Search results for 'Academia.edu' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Galen Strawson (2013). Https://Www.Academia.Edu/.
     
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  2. Markku Roinila, Social Media for a Philosopher. New Apps Blog.
    In this brief review I discuss various social media used by philosophers, such as Academia.edu, PhilPapers, blogs and email-lists. Strenghts and weaknesses of different medias are evaluated.
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  3.  27
    John Corcoran (2014). Corcoran Reviews Boute’s 2013 Paper “How to Calculate Proofs”. MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS 14:444-555.
    Corcoran reviews Boute’s 2013 paper “How to calculate proofs”. -/- There are tricky aspects to classifying occurrences of variables: is an occurrence of ‘x’ free as in ‘x + 1’, is it bound as in ‘{x: x = 1}’, or is it orthographic as in ‘extra’? The trickiness is compounded failure to employ conventions to separate use of expressions from their mention. The variable occurrence is free in the term ‘x + 1’ but it is orthographic in that term’s quotes (...)
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  4.  48
    John Corcoran (2008). Iffication, Preiffication, Qualiffication, Reiffication, and Deiffication. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14 (4):435-6.
    Iffication, Preiffication, Qualiffication, Reiffication, and Deiffication. -/- Roughly, iffication is the speech-act in which—by appending a suitable if-clause—the speaker qualifies a previous statement. The clause following if is called the qualiffication. In many cases, the intention is to retract part of the previous statement—called the preiffication. I can retract part of “I will buy three” by appending “if I have money”. This initial study focuses on logical relations among propositional contents of speech-acts—not their full conversational implicatures, which will be treated (...)
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  5.  45
    John Corcoran (2005). Meanings of Word: Type-Occurrence-Token. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (1):117.
    Corcoran, John. 2005. Meanings of word: type-occurrence-token. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11(2005) 117. -/- Once we are aware of the various senses of ‘word’, we realize that self-referential statements use ambiguous sentences. If a statement is made using the sentence ‘this is a pronoun’, is the speaker referring to an interpreted string, a string-type, a string-occurrence, a string-token, or what? The listeners can wonder “this what?”. -/- John Corcoran, Meanings of word: type-occurrence-token Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150 E-mail: (...)
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  6.  25
    John Corcoran & Joaquin Miller (2012). Lies, Half-Truths, and Falsehoods About Tarski’s 1933 “Liar” Antinomies. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18 (1):140-141.
    We discuss misinformation about “the liar antinomy” with special reference to Tarski’s 1933 truth-definition paper [1]. Lies are speech-acts, not merely sentences or propositions. Roughly, lies are statements of propositions not believed by their speakers. Speakers who state their false beliefs are often not lying. And speakers who state true propositions that they don’t believe are often lying—regardless of whether the non-belief is disbelief. Persons who state propositions on which they have no opinion are lying as much as those who (...)
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  7.  13
    John Corcoran & Sriram Nambiar (2014). Conversely: Extrapropositional and Prosentential. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 20:404-5.
    This self-contained lecture examines uses and misuses of the adverb conversely with special attention to logic and logic-related fields. Sometimes adding conversely after a conjunction such as and signals redundantly that a converse of what preceded will follow. -/- (1) Tarski read Church and, conversely, Church read Tarski. -/- In such cases, conversely serves as an extrapropositional constituent of the sentence in which it occurs: deleting conversely doesn’t change the proposition expressed. Nevertheless it does introduce new implicatures: a speaker would (...)
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  8.  16
    John Corcoran (1999). Critical thinking and pedagogical license. Manuscrito XXII, 109–116. Persian translation by Hassan Masoud. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 22 (2):109-116.
    CRITICAL THINKING AND PEDAGOGICAL LICENSE https://www.academia.edu/9273154/CRITICAL_THINKING_AND_PEDAGOGICAL_LICENSE JOHN CORCORAN.1999. Critical thinking and pedagogical license. Manuscrito XXII, 109–116. Persian translation by Hassan Masoud. Please post your suggestions for corrections and alternative translations. -/- Critical thinking involves deliberate application of tests and standards to beliefs per se and to methods used to arrive at beliefs. Pedagogical license is authorization accorded to teachers permitting them to use otherwise illicit means in order to achieve pedagogical goals. Pedagogical license is thus analogous (...)
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  9.  28
    John Corcoran & Anthony Ramnauth (2013). Equality and Identity. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19:255-256.
    Equality and identity. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. 19 (2013) 255-6. (Coauthor: Anthony Ramnauth) Also see https://www.academia.edu/s/a6bf02aaab This article uses ‘equals’ [‘is equal to’] and ‘is’ [‘is identical to’, ‘is one and the same as’] as they are used in ordinary exact English. In a logically perfect language the oxymoron ‘the numbers 3 and 2+1 are the same number’ could not be said. Likewise, ‘the number 3 and the number 2+1 are one number’ is just as bad from a (...) point of view. In normal English these two sentences are idiomatically taken to express the true proposition that ‘the number 3 is the number 2+1’. Another idiomatic convention that interferes with clarity about equality and identity occurs in discussion of numbers: it is usual to write ‘3 equals 2+1’ when “3 is 2+1” is meant. When ‘3 equals 2+1’ is written there is a suggestion that 3 is not exactly the same number as 2+1 but that they merely have the same value. This becomes clear when we say that two of the sides of a triangle are equal if the two angles they subtend are equal or have the same measure. -/- Acknowledgements: Robert Barnes, Mark Brown, Jack Foran, Ivor Grattan-Guinness, Forest Hansen, David Hitchcock, Spaulding Hoffman, Calvin Jongsma, Justin Legault, Joaquin Miller, Tania Miller, and Wyman Park. -/- ► JOHN CORCORAN AND ANTHONY RAMNAUTH, Equality and identity. Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150, USA E-mail: corcoran@buffalo.edu The two halves of one line are equal but not identical [one and the same]. Otherwise the line would have only one half! Every line equals infinitely many other lines, but no line is [identical to] any other line—taking ‘identical’ strictly here and below. Knowing that two lines equaling a third are equal is useful; the condition “two lines equaling a third” often holds. In fact any two sides of an equilateral triangle is equal to the remaining side! But could knowing that two lines being [identical to] a third are identical be useful? The antecedent condition “two things identical to a third” never holds, nor does the consequent condition “two things being identical”. If two things were identical to a third, they would be the third and thus not be two things but only one. The plural predicate ‘are equal’ as in ‘All diameters of a given circle are equal’ is useful and natural. ‘Are identical’ as in ‘All centers of a given circle are identical’ is awkward or worse; it suggests that a circle has multiple centers. Substituting equals for equals [replacing one of two equals by the other] makes sense. Substituting identicals for identicals is empty—a thing is identical only to itself; substituting one thing for itself leaves that thing alone, does nothing. There are as many types of equality as magnitudes: angles, lines, planes, solids, times, etc. Each admits unit magnitudes. And each such equality analyzes as identity of magnitude: two lines are equal [in length] if the one’s length is identical to the other’s. Tarski [1] hardly mentioned equality-identity distinctions (pp. 54-63). His discussion begins: -/- Among the logical concepts […], the concept of IDENTITY or EQUALITY […] has the greatest importance. -/- Not until page 62 is there an equality-identity distinction. His only “notion of equality”, if such it is, is geometrical congruence—having the same size and shape—an equivalence relation not admitting any unit. Does anyone but Tarski ever say ‘this triangle is equal to that’ to mean that the first is congruent to that? What would motivate him to say such a thing? This lecture treats the history and philosophy of equality-identity distinctions. [1] ALFRED TARSKI, Introduction to Logic, Dover, New York, 1995. [This is expanded from the printed abstract.] . (shrink)
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  10.  29
    John Corcoran (2006). George Boole. In Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2nd edition. Macmillan
    2006. George Boole. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2nd edition. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA. -/- George Boole (1815-1864), whose name lives among modern computer-related sciences in Boolean Algebra, Boolean Logic, Boolean Operations, and the like, is one of the most celebrated logicians of all time. Ironically, his actual writings often go unread and his actual contributions to logic are virtually unknown—despite the fact that he was one of the clearest writers in the field. Working with various students including Susan Wood (...)
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  11.  14
    John Corcoran (2010). Counterarguments and Counterexamples. In Luis Vega (ed.), Luis Vega, Ed. Compendio de Lógica, Argumentación, y Retórica. Madrid: Trotta. 137-142.
    English translation of an entry on pages 137–42 of the Spanish-language dictionary of logic: Luis Vega, Ed. Compendio de Lógica, Argumentación, y Retórica. Madrid: Trotta. -/- DEDICATION: To my friend and collaborator Kevin Tracy. -/- This short essay—containing careful definitions of ‘counterargument’ and ‘counterexample’—is not an easy read but it is one you’ll be glad you struggled through. It contains some carefully chosen examples suitable for classroom discussion. -/- Using the word ‘counterexample’ instead of ‘counterargument’ in connection with Aristotle’s invalidity (...)
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  12.  28
    Galen Strawson (2013). On "Humean". In Https://Www.Academia.Edu/. 1–6.
    In metaphysics, the adjective ‘Humean’ is standardly used to describe positions that deny the existence of any necessary connection or causal influence in concrete reality. This usage has been significantly reinforced by David Lewis’s employment of ‘Humean’ in the phrase ‘Humean supervenience’. It is, however, most unclear that this usage is appropriate, and Lewis himself raised a doubt about it.
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  13.  9
    John Corcoran (2013). Aristotle’s “Whenever Three Terms”. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19:234-235.
    The premise-fact confusion in Aristotle’s PRIOR ANALYTICS. -/- The premise-fact fallacy is talking about premises when the facts are what matters or talking about facts when the premises are what matters. It is not useful to put too fine a point on this pencil. -/- In one form it is thinking that the truth-values of premises are relevant to what their consequences in fact are, or relevant to determining what their consequences are. Thus, e.g., someone commits the premise-fact fallacy if (...)
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  14.  1
    John Corcoran (1971). Discourse Grammars and the Structure of Mathematical Reasoning II: The Nature of a Correct Theory of Proof and Its Value. Journal of Structural Learning 3 (2):1-16.
    1971. Discourse Grammars and the Structure of Mathematical Reasoning II: The Nature of a Correct Theory of Proof and Its Value, Journal of Structural Learning 3, #2, 1–16. REPRINTED 1976. Structural Learning II Issues and Approaches, ed. J. Scandura, Gordon & Breach Science Publishers, New York, MR56#15263. -/- This is the second of a series of three articles dealing with application of linguistics and logic to the study of mathematical reasoning, especially in the setting of a concern for improvement of (...)
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  15.  7
    Larissa Aldridge (2012). From Vice to Virtue: Curiosity and Work in Early Modern England. [REVIEW] Metascience 21 (3):677-678.
    From vice to virtue: Curiosity and work in early modern England Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9624-3 Authors Larissa Aldridge, http://independent.academia.edu/LarissaAldridge Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  16. John Corcoran (1987). Review Of: Garciadiego, A., "Emergence Of...Paradoxes...Set Theory", Historia Mathematica (1985), in Mathematical Reviews 87j:01035. MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS 87 (J):01035.
    DEFINING OUR TERMS A “paradox" is an argumentation that appears to deduce a conclusion believed to be false from premises believed to be true. An “inconsistency proof for a theory" is an argumentation that actually deduces a negation of a theorem of the theory from premises that are all theorems of the theory. An “indirect proof of the negation of a hypothesis" is an argumentation that actually deduces a conclusion known to be false from the hypothesis alone or, more commonly, (...)
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  17. Corijn van Mazijk (forthcoming). Kant and Husserl on the Contents of Perception. Southern Journal of Philosophy.
  18.  58
    Fabio Scardigli (2014). Posters Presented at Horizons Workshop. Foundations of Physics 44 (8):891-904.
    A Quantum Effect in the Classical Limit: Non-equilibrium Tunneling in the Duffing OscillatorAlec Maassen van den BrinkRCAS, Academia Sinica, Taiwanemail: alec@gate.sinica.edu.twThe Duffing model is an oscillator with weak near-resonant driving, damping, and nonlinearity. For certain parameters, the stationary amplitude and phase bifurcate depending on initial conditions, and vary widely from one stable branch to the other. Due to this sensitivity, the system can be used for constructing detection devices.In recent years, an implementation using superconducting devices—the so-called Josephson bifurcation amplifier (JBA)—has (...)
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