential work of David Lewis. But it should not be assumed that such representations are metaphysically neutral and amenable to any theory of causation. On the contrary, this way of representing causation already makes several Humean assumptions about what causation is, and which suit Lewis’s programme of Humean Supervenience. An alternative of a vector diagram is better suited for a powers (...)
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  37. Jessica M. Wilson (2009). Determination, Realization and Mental Causation. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):149 - 169.score: 18.0
    How can mental properties bring about physical effects, as they seem to do, given that the physical realizers of the mental goings-on are already sufficient to cause these effects? This question gives rise to the problem of mental causation (MC) and its associated threats of causal overdetermination, mental causal exclusion, and mental causal irrelevance. Some (e.g., Cynthia and Graham Macdonald, and Stephen Yablo) have suggested that understanding mental-physical realization in terms of the determinable/determinate relation (henceforth, 'determination') provides the key (...)
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  38. Richard Campbell & Mark H. Bickhard (2011). Physicalism, Emergence and Downward Causation. Axiomathes 21 (1):33-56.score: 18.0
    The development of a defensible and fecund notion of emergence has been dogged by a number of threshold issues neatly highlighted in a recent paper by Jaegwon Kim. We argue that physicalist assumptions confuse and vitiate the whole project. In particular, his contention that emergence entails supervenience is contradicted by his own argument that the ‘microstructure’ of an object belongs to the whole object, not to its constituents. And his argument against the possibility of downward causation is question-begging and (...)
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  39. Luke Fenton-Glynn & Thomas Kroedel (2013). Relativity, Quantum Entanglement, Counterfactuals, and Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axt040.score: 18.0
    We investigate whether standard counterfactual analyses of causation (CACs) imply that the outcomes of space-like separated measurements on entangled particles are causally related. Although it has sometimes been claimed that standard CACs imply such a causal relation, we argue that a careful examination of David Lewis’s influential counterfactual semantics casts doubt on this. We discuss ways in which Lewis’s semantics and standard CACs might be extended to the case of space-like correlations. 1 Introduction2 Measurement Outcomes and Counterfactual Analyses of (...)
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  40. Michael Tooley (1987). Causation: A Realist Approach. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Tooley here sets out and defends realist accounts of traditional empiricist explanations of causation and laws of nature, arguing that since reductionist accounts of causation are exposed to decisive objections, empiricists must break with that tradition.
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  41. Ishtiyaque Haji (2004). Active Control, Agent-Causation and Free Action. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.score: 18.0
    Key elements of Randolph Clarke's libertarian account of freedom that requires both agent-causation and non-deterministic event-causation in the production of free action is assessed with an eye toward determining whether agent-causal accounts can accommodate the truth of judgments of moral obligation.
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  42. John Gibbons (2006). Mental Causation Without Downward Causation. Philosophical Review 115 (1):79-103.score: 18.0
    to counterintuitive results. Suppose a mental event, m1, causes another mental event, m2. Unless the mental and the physical are completely independent, there will be a physical event in your brain or your body or the physical world as a whole that underlies this event. The mental event occurs at least partly in virtue of the physical event’s occurring. And the same goes for m2 [2] and p2. Let’s not worry about what exactly “underlying” or “in virtue of” means here. (...)
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  43. Peter Fazekas & George Kampis, Turning Negative Causation Back to Positive.score: 18.0
    In contemporary literature, the fact that there is negative causation is the primary motivation for rejecting the physical connection view, and arguing for alternative accounts of causation. In this paper we insist that such a conclusion is too fast. We present two frameworks, which help the proponent of the physical connection view to resist the anti-connectionist conclusion. According to the first framework, there are positive causal claims, which co-refer with at least some negative causal claims. According to the (...)
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  44. Tyler Burge (1993). Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Argument for Epiphenomenalism [I]: (A) Mental event-tokens are identical with physical event-tokens. (B) The causal powers of a physical event are determined only by its physical properties; and (C) mental properties are not reducible to physical properties.
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  45. Achim Stephan (2002). Emergentism, Irreducibility, and Downward Causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):77-93.score: 18.0
    Several theories of emergence will be distinguished. In particular, these are synchronic, diachronic, and weak versions of emergence. While the weaker theories are compatible with property reductionism, synchronic emergentism and strong versions of diachronic emergentism are not. Synchronice mergentism is of particular interest for the discussion of downward causation. For such a theory, a system's property is taken to be emergent if it is irreducible, i.e., if it is not reductively explainable. Furthermore, we have to distinguish two different types (...)
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  46. Ned Markosian (1999). A Compatibilist Version of the Theory of Agent Causation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):257-277.score: 18.0
    The problem of freedom and determinism has vexed philosophers for several millennia, and continues to be a topic of lively debate today. One of the proposed solutions to the problem that has received a great deal of attention is the Theory of Agent Causation. While the theory has enjoyed its share of advocates, and perhaps more than its share of critics, the theory’s advocates and critics have always agreed on one thing: the Theory of Agent Causation is an (...)
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  47. Christopher Hitchcock (2009). Structural Equations and Causation: Six Counterexamples. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):391 - 401.score: 18.0
    Hall [(2007), Philosophical Studies, 132, 109–136] offers a critique of structural equations accounts of actual causation, and then offers a new theory of his own. In this paper, I respond to Hall’s critique, and present some counterexamples to his new theory. These counterexamples are then diagnosed.
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  48. David Robb (1997). The Properties of Mental Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.score: 18.0
    Recent discussions of mental causation have focused on three principles: (1) Mental properties are (sometimes) causally relevant to physical effects; (2) mental properties are not physical properties; (3) every physical event has in its causal history only physical events and physical properties. Since these principles seem to be inconsistent, solutions have focused on rejecting one or more of them. But I argue that, in spite of appearances, (1)–(3) are not inconsistent. The reason is that 'properties' is used in different (...)
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  49. Thomas Kroedel (2008). Mental Causation as Multiple Causation. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):125-143.score: 18.0
    The paper argues that mental causation can be explained from the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation together with relatively weak assumptions about the metaphysics of mind. If a physical event counterfactually depends on an earlier physical event, it also counterfactually depends on, and hence is caused by, a mental event that correlates with (or supervenes on) this earlier physical event, provided that this correlation (or supervenience) is sufficiently modally robust. This account of mental causation is consistent (...)
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