Search results for 'Acting' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  66
    Susanne Mantel (2013). Acting for Reasons, Apt Action, and Knowledge. Synthese 190 (17):3865-3888.
    I argue for the view that there are important similarities between knowledge and acting for a normative reason. I interpret acting for a normative reason in terms of Sosa’s notion of an apt performance. Actions that are done for a normative reason are normatively apt actions. They are in accordance with a normative reason because of a competence to act in accordance with normative reasons. I argue that, if Sosa’s account of knowledge as apt belief is correct, this (...)
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  2.  44
    Errol Lord (2016). On The Intellectual Conditions for Responsibility: Acting for the Right Reasons, Conceptualization, and Credit. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).
    In this paper I'm interested in the prospects for the Right Reasons theory of creditworthiness. The Right Reasons theory says that what it is for an agent to be creditworthy for X-ing is for that agent to X for the right reasons. The paper has a negative goal and a positive goal. The negative goal is to show that a class of Right Reasons theories are doomed. These theories all have a Conceptualization Condition on acting for the right reasons. (...)
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  3.  47
    Maria Alvarez (forthcoming). Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality. Synthese:1-18.
    What kind of thing is a reason for action? What is it to act for a reason? And what is the connection between acting for a reason and rationality? There is controversy about the many issues raised by these questions. In this paper I shall answer the first question with a conception of practical reasons that I call ‘Factualism’, which says that all reasons are facts. I defend this conception against its main rival, Psychologism, which says that practical reasons (...)
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  4.  84
    Julie Tannenbaum (2002). Acting with Feeling From Duty. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):321-337.
    A central claim in Kantian ethics is that an agent is properly morally motivated just in case she acts from duty alone. Bernard Williams, Michael Stocker, and Justin Oakley claim that certain emotionally infused actions, such as lending a compassionate helping hand, can only be done from compassion and not from duty. I argue that these critics have overlooked a distinction between an action's manner, how an action is done, and its motive, the agent's reason for acting. Through a (...)
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  5.  49
    John Michael McGuire (2012). Side-Effect Actions, Acting for a Reason, and Acting Intentionally. Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):317 - 333.
    What is the relation between acting intentionally and acting for a reason? While this question has generated a considerable amount of debate in the philosophy of action, on one point there has been a virtual consensus: actions performed for a reason are necessarily intentional. Recently, this consensus has been challenged by Joshua Knobe and Sean Kelly, who argue against it on the basis of empirical evidence concerning the ways in which ordinary speakers of the English language describe and (...)
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  6.  17
    Peter Singer (2009). The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to Stop World Poverty. Random House.
    Acting Now to End World Poverty Peter Singer. were our own, and we cannot deny that the suffering and death are bad. The second premise is also very difficult to reject, because it leaves us some wiggle room when it comes to situations in.
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  7.  23
    Maureen Sie (2015). Moral Hypocrisy and Acting for Reasons: How Moralizing Can Invite Self-Deception. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):223-235.
    According to some, contemporary social psychology is aptly described as a study in moral hypocrisy. In this paper we argue that this is unfortunate when understood as establishing that we only care about appearing to act morally, not about true moral action. A philosophically more interesting interpretation of the “moral hypocrisy”-findings understands it to establish that we care so much about morality that it might lead to self-deception about the moral nature of our motives and/or misperceptions regarding what we should (...)
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  8. Michael G. Robinson (1991). Acting Women the Performing Self in the Late Nineteenth Centuryinaugural Lecture, 4 December 1991. Loughborough University of Technology.
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  9. Joshua Knobe, Adam Cohen & Alan Leslie (2006). Acting Intentionally and the Side-Effect Effect: 'Theory of Mind' and Moral Judgment. Psychological Science 17:421-427.
    The concept of acting intentionally is an important nexus where ‘theory of mind’ and moral judgment meet. Preschool children’s judgments of intentional action show a valence-driven asymmetry. Children say that a foreseen but disavowed side-effect is brought about 'on purpose' when the side-effect itself is morally bad but not when it is morally good. This is the first demonstration in preschoolers that moral judgment influences judgments of ‘on-purpose’ (as opposed to purpose influencing moral judgment). Judgments of intentional action are (...)
     
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  10.  8
    John Pollock (2006). Thinking About Acting: Logical Foundations for Rational Decision Making. Oxford University Press, Usa.
    Pollock argues that theories of ideal rationality are largely irrelevant to the decision making of real agents. Thinking about Acting aims to provide a theory of "real rationality.".
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  11.  45
    Luca Ferrero, Intending, Acting, and Doing.
    I argue that intending and acting belong to the same genus: intending is a kind of doing continuous in structure with intentional acting. Future-directed intending is not a truly separate phenomenon from either the intending in action or the acting itself. Ultimately, all intentions are in action, or better still, in extended courses of action. I show how the intuitive distinction between intending and acting is based on modeling the two phenomena on the extreme and limiting (...)
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  12. Christine Korsgaard (2005). Acting for a Reason. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 40.
    The use of the English word “reason” in all of these contexts, and the way we translate equivalent terms from other languages, suggests a connection, but what exactly is it? Aristotle and Kant’s conception of what practical reasons are, I believe, can help us to answer this question, by bringing out what is distinctive, and distinctively active, about acting for a reason. That, at least, is what I am going to argue.
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  13.  10
    Susanne Mantel (forthcoming). Three Cheers for Dispositions: A Dispositional Approach to Acting for a Normative Reason. Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Agents sometimes act for normative reasons—for reasons that objectively favor their actions. Jill, for instance, calls a doctor for the normative reason that Kate is injured. In this article I explore a dispositional approach to acting for a normative reason. I argue for the need of epistemic, motivational, and executional dispositional elements of a theory of acting for a normative reason. Dispositions play a mediating role between, on the one hand, the normative reason and its normative force, and (...)
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  14. Barbara Herman (1981). On the Value of Acting From the Motive of Duty. Philosophical Review 90 (3):359-382.
    Richard Henson attempts to take the sting out of this view of Kant on moral worth by arguing (i) that attending to the phenomenon of the overdetermination of actions leads one to see that Kant might have had two distinct views of moral worth, only one of which requires the absence of cooperating inclinations, and (ii) that when Kant insists that there is moral worth only when an action is done from the motive of duty alone, he need not also (...)
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  15. Marcia Baron (1984). The Alleged Moral Repugnance of Acting From Duty. Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):197-220.
    Friends as well as foes of Kant have long been uneasy over his emphasis on duty, but lately the view that there is something morally repugnant about acting from duty seems to be gaining in popularity. More and more philosophers indicate their readiness to jettison duty and the moral 'ought' and to conceive of the perfectly moral person as someone who has all the right desires and acts accordingly without any notion that (s)he ought to act in this way. (...)
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  16.  72
    Andras Szigeti (2015). Michael E. Bratman: Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1101-1104.
    If you have ever had to move house, you will know this: the worst part is the sofa. You cannot do it alone. Nor will it be enough for me to just lift one end waiting for you to lift the other. We will have to work together to get the job done. If spaces are tight, we will even have to find a practical solution to a tantalizing mathematical puzzle: the moving sofa problem.Joint actions like that are part and (...)
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  17.  99
    Benjamin Mossel (2005). Action, Control and Sensations of Acting. Philosophical Studies 124 (2):129-180.
    Sensations of acting and control have been neglected in theory of action. I argue that they form the core of action and are integral and indispensible parts of our actions, participating as they do in feedback loops consisting of our intentions in acting, the bodily movements required for acting and the sensations of acting. These feedback loops underlie all activities in which we engage when we act and generate our control over our movements.The events required for (...)
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  18.  74
    Holly M. Smith (2014). The Subjective Moral Duty to Inform Oneself Before Acting. Ethics 125 (1):11-38.
    The requirement that moral theories be usable for making decisions runs afoul of the fact that decision makers often lack sufficient information about their options to derive any accurate prescriptions from the standard theories. Many theorists attempt to solve this problem by adopting subjective moral theories—ones that ground obligations on the agent’s beliefs about the features of her options, rather than on the options’ actual features. I argue that subjective deontological theories suffer a fatal flaw, since they cannot appropriately require (...)
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  19.  5
    Darlene Fozard Weaver (2011). The Acting Person and Christian Moral Life. Georgetown University Press.
    Persons and actions in Christian ethics -- Disruption of proper relation with God and others : sin and sins -- Intimacy with God and self-relation -- Fidelity to God and moral acting -- Truthfulness before God and naming moral actions -- Reconciliation in God and Christian life.
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  20.  8
    Michael E. Bratman (2015). Précis of Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):1-5.
    A précis of Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford University Press, 2014).
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  21.  31
    Susan Verducci (2000). A Moral Method? Thoughts on Cultivating Empathy Through Method Acting. Journal of Moral Education 29 (1):87-99.
    Notable educational theorists have begun to call for the cultivation of empathy in moral education. Currently, and almost exclusively, theorists advocate exploring the characters and worlds in literature and biography to nurture empathic capacities. This paper suggests that we can expand the conversation to include the dramatic art of acting. Using Nel Noddings ethic of Care, I contend that the type of empathy necessary for Caring holds certain skills and processes in common with the type of empathy Method actors (...)
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  22.  60
    Josep L. Prades (2007). Acting Without Reasons. Disputatio 2 (23):1 - 18.
    In this paper, I want to challenge some common assumptions in contemporary theories of practical rationality and intentional action. If I am right, the fact that our intentions can be rationalised is widely misunderstood. Normally, it is taken for granted that the role of rationalisations is to show the reasons that the agent had to make up her mind. I will argue against this. I do not object to the idea that acting intentionally is, at least normally, acting (...)
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  23.  84
    Christine James (2013). The Economic and Family Context of Philosophical Autobiography: Acting ‘As-If’ for American Buddenbrooks. Journal of Philosophy of Life 3 (1):24-42.
    This paper addresses the project of philosophical autobiography, using two different perspectives. On the one hand, the societal, economic, and family contexts of William James are addressed, and connected a modern academic context of business ethics research, marketing and purchasing decision making, and the continuing financial crisis. The concepts of “stream of consciousness” and “acting as-if” are connected to recent literature on William James. On the other hand, the significance of family context, and the possible connection between the William (...)
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  24. Raimo Tuomela & Maj Tuomela (2003). Acting as a Group Member and Collective Commitments. Protosociology 18:7-65.
    In this paper we will study two central social notions, acting as a group member and collective commitment. Our study of the first of these notions is -- as far as we know -- the first systematic work on the topic. Acting as a group member is a central notion that obviously must be understood when speaking of the "we-perspective", group life, and of social life more generally. Thus, not only philosophy of sociality, philosophy of social science, political (...)
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  25. Onora O'Neill (1975). Acting on Principle: An Essay on Kantian Ethics. Columbia University Press.
    'Two things', wrote Kant, 'fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe: the starry heavens above and the moral law within'. Many would argue that since Kant's day, the study of the starry heavens has advanced while ethics has stagnated, and in particular that Kant's ethics offers an empty formalism that tells us nothing about how we should live. In Acting on Principle Onora O'Neill shows that Kantian ethics has practical as well as philosophical importance. First (...)
     
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  26. A. Morton (2008). Review: John L. Pollock: Thinking About Acting: Logical Foundations for Rational Decision Making. [REVIEW] Mind 117 (467):716-719.
    a review of John Pollock's *Thinking about Acting* with a focus on his aim of describing psychological mechanisms which are humanly feasible.
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  27.  34
    Dorothée Legrand (2007). Naturalizing the Acting Self: Subjective Vs. Anonymous Agency. Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):457 – 478.
    This paper considers critically the enterprise of naturalizing the subjective experience of acting intentionally. I specifically expose the limits of the model that conceives of agency as composed of two stages. The first stage consists in experiencing an anonymous intention without being conscious of it as anybody's in particular. The second stage disambiguates this anonymous experience thanks to a mechanism of identification and attribution answering the question: "who is intending to act?" On the basis of phenomenological, clinical, methodological and (...)
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  28. Margaret P. Gilbert, Acting Together, Joint Commitment, and Obligation.
    What is it to do something with another person? In the author's book On Social Facts and elsewhere, she has conjectured that a special type of commitment - joint commitment - lies at the root of acting together and many other central social phenomena. Here she surveys some data pertinent to this conjecture, including the assumption of those who act together that they have associated rights against and obligations towards each other. She explains what joint commitment is, how it (...)
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  29.  48
    Joshua Knobe (2007). Acting Intentionally and Acting for a Reason. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):119-122.
    In earlier work, I relied on a commonly-held view about the relationship between the concept of acting intentionally and the concept of performing a behavior in order to achieve a goal. Eric Wiland responds that it was actually a mistake to rely on this view and that the relationship between these concepts is far more complex than was previously thought. I now think that Wiland may be right to reject my earlier approach, and I therefore provide additional empirical support (...)
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  30.  75
    Diane Jeske (1998). A Defense of Acting From Duty. Journal of Value Inquiry 32 (1):61–74.
    Philosophers who, in the light of these attacks, have attempted to vindicate the motive of duty have done so in a half-hearted way, by stressing the motive of duty’s function as a secondary or limiting motivation, or by denying “that acting from duty primarily concerns isolated actions.” I will defend duty as a primary motive with respect to isolated actions. Critics of acting from duty and philosophers who have attempted to respond to them have done little work spelling (...)
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  31.  48
    Timothy Schroeder (2010). Desire and Pleasure in John Pollock's Thinking About Acting. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 148 (3):447–454.
    The first third of John Pollock’s Thinking about Acting is on the topics of pleasure, desire, and preference, and these topics are the ones on which this paper focuses. I review Pollock’s position and argue that it has at least one substantial strength (it elegantly demonstrates that desires must be more fundamental than preferences, and embraces this conclusion wholeheartedly) and at least one substantial weakness (it holds to a form of psychological hedonism without convincingly answering the philosophical or empirical (...)
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  32.  37
    Jens Timmermann (2009). Acting From Duty: Inclination, Reason and Moral Worth. In Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press
    Section I of Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is meant to lead us from our everyday conception of morality to the supreme principle of all moral action, officially christened the ‘categorical imperative’ some twenty Academy pages further into the treatise. It is quite striking that in this first section Kant dispenses with the notorious technical language that pervades not just other parts of the Groundwork but also most of the remaining philosophical writings of the critical period. The mere (...)
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  33.  9
    Dan Corbett (2004). Excellence in Canada: Healthy Organizations – Achieve Results by Acting Responsibly. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 55 (2):125 - 133.
    There is much public focus in North America today on issues of corporate governance and ethics due mainly to the malpractice of several high profile corporate leaders and the negative impact of this on their corporation''s stakeholders, employees and communities. This has caused a crisis of trust in the public and lead to much discussion on ways to prevent such unethical behavior by adopting new approaches through legislation and the structure of corporations. This article is not about introducing a new (...)
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  34.  8
    Sean Capener (2015). Being and Acting: Agamben, Athanasius and The Trinitarian Economy. Heythrop Journal 57 (5).
    In The Kingdom and the Glory, Giorgio Agamben traces a genealogy of the concept of ‘economy’ through the development of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.1 While the more detailed metaphysics of the Trinity—the distinctions between ‘being,’ ‘nature,’ ‘essence,’ and ‘persons’ that drove the debates at Nicea and Chalcedon—were still in the process of development, Agamben argues that the concept of economy formed a kind of ‘placeholder’ for these concepts, holding together the mystery of the Trinity with the seeming ambivalence (...)
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  35.  6
    Arindam Chakrabarti (2016). Introduction: On Playing Roles and Acting Exemplary. Philosophy East and West 66 (1):1-4.
    It is not a semantic accident that four key notions of social ethics are also key concepts of theater. These are the concepts of character, playing a part/role, performance, and acting. Of course, one could object that there is a touch of pun in this claim: A character in a drama is not quite the same as good or bad character in a virtue ethics; acting in theater is mere play-acting, whereas acting in social and personal (...)
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  36.  47
    Susan Leigh Anderson (1995). Being Morally Responsible for an Action Versus Acting Responsibly or Irresponsibly. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:451-462.
    In her article “Asymmetrical Freedom,” and more recently in her book Freedom Within Reason, Susan Wolf claims to have given us a new theory to account for when we can be held morally responsible for our actions. I believe that she has confused “being morally responsible for an action” with “acting responsibly or irresponsibly.” I will argue that Wolf has given us a nice analysis of the latter concepts, but not of the former one as she intended. I do (...)
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  37.  13
    Grzegorz Holub (2008). Being a Person and Acting as a Person. Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 13 (2):267-282.
    The article is primarily concerned with the ambiguities which surround the concept of the person. According to the philosophical tradition taking its roots from Locke’s definition, personhood depends on consciousness. Therefore, ‘personhood’ can be ascribed to different entities, and only these entities acquire a moral standing. This can entail that a human being may or may not be considered as a person, as well as higher animals and even artificial machines. Everything depends on manifest personal characteristics. In order to sort (...)
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  38.  19
    Andrew James McAninch (2015). Acting for a Reason and Following a Principle. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3):649-661.
    According to an influential view of practical reason and rational agency, a person acts for a reason only if she recognizes some consideration to be a reason, where this recognition motivates her to act. I call this requirement the guidance condition on acting for a reason. Despite its intuitive appeal, the guidance condition appears to generate a vicious regress. At least one proponent of the guidance condition, Christine M. Korsgaard, is sensitive to this regress worry, and her appeal in (...)
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  39.  22
    Mick Smith (2006). Environmental Risks and Ethical Responsibilities: Arendt, Beck, and the Politics of Acting Into Nature. Environmental Ethics 28 (3):227-246.
    The question of environmental responsibility is addressed through comparisons between Hannah Arendt’s and Ulrich Beck’s accounts of the emergent and globally threatening risks associated with acting into nature. Both theorists have been extraordinarily influential in their respective fields but their insights, pointing toward the politicization of nature through human intervention, are rarely brought into conjunction. Important differences stem from Beck’s treatment of risks as systemic and unavoidable side effects of late modernity. Arendt, however, retains a more restrictive anthropogenic view (...)
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  40. Raimo Tuomela, Acting As a Group Member.
    Much of human life consists of acting in a group context. We are members of several social groups – small social groups, organizations, nations, states, etc. As to groups, some of them are capable of action, e.g. teams and task groups, organizations, and states. Such group action is action as a group (in contrast to the group members just acting separately and as private persons toward a shared goal, for instance). Groups can only act through their members’ actions. (...)
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  41.  41
    Harry J. Van Buren (1999). Acting More Generously Than the Law Requires: The Issue of Employee Layoffs in Halakhah. Journal of Business Ethics 19 (4):335-343.
    In this paper, the issue of plant closings is analyzed from the perspective of halakhah (the Written Law of Judaism). Two levels of analysis in halakhah must be differentiated: the legal (enforced by courts) and the moral (not enforced by law, but rather framed in terms of duty to God). There is no legal mandate to keep an unprofitable plant open, but there are a number of moral imprecations (particularly "acting more generously than the law requires") that might influence (...)
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  42.  1
    B. Porr (2016). “Truthful” Acting Emerges Through Forward Model Development. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):612-613.
    Open peer commentary on the article ““Black Box” Theatre: Second-Order Cybernetics and Naturalism in Rehearsal and Performance” by Tom Scholte. Upshot: My aim is to show that “truthful” acting that emerges through improvisation is equivalent to the development of mutual forward models in the actors. If these models match those of the audience members, this is perceived as “truthful.”.
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  43.  17
    Jann E. Schlimme (2013). Is Acting on Delusions Autonomous? Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 8 (1):14.
    In this paper the question of autonomy in delusional disorders is investigated using a phenomenological approach. I refer to the distinction between freedom of intentional action, and freedom of the will, and develop phenomenological descriptions of lived autonomy, taking into account the distinction between a pre-reflective and a reflective type. Drawing on a case report, I deliver finely-grained phenomenological descriptions of lived autonomy and experienced self-determination when acting on delusions. This analysis seeks to demonstrate that a person with delusions (...)
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  44.  7
    E. Bernard-Weil (1991). Is It Possible to Equilibrate the Different “Levels” of an Imbalanced Biological System by Acting Upon One of Them Only? Example of the Agonistic Antagonistic Networks. Acta Biotheoretica 39 (3-4):271-285.
    To answer the question in the title, we take as an example the model for the regulation of agonistic antagonistic couples (MRAAC). It is a model that associates 4 non-linear differential equations and allows to simulate balance, imbalance between two state variables, and control, if necessary, by two control variables of the same nature as the state variables: this control is defined as a bilateral strategy (bipolar therapy in the medical field). The super model for the regulation of agonism antagonistic (...)
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  45.  34
    Matthew J. Kisner (2009). Spinoza's Benevolence: The Rational Basis for Acting to the Benefit of Others. Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (4):pp. 549-567.
    This paper is concerned with Spinoza’s treatment of a problem in early modern moral philosophy: the potential conflict between the pursuit of happiness and virtue. The problem is that people are thought to attain happiness by pursuing their self-interest, whereas virtue requires them to act with benevolence, for the benefit of others. Given the inevitability that people will have different and often competing interests, how can they be both virtuous and happy and, where the two are in conflict, which should (...)
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  46.  6
    Steven Weimer (2016). Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (2):489-493.
    In Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together, Michael Bratman refines, systematizes, and defends his “planning theory” of shared agency, various elements of which were sketched in a series of earlier essays on the topic. The book is analytically rigorous and fairly technical at points, but organized and written with extraordinary clarity. It represents a valuable contribution to the literature on shared intention and joint activity, and is essential reading for philosophers working in that area.Bratman takes as his (...)
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  47.  18
    Steven J. Jensen (2010). Getting Inside the Acting Person. International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):461-471.
    John Finnis claims that in order to judge actions we must approach them from the perspective of the acting person, so that the moral evaluation of actions appears to become private. This paper examines Elizabeth Anscombe’s claim that interior intentions can be discovered through exterior actions. Because deliberation is shaped by the causal features of the world, these causal structures can, when viewed from the outside, serve as a window into the private life of the mind. Therefore, we can (...)
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  48.  28
    Laurence Kaufmann (2005). Self-in-a-Vat: On John Searle's Ontology of Reasons for Acting. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (4):447-479.
    John Searle has recently developed a theory of reasons for acting that intends to rescue the freedom of the will, endangered by causal determinism, whether physical or psychological. To achieve this purpose, Searle postulates a series of "gaps" that are supposed toendowthe self with free will. Reviewing key steps in Searle's argument, this article shows that such an undertaking cannot be successfully completed because of its solipsist premises. The author argues that reasons for acting do not have a (...)
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  49.  4
    E. Galgut (2011). Acting on Phantasy and Acting on Desire. South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):132-142.
    According to Davidson, an agent S acts for a reason if S has a pro-attitude towards actions of a certain kind, and if S believes that her action is of that kind. Reasons not only explain actions, but they also justify them. Given this account of rational action, how do we explain what happens when an agent acts irrationally? Psychoanalysis seems to explain irrational behaviour by extending the domain of rational explanation into the unconscious, and Davidson himself admits that many (...)
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  50.  18
    Thomas Berker (2011). Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes and Yannick Barthe, Acting in an Uncertain World: An Essay on Technical Democracy. Minerva 49 (4):509-511.
    Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes and Yannick Barthe, Acting in an Uncertain World: An Essay on Technical Democracy Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 509-511 DOI 10.1007/s11024-011-9186-y Authors Thomas Berker, Department of Interdisciplinary Studies of Culture, Centre for Technology and Society, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 7491 Trondheim, Norway Journal Minerva Online ISSN 1573-1871 Print ISSN 0026-4695 Journal Volume Volume 49 Journal Issue Volume 49, Number 4.
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