101 found
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  1.  56
    Peter Achinstein (1983). The Nature of Explanation. Oxford University Press.
    Offering a new approach to scientific explanation, this book focuses initially on the explaining act itself.
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  2.  79
    Peter Achinstein (2001). The Book of Evidence. Oxford University Press.
    What is required for something to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this fascinating, elegantly written work, distinguished philosopher of science Peter Achinstein explores this question, rejecting typical philosophical and statistical theories of evidence. He claims these theories are much too weak to give scientists what they want--a good reason to believe--and, in some cases, they furnish concepts that mistakenly make all evidential claims a priori. Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, defines three of them by reference to "potential" evidence, (...)
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  3.  12
    Peter Achinstein (1968). Concepts of Science. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press.
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  4. Peter Achinstein (2002). Is There a Valid Experimental Argument for Scientific Realism? Journal of Philosophy 99 (9):470-495.
  5.  93
    Peter Achinstein, Brian Barry, Clarendon Press Oxford, John Bigelow, Robert Pargetter, Cambridge Uni Cambridge, H. James Birx, Richard J. Blackwell, Univer Indiana & C. Blok (1991). L22000. 00. Mind 100:399.
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  6. Peter Achinstein (2010). What to Do If You Want to Defend a Theory You Cannot Prove: A Method of “Physical Speculation”. Journal of Philosophy 107 (1):35-56.
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  7. Peter Achinstein (1978). Concepts of Evidence. Mind 87 (345):22-45.
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  8. Paul Teller, Stefano Gattei, Kent W. Staley, Eric Winsberg, James Hawthorne, Branden Fitelson, Patrick Maher, Peter Achinstein & Mathias Frisch (2004). 10. Selection, Drift, and the “Forces” of Evolution Selection, Drift, and the “Forces” of Evolution (Pp. 550-570). Philosophy of Science 71 (4).
     
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  9. S. F. Barker & Peter Achinstein (1960). On the New Riddle of Induction. Philosophical Review 69 (4):511-522.
  10. Peter Achinstein (1995). Are Empirical Evidence Claims a Priori? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):447-473.
    An a priori thesis about evidence, defended by many, states that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim of the form ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e; all other considerations are a priori. By examining cases involving evidential flaws, I challange this claim and defend an empirical concept of evidence. In accordance with such a concept, whether, and the extent to which, e, (...)
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  11.  7
    Peter Achinstein (2013). Evidence and Method: Scientific Strategies of Isaac Newton and James Clerk Maxwell. OUP Usa.
    In this book, Peter Achinstein proposes and defends several objective concepts of evidence. He then explores the question of whether a scientific method, such as that represented in the four "Rules for the Study of Natural Philosophy" that Isaac Newton invoked in proving his law of gravity, can be employed in demonstrating how the proposed definitions of evidence are to be applied to real scientific cases.
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  12. Peter Achinstein (2000). Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence Are (and Ought to Be) Ignored by Scientists. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):192.
    There are two reasons, I claim, scientists do and should ignore standard philosophical theories of objective evidence: (1) Such theories propose concepts that are far too weak to give scientists what they want from evidence, viz., a good reason to believe a hypothesis; and (2) They provide concepts that make the evidential relationship a priori, whereas typically establishing an evidential claim requires empirical investigation.
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  13.  56
    Peter Achinstein (1974). The Identity of Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (4):257 - 275.
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  14. Peter Achinstein (1977). Function Statements. Philosophy of Science 44 (3):341-367.
    An examination of difficulties in three standard accounts of functions leads to the suggestion that sentences of the form "the function of x is to do y" are used to make a variety of different claims, all of which involve a means-end relationship and the idea of design, or use, or benefit. The analysis proposed enables us to see what is right and also wrong with accounts that analyze the meaning of function statements in terms of good consequences, goals, and (...)
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  15. Peter Achinstein (1994). Stronger Evidence. Philosophy of Science 61 (3):329-350.
    According to a standard account of evidence, one piece of information is stronger evidence for an hypothesis than is another iff the probability of the hypothesis on the one is greater than it is on the other. This condition, I argue, is neither necessary nor sufficient because various factors can strengthen the evidence for an hypothesis without increasing (and even decreasing) its probability. Contrary to what probabilists claim, I show that this obtains even if a probability function can take these (...)
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  16. Peter Achinstein (1992). Inference to the Best Explanation: Or, Who Won the Mill-Whewell Debate? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 23 (2):349-364.
  17.  59
    Peter Achinstein (2007). Atom's Empirical Eve: Methodological Disputes and How to Evaluate Them. Perspectives on Science 15 (3):359-390.
    : This paper examines the debate in the late 19th and early 20th centuries over the acceptability of atomic and molecular physics. It focuses on three prominent figures: Maxwell, who defended atomic physics, Ostwald, who initially rejected it but changed his mind as a result of experiments by Thomson and Perrin, and Duhem, who never accepted it. Each scientist defended the position he did in the light of strongly held methodological views concerning empirical evidence. The paper critically evaluates each of (...)
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  18.  93
    Peter Achinstein (1965). Theoretical Models. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (62):102-120.
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  19. Peter Achinstein (1963). Theoretical Terms and Partial Interpretation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 (54):89-105.
  20.  98
    Peter Achinstein (1962). The Circularity of a Self-Supporting Inductive Argument. Analysis 22 (6):138 - 141.
  21.  20
    Peter Achinstein (1991). Particles and Waves: Historical Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press.
    This volume brings together eleven essays by the distinguished philosopher of science, Peter Achinstein. The unifying theme is the nature of the philosophical problems surrounding the postulation of unobservable entities such as light waves, molecules, and electrons. How, if at all, is it possible to confirm scientific hypotheses about "unobservables"? Achinstein examines this question as it arose in actual scientific practice in three nineteenth-century episodes: the debate between particle and wave theorists of light, Maxwell's kinetic theory of gases, and J.J. (...)
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  22.  90
    Peter Achinstein (1964). Models, Analogies, and Theories. Philosophy of Science 31 (4):328-350.
    Recent accounts of scientific method suggest that a model, or analogy, for an axiomatized theory is another theory, or postulate set, with an identical calculus. The present paper examines five central theses underlying this position. In the light of examples from physical science it seems necessary to distinguish between models and analogies and to recognize the need for important revisions in the position under study, especially in claims involving an emphasis on logical structure and similarity in form between theory and (...)
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  23.  15
    P. Achinstein (ed.) (2005). Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories & Applications. The Johns Hopkins University Press.
    Peter Achinstein has gathered some prominent philosophers and historians of science for critical and lively discussions of both general questions about the ...
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  24. Peter Achinstein (ed.) (1983). The Concept of Evidence. Oxford University Press.
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  25.  26
    Peter Achinstein (1971). Law and Explanation: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science. London,Oxford University Press.
  26.  45
    Peter Achinstein (1964). On the Meaning of Scientific Terms. Journal of Philosophy 61 (17):497-509.
  27.  14
    Peter Achinstein (1969). Between Science and Philosophy. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 66 (11):355-360.
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  28. Peter Achinstein (2001). Subjective Views of Kuhn. Perspectives on Science 9 (4):423-432.
    : In response to a charge of subjectivism, Kuhn in his Postscript emphasizes the importance of "values" (accuracy, simplicity, explanatory power, etc) that are shared by scientists generally. However, Kuhn adds, these values are applied differently by different scientists. By employing a comparison with partially subjective views of Carnap on confirming evidence, this paper raises questions about Kuhn's position on values by considering ways it might be interpreted as subjective and ways it may not.
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  29. Peter Achinstein (2010). Evidence, Explanation, and Realism: Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press.
    The essays in this volume address three fundamental questions in the philosophy of science: What is required for some fact to be evidence for a scientific ...
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  30.  38
    Peter Achinstein (1987). Light Hypotheses. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 18 (3):293-337.
  31.  37
    Peter Achinstein (1984). The Pragmatic Character of Explanation. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:275 - 292.
    Theories of explanation are characterized as being either pragmatic or non-pragmatic, without a clear sense of what this is supposed to mean. The present paper offers a definition of a "pragmatic explanation-sentence", and in terms of this, of a "pragmatic theory of explanation". It is argued that van Fraassen's theory of explanation, despite claims to the contrary, is not genuinely pragmatic. By contrast, the author's own "illocutionary" theory is pragmatic. Attention is devoted particularly to sentences of the form "E is (...)
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  32.  67
    Peter Achinstein (1990). Hypotheses, Probability, and Waves. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1):73-102.
  33.  32
    Peter Achinstein (1987). Scientific Discovery and Maxwell's Kinetic Theory. Philosophy of Science 54 (3):409-434.
    By reference to Maxwell's kinetic theory, one feature of hypothetico-deductivism is defended. A scientist need make no inference to a hypothesis when he first proposes it. He may have no reason at all for thinking it is true. Yet it may be worth considering. In developing his kinetic theory there were central assumptions Maxwell made (for example, that molecules are spherical, that they exert contact forces, and that their motion is linear) that he had no reason to believe true. In (...)
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  34.  6
    Peter Achinstein (2010). Induction and Severe Testing. In Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science. Cambridge University Press 170.
  35.  37
    Peter Achinstein (1990). Light Problems: Reply to Chen. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 21 (4):677-684.
  36.  53
    Peter Achinstein (1963). Circularity and Induction. Analysis 23 (6):123 - 127.
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  37.  89
    Peter Achinstein (1997). On Evidence: A Reply to McGrew. Analysis 57 (1):81–83.
  38.  6
    Peter Achinstein (1973). Concepts of Science: A Philosophical Analysis. Philosophical Review 82 (1):110-114.
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  39. Deborah Mayo & Peter Achinstein (2000). Experiment and Conceptual Change-Evidence, Data Generation, and Scientific Practice: Toward a Reliabilist Philosophy of Experiment-Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence Are (and Ought to Be). Philosophy of Science 67 (3).
     
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  40.  4
    P. Achinstein (1997). On Evidence: A Reply to McGrew. Analysis 57 (1):81-83.
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  41.  12
    Peter Achinstein (1993). Explanation and "Old Evidence". Philosophica 51 (1):125-137.
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  42.  18
    Peter Achinstein (1975). Causation, Transparency, and Emphasis. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):1 - 23.
  43.  23
    Peter Achinstein (1965). The Problem of Theoretical Terms. American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (3):235-249.
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  44.  37
    Peter Achinstein (1977). What Is an Explanation? American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1):1 - 15.
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  45.  16
    Peter Achinstein (1990). The Only Game in Town. Philosophical Studies 58 (3):179 - 201.
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  46.  50
    Peter Achinstein (1994). Explanation V. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:156 - 164.
    Do predictions of novel facts provide stronger evidence for a theory than explanations of old ones? Sometimes yes, sometimes no. Which obtains has nothing to do with whether the evidence is predicted or explained, but only with the selection procedure used to generate the evidence. This is demonstrated by reference to a series of hypothetical drug cases and to Heinrich Hertz's 1883 cathode ray experiments.
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  47. Peter Achinstein (ed.) (2004). Science Rules: A Historical Introduction to Scientific Methods. Johns Hopkins University Press.
    Is there a universal set of rules for discovering and testing scientific hypotheses? Since the birth of modern science, philosophers, scientists, and other thinkers have wrestled with this fundamental question of scientific practice. Efforts to devise rigorous methods for obtaining scientific knowledge include the twenty-one rules Descartes proposed in his Rules for the Direction of the Mind and the four rules of reasoning that begin the third book of Newton's Principia , and continue today in debates over the very possibility (...)
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  48.  12
    Peter Achinstein (1992). Inference to the Best Explanation: Or, Who Won the Mill-Whewell Debate?: Peter Lipton (London: Routledge, 1991), X+ 194 Pp. ISBN 0-415-05886-4 Cloth£ 35.00. [REVIEW] Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 23 (2):349-364.
  49.  13
    Peter Achinstein (1989). Explanation and Acceptability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):467.
  50. P. Achinstein & R. Kagon (eds.) (1987). Kelvin's Baltimore Lectures and Modern Theoretical Physics. MIT Press.
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